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Organised Crime and the State in Spain
Abstract
This thesis seeks to explore the reasons why a particular form o f ‘organised crime’, 
namely illicit enterprise, exists and flourishes in Spain. In explaining this phenomenon thus 
far, journalists, academics and police (and other) officials tend to point to the fact that the 
country possesses a number o f characteristics, or a set o f competitive advantages, that 
make Spain simply ideal for this kind o f criminal activity. Predominantly, these include 
factors such as the location and geography o f Spain, the nature o f Spain’s industry and 
economy and the presence o f immigrant communities. These factors will be explored in 
the thesis and their usefulness as explanatory factors o f illicit enterprise will be assessed.
The thesis will argue that, although the conventional explanations often used to account for 
this phenomenon have some validity, they are essentially too superficial, and thus 
insufficient, to provide a comprehensive understanding. Stimulated by the wider literature 
on organised crime, the thesis therefore hypothesises that other key explanations relating to 
certain weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the political, judicial, legal, and law enforcement 
spheres, which are open to exploitation by criminal groups, are essential in understanding 
Spain’s particular susceptibility to illicit enterprise. The hypothesis will be tested by 
exploring and analysing factors such as corruption and a lack o f transparency and 
accountability in the political, and other, realms; a lack o f political and public attention 
given to the problem o f illicit enterprise; some legal and judicial deficiencies; and some 
apparent complexities surrounding law enforcement and policing structures. The thesis 
contends that the essential explanation for Spain’s particular susceptibility to illicit 
enterprise lies in these vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 1
Organised Crime and the State in Spain: An Introduction
This thesis seeks to  explain  w h y ‘organ ised  crime* (or rather, a  particu lar fo rm  o f  
‘organ ised  crim e’, nam ely ‘illic it enterprise*) ex ists and flourishes in  Spain . T he thesis 
argues that, although the conventional explanations o ften  used to account fo r this 
phenom enon have som e valid ity , they are essentially too  superfic ia l, and  thus insuffic ien t, 
to  provide a  com prehensive understanding. T hus, if  w e  are to  fully understand  the factors 
th at facilitate illic it enterprise in  Spain , w e m ust look  beyond the standard  exp lanations and  
exam ine th e in trinsic w eaknesses and vulnerab ilities o f  the po litical, jud ic ia l, legal, and  law  
enforcem ent spheres, w h ich  are explo ited by crim inal groups. T h e  thesis contends that the 
key explanation for Spain’s particular susceptib ility to illicit enterprise lies in these 
vulnerabilities.
T he purpose o f  this in troductory chapter, then , is to consider som e prelim inary 
issues and  provide a  background and context to  the research  pro ject undertaken . In itially, 
the chapter w ill set out the justification fo r the thesis and  explain w h y  the top ic chosen is, 
indeed, one w orth  researching, before d iscussing the ob jectives o f  the research  and 
in troducing the hypothesis th at w ill b e  tested  in  la ter chapters. Subsequently , som e issues 
re lating  to  m ethodology, research design and  data co llection w ill b e  considered  in som e 
detail and , finally, the structure o f  the thesis w ill be outlined.
Background and justification for the thesis 
Why organised crime?
For a  long tim e, organ ised  crim e has been regarded  as a  m ajo r th reat to  societies, 
econom ies and  political system s all over the w orld  because, b y its very nature , it prom otes 
v io lence and in tim idation , challenges basic norm s and  values, d isto rts civil society and 
perverts legal system s, financial institutions and  leg itim ate businesses. A dd itionally , 
through the corruption o f  public officials and political system s, it  can  potentially threaten  
dem ocratic values, state contro l and national stab ility , ^/toreover, as societies, econom ies 
and  politics have evo lved , a long  w ith  the increasing ease and  speed in  travel and 
te lecom m unications; the grow th  in  technology, in t e r n a t io n a l  trade and  g lobal financial 
netw orks, and  the change in socio-political env ironm ents, so  too has organ ised  crim e1. 
O ver the last few  decades, organised crim e has taken on new  characteristics, crossed
i See, for example Phil WilUams and Ernesto U. Savona (eds.), The United Notions and Transnational O mmhtd  
Crime, London and Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996.
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intemational borders and become an increasingly transnational and global phenomenon.
As such, organised crime is perceived as a growing security threat and is therefore, 
arguably, an important topic to research. Certainly, from a policy perspective, i f  those 
engaged in controlling and fighting ‘organised crime’ are to have any real success, and if  
resources are to be allocated appropriately and efficiently, there is a need to understand 
exactly what it is, what it entails and why it occurs. Academic research can play a role in 
developing this understanding.
Why Spain?
A lthough there exists a  rap id ly grow ing body o f  literature d iscussing  the
phenomenon o f  organised crime, both generally, and more specifically in relation to
particular ‘mafias’ and/or in relation to the problem and existence o f organised crime in
certain states, there is a distinct lack o f literature and empirical work in English language
publications on the phenomenon as it exists Spain. Currently, the English language
literature on organised crime in Spain largely comprises o f  a few specific chapters in edited
books2, brief mentions in general books on either Spain or organised crime3, and a number
o f short media reports published in newspapers such as The G uardian. The situation,
academically, seems little better in Spain. Indeed, although there are a few journalistic
publications4, as Gomea-Cespedes and Stangeland lament:
[ . . . ]  academ ic research in to  organised crim e is v irtually  non-ex isten t. [ . . . ]  
U nfortunately, w e have found no m ore than tw o em pirical studies ab o u t organ ised  
crim e in  Spain.5
Furtherm ore, they stress that:
[ . . . ]  there is a  v ita l need for em pirical research in to  th e ex ten t o f  serious and  
organ ised  crim e in  the country [ . .  .].6
2 Predominantly, Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes and Per Stangeland, ‘Spain: The Flourishing Illegal Drug Haven 
in Europe’ in Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control 
Policies in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrecht, Springer, 2004, pp. 387-412 and Cados Resa-Nestares, 
Transnational Organized Crime in Spain: Structural Factors Explaining its Penetration’ in Emilio G Viano 
(ed.), Global Organised Crime and International Security, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999, pp. 46-62.
3 See, for example, José M. Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics, London and New York, Roudedge, 2004 and 
Ernesto U. Savona, European M any Trails, Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.
4 See, for example, Luis Gómez, España Connection: La implacable expansion é l  crimen organizado en España, 
Barcelona, RBA libros SA, 2005 and Albert Castillón, Libro negro é  las mafias: Mafias internacionales y  blanqueo é  
dinero en España, 2nd ed., Córdoba, Arcopress SL, 2006.
5 See Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. dt., p. 395. The two studies to which they refer are: B. Mapelli 
Caffarena, M. González Cano and T. Aguado Correa, Estudios sobre élincuencia organizada. Meibos, instrumentos y  
estragefias é  la investigación polidal, Sevilla, Mergablum, 2001 and José Luis Diez Ripollés, Ana María Prieto del 
Pino, Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes, Per Stangeland and Diego José Vera Jurado (eds.), Prácticas ilidtas en la 
actividad urbanística: Un estudio é  la Costa é l  Sol, Valencia, Trrant lo Blanch and Instituto Andaluz 
interuniversitario de Criminología, 2004.
6 Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. dt., p. 409.
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In this sense, therefore, there is an important gap in the academic literature, which this 
thesis aims to play a part in filling.
Although Spain is not a country that we immediately associate with organised crime 
in any o f its forms or manifestations (rather, we usually think o f Italy, the USA, Russia or 
Colombia, for example), some preliminary research revealed that the criminal activities that 
we typically associate with ‘organised crime’, and the groups engaged in these activities, 
appear to be quite prolific in Spain. A brief mention o f a few statistics and examples here 
will serve to give us some idea o f the problem. For example, it was reported that, in 2003, 
Spanish police investigated 542 ‘organised crime’ groups, containing a total o f more than 
9,000 members7 *and, in 2004, Spanish police made 323 arrests in connection with 
‘organised crime’*. In 2005, there were, in total, 471 known ‘organised crime’ groups active 
in Spain, each o f which was made up o f at least three members and the majority o f them 
(174 groups) constituted between six and 12 members9 and, in 2006, there were 482 
‘organised crime’ groups detected in Spain, with an average membership o f 23.8 individuals 
per group10. In 2007 and 2008, 564 and 538 groups respectively were detected11, and the 
latest figures show that, in 2009, Spanish police investigated 616 groups in connection with 
activities related to ‘organised crime’12.
The last few years have also witnessed some headline-grabbing seizures and arrests 
in Spain that were related to ‘organised crime’. For example, Operation Ballena Blanca 
(Operation ‘White Whale1), that came to fruition in March 2005, was described at the time 
as the Spanish Interior Ministry’s “biggest investigation’13 (more than 50 people were 
arrested, suspected o f laundering millions o f euros for gangs involved in murder, drug 
trafficking, arms dealing and prostitution; more than 250 properties were also seized; and
7 See ‘Organised crime common in Barcelona and Madrid’, bamknareporter.com, 08/09/05, 
http://www.barcelonateporter.com/index.phpp/comments/organised crime common in barcelona and 
madrid/. [accessed 29/09/05], citing E l Pats.
• See Leslie Crawford, ‘Hot money pays for boom on Spain’s Costa del Crime’, Financial Times, 23/03/05.
9 España. Delincuencia Organizada / 2005, internal annual report on organised crime in Spain produced by the 
Spanish police forces (unpublished). I am grateful to members of the Spanish Judicial Police for allowing me 
access to this report, which is not generally publicly available.
10 See Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M . presentada a l inicio d el añ ojuá cia lpor e l 
F iscal G eneral d el Estada, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourín (2007) (Capítuk III, Volumen I), Madrid, 
2007, pp. 697-698,
http://www.fiscal.es/csblob/Vl CAP3.pdf?blobcol=uridata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkev=id 
&hlobtable=MungoBlobs&hlobwhete=1109248280982&sshinary=tme [accessed 07/09/08],
11 See Gobierno de España (Ministerio del Interior (MIR)), Comparencias lu é a  contra e l crimen organizado en 
España, Madrid, MIR, 02/11/10,
hite;//www.interioreob.es/DGRIS/Balances/Balance 2010/pdf/hal crimen organizado noviembre prese 
ntacion.pdf [accessed 30/04/11].
12 Ibid..
13 'Spain ‘‘cracks |300m money racket”’, BBC News, 13/03/05,
http;//www.bbc.couk/l /hi/world/europe/4344447.stm [accessed 14/03/05].
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bank deposits totalling some 62 million euros were frozen14). Another example was 
Operation Atnspa (Operation W asp1) (June 2005), which was described as ‘the largest swoop 
in history on organised crime in Europe’, as 28 so-called ‘mafia bosses’ from former Soviet 
republics were arrested for laundering money derived from illegal activities in their home 
countries, as well as bankruptcy fraud and having ties to ‘organised crime’15 16. Additionally, 
800 bank accounts were frozen, 42 luxury cars were confiscated, and 400,000 euros in cash, 
cheques, weapons, jewellery and property were seized14. Examples from 2006 include the 
arrest o f  around 100 people for their alleged involvement in an illegal prostitution ring 
involving Russian women working in Spain (in April), and the arrests o f 83 people, in June 
(66 o f them in Spain, throughout seven provinces), as part o f Operation Armagedon 
(Operation ‘Armageddon*), for their involvement in a criminal organisation dedicated to 
the counterfeiting o f credit cards and robberies on housing and industrial estates17. Indeed, 
many more examples could be given, and all this is thought to be just the ‘tip o f the 
iceberg’: the figures and examples discussed above, for example, merely involve the groups 
that the Spanish authorities claim to know about and have been investigating.
Moreover, the national composition o f  the criminal groups active in Spain is wide, 
varied and often mixed. O f the 471 groups that the Spanish police were investigating in 
2005, for example, 66 (14 per cent) were made up entirely o f Spaniards; 120 (25.5 per cent) 
were composed entirely o f foreigners; and 285 (60.5 per cent) o f the groups were mixed, 
that is to say that these groups were composed o f  both Spaniards and individuals 
originating from other countries1*. In Spain, therefore, although there are a number o f 
active indigenous Spanish groups and criminals, the ‘organised crime’ scene is very clearly 
transnational in nature. In fact, nationals o f as many as 99 different countries participated 
in the known 471 ‘organised crime’ groups in 200519. According to police data, these 
groups are mainly active along the Mediterranean coast, in the region o f Galicia and in 
Madrid, but no part o f the Spanish territory is totally free o f ‘organised’ criminal activity20.
The criminal activities undertaken by these groups are wide ranging, although drug 
trafficking appears to be one o f the most significant activities. Other activities include
14 See, for example, Ministerio del Interior (MIR) (Dirección General de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales), 
‘Balance contra la delincuencia organizada en 2005: Las FCSE detuvieron a 3.925 personas y desmantelaron 
290 grupos vinculados con el crimen organizado en 2005’, N ota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 13/02/06, 
http;//www-mir.e$/PGRIS/Notas Prensa/Ministerio Interior/2006/np021 W2htm [accessed 04/08/08]. 
This operation will be discussed in mote detail in Chapter 2.
15 See Dale Fuchs, ‘Police swoop on Spain’s costa crime kings’, The Guardian, 21/06/05, p. 10.
16 Ibid..
17 See, for example Agpncia EFE SA, ‘Grandes operaciones contra el crimen organizado en España (2000- 
2006). Sucesos Nacional’, EFEDATA database, accessed through http://pfedata.efe.ps/ [accessed 19/09/06]
18 España. Delincuencia Orvam?ada / 2005, ob. dt..
» Ibid..
20 Wd..
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arms and explosives trafficking, organised prostitution, illegal gambling, organised business 
robbery, vehicle theft and smuggling, people trafficking, counterfeiting and fraud, 
extortion, kidnapping, intellectual property crimes, the trafficking o f works o f art and 
jewellery and extensive money laundering21 (which, as we will see later in this thesis, also 
leads to ‘organised crime’ infiltrating legal industries such as construction and the 
tourist/hospitality sector). As we will also see later in this thesis, in addition to the illegal 
activities listed here, and in order to carry out and ensure the success o f their respective 
criminal activities, criminal groups in Spain also use violence and intimidation, and they 
corrupt politicians, law enforcement officers, judges, and so on. It is no wonder, then, that 
José Antonio Alonso, the former Spanish Interior Minister, has been quoted as saying that 
‘organised crime’ is ‘as big a threat to Spanish security as Islamist terrorism’22.
The objectives o f the research, the research question and the hypothesis
The purpose o f this thesis, then, is to make sense o f all this; to understand why 
criminal activities o f this nature, and the groups that engage in them, appear to thrive in 
Spain, a developed and democratic nation that has been a member o f the EU since 1986. 
Some logical questions thus arise: Why is Spain attractive to criminal groups? How and 
why are the groups active in Spain able to successfully carry out their businesses there?
The predominant research question underpinning this thesis then is: what is it about Spain 
that facilitates ‘organised crime’ or, more appropriately, its particular form o f ‘organised 
crime’: illicit enterprise?
For many people (journalists, academics, police, and other officials), these questions 
can be answered very easily: Spain has a number o f characteristics or competitive 
advantages that just make it simply ideal for ‘organised’ criminal activity. Predominandy, 
these include the location and/or geographical characteristics o f Spain itself, the nature o f 
Spain’s industry and economy, and the presence o f a  number o f immigrant communities in 
the country. The diesis will show that there is some merit to these arguments: the oft-cited 
factors mentioned above do facilitate criminal activities in Spain and they may also attract 
criminal groups to the country. However, it is the contention o f this thesis that these 
standard explanations appear too superficial to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
why illicit enterprise flourishes in Spain -  there must also be some other, rather more 
subde, dynamics at play. The thesis therefore hypothesises that other key explanations are 
essential in understanding Spain’s particular susceptibility to illicit enterprise and, further,
2* Ibid..
22 See Crawford, op. at., citingjosé Antonio Alonso, the former Spanish Interior Minister. Whether or not 
this is a widely held view amongst the Spanish authorities, however, will be addressed later in this thesis.
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that these explanations can be found in the intrinsic weaknesses and vulnerabilities o f the 
political, judicial, legal, and law enforcement spheres, which are open to exploitation by 
criminal groups. I f  this hypothesis can be supported, we will thus be able to explain and 
understand more fully why illicit enterprise affects, exists and flourishes in Spain, which will 
allow us to move away from the rather superficial and intellectually inadequate explanations 
which currendy seem to dominate. The originality o f this thesis, therefore, lies in providing 
important explanations which have, until now, not been addressed.
Methodology, research design and data collection
This section will outline the overall approach taken to the research conducted for 
this thesis and discuss and appraise the methods and sources used. In doing so, it will also 
present a detailed and sometimes personal account of how the research was carried out, 
which will serve to highlight some o f  the general, and also some o f the more specific, 
difficulties in conducting research on a topic o f this nature. Indeed, although any 
examination o f ‘organised crime’ can prove difficult methodologically, carrying out a study 
on what is, essentially, an illicit and secretive phenomenon occurring in a country outside 
o f  my own meant that I personally faced a number of interrelated difficulties during the 
research process (for example, in terms o f accessing data and being a foreigner and also, 
potentially, in relation to gender). Before discussing these, however, this section will begin 
by outlining the general approach taken in this thesis.
A case study approach
It would have been impossible to undertake in-depth research on illicit enterprise in 
every part o f  Spain (at least in any great detail). Therefore, the approach taken was to look 
at illicit enterprise in Spain as a whole in a general and broad sense, on the one hand, 
whilst, on the other, gain depth by adopting a case study approach to focus on three, very 
different, areas/regions o f Spain (Madrid, the Costa del Sol and Galicia). It is 
acknowledged that the case study method has been stereotyped as a “weak sibling among 
social science methods’23. For example, it is argued that, in contrast to experimental 
methods, case studies lack objectivity and rigour; that the researcher is at risk o f seeing only 
what he or she wishes to see, resulting in observer bias; and that findings in just one case 25
25 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and M ethods, 3-> edition, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage 
Publications Inc., 2003, p.xiil See also Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, Political Science Research 
M ethods, 3 edition, Washington, Congressional Quartedy Inc., 1995, p. 143 and pp. 146-147.
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can simply be due to chance24. However, in response, it could also be argued that the 
potential for bias is not limited to the case study method and bias can be reduced and 
regulated through the triangulation o f data, for example. Moreover, a case study approach 
provides a particularly appropriate research design for a study o f  this type. As Yin 
summarises:
In general, case studies are the preferred strategy [...] when the investigator has 
little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real-life context.25
And:
[...] when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated.26
Clearly, these are all relevant factors in this study. Furthermore, a case study approach 
permits the use o f  a number o f data collection methods27 and allows particular issues to be 
examined with colour and depth. Throughout the thesis, relevant issues relating to Spain 
as a whole will be included and discussed, but the bulk o f the evidence and many o f  the 
examples that will be presented relate to the regions o f  Madrid, Galicia and the Costa del 
Sol. This is because the examples extracted from these cases illustrate particularly well the 
major issues and themes discussed in this thesis.
The choice to use the cases o f  Madrid, Galicia and the Costa del Sol as a 
foundation for detailed research was based on the findings o f  some preliminary research, 
which revealed that these areas were amongst those most associated with the illicit 
enterprise affecting Spain. This fact was also confirmed in many o f  the interviews 
conducted during the fieldwork for this research and is further supported by a police report 
o f 2005 which, as noted above, identified that (although no part o f  Spain is totally free o f  
criminal activity) criminal groups are mainly active along the Mediterranean coast, in the 
region o f Galicia and in Madrid28. Other regions along the Mediterranean coast could have 
been studied as alternative or additional cases but they have not been chosen here because 
they possess characteristics that are similar to the Costa del Sol. For example, illicit 
enterprise and criminal groups are also known to flourish in the Levante region29, but this
24 See Hany Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’ in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. 
Polsby (eds.), Handbook o f  Political Science Volume 7: Stratèges o f  Inquiry, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, 1975, p. 124.
25 Yin, op. cit., p. 1.
26 Ibid., p. 7.
27 See, for example, Frances Heidensohn, ‘International comparative research in criminology’ in Roy D. King 
and Emma Wincup (eds.), Doing Research on Crime and Justice, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008, p. 209.
28 Espada. Delincuencia Organizada / 2005, op. cit..» Ibid..
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area, being situated on the Mediterranean coast and also attracting a large number o f  
tourists, is characteristically similar to the Costa del Sol.
The case study regions:
M adrid
The contents o f  the thesis relating to Madrid concern not just the city o f  Madrid, 
but also the Comunidad de Madrid (Community o f Madrid), which also constitutes one o f  
the 17 autonomous communities o f  Spain. This autonomous community contains only 
one province and thus the Community is conterminous with the province o f  Madrid30. 
Situated right in die centre o f  the Spanish mainland, the city o f Madrid is the capital o f  
Spain, the capital o f  the autonomous community, and the capital o f the province o f  
Madrid31.
Despite the fact that some o f  the professionals interviewed during die course o f  
this research claimed that criminal activity in Madrid was not as noticeable as in other 
regions (because criminal activity there is ‘diluted’32 and not so Visible’33), it would, 
nevertheless, appear that illicit enterprise and criminal activity in the Madrid region is 
particularly prevalent and widespread. In fact; according to police data, and in relation to 
the number o f  criminal groups active there, in 2005, the region o f  Madrid had the highest *41
50 See, for example, ‘Spain Features: Regions of Spain. Madrid: the autonomous community*, 
typicaifyspatiish.com, http://myw.typicallyspanish.com/news/publish/artide 13401.shtml [accessed 13/02/09],
41 See, for example, ibid..
M Interview P2.
M Interview PI.
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incidence o f ‘organised crime’ in the whole o f  the Spanish territory34. Despite the fact that 
the 162 groups identified by the police in that year appeared to reflect a decrease in the 
number o f  known groups active in this region, this data showed that; by some margin, 
there were still more criminal groups active in the province o f Madrid, at that time, than in 
any other region o f Spain35 36. Certainly, since the formulation o f the police figures discussed 
above, a high incidence o f criminal activity in Madrid seems to have prevailed, or at least 
may have become more noticeable. Indeed, relatively recently, following a spate o f  killings 
in the capital (which will be discussed in the next chapter), it was reported that Francisco 
Granados, the consejen de Presidencia, Justicia  e In terior (Presidency, Justice and Home Affairs 
councillor) in Madrid’s regional government, claimed that ‘organised crime has taken over 
Madrid’35, and Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, Spain’s Interior Minister, said that he had given 
instructions to Antonio Camacho, the Secretary o f  State for Security, to ensure that the 
police in Madrid place ‘organised crime’ at ‘the top o f their priorities’37.
It would appear that a wide variety o f  groups, originating from a range o f  different 
countries, are criminally active in Madrid and they engage in a whole host o f  different illicit 
enterprises there. In addition to some domestic Spanish groups and criminals38 (which 
include Gypsy gangs39), there are also a number o f  transnational groups and foreign 
criminals40. The interview and questionnaire sources, for example, often discussed the
38 España. Delincuenda Organizada / 2005, op. at.. Here, Spanish provinces are placed into categories in terms 
of ‘organised crime' activity. The categories are: high; medium/average; low, scarce/limited incidence; and 
irrelevant Madrid was placed at the top of the high’ category. The respondent of questionnaire QB also 
identified Madrid (along with the Costa del Sol) as being the region where organised crime was ‘most 
common’ in Spain. A similar point was also raised during interviews FI and PI 5.
35 España. Delincuencia Organizada / 2005, op. cit..
36 See, for example, EFE, ‘Granados: “El crimen organizado se ha adueñado de Madrid’”, epms.com,
14/01/09,
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/madrid/Granados/crimen/organizado/ha/aduenado/Madrid /rlp^pirspm-) 
d /20090114elpmad 1/Tes [accessed 19/01/09], quoting Francisco Granados, the consejero de Presidencia, 
Justicia » Interior (councillor of Presidency, Justice and Home Affairs) in Madrid’s regional gpvemment (my 
translation).
37 See, for example, ibid, and Agendas, *E1 crimen organizado, primera prioridad de la Policía en Madrid’, 
epds.com, 13/01/09,
h ttp: / / www.elpais.com/arhculo/eicana/crimen/organizado /primera/prioridad /Policía/Madrid /cipe pnrsp / 
20090113elpepunac. 11 11CS [accessed 19/01/09], quoting Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, Spain’s Interior Minister 
(my translation).
38 Interview P2 and questionnaire QD.
39 Observatoire G éopolitique d e s  D rogues (OGD), ‘Spain: Drug G ateway to  E urope’, The World Geopolitics o f  
Drugs 1998/1999 Annual Report: IV. Europe, April 2000, p. 94, httpl//www,opd.org/2000/en/ogd99 4en pdf 
[accessed 24/07/02].
40 There are also a number of rival gangs present in Madrid, which are often involved in violence and murder. 
The most notorious gangs of this kind, whose members are predominantly young people, indude the ‘Latin 
Kings’ and die ‘Netas’. Rather than constituting the type of criminal group with which this diesis is 
concerned, however, these gangs are, perhaps, more accurately described as street gangs. For a typical press 
report concerning the activities of these gangs see, for example, Maria Montes, ‘Los acusados de matar a un 
“latin niegan ser ñetas , E l Mundo: M 2,15/11/06, p. 7. On the “Latin Kings’ generally, see, for example 
Antonio Jiménez Barca, ‘“Yo soy un latin king””, E l Pat's: Domingo, 10/07/05, p. 11.
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presence o f South American and Eastern European groups41 in the region, and specific 
mention was made o f groups and criminals from Colombia42 *, Ecuador45, Poland44, 
Bulgaria45, the former Yugoslavia46, Romania47 and Albania-Kosovo48. Additionally, 
members o f groups originating from Turkey49, Morocco50, Algeria51 and China52 *appear to 
be active in Madrid and, recently, some criminals, linked to Italian mafia groups, have been 
arrested in the region55. However, although these foreign groups may live in Madrid and 
use the region as their base54, some claim that their activities are not limited to the capital 
and its surroundings, as they ‘move around’55 and also work outside o f the region.
The Costa del Sol
Situated in the south o f Spain, on the Mediterranean coast, the Costa del Sol 
(literally ‘Coast o f the Sun*) constitutes, approximately, a 161-kilometre stretch o f 
coastline56, extending roughly from Nerja (50 kilometres east o f the city o f Málaga) to 
Estepona or Manilva (85 kilometres and 97 kilometres respectively west o f  the city o f 
Málaga)57. The holiday resorts and municipalities that make up the Costa del Sol are 
located predominantly in the province o f Málaga, which is one o f the provinces that
41 Groups from Eastern Europe generally were mentioned in interviews PI, P2, J6 and P16.
42 Interviews PI, J l ,  P2 and P9.
45 Interviews P2 and P8.
44 Interviews P2 and J4.
45 Interviews P2 and P16.
44 Interviews J l ,  P2 and J6.
47 Interviews J1 ,J4 ,J6  and P16.
48 Interviews J4 and J6.
49 Interview PI and questionnaire QD. See also G Pérez, ‘Cae el “hiper” de la droga en La Cañada', La 
Raqín, 25/06/08, p. 44.
50 Questionnaire QD.
« Ibid..
52 Ibid..
M For example, in March 2002, Felice Bonetti, a leader of a Genovese Camorra clan, was arrested in Madrid. 
See 'El refugio de la Mafia en la costa mediterránea’, tlpds.com , 11/08/08,
http://www.elpais.com/flrticulo/espana/refiigio/Mafia/costa/mediterranea/elpepunac/20080811elpepinac 
9/Tes [accessed 11/08/08]. Also, in July 2006, police detained seven ‘members’ of the Neapolitan Camorra 
(five Italians and two French people) in Leganés. They were accused of sending cocaine from Spain to Italy. 
See Detenidos en Leganés siete miembros de la Camorra’, aDn (Madrid), 19/07/06, p. 4.
54 Interviews PI, P6 and J4. The professional interviewed in interview PI, for example, discussed how 
Colombian and Turkish groups, and so on, have their structures in Madrid, and the professional interviewed 
in interview P6 stated that foreign groups are based in Madrid, which was their ‘point of arrival’.
55 Interview C2. A similar point was also raised during interview J4.
56 Costa del Sol Tourist Board and Convention Bureau, *Population, size and climate’, 
http://www.visitcostadelsol.com/content/view/345/149/, [accessed 26/06/08]. Note, however, that other 
sources use the term to refer to a 300 kilometre stretch of coastline stretching from Gibraltar in the west to 
La Herradura in the east (see ‘Costa del Sol’, AbsoluttAxarquia.com,
htto ;//w w ,absolute axarauia.com/areas/costadelsol.htm1 [accessed 26/06/08]) or, for example, to a 
coastline of just over 150 kilometres (see ‘Costa del Sol -  Home’, andadda.com , 
http ;//w w ,andalucia.com/costa del sol/home.htm [accessed 26/0/6/08]).
57 Costa del Sol Tourist Board and Convention Bureau, ‘Population, size and climate’, op. at..
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constitute the autonomous community o f Andalucía, but the Costa del Sol also extends 
without established limits into the provinces o f Granada and Cádiz at both ends58.
Following Madrid in die police source for 2005, Málaga province ranked as the 
second highest activity zone for ‘organised crime’ groups in the whole o f Spain, w ith 109 
known groups59. Indeed, Madrid and Málaga were die only provinces identified in this 
source as having a number o f groups in excess o f  100, although six other provinces were 
also identified as having a ‘high’ incidence o f ‘organised crime’60. These were: Barcelona 
and Alicante, each with 94 groups; Valencia, with 76 groups; Murcia, with 58 groups;
Sevilla, with 42 groups; and Almería with 40 groups61 (notably, these are all regions located 
along, or close to, die Mediterranean coast). In relation to the wider Costa del Sol region, 
Málaga’s neighbouring provinces o f  Cádiz and Granada were classified as 
‘medium/average’ zones o f activity62. Although data given in the annual report of Spain’s 
Fiscal General d e l Estado (Attorney General) shows a  notable fall in the number o f detainees 
for ‘organised crime’ offences in Málaga province in 2006 (505 detainees in 2006, 
compared with a total o f 1,256 detainees in 2005)63, it is clear that the province remained an 
important zone for criminal activity during 2006, and beyond. Indeed, if  we consider the 
figures relating to the seizure o f goods and money in ‘organised crime’-related cases
M Ibid..
59 España. Delincuencia Organizada / 2005, op. dt..
“ Ibid..
« Ibid..
62 Ibid..
“  Fiscalía General del Estado, op. at., p. 703. Note, however, that the February 2008 report of die political 
party Izquierda Unida (IU) stated that, in 2006,694 people were detained in Málaga province for organised 
crime offences. See Izquierda Unida-Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía (IU-LV-CA), Aproximación a l 
Crimen O rganizadoy la  A ctividad M aposa en la Costa d el Sol, II Informe: El fnm m  Organizado en la Costa del 
Sol, Observatorio del Crimen Organizado de IU-LV-CA y Oficina de Comunicación de IU-LA-CA, Boletín 
no. 2, Febrero de 2008, p. 5, httD://iumalaga2008.ory/filP</U°/020Infnrme%2fíC.rimPnl)/o200rr"i^dol.t?df 
[accessed 06/10/08], quoting data from die Ministry of the Interior.
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throughout that year, we can appreciate the scale and importance o f criminal activity in this 
region. According to data provided by the National Police, in this province in 2006, 
2,704,354 euros were seized and goods to the value o f 2,410,245,199 euros were 
confiscated64. This data reflects a considerable rise in relation to the figures given for 
previous years (the value o f goods seized in the province was 428,579,702 euros in 2005 
and 50,500,000 euros in 200465). Moreover, in the first eight months o f  2007 alone, 97 
criminal groups (each made up o f either six or seven members) were broken up by police 
in Málaga province66 and, in his 2007 annual report, the Fiscalía (Public Prosecutor) o f 
Málaga disclosed that, after a practical standstill, crimes in the province had risen by four 
per cent with respect to 200667. Notably, in the eastern Costa del Sol, throughout 2007, 
crimes had risen more than 13 per cent in only a year (the highest rate in Málaga), which, 
according to the Public Prosecutor, shows that criminal groups are now also becoming 
more active in the eastern zone o f the region68. Furthermore, the press reported that, as o f 
March 2008 (and according to police sources), Málaga province was the main activity zone 
for 31 per cent o f the organised crime groups detected in Spain as a whole69.
Readers o f the British press might be forgiven for thinking that the much o f the 
criminal activity occurring in this part o f Spain is undertaken by nationals from the United 
Kingdom (UK), gjven the British media’s frequent use o f ‘Costa del Crime’ as a common 
moniker for this region70. This is largely due to the fact that many notorious UK criminals 
(‘organised’ or otherwise) have traditionally sought shelter here (especially in the period 
between the collapse o f  the old extradition treaty between Spain and the UK in 1978 and 
the new one being set up in 1985, which was not retroactive71). Certainly, British and UK
64 Fiscalía General del Estado, op. at., p. 704, quoting data provided by e l Cuerpo N acional de PoBáa (Spanish 
National Police).
65 Ibid
66 See Gema Martínez, “El Gobierno admite que Málaga necesita más policías por sus características 
delictivas’, sur.es, 03/10/07, http://www.diariQSur.es/20071003/mfllaga/gobiemo-admite-malaga-necesitat 
20071003.html [accessed 11/08/08]. Moreover, the political party IU stated that, up to 20/11/07,617 
persons were detained in Málaga province for organised crime offences. See IU-LV-CA, op. a t., p. 5, quoting 
data from the Ministry of the Interior.
67 See N. Sánchez, ‘La Fiscalía avisa de que la delincuencia organizada se extiende ya a la Axarquía’, 
malagahty.es, 05/09/08,
http;/ / www.malagahoy.es / article / malaga/221242/la/fiscalia/avisa /la /delincuencia /organizada/se / extiende
Zra/la/axarquia.html [accessed 07/09/08], quoting the Fiscalía de Málaga’s Memoria A nual2007.
68 See ib id , quoting the Fiscalía de Málaga’s M emoria A nual2007.
69 See Femando J. Pérez, ‘Cuando las balas ya son paisaje’, elpats.com, 28/09/08,
hítp://www elpais.com/articulo/andaluda/balas/paisaie/elpepiespand/200800?.8elpflnd 9/Tes/ [accessed 
08/10/08], quoting police sources.
See, for example, Chris Summers, ‘Life on the “Costa del Crime'”, BBC News Online, 11/07/02, 
http;//news.hhc.ro.nlt/l/hi/world/europe/2121868.stm [accessed 07/07/08].
Interviews C2,J7 and P l l .  See also Giles Tremlett, ‘British body count soars as the Costa killers turn up 
07/08/06> http://www.guardian.co.iik/vV/2006/aug/n7/spflin.iikcrime [accessed
U5/08/08J.
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citizens do form part o f  the criminal make-up o f  the Costa del Sol72 73, however they are not 
the only criminals that are active in, or attracted to, this region. Indeed, press reports have 
claimed that the Mediterranean coast (Málaga and Barcelona, in particular) is also the main 
place o f  refuge fo r Italian mafiosi11, and several leadcrs/members o f  Russian and Eastern 
European criminal groups have been arrested in this area74. Additionally, a whole host o f  
other groups, o f  varying nationalities, also appear to be involved in a range o f  criminal 
activities in the Costa del Sol. Indeed, data from interview, questionnaire and press sources 
provide abundant evidence o f  the above, and also indicate that groups and criminals 
originate from countries and regions such as France, Germany, Holland, Portugal, Nigeria, 
Morocco, South America and North Africa, as well as Spain itself75.
72 For example, Brian Brendon Wright, a major cocaine trafficker and one of the ten most wanted criminals 
at the time in Britain, was detained in MarbeHa in 2005. See, for example, Luis Gómez, 'La ciudad donde 
nadie es demasiado rico’, El País, 20/03/05, p. 21. Other examples of British criminals being detained in this 
area are regulady reported in the Spanish press. For example, see ‘La policía detiene a dos ‘narcos’ británicos 
ocultos en Marbella y desarticula una red de tráfico de cocaína’, E l País, 09/10/05, p. 31.
73 For example, Pascuale Ascione, leader of a Camorra group (Naples) and one of die most wanted men in 
Italy for, amongst other crimes, drugs and arms trafficking and attempted bribery, was detained in Fuengirola 
(where he lived) in December 2000. Other members of his criminal group were captured shortly afterwards. 
In June 2002, four members of the Muz2oni clan (Naples) were detained in Rincón de la Victoria (Málaga). 
One of them, Gaetano di Lorenzo, appeared on the list of most dangerous Italian criminals. Also, in July 
2007, five members of the Mazzarela clan (Naples) were detained in an operation taking place in Marbella, 
Málaga, Fuengirola, Zaragoza and Ceuta. See TJ refugio de la Mafia en la costa mediterránea’, eipds.com, 
11/08/08,
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/refuao/Mafia/co5ta/mediterranea/elpepunac/20080ft11flprpinqy 
9/Tes [accessed 11/08/08]. Also, Maurizio Cirppo, the leader of a drug trafficking clan from Genoa, and 
three of his deputies, were known to have taken refuge in Puerto Bands before moving to Barcelona, where 
they were detained in 2007. See Jesús García, ‘Cae la cúpula de un grupo mafioso italiano refugado en 
Barcelona’, El País, 04/10/07, p. 30.
74 For example, in the first phase of Operación Avispa, which took place in June 2005 and which was carried 
out in various places all along the Mediterranean coast (and which was hailed at the time as ‘the most 
important’ operation against international organised crime in Europe), some of the 28 people detained for 
crimes such as illicit association, money laundering and fraudulent bankruptcy (22 of which were leaders in 
the “Russian Mafia1) were settled and carrying out these activities in the Costa del Sol (particularly in Málaga, 
Marbella, Fuengirola, Benalmádcna and Torremolinos). Also, two of the nine detainees in the second phase 
of this operation, which took place in November 2006, were detained in Málaga. Again, these were members 
of Russian and Georgian mafias and were also accused of money laundering and illicit association. See, for 
example, Ministerio del Interior (MIR) (Dirección General de la Policía), “La Policía detiene a 28 “Vor z 
Konen” de la mafia rusa’, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 20/06/05,
http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas. Prensa/Policia/2005/npQ62003.htm and MIR (Dirección General de la 
Policía y de la Guardia Ovil), ‘La Policía detiene a nueve individuos que integraban la red financiera del 
georgiano Zakhar Kalashov’, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 23/11/06,
http://www.mir.es/DGRJS/Notas. Prensa/Policia/2006/npl 12302.htm [both accessed 10/10/08].
75 Interviews P l, P2, P4, P7, P l l ,  P12, C1,J2,J6, J8 and questionnaires QII, QI, QJ and QK. See also, for 
example, T)etenido un holandés por venta de éxtasis a gran escala’, E l País, 16/11/03, p. 28; ‘España 
extradita a un ruso acusado de al menos cuatro asesinatos’, E l País, 07/08/05, p. 26; ‘Cae una red que 
escondía droga en bloques de hormigón para exportarla a países europeos’, Q ué Pasa, 09/11/05, p. 2; ‘La 
Policía desarticula 37 puntos de venta de droga’, 20 minutos (Málaga), 10/11 /05, p. 3; Raquel Ruiz, 
•Desmantelan una red dedicada al tráfico de hachís oculto en frutos’, 20 minutos (Málaga), 01/12/05, p. 4; 
Javier Martín-Arroyo, ‘La policía desmantela en Málaga una red que blanqueó al menos 30 millones dd * 
narcotráfico, ElPaís, 22/05/05, p. 28; and Cae una red de blanqueo de dinero que compró 132 pisos en 
Mijas’, ABC.es, 07/10/05, http.7/www,abc.e5/hemeroteca/historico-07-1Q-2005/ahr/I íltima/raf-.ma-^H. 
de-blangueQ-de-toro-que-cpmpro-132-nisos-en-miias 611386S1 n  ¿3 h H  [accessed 18/08/08],
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G alicia
Finally, the autonomous community o f  Galicia, which is located in the north west 
o f Spain, provides us with an interesting and somewhat different case.
Galicia borders with Portugal in the south and with the Spanish autonomous communities 
o f  Asturias and Castilla y León in the east. To the north o f Galicia lies the Cantabrian Sea 
and, to the west, extends the Atlantic Ocean. The autonomous community is constituted 
o f four provinces (A Coruña76, Lugo, Ourense and Pontevedra) and, o f  these, it is the 
provinces o f  A  Coruña and Pontevedra that experience the most criminal activity77. The 
2007 annual report o f  Spain’s F iscal G eneral del E stado  (Attorney General), for example, 
states that the greatest number o f individuals linked to ‘organised crime’ groups (that were 
investigated in the previous year) were to be found in the territory between the AP-9 
motorway and the coasts o f  these provinces78. Furthermore, according to police data, in 
2005, the provinces o f  A  Coruña and Pontevedra were classified as being two o f  Spain’s 
‘medium/average’ zones o f activity in terms o f ‘organised crime’, with 34 and 27 groups 
respectively identified by the police in that year, whilst the province o f Ourense, with nine 
groups, was placed in the category o f  ‘scarce/limited incidence’ in terms o f ‘organised 
crime’ activity, and the province o f Lugo, with just two groups, was classed as ‘irrelevant’ in
76 In this thesis, Galician, rather than Castilian, spellings will be used where appropriate.
77 Interview PI 5-
78 Fiscalia General del Estado, op. cit., p. 708. This point was also raised by the professional interviewed in 
interview P17.
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this respect79. A t first glance, therefore, and especially in comparison with Madrid, the 
Costa del Sol and the other provinces along the Mediterranean coast, we might assume that 
criminal activity and illicit enterprise in Galicia is not as common, prevalent or extensive as 
in other regions o f Spain. However, to make such an assumption would be erroneous. 
Certainly, in terms o f  the nature o f  its criminal activity, Galicia is different to the other 
regions discussed in this thesis, but that is not to say that illicit enterprise there is less 
established or entrenched, or that its presence in this region is less problematic. It is worth 
emphasising, therefore, that most o f the cocaine destined for Europe enters the continent 
through the coast o f  this region80, and that Galicia has been described as a ‘smuggling 
paradise’81, accommodating ‘the most brutal, ruthless and successful drug barons Europe 
has ever known’82.
Although the three cases discussed in this study are all affected by illicit enterprise 
they are geographically and characteristically diverse. Most obviously, the three regions are 
located in different parts o f  the Spanish mainland and Galicia and the Costa del Sol are 
coastal regions, whereas Madrid is not. 'Ihe Costa del Sol and Madrid have high immigrant 
populations and experience high levels o f  tourism and, in terms o f  criminal activity, play 
host to a large number o f foreign criminals, but the same cannot be said for Galicia 
Furthermore, the three regions have all developed very differently in e c o n o m ic  terms.
These differences, in themselves, underline that the reasons given to explain ‘organised 
crime’ and illicit enterprise in Spain may not be as straightforward as the standard 
explanations suggest.
Methodology and data collection
In relation to the case studies and, indeed, throughout the research, several, largely 
qualitative, methods o f  data collection have been used. Some o f  the research is based on 
data collected from th e  documentary analysis o f  written records: in addition to consulting 
academic publications (and gathering information from professional seminars and 
conferences), I also collected and extensively reviewed English and Spanish newspapers 
throughout the whole period o f  the research. Additionally, reports, statistics and other
79 España. Delincuencia Organizada, op. cii.. The Spanish Attorney General's annual report for 2007 also lists a 
number of Public Prosecutors, including those of Lugo and Ourense, who, in their annual reports, have 
declared that they did not detect the presence of organised crime groups in their respective territories, at least 
of a stable form (or the operations that have taken place in their territory are related to secondary activities, 
and so on). See Fiscalía General del Estado, op. at., p. 700.
80 See Fiscal General del Estado, op. at., p. 708. Also interview P17.
81 Interview P2 and Giles Tremlett, ‘Ruthless heirs of cocaine trade tighten their grip on a smugglers’ 
paradise’, The Guardan, 16/02/06, p. 23.
82 Tony Thompson and Giles Tremlett, “Ruthless, rich and bloody; now Europe’s most vicious drug lords 
target Britain', guardan.co.uk, 12/06/05, http;//wwwguardian,CO.uk /nfws/2005/inn/1?/imrmnt;nnaW n,, 
[accessed 10/12/08].
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official material published by the Spanish government, inter-governmental organisations, 
statistics institutes, think tanks and other national and international agencies, institutions 
and observatories have been analysed. Furthermore, and following the advice o f 
experienced Spanish experts in the field83,1  also used a questionnaire, incorporating a mix 
o f open and closed questions, to collect some additional data (see Appendices C and D).
In total, 13 questionnaires were completed by experts or practitioners working in the fields 
o f law enforcement, justice, law and journalism in all o f the three case study regions84. 
Finally, fieldwork in Spain was undertaken (which will be discussed in more detail below) 
and I conducted interviews with a number o f professionals working in the field o f 
‘organised crime’ (which included some members o f Spain’s police forces, judges, 
prosecutors and customs officials, as well as lawyers, academics and journalists). In total, 
between November 2005 and April 2007 ,1 conducted 36 interviews with 38 people85 
(including three interviews with professional experts in the United Kingdom (UK)). Unlike 
some researchers in the field o f organised crime, I did not interview (or have any other 
kind o f contact with) any criminals engaged in illicit enterprise in Spain. Some 
commentators have highlighted the obvious problems (‘organised’ criminals do not readily 
discuss their activities) and the (real or perceived) potential dangers associated with talking 
to, o r directly witnessing the activities of, those engaged in ‘organised crime’86 which, it has 
been argued, can ‘tempt the researcher into methodological laziness’87. In my case, 
although it would have been particularly enlightening to hear directly why criminals found 
Spain an attractive base for their illicit activities, I was never in a position to be able to do 
so — I simply had no way o f gaining contact with the criminals active in Spain (although if I 
had, I admit I probably would have been reluctant to do so due to the personal risks this 
might have entailed).
A  mixture o f data collection methods was used to overcome some o f the general 
methodological problems associated with any study on ‘organised crime’ which, as Cressey 
explains, ‘stem from the fact that the society o f organized criminals [ . . .]  is a secret society’88 
and which, in turn, can make data difficult to gather and quantify. The use o f a
83 I am particularly grateful to Dr Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes for her general advice and comments on the 
original interview schedule during a discussion with her at the Instituto A ndahqïnterum vertitario de Criminologa, 
Section de Málaga, University of Málaga, Spain, 10/11/05.
M Appendix A shows the date that each questionnaire was completed and the region to which it relates.
85 Two of the interviews were conducted with two people together, at the same time. The dates and places of 
all the interviews are listed in Appendix A.
86 See, for example, Patricia Rawlinson, ‘Mission impossible? Researching organized crime’ in Roy D. King 
and Emma Wincup (eds.), Doing Research on Crime and Justice, 2™* edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008, pp. 291-313.
87 Ibid., p. 292.
88 Donald R. Cressey, ‘Methodological Problems in the Study of Organized Crime as a Social Problem’ in 
Nikos Passas (ed.), Organised Crime, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995, p. 4.
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combination o f methods, rather than a reliance on just one or two, it was hoped, would 
provide a more comprehensive and reliable bank o f data from which to begin the analysis. 
Yet, it is acknowledged that each o f the methods used has its own particular and individual 
set o f advantages and disadvantages.
Written sources
Even using academic literature to study this topic, for example, is not without its
problems. As will be emphasised in the next chapter, ‘organised crime’ constantly mutates
and adapts to changing circumstances. This not only compounds law enforcement
attempts to curtail it but it also means that the phenomenon evolves more rapidly than an
academic understanding o f it. As Arlacchi highlights, there is a time lag between what is
happening in the criminal world and the reactions o f the academic community, Svhich are
always several years behind the actual, changing social objects o f  inquiry’89. In any case, the
very lack o f academic literature relating to Spain (which was noted earlier in this chapter)
means that any use o f this kind o f data must be complemented with other sources.
Using media reports is a popular way o f gathering information on ‘organised crime’
and its associated activities. However, as Rawlinson points out:
The quality o f  media reporting can vary enormously, from well researched articles 
and documentaries based on balanced interviews and all round impartiality, and 
occasionally, at the cost o f a journalist’s life, to hearsay and the frenzied hysteria so 
often found in the tabloids.90
Indeed, newspaper reports, particularly, can be dramatic and sensationalist yet, in Spain, 
this is curtailed to some degree as press reports in Spanish newspapers regarding ‘organised 
crime’ usually follow a police or judicial investigation (or a Ministry o f the Interior press 
release) because it is illegal in Spain to investigate proactively, even for journalistic 
purposes91. Therefore, although newspaper articles usually only impart much o f the same 
information that can be gained from other sources, as noted above, throughout the whole 
period o f the research, I collected and extensively reviewed English and Spanish 
newspapers because they were very easily accessible (and in abundance)92. The newspaper 
reports, combined with other sources, were particularly useful for gaining basic information 
about specific police operations. They were also useful for finding out about, and 
following the progress of, the many scandals (usually related to corruption) that occurred
89 Pino Arlacchi, M afia Business: The M afia E thic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, London, Verso, 1986, p. xvii.
90 Paddy Rawlinson, ‘Understanding organized crime’, in Chris Hale, Keith Hayward, Azrini Wahidin and 
Emma Wincup, Criminology, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 334.
91 See Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. at., p. 393.
92 Some of the Spanish newspapers were ordered and bought from newsagents in the UK; some were 
collected during fieldwork trips; and some were accessed using the Internet. Newspaper archives were also 
accessed using the Internet or, to a lesser extent, consulted during several visits to the Biblioteca Nacional de 
España (National Library o f Spain) in Madrid.
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during the course o f the research. Yet, in this respect, Nelken (in his discussion o f white-
collar crime) highlights a potential caveat in using such data. He states:
Obtaining information in this way [through newspaper reports] complicates the 
task o f assessing the accuracy, frequency, or representativeness o f the cases 
reported. Are ‘scandals’ by definition unrepresentative o f  normal life, or should we 
rather see them [.. .1 as occasions which expose typical practices and mechanisms o f 
deviance [ ...]?93
As will be discussed later in this thesis, the scandals particularly associated with urban 
corruption, for example, would appear to fall into the latter category. Nevertheless, it is 
still clear that media reports must be used with some degree o f caution.
As noted above, the thesis also uses some ‘official’ data (such as the reports and 
statistical information on ‘organised crime’ and criminals collected by law enforcement 
agencies and government ministries). As Rawlinson notes, recourse to official data is 
generally quite common in research on ‘organised crime’ (because the usual tools o f 
criminological research such as observation, surveys, interviews, samples and 
questionnaires may be difficult or impossible to use)9'*. However, this kind o f  data can also 
pose problems for the researcher. In some instances, for example, accessing this data can 
be problematic. Although some official documents are publically available (such as the 
M inistry o f the Interior reports used in the thesis), access to other data is restricted, either 
due to its confidential nature or perhaps because, as Kelly points out, law enforcement 
personnel may be reluctant to make data available to researchers who may ‘even 
inadvertently, betray confidences or portray law enforcement unflatteringly’95. This latter 
reason may (or may not) explain why I experienced some difficulties in gaining access to 
the police report mentioned and used earlier in this chapter (and elsewhere in the thesis). 
This is an unpublished internal annual report produced by the Spanish police forces 
(containing data on the number o f known ‘organised crime’ groups, their level o f 
organisation, their nationality, the geographical base o f their activities, the types o f activity 
they are engaged in, and so on), which is not publicly available (although it is clear that 
some o f the report’s data is made accessible to the Spanish press). I made a formal written 
request to the Spanish government to have access this to this document, but this was 
refused on the basis o f the report’s ‘confidentiality’. I was also refused access to this 
document, for the same reason, during some o f the interviews with police officials. During 
one interview, for example, the report was placed, temptingly, on the desk in front o f me
93 David Nelken, ‘White-Collar Crime’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook o f Criminology, 3“* edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 845.
94 See Rawlinson, ‘Mission impossible? Researching organized crime’, op. at., pp. 291-292.
95 Robert J. Kelly, Trapped in the Folds of Discourse: Theorizing About the Underworld’ in Patrick J. Ryan 
and George E. Rush (eds.), Understanding O rganised Crime in G lobal Perspective: A  Reader, Thousand Oaks, 
California, Sage Publications, Inc., 1997, p. 40.
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but the respondent categorically refused to  le t m e look at its contents. T w o other 
in terv iew ees, how ever, d id allow  m e to look a t the report: in one instance, the responden t 
opened  the docum ent on h is com puter, turned the screen around to face m e and  le ft the 
room  fo r five m inutes (during w hich tim e I frantically w ro te down as m uch in form ation  as 
I  cou ld); and in the second, the respondent actually p rin ted  o u t 12 pages o f  the rep o rt (o f  
his choosing) and gave these to  me.
Y et, even w hen  data such as this is availab le, there m ay be questions as to  how
usefu l it is. Indeed, as m any researchers such as A rlacchi have observed:
T he organizations that system atically co llect data on organized crim e [ . . . ]  co llate 
this data in  order to  identify and  prosecute professional crim inals, and  n o t in  o rder 
to  provide inform ation for students o f  the social sciences.96
In this thesis, the data gained from  the police report (and o ther official sources like this) 
w ill be used prim arily fo r two purposes. F irstly, th is data  w ill be used (w ith o ther sources) 
to discuss the types o f 'o rgan ised  crim e’ activ ity engaged in by individuals and groups in 
Spain . In this respect, it is particularly useful because, (as w e w ill see in the n ex t chapter) 
b y identifying the types o f  crim inal activ ity that flourish in Spain , w e can be m ore precise 
abou t w hat w e actually m ean by ‘organised crim e’ there. Secondly, data re la ting  to  the 
num ber o f  ‘organised crim e’ groups active in Spain , o r in a  particu lar reg ion , w ill be u sed  to  
build a  p icture o f  the ex ten t o f ‘organ ised  crim e’ and, in term s o f  illu strating  w h ich  reg ions 
o f  Spain  experience g reater levels o f  ‘organised crim e’, fo r exam ple, i t  is also useful. 
H ow ever, using  official statistical data such as th is also raises questions re lating  to  the 
m ethodology used  to com pile it, w h ich  m ay, in  tu rn , affect its reliab ility and  valid ity. I lo w  
is ‘organ ised  crim e’ being m easured/classified/recorded (and does this vary  betw een  the 
agencies that contribute to the data)?97 W hat qualify ing characteristics does a  group need 
to have to be included as an ‘organised crim e’ group in this data? W hat defin ition  o f  
‘organised crim e’ is being used by d ie  agencies co llecting this data? Further, fo r w h a t 
purposes are these data being collected and com piled?98 T he answ ers to these questions 
are no t clear and , for this reason , the lim itations o f  this kind o f  d ata are acknow ledged.
T he statistical d ata re lating  to the num ber o f ‘organ ised  crim e’ groups used  in  this thesis, 
therefore, has been used on ly  fo r illustrative purposes; to  illustrate the com parative levels 
o f  ‘organised crim e’ in certain  regions, fo r exam ple, o r  to  illustrate crim e trends. In  any
96 Af,acchi- °P- d t > P- XWJ- 0ther researchers that have also acknowledged this problem include Ctessev 
at., p. 11; Kelly, op. at., p. 40; Robert J. Kelly, ‘Criminal Underworlds: Looking Down on Society From7’ P'
u l t Z  ^  < * * * — ■■ N » * T .  H o w l ,  « d
97 See.for example, Frank Gregory, 'Classify, report and measure: The UK Organised Crime NoiiHr.««™
f t  “ " r  fr?  “d rr
(paperback edition), London and New York, Roudedge, 2006, pp. 78-96. **
98 Is the data to be used as an indication of performance, for example?
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case, this kind o f information tells us little (if anything) about the causes or the facilitating 
factors o f ‘organised crime’ in Spain, which is what this thesis seeks to explain. To analyse 
this, therefore, we have to look to other data.
The interviews and questionnaires
In this respect, some o f the interview and questionnaire data have proved useful 
and, where appropriate, this will be used in this thesis. As noted above, interviews with 
professionals working in the field o f ‘organised crime’ were undertaken as part o f the 
research for this thesis. I felt that interviewing was both necessary (given the lack o f 
published data relating to organised crime in Spain) and useful (in order to clarify and 
refine the project and provide quotations and raw data for the thesis). The interviews were 
open-ended in nature. After conceptualising the research problem, a very basic interview 
schedule was prepared, which consisted o f a few open questions that would enable the 
respondents to reply freely and spontaneously, without being influenced by any leading 
questions (see Appendix B). An open approach, I felt, would also allow me to immediately 
follow up and explore any interesting points raised and, ultimately, would provide some 
rich data for the study. In reality, and as I became more experienced in conducting the 
interviews, although I always used the original interview schedule as a general basis, I found 
myself tailoring the interviews more to the particular expertise and knowledge base o f  the 
particular respondent. Notes were taken during the interviews in most cases and, as soon 
as possible after the interview, these notes were reviewed and added to. Later, they were 
reviewed again and typed up. Despite initial plans to do otherwise, in the end, only two o f 
the interviews were tape-recorded (initially, I had planned to tape record as many 
interviews as I could, but it soon became clear that respondents were more cautious when I 
asked whether they minded being taped). Almost all o f the interviewees specifically 
requested that their responses remained anonymous due to the confidential and sensitive 
nature o f much o f the material discussed. As a result, when interview material has been 
used in this thesis, it is referenced using a very basic coding that I developed 
subsequently". The questionnaires (discussed earlier in this section) were mostly used in 
cases where it was not possible to carry out an interview with a particular respondent for 9
99 In order not to reveal the identity of the respondent, interviews are referenced using a letter and a number. 
The letter refers to the general field in which the respondent worked at the time of the interview. Thus, very 
basically: A indicates an academic; C indicates a customs officer, F indicates a prosecutor {fiscal in Spanish); J  
indicates a journalist; L indicates a lawyer, M indicates a judge {magstrado in Spanish); and P indicates a 
member of one of Spain’s police forces. The subsequent number is used merely to distinguish a particular 
interview from those undertaken with respondents in the same professional category. Therefore, interview 
P5, for example, denotes the fifth interview undertaken with a member of one of Spain’s police forces. I 
have been unable to specify the professional positions of die respondents any further than this because, in 
some cases, to do so would reveal the respondent’s identity.
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some reason or other (and the questionnaire was designed and refined, through several 
drafts, so that it would elicit the same kind o f data as that anticipated from the interviews). 
The questions included in the questionnaire were developed and prepared in the context o f 
the existing knowledge on the subject, and after I had extensively reviewed the published 
literature and undertaken a significant amount of preparatory research. Again, in order to 
protect the identity o f the respondents, when material from these questionnaires has been 
used in this thesis, it is referenced using a very basic coding100. In every instance when I 
contacted potential respondents and interviewees, I ensured that those approached were 
thoroughly informed about the nature, purpose and possible uses o f my research and 
assured them that their potential cooperation would not lead to any undue inconvenience, 
distress or annoyance.
Clearly, however, as with the other kinds o f data used in this thesis, there are also 
potential problems in using interview and questionnaire data. As will be seen in subsequent 
chapters, the interview and questionnaire respondents often disagreed on the issues 
discussed in the thesis (even when they worked in the same professional field) and thus, in 
assessing their responses, we have to consider the potential factors that can affect this kind 
o f data. For instance, is a respondent being led by the structured questions that the 
questionnaire incorporates? Are interviewees basing their answers on their experiences, or 
on what they have read in newspapers, or other influences? Moreover, when respondents 
and interviewees have offered (or been asked) their opinion as to what facilitates ‘organised 
crime’ or illicit enterprise in Spain, for example, we have to remember that these answers 
merely reflect their perceptions (which is not to say that the factors they indicate as 
facilitators actually do facilitate this kind o f  criminal activity, or that factors they do not 
mention have no merit). Furthermore, are respondents telling the truth? It has been 
argued that elite respondents, for example, will use an interview to:
[...] present themselves in a good light, not be indiscreet, to convey a particular
version o f events, to get arguments and points o f view across, to deride or displace
other interpretations and points o f view.101
It would be naive to think that the interviews granted to me were anything other than 
strictly controlled; the information that I would be given during these was never going to 
go beyond what the respective respondents were prepared to share or select. I had no way 
o f knowing what information had been withheld; what information I had been steered
100 The questionnaires are referenced simply using two letters (for example, QA, QB, QC, and so on): the first 
letter, Q, merely indicates that the data source is a questionnaire and the following letter is used to distinguish 
that particular questionnaire from others.
101 Zoë Slote Morris, The Truth about Interviewing Elites’, Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3,2009, p. 211, citing S. J. 
Ball, 'Political Interviews and the Politics of Interviewing’ in G. Walford (ed.), Researching the Powerful in 
Education, London, UCL Press, 1994, pp. 97-98.
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away from; what information had been filtered. Certainly, in some interviews, the ‘official 
line’ or the standard explanations for organised crime in Spain (discussed in Chapter 3) 
were given and, in many cases, I was told no more than I already knew (from reading 
newspaper articles and other sources, for example). Furthermore, and as will be seen 
elsewhere in this thesis, some respondents were particularly keen to emphasise that 
‘organised crime’ or corruption was really not a problem in Spain (or no more so than in 
any other state) and that the state responded well to these problems. These respondents 
may well have been telling the truth in so much as their answers were an accurate reflection 
o f  their opinion, or they may not have wished to portray in a poor light, or discredit, the 
state institutions that they worked for (which is not particularly surprising). In some cases 
(or at least one), respondents may also have had a more personal agenda in giving restricted 
answers to m y questions, as the following example will illustrate. In the vast majority o f 
cases, the respondents that I interviewed were very welcoming and keen to answer my 
questions (even if  their answers may not have been particularly helpful for the reasons 
discussed above). However, in one instance, I distinctly recall feeling incredibly dejected 
and disappointed after a  much anticipated interview with a  very high ranking police officer 
in one o f the case study regions (whom, because o f his position, some o f my contacts had 
said I simply ‘must’ speak to). I had pursued this particular respondent for several months 
(with very little initial success) yet, when I did finally manage to secure the interview, it 
lasted less than half an hour and the respondent (although professional and polite) was 
quite uncooperative, giving short and ‘official’ answers to the questions that I asked. It was 
interesting to learn six months later, therefore, that this respondent had been charged and 
sentenced to eighteen months in prison (and prohibited from holding office) for revealing 
secrets and providing cover to an Italian drug trafficker102 103. Although I was not expecting to 
personally encounter this during my research, this example underlines a more general 
methodological problem that can be experienced when undertaking research on the topic 
o f ‘organised crime’: if  criminal groups have penetrated and corrupted law enforcement 
agencies, data may not be available at all and, if  it is, it may be unreliable101.
In other instances, however, some respondents (and especially the journalists) were 
much more open to talking about the kinds o f issues that I wanted to discuss and some 
useful, rich and interesting data was gained from both the interviews and questionnaires. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that some degree o f caution must be exercised when using and
102 See, for example, 'Annex 3: Case Study -  Spain’ in Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Examining 
the Links between Organised Crime and Corruption, CSD/European Commission, 2010, p. 194, 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc eentre/cflme/dQC5/studv,,.on. links between organised crime and rnmintion en.odf [accessed 
10/04/11].
103 See Kelly, ‘Criminal Underworlds: Looking Down on Society From Below’, op. at., p. 12.
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analysing the data gained from the interviews and questionnaires. Indeed, as has been 
acknowledged, each o f  the individual types o f  data used in this thesis has its flaws and 
limitations. For this reason, and wherever possible therefore, attempts at triangulation 
have been made, and data from the interviews and questionnaires have been cross-checked 
and used in conjunction with data from the range o f other sources outlined above.
The problems posed by the data discussed above are perhaps typical o f  any study 
on ‘organised crime’. Before closing this section on methodology, however, it is worth 
discussing some further potential issues that may be more specific and personal to this 
particular piece o f  research. Some issues relating to gender and my status as a foreigner 
(and how these impacted on the research) will thus be considered and, finally, the fieldwork 
will be discussed.
Being a  foreigner
Conducting research on an issue affecting a foreign country means that the
researcher will often have to gather data from foreign sources (both primary and
secondary). This presents certain challenges, not least in relation to language. Although I
was already taking Spanish lessons at the time o f starting the research, my ability was
relatively limited. Very quickly, therefore, I dedicated myself to improving my Spanish
through intense courses and private lessons so that I would be able to access as much data
as possible and be in a position to carry out the research ‘properly’. As Rawlinson notes:
Speaking the language o f the country in which one’s research is being conducted is 
by no means necessary, but not having certain linguistic capabilities can have an 
impact on the methodological approaches chosen and the data collected.104 105
Even then, although my Spanish improved enormously, I still had problems with the
nuances and interpretation o f the language, and much more time and effort had to be taken
over every aspect o f  the research. Heidensohn recognises that:
[...] where the nation, system or issue to be studied is in another language, this 
raises a range o f  distinctive issues. There is the simple matter o f translating 
documents, or interpreting interviews or observations. More profound and more 
subtle are all the questions to do with deeper and hidden meanings, which only a 
native speaker can understand.10
Certainly, in my case, reading texts, reports and newspaper articles; writing and responding 
to emails and letters; making and receiving telephone calls (and so on) took much longer 
than it would have done if  I had been able to read, write and speak in English, and it 
caused more anxiety along the way. Furthermore, nearly all o f  the interviews undertaken in 
Spain were conducted entirely in Spanish (not least because the vast majority o f  the
1CM Rawlinson, ‘Mission impossible? Researching organized crime’, op. cit., pp. 298-299.
105 Heidensohn, ap. cit., p. 214.
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interviewees could not (or claimed they could not) speak English). An interpreter or
translator was never used. Conducting the interviews, therefore, proved to be the greatest
challenge in this respect, especially when they took place in noisy bars and restaurants or
even open offices, where background noise and other distractions added further
difficulties. Indeed, in some situations, knowing the language is not always an advantage:
Respondents often speak very quickly in interviews with researchers who 
understand their language, or slip into the vernacular, an especially potent part o f  
discourse in the criminal underworld. For the sake o f fluency in the interview there 
is often a hesitancy to ask respondents to repeat what they have said. And unless 
the researcher is bilingual, linguistic faux pas are inevitable [...].106
It was also difficult to listen and speak in a foreign language whilst simultaneously making
notes.
Added to the problems posed by language, my position as a foreigner may also 
have caused difficulties in terms o f gaining access to interview respondents (at least, 
initially). To some extent; I was dependent on ‘gatekeepers’ to assist with this aspect o f  the 
research and help me penetrate the institutions that I wished to study. Yet, at the outset, I 
had very few contacts in Spain (and, in the professional fields, none outside o f  academia). 
As a foreigner, I felt very much an ‘outsider’, operating in an unfamiliar cultural sphere107. 
As discussed below, as the research progressed and I became more familiar with the field in 
which I was working, the number o f  contacts inevitably ‘snowballed’, but the initial 
difficulties in building contacts that were caused or exacerbated by my status as a foreigner 
(and coupled with the more general problems related to accessing data discussed above), 
probably resulted in me being able to carry out fewer interviews in Spain than I had hoped. 
However, during the interview process itself, being a foreigner may have some advantages. 
As Heidensohn notes, ‘[...] to be a foreigner may confer certain privileges, in particular a 
licence to naïveté’108. Further
[...] being a foreigner allows the interviewer to ask questions very bluntly, in a way 
that a native could not without the risk o f being perceived as too inquisitive and 
thus, intrusive. Much leeway is given to a foreigner, always excused by non-mastery 
o f  a foreign language.109
Whether this results in more information being given, however, is difficult to assess.
106 Rawlinson, ‘Mission impossible? Researching organized crime’, op. at., p. 299.
107 See Laura Piacentini, Surviving, Russian Prisons: Punishment, economy and politics in transition, Cullompton, Willan 
Publishing, 2004, p. 10.
10* Heidensohn, op. dt., p. 215, citing D. Downes, Contrasts in Tolerance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 2- 
3.
109 Emmanuele Cladie Sabot, *Dr Jekyl, Mr H(i)de: the contrasting face of elites at interview*, Geqfonm, Voi. 
30,1999, p.333.
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Gender issues
Mostly, during the fieldwork, I found m yself entering largely a  man’s world110. O f
the people that I interviewed, for example, only four were women; the majority (34
respondents) were men (and, in many cases, they were men o f  an older generation). As a
result, I wondered how seriously I would be taken as a (relatively) young female researcher
and whether the problems I had encountered as a foreigner would then be compounded by
my gender. In reality, however, my gender probably worked to my advantage. Warren, for
example, discusses the ‘harmlessness’ and ‘invisibility’ o f women fieldworkers, which can
prove beneficial in all kinds o f ways111. In other respects too, considerations o f gender
have been discussed in relation to ethnographic research (particularly in the comparative
context), and especially in relation to ‘the sexual politics o f fieldwork’ where:
At issue is the tradeoff between accepting sexism on the one hand and the 
acquisition o f knowledge in the interest o f furthering careers [or the research] on 
the other.112
Rawlinson, for example, describes how the patronising attitude to women by Russian men 
became personally useful to her when a mix up with verbs led to a particularly 
‘embarrassing slip up’ in a public setting113. Piacentini, in her study o f Russian prisons, 
recalls ‘feelings o f being exploited’114 when, for example, she was granted an interview with 
a (male) prison governor only after she had ‘recited Russian poetry in his office in front o f  
senior personnel’115. Despite initially resisting ‘colluding with such gender constructions 
that expect women to look their best and behave in a subservient and passive manner (for 
men)’116, in the end, she ‘reconciled the feelings o f guilt that others too have expressed 
when faced with the realisation that utilising their gender may be advantageous to the 
research [,..]’117. To some extent, I did the same and may well have used my gender to my 
own avail. For example, I always wore cosmetics (and sometimes quite feminine clothing) 
to interviews and meetings, and politely tolerated occasional apparent flirtations from some 
respondents. Moreover, on very many occasions, either during or after an interview, I was 
invited to have a drink or a meal with the respondent. Whether these invitations and the 
behaviour shown towards me by some male respondents reflected an exercise in sexual 
politics or were simply typical o f the notorious Spanish hospitality (and although I
110 For an interesting account of the gender balance in some professions in Spain, see John Hooper, The N w  
Spaniards, 2nd edition, London, Penguin Books Ltd, 2006, Chapter 10.
111 See, for example, Carol A. B. Warren, Gender Issues in Field Research, Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London 
and New Delhi, Sage Publications, Inc, 1988, p. 18.
‘12 Ibid., p. 36.
1,1 See Rawlinson, ‘Mission impossible? Researching oiganized crime’, op. cit., p. 299.
*14 Piacentini, op. at., p. 19.
»5 Ibid..
Ibid., p. 21.
'"Ibid..
- 2 6 -
sometimes politely declined such offers, preferring instead to return to my hotel where I 
could relax and review my interview notes), I have to admit that, on some occasions, I 
accepted these offers for the benefits that such socialising might bring for my research and 
the possible information that I could gain in a less formal setting. I can also associate with 
Fountain’s account o f the strategies she used to collect data for her doctoral study on the 
social and economic organisation o f a network o f British cannabis dealers, which reveals 
how gender can prove to be an instrumental advantage. In relation to some male members 
o f the network, she states:
Sally [one o f her ‘gatekeepers’] and I exploited their paternalism by displaying wide- 
eyed naivety which flattered them and enabled us to ask very unhip questions.11*
Yet, it is clear that exploiting the advantages o f gender also entails some personal and
ethical costs18 19. As Rawlinson states, using gender in this way:
[...] raises a number o f ethical issues for female ethnographers [...], including the 
extent to which they can and should behave in a way that betrays their own values, 
which may only serve to reaffirm the values o f a society they would normally hold 
up for criticism .120
T hefieldw ork
As noted above, fieldwork in all three o f  the case study regions (and elsewhere) was 
undertaken. Primarily, at the end o f 2005 ,1 spent a two-month period at the Instituto 
A ndaluz Ititerum versitario de Crim inologta at the University o f Malaga, which kindly hosted me 
as a visiting research student. Subsequently, and throughout the remaining period o f the 
research, a considerable number o f  further fieldwork trips were made. However, these 
trips were shorter in duration than the first one and, for practical reasons, ranged from 
stays o f  just four or five days to two weeks in Spain (this will be discussed further below).
The undertaking o f fieldwork had several basic purposes: to collect data that may 
not have been available outside o f Spain; to gain further insight into the topic through 
television, radio and additional newspaper reports; and to generally observe and appreciate 
the characteristics o f the case study regions in order to undertake some contextual analysis 
o f their physical environments (for example, with regard to the standard explanations 
discussed in Chapter 3, to visually see the number o f  tourists, level o f  construction work, 
geographical peculiarities, and so on). The main purpose o f the fieldwork trips, however, 
was to meet with and talk to potential informants, such as journalists and official and
118 Jane Fountain, 'Dealing with Data’ in Dick Hobbs and Tim May (eds.), Interpreting the Field: A ccounts o f 
Ethnography, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 158.
119 See, for example, H. L. Ackers, ‘Racism, Sexuality, and the Process of Ethnographic Research’ in I lobbs 
and May, op. at., pp. 209-239.
120 Rawlinson, ‘Mission impossible? Researching organized crime’, op. at., pp. 299-300.
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academic experts in the field. In this regard, and in addition to the more formal interviews 
discussed above, during the fieldwork periods, I also had a number o f  informal meetings 
with various individuals who were knowledgeable about the subject matter o f the thesis for 
one reason or another. Because o f  their informal nature, however, these meetings have not 
been classed or recorded as interviews.
The undertaking o f the fieldwork proved crucial to the research (and turned out to 
be very enjoyable). However, it was far from easy and did not always run smoothly. I was 
surprised by the amount o f bureaucracy that appeared to hinder everything that I wanted to 
do — everywhere that I went (even the National Library), my passport was taken, my 
mobile phone was checked, and my bag was searched or scanned. Despite its European 
proximity, Spain appeared to have a somewhat ‘alien’ culture. Spending time, alone, in a 
foreign country; being away from family and friends; conducting research in a foreign 
language; and incurring costs in terms o f money and time, also raised some personal 
anxieties. I had to endure lots o f ‘hanging around’ and became frustrated when promises 
were broken.
The first period in Málaga, for example, initially appeared to have been o f little 
value, certainly in terms o f the minimal number o f interviews undertaken during this period 
(by which I was measuring my ‘success1). As a result, I chose not to return there after 
spending Christmas in the UK (even though I was welcome to do so by the Institute and 
returning had been part o f my initial plan) - 1 simply could not afford the time and money 
that it would cost in returning to Málaga if  so little was to be gained. With hindsight, 
however, some value can be attached to the period spent in Málaga. Indeed, benefitting 
greatly from the experience and expertise o f the researchers in the Institute, it was during 
this time that the research problem was really refined. During this time, I also produced 
and piloted the questionnaire. Above all else, however, it taught me to be more proactive 
in facilitating the research and securing interviews.
Thus, on my return to the UK, I set about finding new contacts with some vigour.
I sent literally hundreds o f letters and emails to various institutions and organisations in the 
case study regions and at national level (ministries, delegations and sub-delegations o f the 
government, local administrations and town halls, political parties, parliamentary groups, 
judicial bodies, courts, policing and law enforcement bodies, international organisations 
with seats in Spain, newspapers, press agencies, television and radio stations, universities, 
and so on) in the hope that I could secure contact with some o f those involved in these 
who may potentially have knowledge or an informed opinion on the topic and, although in 
the vast majority o f cases, this came to nothing, I was getting some possible leads, mostly 
in Madrid. Following these up, I was able to arrange some interviews in advance and could
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plan visits to Spain around these. These interviews usually ended with suggestions o f  
further contacts and I gained access to other informants through the ‘snowballing’ 
sampling technique o f personal contact. Advice along the lines o f  you should talk to so- 
and-so . . . ’ was always followed, and the approach o f ‘x advised me to contact you’ in initial 
communications with potential respondents afforded me some more success. This period 
o f  fieldwork, however, was undertaken in a very different way to the first one in Málaga. 
Rather than spending a continuous period o f  tim e  in Spain, practical considerations meant 
that I was now forced to undertake shorter bursts o f  fieldwork in the country (to fit around 
my teaching work). During this phase o f the fieldwork (predominantly March -  December 
2006, but also at various points throughout 2007), I was visiting Spain regularly, sometimes 
for just a few days at a time, but often on a fortnightly basis. The majority o f  these visits 
were to Madrid but I also went to Galicia and the Costa del Sol (and Cataluña) during this 
time too121. Indeed, this way o f undertaking the fieldwork actually had several advantages:
because my time in Spain was limited, I used it a lot better.
In sum, although the number o f formal interviews that I undertook is quite modest 
in comparison with other pieces o f  research (for the reasons discussed above), the informal 
meetings and conversations I had with others not included in my interview list, on many 
occasions, proved just as fruitful as my interviews did and they have undoubtedly served to 
inform the research. In other ways, too, the fieldwork became essential in furthering my 
understanding o f  why illicit enterprise flourishes in Spain. As Rawlinson argues:
One o f  the most important aspects o f  being in an alien culture is the ability to
observe not just the subject o f  the study, but the context in which it lies.122
Indeed, the contextual and cultural knowledge that I gained o f  Spain and the professional 
settings that I entered during my fieldwork, was immense, and my understanding o f some 
o f  the key issues in this thesis was surely furthered as a result (and could not have been 
gained in any other way). The many days I spent in the A udiencia N acion al (Spain’s National 
Court), for example, just hanging around (in the hope that I might secure an interview) 
taught me a lot about that institution and the way it works. Furthermore, living and 
working in Spain (as opposed to being there as a tourist -  as I had been on many 
occasions) allowed me to see different things and things differently. The apartment I lived 
in during my time in the Costa del Sol during the out o f  season holiday months allowed 
me to observe the foreign population o f  Benalmádena Costa and the attitudes and way o f
121 The fact that an interview took place in a certain location does not necessarily indicate that the issues 
discussed during that interview related to that region. Rather, it merely reflects the location of the particular 
interviewee on that particular day. Thus, I interviewed professionals in Madrid who were 'experts' on the 
Costa del Sol and professionals in Galicia who were ‘experts’ on Madrid, for example.
122 Rawlinson, ‘Mission impossible? Researching organized crime’, op. at., p. 304.
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life o f these people (as well as what appeared to be some drug deals). For the first time, I 
also observed the extensive construction work on the Costa (something I had not noticed 
as a tourist, despite it always being there). Simultaneously, I was spending my days at a 
Spanish institution, with Spanish people, which gave me an entirely different perspective. 
On one trip, I spent a week just travelling around Galicia, visiting the rias that are used so 
extensively in the trafficking o f cocaine. As Rawlinson states:
[...] without the ‘just looking’ factor to complement the “hard’ data o f surveys and
interviews, our vocabulary o f understanding, particularly o f a phenomenon as
complex as organized crime, is severely limited.123
Despite all the difficulties and (personal) challenges, then, the undertaking o f fieldwork 
proved crucial to the research.
Structure o f the thesis
Having considered the methodology and methods o f  data collection, and having 
introduced the aims and hypothesis of the research in dais chapter, Chapter 2 will discuss 
and review the definitional debate relating to the use o f the term ‘organised crime’, w ith the 
overall aim o f delimiting and clarifying what is meant by the concept in this thesis. It will 
be argued here that Spain’s particular manifestation o f ‘organised crime’ should be more 
appropriately described as ‘illicit enterprise’ and, in order to emphasise this, a discussion o f 
the predominant forms o f  criminal activity that affect Spain will also be included within 
this chapter. Chapter 3 will then begin to analyse the facilitating factors o f  illicit enterprise 
in Spain. This chapter will commence by presenting and assessing the standard 
explanations used to account for this kind o f  criminal activity in the country. It will be 
argued here that, although these explanations have some value, they are essentially 
inadequate in providing a comprehensive understanding o f  why illicit enterprise flourishes 
in Spain. Leading on from this, therefore, the second part o f  Chapter 3 will explain how 
the hypothesis was developed. Subsequently, Chapter 4 will discuss the nature and extent 
o f corruption in Spain and provide examples o f  the different types o f corruption that occur 
there. In support o f the hypothesis, this chapter will show how incidences o f corruption 
reveal vulnerabilities in the political, judicial and law enforcement spheres in Spain, which 
are exploited by criminal groups engaged in illicit enterprise. Chapter 5 will then consider 
how the Spanish state responds to illicit enterprise and will argue that further support for 
the hypothesis can be found in the degree o f political priority and attention given to illicit 
enterprise in Spain, as well as in some apparent weaknesses and inefficiencies in the legal, 
judicial and law enforcement spheres. Finally, Chapter 6 will draw out the key findings of
123 Ibid., p. 305.
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the thesis, identify the strengths and limitations o f the research and consider some possible 
avenues o f further research. Throughout the thesis, evidence and examples from the case 
study regions will be interwoven into the analysis in order to illustrate pertinent points and
issues.
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Chapter 2
What is ‘Organised Crime*?
The central focus o f this thesis is ‘organised crime’. Therefore, in order to be able 
to analyse the factors that facilitate this, it is necessary to discuss the meaning o f this term. 
What, exactly, is ‘organised crime’? Finding an answer to this question, however, is not 
particularly straightforward because, in Schelling’s words, by ‘organised crime’, V e  do not 
mean simply “crime that is organised’”1. The purpose o f this chapter, then, is to both 
highlight, and discuss, the debate concerning definitional issues and also review some o f 
the contesting definitions o f ‘organised crime’ whilst simultaneously delimiting what is 
meant by the term in this thesis. In relation to this latter issue, some o f the findings o f  this 
research detailing the types o f criminal activities that flourish in Spain (and the groups that 
engage in these) will be incorporated into this chapter and, from this, we will see that the 
‘organised’ illegal activities occurring in Spain constitute a specific form o f ‘organised 
crime’; that o f  ‘illicit enterprise’. This discussion will thus provide a clear entry point for 
the analysis that follows relating to the factors that facilitate this kind o f activity in Spain.
The many difficulties in defining and clarifying ‘organised crime’ (as well as 
criticisms relating to the actual use o f this term) are widely acknowledged and well 
documented. As Michael Levi pointed out in 1998: ‘It has become commonplace to 
observe that the term ‘organised crime’ is frequently used but difficult to define’2 3and, as 
Harfield noted ten years later, ‘little has changed to warrant amending [Levi’s] axiomatic 
observation [...]’.* Indeed, almost every publication on this topic inevitably contains a 
section or commentary or, at least, an acknowledgment o f  the difficulties in defining the 
term.
The definitional difficulties arise for a number o f reasons. To some extent, 
understanding is a matter o f perspective: different people understand the term quite 
differently; not everyone has identical perceptions o f what ‘organised crime’ is4. Law 
enforcement and criminal justice officials are likely to see ‘organised crime’ much
1 Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 
180.
2 Michael Levi, ‘Perspectives on “Organised Crime”: An Overview’, The Howard journal, Vol. 37, No. 4,1998, 
p. 335.
3 Clive Harfield, The organization of “organized crime policing” and its international context*, Criminology &  
Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, No. 4,2008, p. 483.
4 Jay S. Albanese, O rganised Crime in America, 3rd edition, Cincinnati, Ohio, Anderson Publishing Co., 1996, p.
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differently than the public at large and academic scholars are likely to define ‘organised
crime’ according to their general perspective or particular purposes. Thus:
Economists model it in terms o f economic factors. Government investigators 
model organized crime as a hierarchical government-like enterprise. Social 
scientists view it as a social phenomenon.5 6
Disputes over the definition o f ‘organised crime’ may also arise because experts and
researchers in this field may be exposed to different evidence. As Kelly reminds us:
Research has shown that experts (i.e. law enforcement specialists at local and 
national levels, journalists, and social scientists) located in different professional 
settings do not always share equal access to data nor do they conduct their work on 
similar data bases.7 *
Furthermore, definitions are specific to time and place. It is likely that ‘organised crime’ 
will be understood quite differently in different societies and cultures* and one fundamental 
characteristic o f ‘organised crime’ is that it constantly changes and mutates. Therefore, 
‘organised crime’ as it was in the 1930s is hardly comparable to ‘organised crime’ in the 
1980s9, and neither is comparable to contemporary ‘organised crime’ in the twenty first 
century. Hence, definitions and models o f the phenomenon may need to be constantly 
revised and updated. As Levi questions:
Why, after all, should an organizational model o f  crime that applies to parts o f Italy 
in some historical periods apply either to the north-eastern US or the entire US; 
and even if  it accurately depicts crime there, why should it apply throughout, or 
indeed in any part of, the UK, Germany, or Canada [or -  we could add -  Spain]?10
The overall result, then, is that the term ‘organised crime’ is, and has been, variously 
used to cover a range o f different phenomena. For example, the term has been used to 
refer to a myriad o f criminal organisations, often distinguished by their ethnicity (such as, 
typically, the Italian mafias, the so-called Colombian cartels, the Russian Mafia, the 
Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triads, and so on), which can, and do, vary considerably in 
their structure, characteristics and modus operands. The term has also been used to refer to 
many different forms o f criminal activity (such as drug and weapons trafficking, people
5 See, for example, Andrzej E. Marek, ‘Organized Crime in Poland’ in Kelly, O rganised Crime: A G lobal 
Perspective, op. tit., p. 160; Robert J. Kelly, Trapped in the Folds of Discourse: Theorizing About the 
Underwodd’, op. tit., p. 48; Botonia Halstead, The Use of Models in the Analysis of Organized Crime and 
Development of Policy’, Transnational O rganised Crime, Vol. 4, No. 1,1998, p. Z
6 Albanese, op. tit., p. 76.
7 See Robert J. Kelly, 'Criminal Underworlds: Looking Down on Society From Below* in Robert J. Kelly (ed), 
O rganised Crime: A G lobal Perspective, Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1986, p. 27, note
• Marek, op. tit., p. 160.
9 See Kelly, ‘Criminal Underwodds: Looking Down on Society From Below’, op. tit., p. 27, note 1.
10 Michael Levi, The Organization of Serious Crimes’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 3rd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 881, citing M. 
Be are, Criminal Conspiracies: O iganigtd Crime in Canada, Scarborough, Nelson Canada, 1996.
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smuggling/trafficking, extortion, protection rackets, the smuggling o f  contraband, loan 
sharking, fraud and counterfeiting, vehicle theft and smuggling, organised prostitution, 
illegal waste trafficking, the trafficking o f  endangered species, money laundering, and so 
on)11. Some have even gone as far as claiming that Svhite collar’ crime is ‘organised 
crime’12. Furthermore, as Rawlinson points out, the term ‘has become synonymous with 
other expressions such as mafia, criminal cartels, gangsters, the mob, to name but a few’13. 
The outcome, therefore, as Albanese states, is that; There appears to be as many 
descriptions o f organized crime as there are authors’14. The mere 150 or so o f these 
descriptions that academic and former lawyer, Klaus von Lampe, lists on his website on 
organised crime research15, for example, emphasise the problems in finding a generally 
accepted definition o f ‘organised crime’ as a result o f the range o f  different variables o f 
which it is composed16. Attempts to define ‘organised crime’, then, have proved to be a 
continuing source o f  controversy and contention, and definitional disputes continue to rage 
in the literature.
Finding some consensus on the definition o f ‘organised crime’, however, is 
important for a number o f reasons. Clearly, from a policy perspective, a clear and effective 
definition can help those engaged in curbing ‘organised crime’ know what they are fighting, 
and ensure that resources, responsibilities and penalties can be appropriately allocated and 
evaluated. Moreover, Longo argues that:
[...] there is a methodological requirement o f finding an exclusive meaning o f a term 
which is not yet unanimously defined either by those scientific disciplines involved 
in this topic [such as international relations, sociology, criminology, international 
law, penal law] or by the different judicial systems.17
A  clearly defined term, she argues, ‘could facilitate collaboration between different 
disciplines and activate a synergic action or energy between them’18. It is not the aim or 
purpose o f this thesis to attempt to solve the definitional debate, however we do need to 
acknowledge and discuss the conceptual problems in order to clarify which o f the
11 See, for example, Europol, EU Organised Threat Assessment: OCTA 2011, The Hague, Europol, [no date], 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/puhlications/European Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTAVO 
CTA 2011.pdf [accessed 30/05/11].
u  See, for example, Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.
11 Paddy Rawlinson, ‘Understanding organized crime’ in Chris Hale, Keith Hayward, Azrini Wahidin and 
Emma Wincup, Criminology, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 323-324.
14 Albanese, op. at., p. 2.
15 See http://www.organized-crime.de/OCDEFl.htm [accessed 07/03/11].
16 Francesca Longo, ‘Discoursing otganized crime: Towards a two-level analysis’ in Felia Allum, Francesca 
Longo, Daniela Irrera and Panos A. Kostakos (eds.), Defining and Dejying O rganised Crime: Discourse, perceptions 
and reality, London and New Yotk, Roudedge, 2010, p. 15 citing Klaus von Lampe, ‘Not a process of 
enlightenment: the conceptual history of organized crime in Germany and the United States of America’, 
Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2,2001, pp. 99-116.
17 Longo, op. a t., p. 15.
18 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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understandings and definitions o f ‘organised crime’ are useful (or not) for our purposes.
We need to find some clarity because, essentially. Iiow we define has an impact on
perception’” and how we explain Vlll be coloured by what Dwight Smith refers to as “the
• • >20
entry point” o f  our discussion or investigation .
D efining ‘organised crime’ in Spain -  from  ‘organised crim e’ to ‘illicit 
enterprise* 
In sifting through the definitional debate, we could begin by acknowledging Van
Duyne and Vander Beken’s claim that the phrase 'organised crime’ is not a completely
outlandlish string o f words -  a. the very lease we have a general image o f what ‘otganised
crime’ may be from decades of popular movies and books on this phenomenon". Indeed.
to echo the opening sentence o f the UK’s 1993 O ^ m e d  C rim e O m firen ccA  T h rea
A sseem en t, 'organised crime' may be difficult to desct.be but. like an elephant, 'you know It
when you see if."  Yet, this does not help us to find conceptual clarity and so a
i , enforcement and academic definitions might prove more consideration o f  some legal/law enforcement
insightful.
Legal and law e n f o r c e m e n t  definitions
There exists a range o f legal definitions o f ‘organised crime' that are written or 
stated in some national penal codes and statutes, or t o .  are laid down by In,«national 
organisations that have law enforcement functions. In the USA, for example, the 
Racketeer Influenced and Com.pt Organizations legislation (RICO), which Is par. (Thle 
IX) o f the Organized Crime Control Act 1970, makes it an offence to acquire, operate or 
receive income from an ‘ent«prise’ through a ‘pattern o f racketeering activity". ‘Enterprise- 
can include an individual or agroup, ‘pattern’ means the commission o f a. leas, two o f the 
ap -ifled  crimes within a ten-year period, and ‘racketeering’ includes a wide array o f  
crimes” . As such, RICO has awrde application, which has been extended even further by 
case law. Indeed, it encompasses crimes committed by legitimate businesses and agencies
»  d S i Smith, Wtckersham to Sutherland to Katzenback: Evolving an "official"
M ,p .  332 ,cm n guw ^  and Social Chang, Vo\. 16,1991, pp. 135-154.definition for organized c r im e , i^nme, j-eu*_ . °  . , .. . .  , .
2i p c  van T. Vander Beken, The incantations of the EU organised crane policy making1, Crime,
Law & Social Chang, Vol. 51,2009, p. 263.^ JWW( * w* w -,----- . .
22 ^ e  Uriel, p 267 citing National Criminal Intelligence Service, Organised crime conference: A tinea! assessment; a 
summary o f  speeches'presented at the Police S taff College, Hampshire, 24* -26* May, United Kingdom, OICJ, 1993.
»  For further details regarding RICO, see, for example, Levi, The Organization of Serious Crimes', op. at.,
'  » » - -------------el A  L  r w l . ^ n l .  „  f L *  — ■*-—  -  *  J  * *.!     t )  ^  A*  U l  1 U 1 U 1 C I  u t i o s i r i ]  -pp. 883-884; Albanese, op. at., pp . 197-201; Howard Abadinsky, Organised Crime, 6*  edition, Belmont, CA, 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000; pp. 400-405; Joseph Wheatley, ‘Evolving perceptions oforganized 
crime: the use of RICO in the United States’ in Allum et cd, pp. 85-98. B
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and has been used to prosecute the criminal activities o f a county sheriff's department, 
abortion protesters and a state tax bureau, amongst other entines”. It has therefore been 
criticised, not least because its scope is seen as ‘overreaching’:
r Heading to the prosecution o f persons who, although they may have been 
involved in criminal behavior, are not by any stretch o f the miagmanon connected 
to organi2ed crime.
In this respect (and others), then, this American conceptualisation is too wide for die
purposes o f  this thesis and does not adequately reflect what is mean, by ‘organised crime-
in Spain. For example, more than one person is involved in die type o f ‘enterprise' with
which we are concerned (as will be discussed below, the criminal activities flourishing Spain
are undertaken b , groups or, at least, networks o f individuals). In that regard, die United
Nations (UN) definition is more accurate. Article 2 o f the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Oiganized Crime defines an ‘organised crime group' as:
r 1 a structured group o f three or more persons, existing for a period o f time and 
acting in concertwith the aim o f committing one or more senous cnmes or 
offences in accordance with dais Convention in order to obtain, d,reedy or 
indireedy, a financial or other matenal benefit.
‘Structured group' is to be considered in to  widest sense so as to encompass groups with a 
variety o f  stiuctures*. Although similarly quite broad, Inteipol's definition also has some
value. It defines ‘organised crime as.
r 1 onv eni-erorise or group o f persons engaged in a continuing illegal activity 
whicMias as to p rim al purpose die generation o f prof, ts and continuance o f die 
enterprise regardless o f national boundanes.
Definitions like diese are useful to an extent because they oudine some o f die 
purposes and activities o f ‘orgmised crime' and they underline that ‘organised crime' does 
not merely involve a random or spontaneous getting together o f  individuals for die 
commission o f a one-off offence. Generally, however, many o f the current definitions o f  
this type tend to be relatively ambiguous and much wider in scope than die academic ones 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. This is no. surprising given that their purpose 
is to provide a basis for die successful investigation and prosecution o f  the people engaged
24 Albanese, op. cit., p. 197.
Convention Agrian W n . t i o n d  O ^ s e d  Ctime 20Ü0. 
w r / / „  imriin documecidi.g/ccm eyQn. cafepdE
2^ S ^  mean a r f at; s n o t n x  K
immediate commission o f an offence and that does not need to have fonnally defined roles for its members,
continuity o f its membership or a developed structure • , . , ,   , .
2» See for example David L. Carter, ‘International Organized Come: Emerging Trends in Entrepreneunal
C „ Ï 3 i ' V »  » d  C r o ie  E. Ru.h ( .d r ) ,  id
R eader, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, Inc., 1997, p. 137.
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in ‘organised crime’. Much legislation is probably purposely written to cover a  wide set o f 
circumstances so as ‘to avoid the risk that any major criminal might “get away with it”’29. 
Yet, because o f their breadth, they do not provide the conceptual clarity needed for this 
thesis, and they do not take into account the fact that manifestations o f ‘organised crime’ 
differ from country to country. Indeed, as argued above, an analytically useful definition 
must be specific to time and place.
As a result, some countries have formulated their own definitions o f ‘organised 
crime’ (presumably reflecting the specific nature o f that phenomenon in their state). For 
example, the Dutch intelligence service views ‘organised crime’ as having eight progressive 
elements, the first being ‘any hierarchical structure’ and the last being ‘members who act 
violently against competitors’30 and the 1994 Swiss Penal Code defines a  criminal 
organisation as:
[ . . .]  an organization which keeps its structure and personnel a secret and whose 
aims are to commit criminal acts o f violence or procure financial advantage by 
criminal means.31
The working definition o f ‘organised crime’, used by Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt, and 
adopted by the Working Party o f Police and Judicial Authorities (AG Justiz/Polizei) in May 
1990, states that:
Organised crime is the planned commission o f criminal offences determined by the 
pursuit o f profit and power which, individually or as a whole, are o f  considerable 
importance if  more than two persons, each with his/her own assigned tasks, 
collaborate for a  prolonged or indefinite period o f time,
a) by using commercial or business-like structures,
b) by using force or other means o f intimidation or
c) by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial 
authorities or the business sector.32
The Serious Organised Crime Agency o f  the UK, however, aims to understand ‘organised 
crime’ in terms o f the physical, social, environmental, economic and structural ‘harm’ it 
poses at individual/local, community/regional and UK/intemational levels33 and, by way 
o f  definition, it claims that.
Organised crime is defined as ‘those involved, normally working with others, in 
continuing serious criminal activities for substantial profit, whether based in the
29 Levi, The Organization of Serious Crimes’ op. at., p. 882.
30 See Carter, op. a t., p. 137.
31 Maria Luisa Cesoni, ‘Mafia-Type Organizations: The Restoration of Rights as a Preventive Policy’ in Emilio 
C. Vtano (ed.), Global O rganised Crime and International Security, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999, p. 
161 citing 1994 Swiss Penal Code, Article 260ter.
32 See, for example, Bundeskriminalamt, Organised Crime 2008 N ational Situtation Report, Press Release Summary, 
Bundeskriminalamt, 2008,
hitp;//www,bka.de/lageberichte/ok/2008kf/laQebild ok 2008 knrzlaee englisrhpHf [arr^.s^d 30/04/11].
33 Serious Organised Crime Agpncy (SOCA), The United Kingdom Threat A ssessment o f Organised Crime 2009¡10, 
SOCA, http://www.soca. gov.uk/about-soca/library ?start=10 [accessed 01/05/11],
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UK or elsewhere’. Organised criminals that work together for the duration o f  a 
particular criminal activity or activities are what we call an organised crime group .34
Although there are some similar variables contained in definitions such as these (relating to 
structure, use o f violence, motivation, and so on), it is nevertheless apparent that different 
states emphasise different elements when conceptualising ‘organised crime’ and that 
definitions, essentially, vary. Although this is appropriate (if it reflects the different 
manifestations o f ‘organised crime’ in respective states), it nevertheless highlights a lack o f 
definitional consensus in the legal sphere. Within the European Union (EU) alone, for 
example, ‘organised crime’ is defined quite differently within the national criminal laws o f 
its member states, and some member states do not appear to have their own formal 
definition o f ‘organised crime’ at all. Unfortunately, for our purposes, Spain is one such 
member state (although there have been some positive moves in the right direction in this 
regard since 2010) -  as will be discussed in Chapter 5, although L ey O rganica 5/2010 de 22 de 
ju n io , (which modified L ey O rgdnica 10/1995 de 23 d e noriem bre o f the Penal Code, and which 
came into force in December 2010) now defines ‘criminal organisation’35, the primary piece 
o f criminal legislation, the Penal Code, still does not contain a definition o f ‘organised 
crime’ and, until 2010, only Article 282(4) to  o f the L ey de E njuiciam iento C rim inal (Criminal 
Procedure Law) relating to Spain’s use o f  undercover agents offered some indications of 
what ‘organised crime’ might mean in those particular circumstances. Indeed, it will be 
argued later in this thesis that the lack o f a clear and formal definition o f ‘organised crime’ 
in Spain itself may contribute to the vulnerabilities apparent in the legal sphere which, it 
will be argued, facilitate ‘organised’ criminal activity in Spain. For the purposes o f this 
chapter, though, this means that we have to search outside o f the primary Spanish 
legislation to find an entirely clear entry point for our discussion. Furthermore, in the 
absence o f a formal definition o f ‘organised crime’, it is unclear how the Spanish state and 
its citizens conceptualise the types o f  criminal activities and behaviours discussed in this 
thesis. However, when specifically asked which one o f  three given definitions 
corresponded most closely to how they defined and understood the term ‘organised 
crime’36 37, three respondents chose the definition contained in Article 282(4) to 37 o f  the L ey de 
E njuiciam iento C rim inal relating to Spain’s use o f undercover agents, and two respondents 
indicated a preference for the UN definition discussed above38 *. The majority o f the
34 Serious Organised Crime Agency, Home -  Threats -  Organised crime groups’, 2011, 
http://ww.soca.gov.uk/threats /organised-crime-groups [accessed 01/05/11],
35 In Article 570 bis.
36 See Appendices C and D.
37 Questionnaires QH, QJ and QL.
3* Questionnaires QC and QK.
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questionnaire respondents (six o f the thirteen) answered that it was the EU definition”  and 
another two respondents stated that all three o f  the definitions corresponded to their 
understanding” . It is clear, then, that the EU definition o f  'organised crime' has some 
value in Spain (and this was confirmed in a recent Ministry o f  the Interior document", 
which used the eleven-point definition discussed below), but does it accurately depict the 
nature o f  ‘organised crime* there?
A  joint report from the European Commission and Europol, published in 2001", 
highlighted the significance o f  a harmonised definition o f  'otganised crime' within the EU. 
As a means o f  developing a 'union-wide' approach to the problem«, it laid down eleven 
characteristics as a mechanism for defining 'organised crime’, o f  which at least six had to be 
met. The first four were classed as mandatory:
1. collaboration among more than two people;
2. extending over a prolonged or indefinite period o f  time;
3. suspected o f  committing serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for 
at least four years or a more serious penalty; and
4. the central goal is profit and/or power.
_  . . were classed as optional criteria, but at least two o f theseThe remaining seven indicators uas&cu
also had to be met:
5. specialised division o f  labour among participants;
6. exercising measures o f  discipline or control;
7. employing violence or other means o f  intimidation;
8. employing commercial or business-like structures;
9. participating in money laundering;
10. operational across national borders;
11. exerting influence over legitimate social institutions (polity, government, justice, 
economy).* 44
This approach marked the EU*s clear will to shape national definitions as a means o f  
developing standardised security mechanisms45 but, in taking this approach, the EU 
produced a broad and vague definition. Thus, as Ixvi summarises:
59 Questionnaires QA, QB, QE, QG, QI
«  S h i e m T i E d e l  Interior (MIR)), C om ported* lucha contra e l crimen orgam ydo en Esparfa,
201Q/pdf/bal .Crimea stre m ta l Q. nwiembre..prcse
maciQl ipdf [accessed ^ 0/^4/1 , 7~owards a  European Strategy to Prevent Organised Crime, Commission Staff
« E u r o p e a n ^ X ' mmission and Europol,SEC433,2001.
«  ^  Hdenic’aMpico/The evolution of the European Union's understanding of oiganized crime and its 
embedment in EU discourse in Atlum f t  d , PP- 50-51
44 European Commission and Eutopol, op. at..
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Within the EU definition, provided that they work over a prolonged period o f  time 
-  however long that is -  ‘organized crime’ can mean anything from major Italian 
syndicates in sharp suits or peasant garb, to three very menacing burglars with a 
window-cleaning business who differentiate by having one as look-out, another as 
burglar, and a third as money-launderer, and who sue every newspaper who 
suggests that their business is disreputable!45 6
This definition was, until very recently, also used by Europol, which, in addition to 
investigating organised or ‘serious’ crime involving more than one EU member state, 
oversees the compilation o f data received from member states for the annual (formerly) 
Organised Crime Situation Reports (OCSRs) and (since 2006) the Organised Crime Threat 
Assessments (OCTAs)47. Several problems have been identified in relation to the 
respective OCTAs4®, and the OCSRs before them. Not least, and as van Duyne and 
Vander Beken argue, the validity o f the OCTA, for example, hinges on the validity o f  the 
definition o f ‘organised crime’ used to formulate it49. Thus, the broadness o f the eleven- 
point definition as a whole, and the ‘ambiguous, badly delineated, redundant or 
overlapping’50 components within it, underline the need to be more precise when defining 
‘organised crime’. In relation to the vocabulary used in policies on police cooperation, 
however, it would appear that Europol and the EU are now favouring a lexicon that is even 
less precise.
Indeed, recently, as the legal basis o f Europol has changed (from being 
underpinned by a Convention to a Decision) and the financing o f  it has moved from 
member state contributions to the Community budget, there has also been a shift in the 
vocabulary within which policies on EU police cooperation are articulated: a shift from 
‘organised crime’ to ‘serious crime ’.51 As Dom explains, with the aim o f easing the support 
provided to EU member states in relation to cross-border criminal investigations where the 
involvement of ‘organised crime’ is not demonstrated from the start, Europol’s sphere o f 
competence has changed from those crimes which are ‘organised’ to a wider set o f criminal 
acts that are considered to be ‘serious’ even if  they do not meet the criteria for ‘organised 
crime’ (for example, alongside a number o f crimes that are commonly regarded as
45 Carrapifo, op. at., p. 51.
46 Levi, The Organization of Serious Crimes’, op. at., p. 883.
47 Roberto Gonella, The Role of Europol in Fighting Organised Crime’, paper presented at the 2nd General 
Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (Section 19: Organised Crime, Politics and 
Civil Society), Philipps-Universität, Marburg, Germany, 18/09/03 — 21/09/03.
48 See, for example, van Duyne and Vander Beken, op. at.. See also Frank Gregory, ‘Classify, report and 
measure: The UK Organised Crime Notification Scheme’ in Adam Edwards and Peter Gill (eds.), 
Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on globa l security, (paperback edition), London and New York, 
Routledge, 2006, pp. 78-96.
49 Van Duyne and Vander Beken, op. a t., p. 274.
50 Ibid., p. 269.
51 See Nicholas Dom, The end of organised crime in the European Union’, Crime, Law & Social Change Vol 
51,2009, pp. 283-295.
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belonging to ‘organised crime’, the Europol Decision also includes, for example, terrorism, 
racism and xenophobia, rape, arson and the unlawful seizure o f aircraft/ships)52 53. Dorn 
sees this shift in the EU’s vocabulary -  a shift, he argues, that can also be expected to 
change police vocabulary55 56— as marking the ‘end’ or the ‘impending fall’54 o f the use o f the 
term ‘organised crime’. Whether that ends up being the case remains to be seen but 
Europol’s move away from ‘organised crime’ certainly might prove beneficial in practical 
and political terms by avoiding the acknowledged problems associated with the concept, 
such as:
[...] its fuzzy boundaries (how many people? over what time period? with or without 
threats or violence? etc!); its political partiality (tendency to focus upon foreigners 
and away from corporate crime); and the difficulties o f reporting against it in a 
meaningful and consistent manner. The concept generates more heat than light. It 
causes difficulties for police priority-setting, management, intelligence, reporting -  
and hence for the prospects for accountability.55
For the purposes o f  this thesis, however, the adoption o f the term ‘serious crime’ is not 
appropriate. This is because although there is no doubt that ‘serious’ crime can, and does, 
include ‘organised crime’, it also includes criminal activity outside the scope o f this thesis 
and outside the scope o f what is usually regarded as ‘organised crime’ (such as terrorism, 
rape, arson, and so on, as detailed above). Terrorism, for example, can be distinguished 
from ‘organised crime’ on the basis o f the motivations o f  those involved in these respective 
forms o f  crime. As Abadinsky points out, so-called organised crime groups are ‘not 
motivated by social doctrine, political beliefs, or ideological concerns [ . . . ] ’“ . Their goals 
are money and/or power. This distinguishes ‘organised crime’ groups from other 
organised groups that violate the law for other purposes, such as terrorist organisations. In 
some instances, ‘organised crime’ and terrorist groups may collaborate and exchange illegal 
goods but ‘organised crime’ groups:
[do] not have political agendas o f their own [...] They [do] not espouse a particular 
radical, liberal, conservative, or other political ideology.57
‘Serious’ crime, therefore, is too wide a term to use in this thesis. We need to find a better 
descriptor, and the academic definitions o f ‘organised crime’ could allow us to do that.
52 Ibid., pp. 286-287.
53 Ibid., p. 287.
54 Ibid., p. 283.
55 Ibid., p. 292.
56 Abadinsky, op. tit., pp. 1-Z
57 Longo, op. tit., p. 17, citing J. O. Ftnckenauer, *Problems of definition: what is organized crime?1, Trends in 
O rganised Crime, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 65.
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Academic definitions
The approach to defining ‘organised crime’ in the academic literature, however, is 
haphazard. Although definitions can be classified in all sorts o f ways, for example by 
perspective: economic, social, political, legal, national, international and so on, the main 
problem appears to lie in the fact that some definitions focus on who is involved in 
organised crime (that is, the criminal groups), whilst others focus on what is involved (that 
is, the criminal activities and behaviours).
The ‘w ho’ question — who is involved in  ‘organised crim e ?
Many o f the definitions and models o f organised crime which tend to focus on the
Svho’ question emphasise the way in which ‘organised crime’ is organised and the structural
make-up o f criminal groups (matters over which there have been some considerable
disagreement). The hierarchical model5® o f organised crime, for example, generally depicts
‘organised crime’ as a violent group o f criminals who act together on a long-term basis, as
stereotypically portrayed in popular discourse by films and novels such as The Godfather.
This model o f organised crime was perhaps firstly, and certainly most notoriously,
proposed to account for Italian-American criminal activity in the USA. It describes
‘organised crime’ as a single monopolistic unit or ‘Mafia’, imported to the USA by Italian
immigrants, which has a corporate or government-like hierarchical structure, based on a
division o f labour (with individuals having specialised functions and skills), and governed
by secrecy, initiation rituals, formal rules o f behaviour and an unwritten code o f  honour. It
first came to light in 1950 when US Senator Estes Kefauver, recognising the importance o f
‘organised crime’ as a national policy issue, chaired a Special Senate Committee to
investigate the phenomenon. The ‘FCefauver Committee’ held live televised hearings across
the country (creating huge publicity) and concluded:
There is a sinister criminal organization known as the Mafia operating throughout 
the country with ties in other nations in the opinion o f the committee. The Mafia 
is a direct descendant o f a criminal organization o f  the same name operating in the 
island o f Sicily [.. .].58 9
In reality, it seems that the Committee’s conclusions were based more on the opinions o f 
the testifying law enforcement officials than on hard evidence, but this ‘mafia mystique’60, 
or alien conspiracy theory, was accepted wholeheartedly by the American public and the
58 Albanese {op. at., p. 77) refers to a 'hierarchical model’, but other authors also variously refer to this model 
as the ‘bureaucratic’, ‘corporate’ or ‘alien conspiracy* model
59 Albanese, op. at., pp. 100-101, quoting US Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in 
Interstate Commerce, Third Interim Report, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 2.
60 Dwight G Smith, ‘Some Things That May be More Important to Understand about Organized Crime than 
Cosa Nostra’, University o f Florida Law Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 1,1971, p. 6.
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concept o f  the ‘Mafia’ was catapulted to the forefront o f public concern, for a while at 
least61. In November 1957, public and official concern was reawakened when 58 Italians 
(some with criminal records) met at the home o f Joseph Barbara in Apalachin, New York. 
In a blaze o f publicity, this was heralded as a meeting of, and therefore evidence of, a 
‘Mafia’, although, once more, the event merely cemented public attitudes about the 
existence o f an alien conspiracy rather than presenting any real evidence62.
What really gave the concept a boost, however, was Joseph Valachi’s testimony 
before a Senate Sub-Committee on Investigations in 1963 (Valachi was a lower-level 
criminal associated with the Genovese crime ‘family’ who turned government informer). 
Valachi testified to the existence o f a nation-wide organisation that was engaged in 
widespread criminal activity, called L a Cosa N ostra (which was taken to be an alternative 
name for ‘Mafia’). He gave details o f  the hierarchical structure o f this organisation and 
described how this new ‘Mafia’ had emerged: from a bloody power struggle amongst 
criminal gangs that took place in 1931 (known as the Castellammarese War). Although 
Valachi’s testimony has been criticised for being uncorroborated, inconsistent and 
fundamentally flawed, his version o f events ‘proved a godsend for government officials 
seeking a hook upon which to hang Kefauver and Apalachin’63. I Iis testimony was 
accepted and it served as a basis for subsequent theories about ‘organised crime’ in the 
USA64. Predominantly, the conclusions o f the President’s Commission’s Task Force 
Report o f 196765 relied heavily on the revelations o f Valachi and the assertions o f 
Kefauver. The report concluded that:
Today the core o f organized crime in the United States consists o f 24 groups 
operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation. Their membership is 
exclusively men o f Italian descent, they are in frequent communication with each 
other, and their smooth functioning is insured by a national body o f  overseers.66
The report also detailed the hierarchical and corporate structure o f each criminal group or 
‘family’, which was based on a division o f labour and code o f  conduct, and which, it 
claimed, resembled that o f Mafia groups operating in Sicily67. It also described a ruling
61 See, for example, Albanese, op. at., p. 77 and pp. 100-103; Abadinsky, op. at., pp. 440-443; Dick Hobbs, 
‘Criminal Collaboration: Youth Gangs, Subcultures, Professional Criminals, and Organized Crime’ in Mike 
Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 2nd edition, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 826.
62 For further details o f the Apalachin incident see, for example, Albanese, op. at., pp. 103-107; Hobbs, op. at., 
p. 826.
“  Hobbs, op. at., p. 827.
64 For further details o f Valachi’s testimony, including its inconsistencies and flaws, see, for example, 
Albanese, op. at., pp. 107-110; Hobbs, op. at., p. 827; Abadinsky, op. at., pp. 443-444.
65 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task F ora Report: O rganised 
Crime, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1967.
66 Ibid., p. 6.
67 Ibid , pp. 7-10.
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body, which it called a ‘Commission’, that served to solve organisational and jurisdictional 
disputes between the groups68. At a time Svhen the collected knowledge o f organized 
crime could be found on a single shelf in a library’69, the conclusions o f the report and the 
subsequent books and articles written by some o f the Task Force consultants and authors 
o f the report’s appendices (notably Donald Cressey)70, which promoted the model and 
provided it with scholarly legitimacy, proved very influential. In total, these works defined 
and influenced the study and understanding o f ‘organised crime’ in the USA well into the 
1970s71 and even beyond72.
Although it is the case that other ‘organised crime’ groups outside o f the USA have 
also been described as having a hierarchical and bureaucratic structure, the hierarchical 
model has been widely criticised. Predominantly, and as previously indicated, some 
commentators have particularly highlighted how Valachi’s testimony was fundamentally 
flawed in many respects73 and yet the President’s Commission o f 1967, and scholars such 
as Cressey, appeared to rely on and repeat this evidence, without presenting any other 
original empirical data in support o f the hierarchical model. As such, Reuter voiced the 
concerns o f many when he concluded that the theory behind the model had ‘never been 
well developed or subject to rigorous testing’74. Varese, however, has recently argued that, 
in terms o f his reliance on the Valachi testimony at least, Cressey ‘should be given a 
suspended sentence’75. He points to the fact that Cressey, himself, acknowledged that 
Valachi’s testimony was contradictory at times and that the statements contained in the 
testimony were often the product o f interactions whereby senators interrupted Valachi and
68 Ibid., p. 8.
69 Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, ‘Introduction’ in Ryan and Rush, op. at., p. x.
70 For example, Donald R. Cressey, Theft o f the Nation: The Structure and Operations o f  O rganised Crime in America, 
New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1969; Donald R. Cressey, Criminal Organisation: Its Elementary Forms, 
New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1972; Ralph Salerno and John S. Tompkins, The Crime Confederation: 
Cosa N ostra and A llied Operations in O rganised Crime, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1969; Thomas C. 
Schelling, What is the Business of Organized Crime?’, American Scholar, 1971, pp. 175-184; Schelling, Choice 
and Consequence, op. at..
71 See, for example, Peter A. Lupsha, ‘Organized Crime in the United States’ in Kelly, Organised Crime: A 
Global Perspective, op. a t., p. 37.
72 See, for example, Thomas A. Firestone, ‘Mafia Memoirs: What They Tell Us About Organized Crime* in 
Ryan and Rush, op. cit., p. 77 (quoting President’s Commission on Organized Crime, The Impact: Organised 
Crime Today, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 26-27); Charles H. Rogovin and 
Frederick T. Martens, The Evil That Men Do’ in Ryan and Rush, op. cit., p. 32.
73 For a detailed criticism of Valachi’s testimony and the other evidence used to support the hierarchical 
model, see Joseph L. Albini, The American M afia: Genesis o f d  Legend, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1971, pp. 225-258. See also, for example, Albanese, op. a t., pp. 78-79.
74 Peter Reuter, D isorganised Crime: The Economics o f the Visible I land, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT 
Press, 1983, p. 7.
75 Federico Varese, ‘General Introduction: What is organized crime?’ in Federico Varese (ed.), Organised Crime, 
(Critical Concepts in Criminology series), London, Roudedge, 2010, p. 11, available at: 
http://www.sociolopv.ox.ac.uk/documents/people/matcrials/varescf/What is Organized Crime- 
Introduction.pdf (accessed 06/04/11).
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often then failed to return to issues that he had raised76. Moreover, recent evaluations o f 
Valachi’s testimony suggest that, in many parts, it was consistent with, and was 
corroborated by, other sources77.
Nevertheless, beginning in the 1970s, numerous pieces o f research were 
subsequently undertaken (that relied on sources outside o f the US government) whose 
findings appeared to contradict the hierarchical model. The patron-client model78 o f 
organised crime, for example, defines and describes ‘organised crime’, not as a large 
controlling hierarchy, but as a *10086 agglomeration’79 o f criminals based on cultural, ethnic 
or economic ties. According to this model, there appears to be no national crime syndicate 
that connects individual criminal groups to each other. Instead, there is merely a series o f 
relatively independent, informally coordinated, entities. The first proponent o f this view 
appears to be Albini. As well as refuting the claim that the Mafia was imported to the USA 
by Sicilian immigrants80, he argues that;
Rather than being a rigidly bureaucratized national organization, syndicates in the 
United States are more adequately understood in terms o f patron-client 
relationships within and between syndicates.81
In such relationships, the roles, expectations and benefits o f the participants are based 
upon agreement or obligation. At roughly the same time, Ianni’s research into an 
‘organised’ crime family in Brooklyn also concluded that groups appeared not to be 
bureaucratic and this work reinforced the existence o f patron-client ties, as described by 
Albini82. Others have also found that ‘organised crime’ groups tend to display largely 
informal or ‘disorganised’ structures. For example, Haller described the illegal enterprises 
o f Italian crime families in the USA as ‘informally organized’83 and, from a study o f ‘upper 
level’ drug smugglers in the south west o f the USA, Adler concluded that ‘illicit markets are
76 Ibid., citing Donald R. Cressey, Theß o fa  N ation: The Structure and Operations o f O rga n ici Crime in America,
New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1969, p. 37.
77 Varese, op. tit., p. 11, citing David Critchley, The Origins o f O rganised Crime in America: The New York City 
Mafia, 1891-1931, London and New York, Roudedge, 2009; Nick Gentile, Vita d i Capomafia: Memorie raccolte da 
Felice ChUente, Roma, Crescenzi Allendorf, [1963] 1993; Joseph Bonanno (with Sergio Lalli), A Alan o f H onour 
The Autobiography o f Joseph Bonanno, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983.
78 Also referred to in die literature as the ‘patrimonial’ or ‘feudal’ model.
79 Firestone, op. tit., p. 77.
80 See Albini, op. tit..
81 Ibid., p. 223.
82 See Albanese, op. tit., p. 81; Lupsha, op. tit., p. 38; Abadinsky, op. tit., p.8, all quoting Francis A  J. Ianni with 
Elizabeth R. Reuss-Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship and Sodai Control in O rganised Crime, New York, New 
American library, 1972. See also Firestone, op. tit., p. 78, quoting Francis A. J. Ianni, The Malia and the Web 
of Kinship’ in Francis A  J. Ianni and Elizabeth R. Reuss-Ianni, The Crime Society: O rganised Crime and Corruption 
in  America, New York, New American Library, 1976, p. 55.
83 Mark H. Haller, ‘Bureaucracy and the Mafia; An Alternative View’ in Ryan and Rush, op. tit., p. 55.
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populated by individual entrepreneurs and small organizations rather than massive, 
centrally organized bureaucracies’84.
These definitions/models, which emphasise the structural makeup o f criminal 
groups, are useful in so far as they underline the different ways in which criminal groups 
can be ‘organised’. It is clear that members o f  a criminal group will not engage in random 
behaviour but will carry out their activities in a coordinated and united way, which will be 
facilitated by the group having some kind o f bonding and structure. However, as we have 
seen above, the organisational structure o f  a group is not standardised. Some ‘organised 
crime’ groups may have a hierarchical structure that involves specialisation and a clear 
division o f labour, and they may use secret codes and engage in rituals as bonding 
mechanisms. Other groups, however, may have a looser organisational structure, as 
described by the patron-client model, with members ‘glued’ together by ethnic, regional, 
cultural or economic ties. Some criminal groups may even combine elements o f both and 
have, for example, a hierarchical structure at some levels with a more fluid network 
structure at the lower levels85 *. What is clear is that ‘organised crime’ does not involve just 
one type o f group with one type o f  structure; a variety o f organisational formats can be 
used to participate in ‘organised crime’, and it is rational that a criminal group will employ a 
structure that is best designed to carry out its purposes.
This rationality may explain why, since the 1990s (at least), a more general or broad 
term has started to appear in the organised crime research, as more and more studies have 
focussed on the ‘network’ structure o f criminal groups and associations84. For criminal 
groups, networks are beneficial as they are less likely (than hierarchies, for example) to 
attract attention and can be disassembled and then reassembled quickly and in different 
forms87. During the 1990s and 2000s, therefore, the description o f ‘network’ came to be 
included in a number o f definitions o f ‘organised crime’88. I Iowever, this may not aid 
clarity as Varese, for example, argues that network perspectives conceptualise ‘organised
M Patricia A. Adler, Whetting and Dealing: An Ethnography o f  an Upper-Level Drug Dealing and Smuggling Commutât), 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 82.
85 Phil Williams and Ernesto U. Savona (eds.), The United Nations and Transnational O rganised Crime, London 
and Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996, p. 4.
“ Varese, op. at., p. 7, citing Gary W. Potter, Criminal Organizations: V ia, Racketeering, and Politics in an American 
City, Prospect Heights, IL, Waveland Press, 1994; James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, Russian M afia in 
A merica: Immigration, Culture and Crime, Boston, North Eastern University Press, 1998; N. Coles, 'It’s not what 
you know — it’s who you know that counts: Analysing serious crime groups as social networks’, British jou rna l o f 
Criminology, Vol. 41, No. 4,2001, pp. 580-594; Klaus von Lampe, ‘Criminally exploitable ties: A network 
approach to organized crime’ in Emilio G Viano, José Magallanes and Laurent Bidel (eds.), Transnational 
Organized Crime: Myth, Power and Profit, Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2003, pp. 9-22; Edmund 
Chattoe and Heather Hamill, ‘It’s not who you know — It’s what you know about people you don’t know that 
counts’, British Journal o f  Criminology, Vol. 45, No. 6,2005, pp. 860-876.
87 Rawlinson, op. dt., p. 331.
88 According to Varese, ‘network’ appeared in 3.4 per cent of the definitions from the 1990s that he reviewed, 
and in 5.2 percent of the definitions from the 2000s. See Varese, op.cit., p. 7.
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crime1 too broadly". Similarly. Levi emphasises that it is not always clear what is meant by 
the terms 'network’ or 'networking”“. The literature review o f upper-level drng trafficking 
undertaken by Dorn H at', for example, indicates that there would appear to be at least 
three common uses for the term 'network1. Firstly, the term is sometimes used as a way o f 
describing the structure and/or everyday workings o f the market as whole -  that is, 
through networking, traffickers construct the maritet Secondly, the term is sometimes 
used as a way o f  describing drug markets as being made up of independent small groups or 
individuals. Thirdly, the term is sometimes used as away o f referring to the durability or 
otherwise o f criminals’ organisational and other arrangements, when these are seen as ever- 
changing and impermanent •
Thus, the hierarchical model and the patron-client model (and, in some cases, the 
network perspective), although distinct and contrasting in their descriptions o f the 
organisation o f criminal groups (particularly in terms o f their structures), have all emerged 
from a tendency to define and understand ’organised crime’ by focussing on the groups 
involved in i, and, in some cases, from attempts to understand particular groups (such as 
the American Mafia, as seen above). However, (and assuming that the data was available to 
do so) it is difficult to understand the entirety of 'organised crime’ if we just look at one 
group, or a few, and formulate a definition based on its particular characteristics, structure 
and firnctions. Clearly, 'otganised crime’ groups are likely to differ in these respects. 
Although we can leant a lot by analysing individual groups, we cannot, for example, 
compare the so-called Colombian cartels and the Russian mafias, or even the Comm, and 
■Ndnongheta (both Italian 'otgmised crime’ groups) and formulate a definition o f 'organised 
crime' from this, in die same way that we cannot (to use I Jailer’s terminology“) compare 
apples and oranges. Therefore, an alternative approach to understandmg 'organised crime’ 
will now be considered.
The ‘what'question-whatdoes ‘ogam ed a im ’ dot
Turning now to the ‘what’ question, other academic definitions focus on the 
activities, rather than the groups, involved in ‘organised crime’ and it is argued here that 
this approach will help us to better understand the specific type o f 'organised enme’ tha, 
flourishes m Spain. Indeed, Smith atgues tha. this approach, generally, is a better ‘entry 89*123
89 ibid., p. 13. . . /- ■ „ „„a Terrorism’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner
"  S“  Lrti. 'O r g » ^ C r n *  n n d O x f o r d  University Press, 2007, pp. 788-789.
Home Office Online Report
91 N. Dorn, M. Levi and L* King, TWrtnrate UK- 2005
22/05, Home Office Research Development and Stahst.cs Drrectorate, UK, 2005.
92 Ibid..
93 See Haller, op. at., p. 57.
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point’ for an understanding o f ‘organised crime’94. He focuses on the distinction between 
the events called organised crime (the activities, or the “what’ question) and the people called 
organised crime (the groups, or the Svho’ question) and contends that the distinction is 
‘critical’:
The observer who looks first at events and then at the persons associated with 
them is more likely to adopt a scientific, value-free and causal analytic style. The 
observer who defines a universe by die people it contains is more prone to bias and 
to nontestable assumptions -  in short, to conclusions that are based more on 
ideology than on logic.95
In relation to the activities involved in ‘organised crime’, Varese’s content analysis 
o f  115  definitions o f ‘organised crime’ shows that references to ‘enterprise’ started to 
appear in definitions in the 1970s and have continued to grow in subsequent decades96. In 
fact, from around this time, we can identify the emergence o f  an enterprise model o f  
organised crime in academic publications, which emphasises the business dimension o f  
‘organised crime’ and describes how economic concerns and considerations are the primary 
causes o f  criminal behaviour. From this perspective, it is economic relationships, rather 
than personal ones (no matter whether they are based on hierarchy or ethnicity), that form  
the basis o f  ‘organised crime’ activity97. This model is probably most associated with 
Smith, who developed a ‘spectrum-based theory o f  enterprise’98 9to show that criminal 
groups have the same objectives and form in the same ways as legitimate businesses. As 
Williams and Godson explain:
There is a continuum o f  business enterprises from licit firms which engage solely in 
licit businesses, through licit firms which sometimes act in illicit ways, to illicit firms 
which operate in illegal markets and provide prohibited or highly regulated goods 
and services. [...] wherever enterprises fall on the licit-illicit continuum they 
behave in essentially similar ways [...]."
Therefore, although ‘organised crime’ groups (or ‘criminal enterprises’) and legitimate 
businesses possess different characteristics and deal in different types o f  commodity, the 
former essentially mirrors the latter because, for example, both rationally search for
94 Smith, “Wicket-sham to Sutherland to Katzenback: Evolving an “official” definition for organized crime’, op. 
at., pp. 135-154.
95 Ibid., p. 136.
96 Varese, op. at., p. 7.
97 See Albanese, op. a t., pp. 83-84.
98 See Albanese, op. cit., p. 83; Dwight C  Smith, ‘Oiganized Crime and Entrepreneurship’, International journal 
o f  Criminology and Penology, Vol. 6,1978, pp. 161-177; Dwight C. Smith, ‘Paragons, Pariahs, and Pirates: A 
Spectrum-Based Theory of Enterprise’, Crime and Delinquent?), Vol. 26,1980, pp. 358-386; Dwight C. Smith, 
The M afia Mystique, Revised edition, Lanham, MD, University Press o f America, 1990; Smith, ‘Some Things 
That May be More Important to Understand about Organized Crime than Cosa Nostra’, op. a t:. Smith, 
‘Wickersham to Sutherland to Katzenbach: Evolving an “Official” Definition for Organized Crime’, op. at., 
pp. 135-154.-'
99 Phil Williams and Roy Godson, ‘Anticipating Organized and Transnational Crime’, Crime, lam ' & Social 
Change, Vol. 37,2002, p. 324.
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opportunities to maintain and extend their share o f  the market and both seek to maximise 
their profits by responding to the needs and demands o f  suppliers and customers100 10.
From an enterprise perspective, therefore, which (instead o f focussing on actors) 
generally focuses on the activities involved in ‘organised crime’ (and, more specifically, on 
the business activities), certain types o f  ‘organised crime’ behaviour are emphasised, which 
can be categorised as follows:
The provision o f  illic it goods
Some criminal groups are involved in providing goods that some segments o f  
society desire but cannot easily acquire because the goods are illegal or regulated. 
Predominantly, this includes all kinds o f  drugs but could also, for example, include arms 
and nuclear material, and certain flora and fauna.
The provision o f  lic it goods th a t h aw  been acquired through illic it means
Some criminal groups are also involved in providing goods that are acquired 
through theft (such as stolen vehicles or antiquities) and through fraud (such as a whole 
range o f  counterfeit products, from documents and credit cards to DVDs). Some 
members o f  the public also wish to purchase goods (such as cigarettes and alcohol) at the 
lowest possible price. Likewise, some criminal groups provide these goods, which in 
themselves would be licit had they not been acquired through tax evasion and smuggling.
The provision o f  illic it services
Albanese, like others, highlights that some criminal groups are also involved in 
satisfying the public’s demand for money (through loan sharking301), sex (through 
prostitution) and gambling (other than that which is permitted by the state), which 
legitimate society does not fulfill102. Other examples in this category could include a 
criminal group’s involvement in illegal toxic waste dumping, or its involvement in illegally 
transporting people who want, or need, to be somewhere else.
As a provider o f  goods and services, then, Rawlinson argues that ‘organised crime’ 
can be seen as ‘primarily a reactiw  phenomenon, exploiting gaps in a diverse and lucrative 
market’103 *whose clientele are either ‘“ordinary” folk who seek, or are forced to seek, 
alternative routes to satisfying needs unmet or proscribed by the legislatures o f  the
100 See ibid:, Albanese, op. at., p.83
101 Albanese defines loan sharking as 'the lending of money to individuals at an interest rate in excess of that
permitted by law’. See Albanese, op. at., p. 5.
™Ibtd.
i0S Rawlinson, op. a t., p. 326.
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The case o f  Galicia shows how drug trafficking has become particularly established 
in that region. Here, drug trafficking activities have evolved from a tradition o f  smuggling, 
which perhaps dates back to the time o f  the Civil War (1936-1939)n0. Traditionally, 
smuggling involved products such as food, medicine, clothing, minerals, illegal alcohol and, 
mainly, tobacco"1, which earned the smugglers reputations as public benefactors, giving 
them prestige and arousing the admiration o f  the local population"2. Tempted by the 
profits to be made, however, Galicia’s smuggling groups, known as ‘clans’"3, gradually 
moved from the smuggling o f  socially acceptable commodities to more ominous activities. 
During the 1960s, having discovered the benefits o f  American tobacco, Galicia’s smugglers 
were already starting to deal with other criminal organisations dedicated to this activity and 
beginning to employ money laundering techniques, and they were also expanding their 
distribution networks into the rest o f  Spain"4. Later, and using the existing traditional 
smuggling structures, they also expanded into the trafficking o f  drugs"5 and, during the 
1980s, Galicia’s smugglers embarked upon a long-lasting (but, sometimes, shaky) 
relationship with the Colombian cocaine cartels. This relationship evolved in light o f  the 
increasing saturation o f  the North American cocaine market. Because o f  this, the clans in 
Galicia held the key to something that the Colombians badly wanted: the unexploited 
European market. In return, the Colombians could offer a product that would 
phenomenally increase the profits o f  Galicia’s gangs"6 and, at this time, Galicia’s smugglers 
were in search o f  a new business venture. One o f  the interview sources, for example, 
related how the price o f  their smuggled tobacco had been lowered by the introduction o f  
fake American cigarettes into Europe (by Eastern European smugglers), which forced the 
local smugglers to again search for more profitable activities117. Subsequently, during the 
mid 1980s, two large police operations against illegal tobacco smuggling were carried out in 
Galicia. A  large number o f  people were arrested in these operations and imprisoned"8. 10*45
110 Carlos Resa-Nestares, Transnational Organized Crime in Spain: Structural Factors Explaining its 
Penetration’ in Emilio C. Viano (ed.), Global Organised Crime and International Security, Aldershot, Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 1999, p. 53.
111 See, for example, ib id . This point was also raised during Interviews J1 and M l.
1,2 See Resa-Nestares, op. at., pp. 53-54.
115 Interview J2. According to Gomez-Cespedes and Stangeland, these groups are structured in hierarchical 
clusters. See Alejandra Gomez-Cespedes and Per Stangeland, ‘Spain: The nourishing Illegal Drug I Iaven in 
Europe’ in Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Po&cies 
in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer, 3004, p. 399.
114 See Resa-Nestares, op. tit., p. 53.
115 Interviews PI, P3 and P17.
116 Resa-Nestares, op. at., p. 54; Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), ‘Spain: Drug Gateway to 
Europe’, The World Geopolitics o f  Drugs 1998/1999 Annual Report: IV. Europe, April 2000, p. 89,
Transnational Organised Crime in the Age of Globalisation: A Case Study of the Colombian Cartels and 
Russian Mafias in Spain’, Grotius, No. 1,2004, pp. 93-108.
117 Interview M l.
118 During interview M l, it was stated that more than 300 people were arrested in each of these operations.
-51  -
According to the interview source, whilst in prison, Galicia’s smugglers met, and formed 
alliances, with Colombian traffickers and, thus, the new relationship was formed119. From 
then on, Galicia became one o f  the main points o f  entry o f  cocaine into Europe120 and the 
involvement o f  Galicia’s smugglers in this trade has continued to this day121, reaching 
unprecedented heights in the late 1990s122.
According to several sources, it seems that cocaine trafficking operations initially 
worked in the following way: the Colombian traffickers would convey the cocaine to 
Central America123 or the Caribbean124, where it would be picked up by Galicia’s smugglers 
and trafficked into Spain (more recently, West Africa has emerged as a regional transit hub 
for the trafficking o f  cocaine to Spain)125. Ships, flying flags o f  third countries, would 
transport the cocaine across the Atlantic and then it would either be collected in the high 
seas and brought to Galicia’s craggy shores by fishing vessels or speedboats (known as 
planeadoras), or the ship would dock at one o f  Galicia’s ports and the drug consignment 
would be unloaded together with other merchandise that served as a front126. It seems that 
the Colombian traffickers and Galicia’s smugglers would then each claim 50 per cent o f  the 
merchandise127. The smugglers o f  Galicia would distribute their share mainly throughout 
the Spanish market and the Colombians’ share would move on to the European market 
(and, as the distribution networks were different, no conflict would arise between the two 
parties)128. In subsequent years, however, it seems that the business relationship between 
Colombian traffickers and Galicia’s clans may have changed. For example, there is some 
evidence that Colombian traffickers are no longer working with their partners in Galicia to 
the same extent. In 2001, the Center for Geopolitical Drug Studies (Association d'Etudes
119 Interview M l.
120 Resa-Nestares, op.cit. p. 54; OGD, op. at., p. 89; Giles Tremlett, Ghosts o f  Span: T ra ils through a country's 
hidden past, London, Falier and Palier Limited, 2006, p. 379. The statement: ‘all the cocaine from Colombia 
enters here’, made during interview P3, may be a little exaggerated, however.
m  During Interview M l, it was claimed that, currently, cocaine was ‘in the hands of 2 ,3  or 4 organisations in 
Galicia’.
122 OGD, op. at., p. 89.
123 ibid., P. 9 i. ;
124 Center for Geopolitical Drug Studies (Association d'Etudes Géopolitiques des Drogues (AEGD)), ‘Spain: 
The New Route of Colombian Traffickers’, Geopolitical Drug Newsletter, No. XX, July/August 2001, p. 1 , 
http;// www.geQdmgs.net/mini-lettres/AEGD5GB.pdf [accessed 24/07/02).
125 See, for example, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Annual Report 
2008: The State o f  the Drugs Problem in Europe, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2008, p. 59, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publicarions/ammaLjyport/2008 [accessed 
10/11/08] and Council of die European Union,‘Regional report on West Africa’ (from die French chair of 
the West Africa subgroup to die Dublin Group), S t80/09, Brussels, 12/01/09, 
http://regi5terconsilium,europa,eu/pdf/en/09/st05/st0518Q,en09.pdf [accessed 03/02/09].
126 See Resa-Nestares, op. (it., p. 54; OGD, op. at., p. 90. Note, this description of the trafficking operations is 
also included in Sands, op .tit., p.96.
127 See Resa-Nestares, op. cit., p. 54; OGD, op. cit., p. 91, AEGD, op. à t., p, 1; Sands, op. at., p. 96; Library of 
Congress, Nations Ilospitablt to Organised Chime and Terrorism, Washington D. G, Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, October 2003, p. 141, http://www.loc.Pov/rr/frd/pdf files/Nats I lospitahle.pdf 
[accessed 09/06/08].
128 Resa-Nestarcs, op. a t., p. 54.
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Géopolitiques des Drogues (AEGD)) reported that, since 2000, Colombians have tended 
to control the importation o f  cocaine into Spain themselves129, and police estimates showed 
that the Colombians controlled, without intermediaries, 70 per cent o f  the cocaine 
smuggled into Spain in 2001, forcing the Spaniards into subordinate roles130. This ‘growing 
gap* between organisations appears to have developed in 1992, when one o f  Galicia’s clans 
claimed it had ‘lost’ a large shipment o f  cocaine; a story that the Colombians did not 
believe131. Furthermore, in addition to a growing distrust on the part o f  the Colombians, 
the volume o f  business between the two organisations also reduced as a consequence o f  
the arrests o f  a number o f  Galicia’s major smugglers. It is therefore thought that 
Colombians are using new routes, increasingly smuggling cocaine through the Strait o f  
Gibraltar and along the Mediterranean coast, for example132 (although Resa-Nestares 
believes that the Colombians have always had a two-pronged attack, using both the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean sea routes133, as well as establishing contacts in other coastal 
regions o f  northern Spain134).
Nevertheless, despite these changes in the business relationship between the 
Colombian traffickers and their counterparts in Galicia, some cocaine continued to transit 
through Galicia (and it still does). In addition to cocaine from Colombia (which still 
remains Spain’s largest supplier o f  cocaine135), one interview source stated that the drug 
also reaches Galicia from Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia and other South American countries136. 
However, several sources emphasised the fact that Galicia’s smugglers are merely the 
distributors or transporters o f  cocaine137: they ‘do not own the cocaine’138, they are a link in 
the chain’ involved in getting the drugs ‘o f f  the boat and into Spain’139 and, these days, it 
seems more likely that, for their part in these operations, Galicia’s traffickers receive
129 AEGD, op. cit., p. 1; Center for Geopolitical Drug Studies (Association d’Etudes Géopolitiques des 
Drogues (AEGD)), ‘Galician Traffickers Change Tack’, Geopolitical Drag Newsletter, No. 1, Octol>er 2001, p. 8, 
http://ww.geQdnigs.net/mini-lettres/AEGD6GB.pdffaccessed 24/07/021.
130 AEGD, 'Spain: The New Route of Colombian Traffickers’, op. cit., p.l.
131 This resulted in the murder of the treasurer of the Chamber of Commerce of Vil aga reía de Arousa 1 
(Pontevedra) (who belonged to the gang in Galicia) by a team of Colombian hired killers. See ibid..
132 Ibid, and AEGD, ‘Galician Traffickers Change Tack', op. cit.. Hie Council of the European Union 
confirms that Morocco, for example, has recently become an entry channel for Latin American cocaine, 
which would appear to support this trend. See Council of the European Union, ‘Regional report for North 
Africa’ (from the Spanish regional Chair of the Dublin Group to the Dublin Group), 5280/09, Brussels, 
13/01/09. p. 12. http://regfster.consilium.eutopa.eu/pdf/en/09/st05/st0528Q.enQ9,pdf [accessed 
28/01/09].
133 Resa-Nestares, op. cit., p. 54.
134 Ik'd., p. 48.
135 See United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
2008 International Narcotics Control Strategic Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2008, p, 503, 
http://ww.state,gov/documents/organi?ation/lQ0890.pdf. [accessed 19/09/08], 1
136 Interview M l.
137 This point was raised during interviews M2, P15 and P17, for example.
138 Interview M l.
139 Interviewjl.
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(depending on the source) either 25-27 per cent140, or up to 30 per cent141, or one-third142 o f  
the consignment’s worth in either money or cocaine (with cocaine being the preferable 
option because the local clans can then sell the drug on to other organisations and make 
more profit by mixing the drug with other substances143). The remainder o f  the drug 
consignment (which belongs to the South American (mainly Colombian) traffickers) is 
hidden on the coast o f  Galicia before being transported to Madrid, where Colombians sell 
it to other criminal groups, who then move it throughout Europe144. Indeed, according to 
some o f  the interview sources, the South American criminals involved in these transactions 
tend not to be based in Galicia. Rather, they are based in Madrid, or travel into Spain from  
their countries o f  origin and straight out again145. Apparently, in recent years, there has 
been less o f  a need for South American criminals to be based in Spain because many o f  the 
drug trafficking operations are now being set up by South American ‘intermediaries’ (who 
live in Spain, but do not attract the attention o f  the police because they live as legal citizens 
and own legitimate businesses such as hotels and restaurants), and it is now common 
practice for a sicario (hired assassin) to travel to Spain from South America and carry out his 
business in just a day, should the need arise146.
The problems that Galicia’s clans have encountered with the Colombians have 
forced them to diversify too. In recent years, and also following the tightening o f  police 
controls in Galicia, Portugal emerged as an alternative cocaine entry point147. As a result, 
Galicia’s smugglers entered into new agreements and joint ventures with Portuguese 
traffickers148 and relocated some o f  their ‘financial setups’ to the north o f  that country149. 
Furthermore, it has also been argued that Galicia’s smugglers have diversified their product 
range, and that their dependency on hashish and heroin smuggling has increased in recent 
years150. The AEGD, for example, presents some examples o f  recent police operations
140 Interview M l. See also Tremlett; ùbosts o f  Span: Travels through a country’s  h iélen  past, op. (it., p. 380; Tony 
Thompson and Giles Tremlett; 'Ruthless, rich and bloody: now Europe’s most vicious drug lords target
[accessed 10/12/08]; and José María I rujo, 'La gran marea blanca’, E l P as: Domingo, 25/01/04, p. 3, quoting 
José Antonio Vázquez Tain, (at the time) a judge in Vüagarda de Arousa (Pontevedra).
141 Giles Tremlett; ‘Ruthless heirs of cocaine trade tighten their grip on a smugglers’ paradise’, The Guardian,
16/02/06, p. 23.
142 Interview J l ,
143 Interview M l.
144 Ibid..
145 Interview J l .
146 Interview M l. See also Irujo, op. at., p. 3, quotingjosé Antonio Vázquez 1 am, (at the time) a judge in 
Vilagarcía de Arousa (Pontevedra).
147 AEGD, ‘Galician Traffickers Change Tack’, op. at..
148 Ibid.. See also library of Congress, op. cit., pp.141-142. This point was also identified in questionnaire QL
149 OGD, op. cit., p. 90.
150 See, for example, AEGD, ‘Galician Traffickers Change Tack’, op. cit:, library of Congress, op. cit., p.141.
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involving heroin seizures in Galicia151 and points to the fact that, during 2000, the amounts 
o f  heroin hauled in Galicia grew from one per cent to seven per cent o f  the total heroin 
seizures in Spain152. Furthermore, the Spanish Civil Guard has uncovered strong ties 
between some o f  Galicia’s smugglers and Moroccan hashish traffickers153. It is worth 
stating, however, that although cocaine has undoubtedly been the principal drug associated 
with the clans o f  Galicia, some traffickers from the region have been involved with hashish 
and/or heroin for some years. Resa-Nestares, for example, argues that smugglers from  
Galicia have been associated with Moroccan hashish traffic ‘for some time’ (the normal 
route o f  entry for this drug being in fishing boats from Galicia, which fish o ff  the 
Moroccan coast) and that smugglers from Galicia entered into a relationship with Turkish 
heroin groups, and began to deal in this drug, at the end o f  the 1980s154. Some o f  the 
interview sources also confirmed that both heroin and hashish were trafficked into Galicia, 
albeit to a lesser extent than cocaine155, and a look at some more recent data confirms that 
heroin trafficking (in some cases, involving Turkish individuals) is still occurring in the 
south o f  Pontevedra province, for example156. However, new trends are revealed in the 
cases o f  hashish and cocaine. In respect o f  hashish, recent investigations show that 
smugglers from Galicia, who are dedicated to the large-scale (sea) traffic o f  this substance, 
have changed the centre o f  their operations to the Mediterranean coast157. Indeed, data for 
2006 shows the practical ‘disappearance’ o f  Galicia in the records o f  prominent operations 
against hashish158. As a result, it appears that hashish now arrives in Galicia by road, 
smuggled in vehicles that travel on the Portuguese motorway between I luelva (Andalucía) 
and Pontevedra159. In respect o f  cocaine, however, it seems that large quantities o f  this
151 For example, in May 2001, a 100-kilogram shipment of Turkish heroin was confiscated from a trailer in O 
Porrino (Pontevedra) and, in May 2000, a trafficking ring from Galicia was destroyed while it was receiving 
100 kilograms of heroin from Turkey. See AEGD, ‘Galician Traffickers Change ’l ack’, op. at..
™Wd..
153 United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, op, 
at., p. 504.
154 See Resa-Nestares, op. at., pp. 54-55.
155 Interviews M l and PI, for example.
156 In some cases, the heroin in distributed in Portugal. See Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l 
Gobierno de S. M . presentada a l inicio del añojudicial p o r e l F iscal General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Coñete- 
Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), Madrid, 2007, p. 709,
http;//ww,fiscales/csblob/¥l CAP3.pdf?blobcol=uHdata&blobhcader=applicatÍQtiTs2Fpdf&blQbkey=id 
&blQbtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1109248280982&ssbinary=!tfue [accessed 07/09/08). This point was 
also made by the professional interviewed in interview P17.
157 See ibid..
158 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del año jud icia lpor e l F iscal 
General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Candido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitulo II, Volumen I), Madrid, 2007, p. 
179,
hltp.;Z/wwdkcales/csblob/Vl CAP2.pdf?blobcol=uridataM>lohheadcr=application%2Fpdf&biobkey=id 
jkblobtable ^ MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1109248280967&ssbinary=true [accessed 18/08/08].
159 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S, M. presentada a l inicio del añojudicial p o r e l F iscal 
General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), op. cit., pp. 709- 
710.
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drug are, once again, entering Galicia. The Spanish Attorney General’s 2007 annual report, 
for example, details how the entry points for cocaine, which had previously been displaced 
to Portugal, were returning to the region (as well as to the south o f  the Peninsula), due to 
the seizure o f  large quantities o f  the drug during various operations carried out by the 
Portuguese police at the beginning o f  2006160. Indeed, some major seizures made during 
the summer o f  2008 are viewed as confirmation o f  the fact that criminal organisations are 
increasingly operating, once again, in Galicia and using the Ría de Arousa (and other 
estuaries) to carry out their disembarkations o f  cocaine161.
In order to folly understand the extent o f  the criminal activity undertaken in 
Galicia, it is important to emphasise the sheer scale o f  the drug trafficking business carried 
out there, which can only be partly illustrated by the numerous seizures made by the 
authorities and reported in the Spanish press in recent years. During 2003, for example, 
the Spanish authorities managed to intercept a number o f  vessels in the Atlantic that were, 
inevitably, heading towards foe coasts o f  Galicia or Portugal with their loads o f  cocaine: a 
total o f  37,400 kilograms o f  foe drug was seized in foe course o f  15 operations, which 
resulted in 116 arrests162. More recently, some important interventions during foe first half 
o f  2006, for example, included foe tonne o f  cocaine found in a van on foe AP-9 motorway; 
foe half tonne, and later 800 kilograms, o f  cocaine seized respectively in foe port o f  Vigo; 
foe cargo o f  more than one tonne o f  cocaine, worth 30 million euros, seized on foe vessel 
‘Nadia’; and foe 180 kilograms o f  cocaine, on its way to Galicia from Portugal, which 
formed part o f  a consignment o f  six and a half tonnes165. It was at the end o f  2006, 
however, when Spanish police successfully carried out what they considered to be their 
‘most important’ operation for seven years164. During O peration DesteUo, police intercepted, 
at sea, a cargo o f  1,800 kilograms o f  cocaine (ultimately, heading for the coast o f  Galicia) 
and interrupted the introduction into Spain o f  another 4,000 kilograms. The 34 people that
160 Ibid., p. 709. This point was also made by the professional interviewed in interview P17.
161 In just two weeks of August 2008,for example, police seized nearly five tonnes of cocaine and, between 
June and the beginning of September 2008, a total of 9,500 kilograms of cocaine were seized. See Elisa Lois, 
‘La policía refuerza la vigilancia en la costa para frenar la entrada de droga’, elpais.com, 20/08/08, 
hítp:/7www,elpais.com/articulo/Galicia/policia/re fuerza/vnglancia/costa71miac/£Qírada/droga/d[X'piinitg 
al/20080820e!pgal 6/Tes [accessed 20/08/08] and Elisa Lois, "‘Más que repunte del narcotráfico hay exceso 
de confianza en algunas bandas’”, (interview with the Anti-Drug Public Prosecutor of Pontevedra, Marcelo 
de Azcárraga Urteaga), elpms.com, 01/09/08,
pi.autgal/20Q8Q901 clpgal 9/Tes / [accessed 10/12/08].
102 See Irujo, op. (it., pp. 1-3.
165 See, for example, *E1 hijastro de Oubiña lidera una banda de narcos muy poderosa’, tkorm£al¡eg>js, 
02/05/06, http;//wwwxkonKQgalkgQ.es/index,phphdNottcia~4Q.23.4 [accessed 10/12/08], Note that the 
word tonelada in Spanish literally translates as ‘ton’. However, as it is assumed that this relates to a metric ton, 
when Spanish sources are translated in this thesis, the word ‘tonne’ is used to denote this.
164 Elisa Lois, Tin nuevo arresto eleva a 32 las detenciones de la 'Operación Destello', ttpds.com , 17/04/07,
12/12/08].
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were detained in the course o f  this operation (including some members o f  Galicia’s most 
important clans) were believed to have formed part o f  the largest network o f  drug 
traffickers detected in Spain in recent years and one o f the most important networks 
dedicated to the traffic o f  cocaine in Europe165. Many more examples o f  drug seizures 
involving Galicia’s traffickers could be given. However, according to some commentators, 
the volume o f  the drugs seized in these operations only tells part o f  die story, because 
much greater quantities are trafficked successfully. In 2005, for example, it was reported 
that Spanish customs officials believed that they only stopped less than ten per cent o f  the 
drug traffic into Galicia, and that at least five tonnes ‘get through’ every month166. It is 
difficult to know whether this is true or not. Indeed, we must always be wary o f  the 
accuracy o f  estimated figures like this167 and even, perhaps, o f  some o f  the figures relating 
to seizures -  as van Duyne notes, in some cases, there is a tendency to ‘dogmatically’ 
multiple seizures by ten per cent168. Nevertheless, it is clear the drug trafficking constitutes 
a significant proportion o f  the criminal activities undertaken in Galicia.
As in Galicia, the trafficking o f  drugs is also one o f  the most frequent types o f  
criminal activity undertaken in the Gasta del Sol region. Indeed, over the last few years, 
Andalucía has consistently topped the statistical tables concerning this matter. For 
example, between 1999 and 2004, the number o f  people arrested for drugs trafficking 
offences in Andalucía, year by year, was significantly higher than in any other autonomous 
community o f  Spain: 4,447 people were under arrest in 1999; 4,803 in 2000; 4,791 in 2001; 
4,896 in 2002; 4,241 in 2003; and 4,019 in 2004169. To compare, the autonomous 
communities with the next highest figures for 2004, for example, were: Valencia with 1,973 
people under arrest; Madrid with 1,508 under arrest; Las Canarias with 1,206 under arrest,
165 For details of this operation, see, for example, iUd:, Ministerio del Interior (MIR) (Dirección General de la 
Policía y de la Guardia Gvil), ‘La Policía Nacional detiene a cinco narcotraficantes en Madrid y Pontevedra en 
la segunda fase de la "Operación Destello’, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 12/01/07,
http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/Policia/2007/np011205.htm; Julio Á  Fariñas, ‘La operación 
Destello desactiva la logística de carteles colombianos’, La Voz ^  Calida, 15/01/07, 
http;//www,lavQzdcpJida.es/hemeroteca/2007/01/15/5456202.shtml; ‘La policía culmina la operación 
Destello con la detención de un miembro del clan de los Oubiña’, La Vo%de Galicia, 16/04/07, 
http://wwwJavozdegalicia.es/hemeroteca/2007/04/16/5722584.shtml [all accessed 12/12/08): and Cruz 
Morcillo, ‘Las mafias marroquíes del hachís toman el relevo a los gallegos en el tráfico de cocaína’, abc.es, 
17/02/07. http://www.abc.eS/hemeroteca/historico-17-02-2007/alx:/Nadonal/las-mafias-marroquies-dcL 
hachis-toman-el-relevo-a-Ios-gallegos-en-el-trafico-de-cocaina 1631525320978,html [accessed 10/12/08].
166 Thompson and Tremlett, op. tit-
167 We should consider, for example, the reasons why the authorities involved are making public statements 
like this.
168 Adam Edwards and Pete Gill, ‘Crime as enterprise? The case of "transnational Otganised crime'”, Crime, 
haw  & Social Change, 2002, p. 206, dting P. van Duyne, ‘Money Laundering: links between the "underworld” 
and "upperworld’”, Paper presented to the S“1 meeting of the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council’s 
Research Seminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime, University of Cardiff, 05/04/00.
169 See Elisa Garda España and Fátima Pérez Jiménez, Seguridad Ciudadana y  A ctividades Podrióles, Informe del 
Observatorio de la Delincuencia en Andaluda 2005, Málaga, Instituto Andaluz Interuniversitario de 
Criminología and Fundación El Monte, 2005, p. 145.
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and Cataluña with 1,124 under arrest170. Furthermore, o f  the 11,015 known drug 
trafficking-related crimes committed in Spain in 2004,2,797 o f  them took place in 
Andalucía, which again represents a much higher figure than in any other autonomous 
community (even though it was a decrease on the previous year’s figure o f  3,109 crimes)171. 
Additionally, despite a yearly fall in the number o f  judicial proceedings initiated for drug 
trafficking offences in Andalucía between 2002 and 2006172 173, this autonomous community 
yet again topped the statistics in this arena. For example, there were 6,301 judicial 
proceedings o f  this type initiated in Andalucía in 2006, whilst the statistics for the next five 
highest autonomous communities in this respect were: Cataluña with 2,871 proceedings; 
Las Canarias with 2,646 proceedings; Valencia with 1,148 proceedings; Murcia with 1,093 
proceedings; and Madrid with 1,015171. Also, in 2006, along with Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria, Barcelona and Madrid, Málaga itself featured as one o f  the four provinces that had 
initiated the most judicial trials for drug trafficking crimes (a situation that appears typical 
o f  the preceding years also)174.
Undoubtedly, hashish is the main (although not the only175) drug trafficked in this 
area (Spain being both a consumption country and a transshipment area for this drug 
entering Europe as a whole176). Although the claim by one interview source that ‘all the 
hashish for Europe enters here’177 may, perhaps, be a little exaggerated, it is clear that there 
has been a tradition for Moroccan hashish (particularly) to be introduced into Spain 
through Andalucía, typically using a whole range o f  sea vessels and boats178. However, in 
his 2007 report, the Spanish Attorney General outlined an increasing tendency for 
traffickers to introduce this drug into other parts o f  Spain (such as Murcia, Valencia and
170 Ibid., p. 145.
171 See ibid., p. 150.
172 The figures are: 9,262 proceedings in 2002; 8,352 proceedings in 2003; 8,334 proceedings in 2004; 6,577 
proceedings in 2005; and 6,301 proceedings in 2006. See Fiscalia General del Estado, Memoria elevada at 
Gobiemo de S. M. presentada at inicio del adojudicialpar e l F iscal General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Condi do Conde- 
Pumpido Tourdn (2007) (Capituk II, Volume» I), op. at., p. 186.
173 See ibid., pp. 186487.
174 Ibid., p. 187.
175 For example, as discussed, cocaine is increasingly being introduced into Spain through the southern 
regions of the country. To illustrate, the Council of the European Union has recently reported that groups 
linked to die Italian mafias have been detected transporting large cocaine consignments by helicopter and 
small plane between points in northern Morocco and points in the south of Spain. See Council of the 
European Union, ‘Regional report for North Africa’, op. at., p. 12.
176 See, for example, United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, op. at., p. 503. Also interview J7.
177 Interview P3. -
178 Interviews C l, C2, PI, P8 and P15. See also Fiscalia General del Estado, Memoria elevada alG obiemo de S. 
M. presentada a l inicio d el ado judicia lpar e l F iscal G eneral del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D, Candida Qmde-Pumpido Tourdn 
(2007) (Capitulo II, Volume» I), op. at., p. 179, p. 182, and p. 190 and United States Department of State, 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, op. a t., pp. 503-504.
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Cataluña), as well as France179, as a result o f  the introduction o f  the Sistem a Integral de 
V igilen da E x te rio r  (SIVE) (Integrated System o f  External Surveillance)180 that affects the 
G ulf o f  Cádiz, the Strait o f  Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea, and also due to the fact that the 
same routes for hashish and cocaine are now being used by traffickers in some instances181. 
Nevertheless, in 2006, more than 50 out o f  100 seizures o f hashish in Spain were seized in 
Andalucía, which, again, was a significantly higher figure than in other autonomous 
communities: the figure for Andalucía was followed by that for Valencia (19 out o f  100 
seizures), then Murcia (14 out o f  100 seizures), then Cataluña (7 out o f  100 seizures), and 
another 7 out o f  100 seizures took place in all o f  the remaining autonomous communities 
put together182. Moreover, the movement o f  hashish directly from Morocco to Andalucía, 
by sea, continues to be the most used route for traffickers o f  this drug, with the quantities 
o f the drug trafficked rising each year (and usually exceeding 1,000 kilograms in each 
shipment)183.
The trafficking o f drugs also appears to be one o f the most predominant types o f  
criminal activity in Madrid. Between 2000 and 2004, for example, this autonomous 
community almost always retained third place in terms o f  the number o f  people arrested 
for drug trafficking offences — only in 2003 did Madrid drop to fourth place in this respect, 
with figures of: 2,080 people under arrest in 2000; 1,811 in 2001; 1,664 in 2002; 948 in
179 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del aü oju d iáa lporel F iscal 
General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Candido Conde-Pansido Toarán (2007) (Capítulo TI, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 179.
This issue was also raised during interviews P4, P8 and PI 2.
180 SIVE is Spain’s border surveillance system operated by lhe Guardia C ivil (Gvil Guard). Using a system of 
fixed and mobile sensors, including radars, video cameras, infrared cameras, and so on, its objective is to 
improve the surveillance of Spain’s borders in order to respond to, and control, direats such as illegal 
immigration and drug trafficking. For example, the system carries information in real time to control centres, 
which convey die necessary orders for the interception of any vessel that approaches national territory from 
the sea (the system can detect vessels from a relatively long distance). The system operates in areas typically 
experiencing high incidences of illicit trafficking, including the coast of Andalucía, the Canary Islands and 
Cueta and Melilla. However, it could be extended to the rest of Spain’s national territory. See Guardia Gvil 
(Oficina de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales), 'Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE): 
Introducción’, [no date], http://www.guardiacivil.org/prensa/actividades/siveQ3/intro.jsp: Guardia Gvil 
(Oficina de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales), ‘Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE): 
Localización e Implantación’, [no date],
http://www.guardiadvil.org/prensa/actividades/siveQ3/localizadQn.isp; Guardia Gvil (Oficina de 
Relaciones Informativas y Sodales), ‘Sistema Integrado de Vigilanda Exterior (SIVE): Fundones y 
Capaddades Técnicas’, [no date], http://www.guardiativa.org/prensaZactividades/siyeQ3/fundQnes.jsp [all 
accessed 05/09/08].
181 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada cd Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del ariojudicialpor e l F iscal 
General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Candido Conde-Pumpido Toarán (2007) (Capítulo 17, Volumen I), op. cit,, p. 179. See 
also Council of the European Union, ‘Regional report for North Africa’, op. cit., p. 10.
182 See Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada a l Gobierno de S, M. presentada a l inicio del ariojudicialpor e l 
Fiscal General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Toarán (2007) (Copínelo 77, Volumen I), op, cit., p.
179. . ........
188 Ibid., p. 190. The Council of the European Union has recently reported that the Spanish authorities seized 
a total of almost 1,000 tons of hashish from Morocco alone up to November 2008, which could result in total 
of 1,200 tons by the end of that year a figure that is unprecedented in recent years. See Council of the 
European Union, ‘Regional report for North Africa’, op. cit., p. 11.
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2003; and 1,508 in 2004184. Moreover, as noted above, in 2006, Madrid featured as one o f  
the four provinces that had initiated the most judicial trials for drug trafficking crimes185. 
The trafficking o f  heroin seems to be particularly associated with the region. For example, 
in 2006, 44 per cent o f  the heroin seized in Spain (some 201 kilograms) was seized in 
Madrid, which represented a considerably higher amount than the quantities o f heroin 
seized in other regions: the figure for Sevilla (27 per cent o f  heroin seizures or 122 
kilograms) follows that for Madrid; Alicante (in the autonomous community o f  Valencia) 
registered 17 per cent o f  seizures (77 kilograms); three per cent o f  seizures (14 kilograms) 
were made in Huelva (in the autonomous community o f  Andalucía); and the remaining 
regions, taken together, accounted for nine per cent o f  the seizures (40 kilograms)186. 
Moreover, the 28 kilograms o f  heroin seized by police in June 2008, which amounted to 
the largest apprehension o f  the substance made in Spain to that point in 2008, were seized 
in Madrid187. The criminal groups active in Madrid also engage in the trafficking and 
distribution o f  cocaine and perhaps, even, also the processing o f  this drug. In 2008, for 
example, it was reported that police had discovered two cocaine ‘laboratories’ (one in an 
apartment in the capital city and the other in a luxury villa (or chalé in Spanish) in Fuente el 
Saz del Jarama (north o f  the capital))188. As noted above, some o f  the cocaine that is 
trafficked into Galicia is then transported on to Madrid, yet cocaine also reaches this region 
by air, smuggled on commercial aircraft, which arrive at Barajas airport from Latin 
America, for example189. It would appear that cocaine is smuggled by passengers using a 
variety o f  methods, which include hiding the drug inside items o f  hand luggage and 
suitcases (sometimes with false bottoms) or concealing it within clothes, shoes, cosmetic 
bottles and bottles o f  liquor or, alternatively, passengers will carry the drug in their 
bodies190. Indeed, the 228 seizures o f  cocaine made at Spanish airports during die course
184 See Garda España and Pérez Jiménez, op. at., p. 145.
tas Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del añojudiáalpor e l F iscal 
General del Estado, Exento. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitula 77, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 187.
186 See ibid., p. 184.
187 It was reported that, in this operation, police broke up an organised group of drug traffickers that operated 
from La Cañada Real Galiana (a shantytown south of the city of Madrid). Along with die 28 kilograms of 
heroin, police also seized a number of firearms and 187,000 euros. Six people were arrested, including two 
people of Turkish origin (one from the supplying group, who headed die group in Spain, and a leader from 
the supplying group, who was in Spain to oversee the transaction). See Pérez, G, ‘Cae el “hiper" de la droga 
en La Cañada’, Im Ra^ón, 25/06/08, p. 44.
188 See ‘Caen 5 narcos y dos “cocinas”, una de ellas en un chalé', ABC, 16/04/08, p. 62.
189 See, for example, Damián Zaitch, ‘Recent Trends in Cocaine Trafficking in The Nedierlands and Spain’ in 
Dina Siegal, Henk van de Bunt and Damián Zaitch (eds.), Globed Organised Crime: Trends and Developments, 
Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, p. 16.
190 See, for example, José L. Muñoz and N. de Cardenas, ‘Barajas se está convirtiendo en el mayor punto de 
entrada de cocaína’,Q ué! (Málaga), 17/11/05, p. 8; EFE, ‘Ocultaba 4 kilos de cocaína en seis pares de 
zapatos’, Q ué!, 21/11/05, p. 13; and Intervienen 27 kilos de cocaína’, 20 minutos (Madrid), 17/10/06, p, 4.
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o f  2006 were carried out primarily at the airports o f  Madrid and Barcelona191. Similarly, 
Barajas is one o f  the airports in Spain (along with airports in Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca 
and Islas Canarias (the Canary Islands)) where die highest volumes o f  traffic in MDMA192 
have been detected193, and Spain’s F iscal G eneral del E stado  (Attorney General) sees the use 
o f  air channels as being important in explaining why Madrid is an important location in 
terms o f  heroin seizures194. Thus, the trafficking o f  several different kinds o f  drug is 
certainly a significant activity carried out in this area.
O th er crim inal activities an d  enterprises
Another criminal activity that groups in Spain frequendy participate in is human 
trafficking/illegal immigration. This activity seems to be particularly associated with the 
Costa del Sol195. People are typically smuggled into the coastal provinces o f  Andulucia by 
sea, using p a leras (small dinghy-like boats) or pneumatic boats196, often at great risk to the 
lives o f  those smuggled. Human trafficking is a problem that extends to all the coastal 
provinces o f  Andalucía, although, in recent years, it has especially affected the provinces o f  
Almería, Málaga and Granada, again as a result o f  the intensity o f police controls deployed 
in the western provinces o f  Andalucía through the SIVE system197. Certainly, much o f  the 
traffic o f  this type appears to come from Morocco, using the Strait o f  Gibraltar and, 
according to some o f  the interview sources, involves North African smugglers198. Indeed, 
information given by the F iscalía  (Public Prosecutor) o f  Granada details, for example, the
191 See Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada id  Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del añojudicialpor e l 
Fiscal General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Toumn (2007) (Capítulo II, Volumen I), op. cit., p.
182 and EMCDDA, National Report 2007: Span, op. cit., p. 187. The Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs of the United States Department of State has also reported that the airports in 
Madrid and Barcelona play expanding roles as the entry point for much of the cocaine trafficked into and 
through Spain. See United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and law  
Enforcement Affairs, op. a t., p. 505.
192 That is, methylenedioxymethamphetamine or, more commonly, 'ecstasy'.
193 Certain quantities of MDMA are trafficked into Spain by individuals posing as tourists on commercial 
flights. See EMCDDA, op. cit., p. 188. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
of the United States Department of State also reports that airports in Madrid and Barcelona are transit points 
for passengers who intend to traffic ecstasy and other synthetic drugs, mainly produced in Europe, to the 
United States. See United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, op. a t., p. 505.
194 See Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del año ju d icia lpor e l 
Fiscal General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Gonde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 
184. The point that drugs, generally, enter through Barajas airport was also made during interview J6, and the 
professional interviewed in interview P15 explained how ‘enormous quantities’ of drugs are seized at Barajas 
airport.
t9S Interview J2; questionnaires QH, QI, QJ and QK; and Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada a l 
Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del año ju d icia lpor e l F iscal General del Estado, Excmo, Sr. D, Cándido Conde- 
Pumpido Tourvn (2007) (Capítulo III, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 703.
196 For example, for details of the number of interventions of such vessels in Granada province alone in 2006, 
see Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. Ai. presentada a l inicio é l  añojudicialpor e l F iscal 
G eneré é l  Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. C á n é é  Q m é-P um pié Tomón (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 702.
197 Ibid..
193 Interview P2.
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existence o f  organised networks, operating from the north o f  Morocco, which mostly 
dedicate their operations to the capture o f  families with minors, with the purpose o f  
transferring them to Spain and subsequently introducing them into the social security 
system o f  the Ju n ta  (Government) o f  Andalucía (thus allowing them to receive significant 
amounts o f  money). There have been serious threats made to some families in Spain when 
they have not met the payments agreed with the criminal organisations199. Other human 
trafficking networks operating in the Costa del Sol carry out their activities in order to 
supply illicit markets with labour, or for prostitution purposes. Some groups have been 
detected in this area, for example, that were trafficking Nigerian, Brazilian, Russian and 
Romanian women for their sexual exploitation in conditions close to slavery200. Indeed, 
illegal prostitution is commonly listed, both in official documents and by the interview and 
questionnaire sources, as one o f  the many activities that criminal groups in the Costa del 
Sol are involved in201.
Organised prostitution has also been identified as an activity that is undertaken in 
Galicia202 203, and criminal groups in Madrid are particularly associated with activities related to 
organised prostitution205. Prostitutes, o f  many different nationalities, are very visible in the 
streets and clubs o f  Madrid city, and there are certain areas in the Community where the 
concentration o f  prostitutes is particularly high. Casa de Campo, to the west o f the capital, 
is one such area204 . According to one o f  the questionnaire respondents205, the presence o f  
a high number o f  prostitutes in a neighbourhood upsets the inhabitants o f  the area, who 
feel, for example, that the practice o f  prostitution poses a ‘bad example* to their children.
As a result, the authorities tty to ‘make life impossible for the prostitutes’206 and attempt to 
stop their activities in these areas. After some recent attempts to do this in Casa de Campo 
(by implementing traffic restrictions in the area), it was therefore thought that Madrid’s 
prostitutes were being displaced to other areas in the Community, such as Fuenlabrada, 
Alcalá de Henares and Villaverde, yet there is evidence that prostitution still occurs in Casa
199 See Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del añojudicialpor e l 
Fiscal General del Estado, Excmo, Sr. D. Cdná’do Conde-Pungido Tontón (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 
703.
200 Ibid.. ■
201 See, for example, ibid, and Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S, M. presentada a l inicio 
del año ju d icia lpor e l F iscal G eneral del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2(X)7) (Capitulo II, 
Volumen I), op. cit., p, 190. Also interviews C2,J6,J8 and questionnaires QH, QI, QJ and QK.
202 See Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada d  Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del añojud icidpor e l 
Fiscal G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tontón (2007) (Capitulo II, Volumen I), op, til., pp. 
235-236. Also interview P16 and questionnaires QE, QF and QL.
203 This issue was raised during interviews FI and J6, as well as in the responses to questionnaires QB and 
QD, for example.
204 This was particularly mentioned by the professional interviewed in interview J6.
205 Questionnaire QD.
206 Questionnaire QD.
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de Campo207. According to some o f  the professionals interviewed or questioned for this 
research, ‘mafias’ control the prostitutes in these areas, as well as in Madrid’s streets and 
clubs208. The 2007 report o f  Spain’s Attorney General also discusses the existence o f  
‘organised’ groups in Madrid (predominantly o f  Romanian and Eastern European origin209) 
whose aim is the sexual exploitation o f  non-Spanish women210 21. These particular groups 
carry out their activities mainly in the areas close to the major roads that run through the 
Community, which are also the areas where numerous clubes de a ltem £ n  can be found212. 
According to the Attorney General’s report, the most frequent assumption is that these 
criminal groups introduce women (usually from Eastern Europe) into Spain by means o f  
deception (for example, the women are offered work in Spain that is entirely unrelated to 
their later sexual exploitation)213. Once in Spain, however, the criminal group retains the 
women’s passports and demands a payment for their transfer to Spain214. The women are 
also deceived regarding the processing o f  residence and work permits (which are needed to 
legalise their status in Spain), and they are kept in lodgings, deprived o f  their freedom o f  
movement215. Additionally, they can be continually moved from place to place, and threats 
can be made to their families in their country o f  origin216. Ultimately, they are forced into 
prostitution. In 2006, in the Madrid region, legal proceedings relating to prostitution were 
initiated in some 35 cases217. However, the circumstances surrounding the women 
(discussed above) often mean that victims are reluctant to cooperate in an investigation for 
fear o f  reprisals from the criminal group, or they fear that police officers involved in 
investigations will find that they are present in Spain illegally218.
Another activity undertaken by criminal groups in Madrid is the theft and 
smuggling o f  luxury vehicles, particularly cars219. Typically, it would appear that, after the 
cars are stolen, they are furnished with false number plates and documentation and then
207 See, for example, Luis Labarga, ‘“No es mi problema adonde van’”, E l Mundo: M 2 ,17/07/07, p. 4 and 
“Las prostitutas huyen a Fuenlabrada y Alcalá’, M etro (Madrid), 17/07/07, p. 3.
208 Interview J6 and questionnaire QD.
209 The professional interviewed in interview PI also stated that Eastern European groups were involved in 
activities related to prostitution in Madrid.
210 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. Ai. presentada a l inicio del añojudicialpor e l F iscal 
General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitulo 111, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 712.
211 The dictionary translation of clubes de alterne is typically ‘singles clubs’ or 11081688 clubs’. However, these 
establishments are, perhaps, best described as 1 )6001618’.
212 Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. AI. presentada a l inido del añ oju d ida lporel F iscal 
General é l  Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. C á n é é  C oné-P um pié Tomón (2007) (Capítulo III, Volumen I), op. rit., p. 712.
2,8 Ibid..
214 Ibid..
215 Ibid..
216 Ibid..
2'7 Ibid..
218 Ibid..
219 This point was raised during interviews PI and P9, for example. See also Resa-Nestares, op. at., p. 52, For 
an example of a recent case involving police arrests for this type of activity, see ‘Citen tres ladrones de coches 
de lujo’, E l A luné: M 2 ,16/11/06, p. 7.
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transported abroad to be resold220. Some sources associate these kinds o f  activities 
particularly with Eastern European criminals221. Eastern European criminals were also 
often associated, particularly by some o f  the interview sources, with violent robberies on 
houses and industrial estates in Madrid222. Activities related to credit card fraud and the 
counterfeiting o f  money, which may be ‘related to organised crime’, also appear to be 
undertaken frequently in this region223. Indeed, in September 2007, police in Madrid seized 
403,000 forged euros (mostly in 200 Euro notes), which the press claimed was ‘the largest 
cache o f  counterfeit notes’ seized in Europe224. Also in the course o f  this so-called 
Operación D anubio, ten members o f  a criminal network, o f  Bulgarian and Romanian origin, 
that were living in Madrid and involved in the smuggling and distribution o f  the false notes, 
were detained225. Other criminal activities undertaken by groups in Madrid, which were 
variously identified by the interview and questionnaire sources, included (small-scale) arms 
trafficking, the smuggling o f  antiquities, people trafficking, extortion, protection and 
money laundering226.
In relation to other criminal activities carried out in Galicia, some o f the interview 
sources stated that the trafficking o f  arms was possibly also carried out in the region227, and 
the possession o f  firearms in Ourense, for example, was mentioned in the Attorney 
General’s 2007 annual report228. Furthermore, groups o f  Spanish citizens, which engage in 
violent robberies on banks, have been investigated by Galicia’s specialised police unit, the 
G rupo de R espuesta E specia lpara  e l Crim en O rganizado (GRECO) (Special Response Group for 
Organised Crime). These organisations are composed o f  criminals living in Galicia, who
220 See, for example, Resa-Nestares, op. at. and 'Caen tres ladrones de coches de lujo’, op. rít..
221 For example, the professional interviewed in interview J4 associated Bulgarian criminals with tire theft of 
cats, and Resa-Nestares claims that the stolen cars are transported by ‘Russian or Polish mafia groups’ to 
Eastern Europe. See Resa-Nestares, op. at.. Also see ‘Caen tres ladrones de coches de lujo’, op. cit..
222 The professional interviewed in interview PI, for example, associated ‘Eastern Europeans’ generally with 
these types of activities, and die professional interviewed in interview J4 specifically mentioned Romanian 
and Kosovo Albanian criminals when discussing this kind of crime. It became clear during the course of the 
research that many people in Spain (including police officers), as well as the press, would regard this kind of 
activity as constituting ‘organised crime’ and, when asked about the ‘organised* criminal activities occurring in 
Madrid, the professionals interviewed in interviews PI, J4, J6 and P15 all included the violent robbery on 
houses and/or industrial estates as examples o f ‘organised’ criminal activity in this region.
223 The professional interviewed in interview J4, for example, claimed that Romanian criminals were involved 
in credit card fraud in Madrid and, in the Attorney General’s 2007 report, it was noted that the 77 cases 
involving the counterfeiting of money that were recorded in Madrid in 2006 could ‘relate to activities of 
organised crime’. See Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l irado delaño 
ju d id a lp or e l F iscal G eneral d el Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Toarán (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), 
op. di., p. 711 (my translation).
224 See C. 1 lidalgo, ‘Incautado el mayor alijo de billetes falsos y de “major calidad” de Europa’, ABC, 
05/09/07, p. 53 (my translation).
225 See ibid.; Pablo Merraiz, ‘El mayor golpe contra el dinero falso’, E l Mundo: M 2,05/09/07, p. 2; and ‘Cae 
una banda que falsificó 400.000 euros’, La Ra^tin, 05/09/07, p. 31.
226 Interviews PI, F2 and P9, and questionnaires QB and QD.
227 Interviews P2 and J l .
228 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada d  Gobierno de S. M. presentada d  irado d ela ñ o ju d iad p or e l F iscd  
G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitulo TI, Volumen I), op. dt., p. 235.
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carry out these crimes both in the region and elsewhere in Spain (as well as in Portugal)229. 
Similarly, GRECO has also investigated groups o f  Romanian, and Kosovo Albanian, 
criminals who travel to Galicia to undertake organised robberies230. According to the 
Attorney General, these can be seen as examples o f  organised groups that operate in 
Galicia on the margins o f  drug trafficking231.
Other activities that have been identified as being undertaken in the Costa del Sol 
include cigarette smuggling232, racketeering233, the robbery and smuggling o f  vehicles234, 
arms trafficking235, fraud and forgery236, the smuggling o f  fauna and flora237, organised 
robbery o f  domestic and industrial properties238 and money laundering on an extraordinary 
scale239 (which will be discussed more extensively later in this chapter). Finally, and to 
complete the picture o f  the types o f  illicit activities undertaken by groups in Spain, we can 
also add explosives trafficking, illegal gambling, extortion, kidnapping, intellectual property 
crimes and the trafficking o f  works o f  art and jewellery240. Thus, it is clear that ‘organised’ 
illegal activity in Spain is not confined to one particular type o f  enterprise or venture.
Haller notes that ‘at the heart o f  what is often meant by organized crime are the 
types o f  enterprises that sell illegal goods and services to customers [...]’241. The discussion 
above shows that this is a particularly accurate statement in the case o f  Spain: a 
consideration o f  the types o f  criminal activity that predominantly flourish there (drugs 
trafficking, human trafficking, organised prostitution, vehicle smuggling, fraud and 
counterfeiting, and so on) illustrates that we need to understand ‘organised crime’ in the
229 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del añojudiáalpor e l F iscal 
General d el Estado, Excmo, Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capítulo IJI, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 710.
230 Ibid.. These groups/activities were also identified in questionnaire QL.
231 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada d  inicio del añ oju d iadpor e l F iscd  
G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capítulo III, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 710.
232 Interview C l. See also Resa-Nestares, op. cit., p. 51.
233 Interview C2.
234 Questionnaires QII, Ql, QJ, QK and interview PI. See also Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada d  
Gobierno de S, M. presentada d  inicio del añopudridpor e l F iscd  G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. C ánido Conde- 
Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capitulo IJI, Volumen I), op. cit., p. 703 and Resa-Nestares, op. cit., p. 52.
235 Interview P3 and questionnaire QK.
236 Questionnaires QI I, QJ and QK. See also Fiscalía General del Estado, M emoria elevada dG obierno de S, M. 
presentada d  inicio del año ju ir id p o r  e l F iscd  G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. C ánido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) 
(Capítulo U, Volumen I), op. rit., pp. 195-196 and Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. AI. 
presentada d  inicio del añopudridpor e l F iscd  G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. C ánido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) 
(Capítulo III, Volumen I), op. ¿r.,p.703.
237 Questionnaire QI.
238 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada d  Gobierno de S. AL presentada d  inicio d el año ju d r id p o r  e l F iscd  
G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. C ánido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capítulo III, Volumen I), op, cit., p. 703,
239 See, for example, ibid, and Fiscalía General del Estado, Alemoria elevada d  Gobierno de S. Ai. presentada d  inicio 
del año ju i r i d p o r e l F iscd  G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. C ánido Conde-Pumpido Tomón (2007) (Capítulo II, 
Volumen I), op. rit., p. 195. Also questionnaires QG, QM, QI, QJ, QK and interviews F2 and J6.
240 España. Delincuencia Organizada f  2005, internal annual report on organised crime in Spain produced by die 
Spanish police forces (unpublished).
241 Alan A. Block, Tlistory and the Study of Organized Crime’, Urban Life, Vol. 6, No. 4,1978, p. 470, citing 
Mark H. Haller,‘Organized crime in urban society*, J o u m d o f S orid  History, Vol, 5,1971-1972, pp. 210-234.
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country from an enterprise perspective, in terms o f  the provision o f  illegal goods and 
services. Varese notes that the provision o f  illegal goods and services, as the essence o f  
‘organised crime’, appears in definitions during the 1960s242 (for example, in the 1967 
President’s Commission Task Force on Organized Crime report243 and in an article 
published the same year by Donald Cressey244). However, he also notes that, during the 
1970s, there appears to be a move away from authors mentioning specific behaviour 
patterns, such as the supply o f  illicit goods and services, in favour o f  the more general term 
‘illegal activities’245. Clearly, the term ‘illegal activities’ can incorporate a much wider range 
o f  criminal behaviour, and what the enterprise model o f  organised crime and definitions 
that highlight the provision o f  illegal goods and services (or simply illegal activities) in the 
manner discussed above do not emphasise is ‘the distinction between producers o f  goods 
and services, and providers o f  services o f  dispute settlement and protection in criminal 
markets’246. Nor do they emphasise the power aspect and motivation o f  some criminal 
groups.
The exercise o f  pow er, an d  M a fia ’
Indeed, the definitions o f  some scholars highlight a further or alternative activity 
that some criminal groups ¡n some parts o f  the world are involved in: the exercise and 
control o f  power over a geographical area. Some scholars (particularly Block247) argue that 
there are actually two types o f  ‘organised crime’ group, which are involved in distinctly 
different types o f  activity: the ‘enterprise syndicate’, which operates ‘exclusively in the arena 
o f  illicit enterprises such as prostitution, gambling, bootlegging, and narcotics’248 as 
described above, and the ‘power syndicate’, which, rather than being involved in enterprise, 
is ‘deeply involved in the production and distribution o f  informal power’249. This may be 
achieved, for example, through activities such as extortion or kidnapping. Catanzaro refers 
to the actors involved in the latter type o f  syndicate as ‘political entrepreneurs’ who, by 
creating a climate o f  fear, aim to gain control over a particular territory or the people that 
are part o f  it250. Although originally applied by Block to the criminal syndicates that
242 Varese, op. at., p. 10.
243 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, op. cit..
244 Donald Cressey, ‘Methodological problems in the study of organized crime as a social problem’, Annals o f  
the American Academy o f  Political and Social Science, Vol 374, No. 1,1967.
345 Varese, op. at* p. 10.
246 Ibid., p. 12.
247 Alan Block, East Side-West Side: Organising Crime in New York, 1930-1950, Cardiff, University College 
Cardiff Press, 1980.
248 Ibid., p. 129.
249 Ibid., p. 13.
250 Raimondo Catanzaro, “Violent Social Regulation: Organized Crime in the Italian South, Social & Legal 
Studies, Vol. 3,1994, pp. 268-269.
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operated in New York in the 1930s and 1940s251, the concept o f  the ‘power syndicate’ has 
most predominantly been applied to the criminal groups o f  southern Italy, and particularly 
to the Sicilian Mafia. This is reflected in the definitions o f  scholars who have researched 
this area o f  ‘organised crime*. For example, Blok defines ‘mafia’ as a ‘modus liven d ï and 
argues that:
The M aftoso can [...] be considered as a variety o f  the political middleman or power 
broker, since his reason d'être is predicated upon his capacity to acquire and maintain 
control over the paths linking the local infrastructure o f  the village to the 
superstructure o f  the larger society.252
The distinction between die ‘power syndicate’ and the ‘enterprise syndicate’, 
however, may not be so clear cut in reality, as some criminal organisations may combine 
enterprises with features o f  ‘power syndicates’. Walston’s discussion o f  the Neapolitan 
C cm orra, for example, shows that enterprise and power are not mutually exclusive 
components o f  some Cam orra groupings253. Indeed, the exercise o f  power and control over 
a given territory can give criminal groups an advantaged position in relation to markets and 
entrepreneurial activity254. Moreover, the distinction between the ‘enterprise syndicate’ and 
the ‘power syndicate’ may have been more pronounced in the past. Authors such as 
Walston255, Arlacchi256, Hess257 and Zaitch258, for example, all discuss an evolution (from  
around the 1960s onwards) from a power-motivated mafia in Sicily, for example, to a more 
‘entrepreneurial’ or ‘financial’ mafia259. However, these authors, nonetheless, maintain that 
‘mafia’ groups should essentially be defined in terms o f  ‘power syndicates’ and Zaitch, for 
example, argues that:
The evolution from a ‘traditional’ to a more modem ‘entrepreneurial* or ‘financial’ 
m afia does not contradict [the] centrality o f  the ‘logic o f  power’.260
Related to the recognition that ‘mafia’ can be seen as a special form o f  ‘organised 
crime’, some scholars see ‘mafia’ as being o f  a particularly special type, one that is 
predominantly associated with the supply o f  protection. Gambetta, for example, defines 
‘mafia’ as *[...] an industry which produces, promotes, and sells private protection’261. He
251 See Block, East Side-West Side: Organising Crime in New York, 1930-1950, op. at., particularly Chapter 6.
252 Anton Blok, The M afia o fa  Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A Study o f Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, Prospect 
Heights, Illinois, 1974, p, 7.
253 James Walston, ‘See Naples and Die: Organized Crime in Campania’ in Robert J. Kelly (ed.), Organised 
Crime: A Global Perspective, Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1986, pp. 134-158.
254 See Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, op. cit..
25s Walston, op. at..
256 Pino Arlacchi, M afia Business: The M afia Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism, London, Verso, 1986.
257 Henner Hess, Mafia & M afiosi: Origin, Poiver and Myth, London, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1998,
258 Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, op. cit..
259 See also Longo, op. at., pp. 18-19.
260 Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlmids, op. cit..
261 Diego Gambetta, The Sicifian Mafia: The Business o f  Private Protection, Cambridge, Massachusetts, I Iarvanl 
University Press, 1993, p. 1.
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argues that although m afiosi may deal in a variety o f  commodities, that should not be what 
defines them:
[...] mafiosi are not entrepreneurs primarily involved in dealing with illegal goods 
[...]. Mafiosi as such deal with no good other than protection.262
Likewise, Varese263 and Hill264, in their studies o f  the Russian Mafia and the Japanese
Y a ku b a  respectively, define a ‘mafia’ group as one that specialises in protection as a
commodity. Indeed, although some people may use the terms ‘mafia’ and ‘organised crime’
synonymously, it is this very specialisation in the supply o f  protection as a form o f
governance which has led to some Russian criminal organisations, the Sicilian C osa N o stra ,
the Japanese Y a ku b a  and even die Hong Kong Triads265 being collectively labelled as
‘Mafias’ and, for this reason, these groups should be considered as essentially different to
other criminal and ‘organised crime’ groups266. In some cases, ‘mafia’ protection may
actually be nothing more than spurious protection from the group itself. However, in
other cases, the protection and the services offered by ‘mafia’ groups may be genuine.
Studies have shown, for example, that the Sicilian Mafia has provided genuine (albeit
illegal) protection against theft and extortion, served to limit competition in particular
industries and has provided arbitration and mediation services to settle disputes267. In
providing such forms o f  protection, however, ‘mafia’ groups may not necessarily adhere to
rules favouring fairness or merit. As Varese emphasises:
[...] the Mafia operates without consideration for justice, fairness or the well-being 
o f society at large. In the world run by die Mafia, there is no such thing as a ‘right’ 
even to the protection for which one has paid. Mafiosi can ask for more favours or 
more money, or collude widi other Mafias against dutifully paying clients, and there 
is no higher authority to which the victim can appeal.268
Focussing on the Svhat’ question and the activities involved in ‘organised crime’ in 
this respect further helps our understanding o f  the nature o f  ‘organised crime’ in Spain -  
the categorisation o f ‘mafia’ as a special form o f  ‘organised crime’, and the distinction 
between power syndicates and enterprise syndicates, allows us to be even more specific 
about the motivation o f  the groups engaged in the illicit activities in Spain which were
262 Ibid., p. 9.
265 Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a  New Market Economy, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, p. 4; Federico Varese, ‘W'hat is the Russian Mafia?1, Low Intensify Conflict & la w  Enforcement, Vol. 
5, No. 2,1996, p. 131. See also Varese, ‘General Introduction: What is organized crime?1, tip. at., pp. 17-19.
264 See Peter B. E. Hill, The Japanese M afia: Yakuba, Law, and the State, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003,
p. 10.
265 See, for example, Gambetta, op. at:, Varese, The Russian Mafia, op. cit:, Hill, op. cit., Yiu Kong Chu, The Triads 
as Business, London and New York, Roudedge, 2000.
266 See Gaml>ctta, op. cit., p. 227; Hess, op. cit., p. 198.
267 See, for example, Gambetta, op. cit. and Hess, op. cit..
268 Varese, ‘General Introduction: What is organized crime?1, op. cit., p. 18, citing Gambetta, op. cit., p. 33 and 
Varese, The Russian Mafia, rip. cit., p. 6 and p. 190.
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detailed above. As we have seen, the criminal activities occurring in Spain involve the
provision o f  illicit goods and/or services, or the provision o f  licit goods through illicit
means, and there is no evidence to suggest that the groups involved in these activities are
motivated by anything other than money and profit. Therefore, according to Block’s
distinction, the criminal groups operating in Spain are ‘enterprise syndicates’. We have
seen that ‘mafias’ or criminal groups o f  the ‘power syndicate’ variety (such as the various
Italian ‘mafias’) are active in Spain but they do not (as yet) act as ‘power syndicates’ there:
their activities are confined to enterprise. Indeed, although political involvement may be a
part o f  these (and other) groups’ activities in Spain (through corruption, for example — and
this will be discussed in Chapter 4), the purpose o f  this is to gain protection or immunity
for the illegal activities that they participate in269. As Rawlinson makes clean
Even when organized crime is engaged in more politically motivated activities, such 
as the corruption o f  government officials, these relationships are underscored by 
entrepreneurial goals.270
The evidence does not suggest that the criminal groups active in Spain are aiming to secure 
the full control o f  a given territory or exercise power in the way that a ‘power syndicate’ or 
‘mafia’ would.
Therefore, although the terms crimen organi^ado or delincuenda organi^ada (both 
translate literally as ‘organised crime1) are used extensively in Spain by the media, the 
Spanish authorities and the Spanish police (as they were by the other categories o f  
professional interviewed for this thesis), ‘illicit enterprise’ as a particular form o f ‘organised 
crime’ is actually a more accurate term to use in order to describe and reflect the forms o f  
criminal activity being carried out in Spain and with which this thesis is concerned. As a 
result, and where appropriate, the use o f  this term will be favoured over that o f  ‘organised 
crime’ in the remaining chapters o f  this thesis.
For the purposes o f  reviewing the definitional debate, and also in order to provide 
a fully comprehensive picture o f  illicit enterprise in Spain, one or two further issues need 
addressing in this chapter. Particularly, it is now worth highlighting that, given the 
difficulties o f  finding a precise definition o f ‘organised crime’, some academics have 
preferred to take a different approach and have formulated lists o f  defining variables or 
characteristics o f ‘organised crime’. Maltz, for example, includes the following attributes as 
potential indicators o f ‘organised crime’: corruption, violence, sophistication, continuity,
269 Howard Abadinsky, Organised Crime, 9* edition, Belmont, California, Wadsworth Publishing, 2009, p. 3.
270 Rawlinson, op. at., p. 326.
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structure, discipline, multiple enterprises, legitimate business and bonding271. Similarly, 
Finckenauer includes in his list o f  variables: lack o f  ideology, structure/organised hierarchy, 
continuity, violence/use o f  force or the threat o f  force, restricted membership, illegal 
enterprises, penetration o f  legitimate businesses and corruption272, and Abadinsky’s most 
recent list claims that ‘organised crime’: has no political goals, is hierarchical, has a limited 
or exclusive membership, constitutes a unique subculture, perpetuates itself, exhibits a 
willingness to use illegal violence, is monopolistic and is governed by explicit rules and 
regulations273.
This kind o f  approach to characterising ‘organised crime’ has its advantages, 
because it is able to gather together and take into account all the differing aspects o f  the 
more specific academic definitions o f  the phenomenon. I Iowever, this approach also 
reflects the eleven-point EU definition, for example, and, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, some o f  these legal/law enforcement definitions can be criticised for their breadth 
and all-encompassing nature. Indeed, the academics that take this approach themselves 
point out that some criminal organisations may not possess all o f  the attributes included 
their lists274 or that some characteristics may be central, while others are peripheral, and so 
on275. Furthermore, even from just the three examples given above, we can see that the 
contents o f  the lists are not identical (indicating that disagreement is inherent even with this 
more general approach), and the differing attributes which are (or are not) included in the 
respective lists are likely to be dependent on the same factors that account for the 
differences in definitions (perspective, data, time, place, and so on). Certainly, as we have 
seen in this chapter, not everyone would agree, for example, that ‘organised crime’ is 
hierarchical.
Nevertheless, a discussion o f  some o f  these variables in relation to Spain will serve 
to give us further understanding o f  the nature and extent o f  illicit enterprise there. As 
noted in the Introduction, in order to carry out and ensure the success o f  the illegal 
activities discussed earlier in this chapter, criminal groups in Spain use violence and 
intimidation, and they corrupt politicians, law enforcement officers, judges, and so on. The 
issue o f  corruption will be discussed in Chapter 4. However, some examples o f  the 
violence undertaken by criminal groups in Spain will be mentioned here because, according
271 Michael D. Malta, Toward Defining Organized Crime’ in Herbert E. Alexander and Gerald E. Caiden 
(eds.), The Politics and E conomes o f  Organised Crime, Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books/D.C. Heath 
and Company, 1985, pp. 21-35.
272 See Longo, op, at., p. 17, citing J. O. Finckenauer, 'Problems of definition: what is organized crime?’, Trends 
in Organised Crime, Voi. 8, No. 3,2005, pp. 63-83.
273 See Abadinsky, Organised Crime, 9lh edition, op. a t , pp. 3-5.
274 See ibid., p. 5.
275 Maltz, op. cit., p. 24.
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to the Public Prosecutor o f  Malaga, for example, the most worrying aspect o f  the criminal 
activities undertaken in Spain is not the quantitative increase o f  crime but, in qualitative 
terms, the seriousness o f  the crimes committed274, and this surely encompasses the threat to 
life that these crimes inevitably involve- Indeed, as elsewhere in Spain, violence relating to 
some o f  the criminal activities discussed above occurs in the Costa del Sol and this involves 
shootings, killings, kidnappings and gang fighting as a result o f  feuds and settling o f  
accounts within, and between, criminal groups276 77. A  review o f the Spanish (and, indeed, 
the British) press over the last few years provides us with many examples o f such violence 
in this region. However, some recent examples include the shooting (and killing) o f  British 
criminal, William Moy, in a bar in Marbella in July 2006, in what was believed to be a drug 
gang execution278, or the professional hit on an Estonian man (who had ‘connections with 
organised crime1) in die very same bar in August 2007279. Shortly afterwards, in September 
2007, three men (one Ecuadorian and two Colombians) were shot in Fuengirola in what 
was thought to be a drug-related settling o f  scores (one man died at the scene and the 
others died later in hospital)280. This happened just two days after a burnt out body was 
found in a car in Estepona281, Another example was the shooting (and killing) o f  a known 
Irish gangster in February 2008, who had spent the last two years taking refuge in one o f
276 See Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. Ai. presentada a l inicio del año ju d icia lpor el 
Fiscal General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Toarán (2007) (Capitalo II, Volumen 1), op. cit., p. 
195 and N. Sánchez, ‘La Fiscalía avisa de que la delincuencia organizada se extiende ya a la Axarquía’, 
malagahoy.es, 05/09/08,
http;//www,maIagahoy.es/article/malaga/221242/la/fiscalía/avisa/la/delincuencia/organizada/se/ extiende 
/ya/Ia/axarquia.html [accessed 07/09/OK).
277 Interviews P2, J6 and P12, and Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l 
inicio del año ju á cia lp o r e l F iscal General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Toarán (2007) (Capitulo II, 
Volumen I), op. cit., p. 195. Indeed, tire political party IU claimed that, during 2006, the Costa del Sol was the 
scene of more than 50 kidnappings and settling of accounts between criminal groups. See Izquierda Unida- 
Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía (IU-LV-CA), Aproximación a l Crimen Organizado y  ¡a A cthidad M ajiosa 
en la  Costa del Sol, II Informe: El Crimen Óiganizado en la Costa del Sol, Observatorio del Crimen 
Organizado de IU-LV-CA y Oficina de Comunicación de IU-LA-CA, Boletín no. 2, Febrero de 2008, p. 14, 
bltp;//iumaIaga20Q8,org/files/n%20Informe%20Crímen%200rganizadQlp d f  [accessed 06/10/08).
278 See, for example, Giles Trcmlett, 1306511 body count soars as the Costa killers turn up die heat*, 
guardian.co.uk, 07/08/06, http ,7/w w  .guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/aug/07/spain.ukcriroe [accessed 05/08/08].
279 See, for example, *Estonian man shot dead in Nueva Andalucía, Marbella’, typicallyspanish.com, 27/08/07, 
http;//www,typicallyspanish.com/news/publish/printer 12162.shtml [accessed 19/09/07], quoting Diario 
Sur and ‘Organised crime links reported in Marbella shooting', typicallyspanish.com, 02/09/07,
http;//w w .typicallyspanish.com/news/publish/printer 12250.shtml. [accessed 17/09/07], quoting Diario 
Sur.
280 See, for example, ‘Shooting in Fucngirola Claims 2 lives’, Costadelsol.st, 12/09/07,
Fuengirola shooting', typicallyspamsb.com, 13/09/07,
participation to the Ftiengjtola shooting^, typicalA/spanisbxom, 14/09/07,
http;//www.typicallyspanish.com/news/publish/printer 12472.shtml and Third man dies after Fuengirola 
shooting^, typicallyspamsb.com, 16/09/07, .•
281 ‘Shooting in Fuengirola Claims 2 Lives’, op. at..
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Estepona’s many urbanisations282, to which we can add the three shootings (resulting in a 
total o f  seven people injured) that took place in public bars in Marbella in the space o f  just 
one month (August/September 2008) and which, again, were all believed to be the result o f  
(unconnected) settlings o f  scores between criminal gangs283. Moreover, sometimes, it is not 
just members o f  the criminal gangs themselves that are harmed in these attacks. For 
example, in 2004, the Spanish public was particularly shocked when an innocent man and 
child were killed (and at least another three people were seriously injured) when three 
hooded men using Kalashnikov rifles discharged between 50 and 100 bullets in a 
hairdressing establishment in Marbella284. Indeed, as the Spanish Attorney General’s annual 
report emphasises, the dangerousness o f the criminal groups in this area can be 
demonstrated by the number o f  arms seized by the police when the groups are detained.
For example, according to data from the Spanish National Police, 39 firearms, 224 
cartridges and 9 blades were seized in this region in 2006 alone285.
Criminal groups also engage in violence elsewhere in Spain. Indeed, reports o f  
kidnappings, shootings and violent settling o f  scores involving members o f  Galicia’s clans 
appear regularly in the Spanish, and even international, press286. As Thompson and 
Tremlett have pointed out:
In Galicia, shootings and the sudden disappearance o f  those said to be connected 
to smuggling, often believed to have been sent to the bottom o f  the sea by their 
rivals, have become more common since cocaine began arriving there in the 
Eighties.287
282 See, for example, Juana Viudez, ‘Estcpona o la logica de la corrupcion’, elpais.com, 22/06/08, 
http://www.elpais.com/artiailo/andalucia/Estepona/lQgica/corrupdon/elpepue5pand/2Q080622elpand ,3/ 
Tea [accessed 11/08/08].
283 See, for example, M. J. Cruzado, 'Latest shooting in Marbella sparks calls for more police patrolling the
sliQOting-marbclla-spairks-200810031433.html [accessed 06/10/08] and Fernando J. Perez, ‘Cuando las balas 
ya son paisaje’, epais.com , 28/09/08,
http://www^lpais,com/articulo/andalucia/balas/paisaje/elpepiespand/20080928elpand 9/Tes/ [accessed 
08/10/08].
284 See, for example, Luis Gomez, ‘La costa del crimen organizado’, E l Pat's, 12/12/04, pp. 1-3.
285 piscaifa General del Estado, M emoria eltvada a l GoHemo de S. M .pm entada a l ¿mao del ath judicia l f o r  e l F iscal 
General del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Candida Conde-Pumpido Tourdn(2007) (Capituh III, Volumen I), op. at., pp. 703- 
704, quoting data from e l Cuerpo National de PoHa'a (Spanish National Police).
286 For example, in September 2005, it was reported that a man was shot dead in Ourense in what was 
believed to be a settling of scores between Galicia’s drug traffickers. The same report also gives details of the 
murder of two men in Pontevedra earlier that year in another presumed settling of scores. See EFE, ‘Un 
hombre fallece a tiros en Ourense en un supuesto ajuste de cuentas’, E l Pais, 04/09/05, p. 29. Another 
example, this time from the British press, details the deaths of the FeijiSo cousins, whose charred corpses 
were discoved in Cambados (Pontevedra) in December 2005. The report also refers to other traffickers that 
were killed or kidnapped in Galicia in 2005. See Tremlett, 'Ruthless heirs of cocaine trade tighten their grip 
on a smugglers’ paradise’, op. ciL
287 Thompson and Tremlett, op. at..
- 7 2 -
It seems that the trend has endured in recent years. Throughout 2005, for example, there 
were Tralf a dozen murders’288, and the Attorney General’s 2007 report confirmed that, 
during 2006, there continued to be kidnappings and settlings o f  scores between criminal 
clans, which were carried out either as an element o f  pressure to guarantee operations or as 
a means o f  collecting debts, or even as compensation for aborted operations289. It seems, 
however, that until now at least, such violence in Galicia has been confined to the criminal 
world, and has been directed against individuals within the same organisation, or against 
other organisations engaged in the same criminal activity290.
Furthermore, as in the other regions examined in this thesis, the criminal groups 
active in Madrid also engage in violence to facilitate their activities. Although the data held 
by the Public Prosecutor o f  the autonomous community o f  Madrid records a relatively low 
number o f  homicides resulting from settlings o f  scores between criminal organisations in 
recent years (11 deaths in 2005 and just two in 2006)29', a review o f  the Spanish press (and 
other sources) would lead us to believe that violence related to criminal gangs in Madrid is 
more frequent Indeed, numerous examples could be given, yet just two or three are 
probably sufficient to illustrate the point: in a period o f  only two months during 2001, for 
example, a total o f  17 Colombians were killed in Madrid as a result o f  ‘organised crime’- 
related violence292; at least 20 o f  the 53 foreigners murdered in Madrid during the first ten 
months o f  2003 were thought to have been killed as a result o f  a settling o f  scores293 and, 
writing in 2004, Gômez-Céspedes and Stangeland highlighted the 30 plus ‘drug-related 
ven d etti that had taken place in the region since 2000294. Moreover, some recent examples 
o f  violence involving criminal gangs include the shooting and killing, in January 2009, o f  a 
suspected Colombian capo as he lay in his Madrid hospital bed, or the incident that 
occurred just two days later in the centre o f  the capital, when a Romanian nightclub
288 Interview PI 7.
289 Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M .presentada d  inicia del añ oju d iad  p or e l V ised 
G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr, D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Toaron (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), op, at., p. 708. 
This point was also made by the professional interviewed in interview P17.
290 Ibid..
291 See Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada d  Golñemo de S. M. presentada d  inicio del año ju d id a lp or e l 
V ised G enerd del Estado, Excmo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Toaron (2007) (Capítulo III, Volumen I), op. a t., p.
292 See Jennifer Sands, 'Exploring Transnational Organised Crime in the Age o f Globalisation: A Case Study 
of the Colombian Cartels and Russian Mafias in Spain’, Geodas, No. 1,2004, p. 98, citing Tony Thompson, 
T>eadly Cargo’, Tbe Observer, 21/04/02, http: / /www.guardian.co.uk / Archive [accessed 24/07/02]; Giles 
Tremlett, ‘Colombian cocaine war shifts to Madrid’, The Guardian, 28/09/01; Tres colombianos mueren en 
un tiroteo entre bandas de narcotrafieantes en Madrid’, E lP ds, 26/09/01, http://www.elpais.es [accessed 
24/07/02]; F. J. Barroso and T. Escárraga, ‘Los ajustes de cuentas entre "narcos” colombianos se cobran diez 
vidas en 40 días en Madrid’, E l P ds, 27/09/01, http://www,elpais.es [accessed 08/08/02]; and Patricia 
Ortega Dolz, ‘Las bandas de delincuentes extranjeros en España han crecido un 30% en un año’, E l Pds,
30/09/01,]
293 See Francisco Peregjl, ‘Venganzas mortales’, E l P ds, 23/11/03, p. 28.
294 Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. rit., p. 387.
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doorman (who was facing trial for kidnapping) was murdered in what police suspected was 
a settling o f  scores between a Bulgarian clan and a rival Spanish group (the gunman was 
also suspected o f  killing another man and injuring three people as he fled the scene)295. 
Indeed, as in other regions o f  Spain, it would appear that killings and settlings o f  scores, as 
well as kidnappings, occur in Madrid when there is a dispute between criminal groups over 
the control o f  a particular territory or trade, or when a ‘debt’ is owed296, and much o f  the 
violent activity is undertaken by sicarios (hired assassins), which now appear to be 
established, and living in, Madrid297. Although acts o f  violence in Madrid are most usually 
directed towards other members o f  the criminal world, as in the Costa del Sol, members o f  
criminal gangs have not been the only victims o f  shootings and kidnappings. For example, 
in August 2002, an inspector from Madrid’s Homicide Squad was shot and killed (and 
another two agents were injured) when attempting to arrest two Colombian sicarios that 
had, allegedly, killed another South American the previous weekend298. Also, the Spanish 
press has recently recounted the activities o f  some Chinese citizens (dubbed ‘a Chinese 
mafia’) that had been kidnapping their, seemingly innocent, compatriots (predominantly 
young people and children) in Madrid, purely to make money299.
Another characteristic o f ‘organised crime’ that appears in the lists o f  both Maltz 
and Finckenauer discussed above, and which is particularly important in the case o f  Spain, 
is the penetration o f  legitimate businesses. Criminal groups may become involved in 
legitimate businesses for a number o f  reasons300 bul; predominantly, legitimate businesses 
can be used to launder money. In Spain, just like anywhere else, the criminal groups 
engaged in illicit enterprise have to launder the proceeds o f  their crimes and, in Spain, this 
has led to criminal groups infiltrating legal industries such as construction and the 
tourist/hospitality sector. Significantly, and as one o f  the recent annual reports by 
SEPBLAC (Servicio E jecutivo de la  Com isión de Prevention de Blanqueo de C apitales e Infracciones 
M onetarias) (Executive Service o f  the Commission for the Prevention o f  Money Laundering
295 See, for example, F. Javier Barroso and Rafael Fraguas, ‘Choque de mafiosos: dos muertos’, e!pás.com , 
13/01/09,
htlp;//www.elpais.com/articulo/madrid/ChQque/mafio5os/muertos/clpepiespmad/20090113elpmad 3/Tt¡ 
S [accessed 19/01/09].
296 See, for example, Jesús Duva, ‘Los geos liberan en Madrid a un hombre que estaba secuestrado por unos 
sicarios’, ElPm's, 16/01/05, p. 30.
297 The professional interviewed in interview J2, for example, claimed that sicarios are Very common’ in 
Madrid. On this point, also see Pablo Ordaz, *Los sicarios abren sucursal en Madrid’, E¿ País, 03/11/02, p.
298 See, for example, Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. át., p. 401 and Ordaz, op. ciL
299 See, for example, Jesús Duva, ‘Ojos vendados, palizas y una pistola en la cabeza’, etpiis.com, 14/01/09,
pmad 4/Tes [accessed 19/01/09],
300 See, for example, Maltz, op. á t., pp. 31-32.
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and Monetary Offences) points out, in recent years, the real estate sector, generally, has 
been identified by various national and international institutions/bodies as being one o f  the 
most utilised channels for money laundering by criminal organisations301, and the case o f  
the Costa del Sol provides several notable, and alarming, examples o f  such practices and 
thus deserves special mention. Certainly, a look at some o f  the successful police operations 
from the last few years serves to illustrate the extent o f  this problem. One o f  the most 
famous and important cases, for example, unravelled in March 2005 with O peration Ballena 
Blanca (Operation “White Whale’)302, during which (it was claimed at the time) Spanish 
police uncovered ‘the largest money laundering network in Europe’303. It was alleged that 
hundreds o f  shell companies, run from the Marbella offices o f  lawyer Fernando del Valle, 
were set up, in order to launder the illicit proceeds o f crime o f  several international 
‘organised crime’ groups involved in drugs and arms trafficking, prostitution, kidnapping, 
fraud, tax evasion, murder, and so on. Most o f the money was invested in the property 
sector in the Costa del Sol and, at the time, it was estimated that over 250 million euro had 
been laundered. More than 50 lawyers and businessmen, as well as the mayor o f  Manilva 
(Málaga), were arrested in connection with this case and 251 properties in the Costa del Sol 
were seized, along with bank accounts, boats, light aircraft and several luxury motorbikes 
and cars304.
Operación B allena Blanca marked the first time that police had ‘established a direct 
link between ‘organised crime’ and Spain’s construction and real estate industries’305, and 
confirmed that money from international drug trafficking was being invested in the Spanish
301 See Servicio Ejecutivo de la Comisión de Prevención de Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias 
(SEPBLAC), Memoria A nnual2006, Madrid, SEPBLAC, 2007, p. 57 and p. 59, 
http://ww.sepblac.es/español/informes y  publicaciones/memoria2006,pdf [accessed 20/08/08],
302 For foil details of dris case see, for example, ‘La policía destapa en Marbella la mayor red de blanqueo en 
Europa’, E l País, 13/03/05, p. 1; Luis Gómez, ‘La red de blanqueo de dinero desarticulada en Marbella 
utilizaba más de mil sociedades’, E l País, 13/03/05, pp. 19-20;). Martín-Arroyo, 'El alcalde de Manilva 
anuncia su dimisión tras ingresar en prisión’, E l País, 16/10/05, p. 32; “White Whale Connection’, The Euro 
Weekly News (Costa del Sol), 27/10/05 -  02/11/05, p. 6; Montse Martin, The Marbella Connection’, Sarin  
English, 28/10/05 -03/11/05, pp. 18-19; MIR (Dirección General de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales), 
‘Balance contra la delincuencia organizada en 2005; Las FCSE detuvieron a 3.925 personas y desmantelaron 
290 grupos vincularlos con el crimen organizado en 2005’, Nota deprensa, Madrid, MIR, 13/02/06, 
http://ww.mir.es/DGRIS/Balances/Balance 2005/pdf/balance 2005 crimen-QtEanizadoqxif [accessed 
04/08/08]; Diez Ripollés and Gómez-Céspedes, op. at., pp. 16-17 and Manuel Villoría, ‘Country reports: 
Spain’, in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report2006, London and Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press 
in association with Transparency International, 2006, pp. 251-252,
http://ww.transparenry Qrg/publications/gcr/downlQad p;.r/download....gcr .2006 [¡recessed 08/10/08],
303 See ‘La policía destapa en Marbella la mayor red de blanqueo en Europa’, op. dt. (my translation).
304 In September 2008, the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor finally concluded his investigation into this case. In a 
document delivered to a Marbella court on 16/09/08, die prosecutor detailed the so-called ‘plot’, organised in 
order to launder 12 million Euros from mafia activities through the offices of Del Valle. The prosecutor 
concluded that up to 18 people contributed to the ‘corrupt plot*. See, for example, Francisco Mercado, 111 
bufete de Del Valle blanqueó 12 millones de euros de origen criminal’, epas.com , 17/09/08,
/2Q08Q917elpepinac 13/Tes [accessed 20/10/08].
305 Villoría, op. dt., p. 252.
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real estate sector306. Further evidence soon followed. For example, in May 2005, in 
O peration L a ila , Spanish police dismantled a hashish trafficking network that laundered at 
least 30 million euros from the proceeds o f  that activity through the real estate and 
financial sectors o f  the Costa del Sol. The property embargoed in that operation reached 
almost 10.5 million euros, and deposits from bank accounts totalling 470,433 euros were 
also seized. In order to launder its illicit proceeds, the criminal group (composed o f  
Moroccans and Spaniards) used a framework o f  companies, controlled by different 
members o f  the group and managed through lawyers’ offices in the Costa del Sol, to invest 
in plots o f  land, build properties (acting as developers) and transfer the ownership o f  the 
properties from one company to another307. Other examples from 2005 include Operación 
Sugar, in July, in which a drug trafficking network (trafficking cocaine and hashish from the 
Costa del Sol to the UK) was found to be laundering some o f  their illicit profits by making 
numerous investments in real estate, using large amounts o f  cash and taking out mortgage 
loans (which overvalued the properties in order to increase the amounts laundered)308 309, and 
Operación Turrón in October. In the latter operation, it was estimated that around 40 million 
euros were invested in the purchase o f  real estate developments in Mijas Costa (Málaga) by 
a Portuguese criminal group for the purposes o f  laundering the proceeds gained, yet again, 
from drug trafficking. A  total o f  132 luxury apartments were seized in the operation and 
four people were arrested, including a lawyer that was working in Marbella and who was, 
allegedly, managing the companies that were making the real estate purchases300. In January 
2006, it was also reported that Spanish police, in collaboration with British police, had 
seized (amongst other things) 3,800 kilograms o f  hashish resin and detained 34 people that 
were operating in both Spain and the UK. The principal members o f this group were 
settled in Marbella and were involved in the acquisition, concealment and dispatch o f  the
306 José Luis Barbería, ‘Las mafias echan sus tentáculos en la construcción’, elpds.com , 03/10/06, 
http;//www.elpás,com/articulo/espana/mafias/echan/tent¡iculos/constniCCÍQll/£lPp.Qtesp/20061003clpepi 
nac 16/Tes/ [accessed 10/10/0«]
307 See, for example, Martín-Artoyó, 'La policía desmantela en Málaga una red que blanqueó al menos 30 
millones del narcotráfico’, op. rít. and MIR (Dirección General de la Policía), *La Policía da un nuevo golpe en 
la Costa del Sol al blanqueo de dinero’, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 21/05/05,
hito;//www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas Prensa/Policia/2005/np052101,htm [accessed 18/08/08].
308 See, for example, MIR (Dirección General de la Policía), *La Policía bloquea bienes valorados en decenas 
de millones de euros procedentes del blanqueo en la Costa del Sol’, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 14/07/05, 
http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas Prensa/Policia/2005/np071402.htm and 'Detenidos 13 británicos por 
tráfico de drogas y blanqueo en Málaga’, elpds.com , 15/07/05,
htto;//www,elpais.com/artjculo/espana/De tenidos/hritanicos/trafico/drogas/blanqucQ/Malaga/elpcpunac 
/2Q050715elpcpinac 10/Tes [both accessed 18/08/08].
309 See, for example, ‘Cae una red de blanqueo de dinero que compró 132 pisos en Mijas’, op. de.; MIR 
(Dirección General de la Policía), ‘132 apartamentos de lujo embargados, cuentas bloqueadas e investigado un 
despacho de abogados marbellí’, Nota deprensa, Madrid, MIR, 07/10/05,
http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas Prensa/Policia/2Q05/npl00702.htm [accessed 18/08/08]; and Antonio 
Montilla, ‘Anothcr Costa money laundering gang held’, Surin Engtish, 14/10/05 — 20/10/05, http://past-
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drug to the UK, where it was then distributed. Once again, they also used real estate 
companies in the Costa del Sol to launder the proceeds gained from these illicit activities310. 
Also in 2006, in October, in the second phase o f  Operación D elfín, Spanish police detained 
four people who were members o f  a financial and economic framework used by 
international drug trafficking organisations for the laundering o f  their illicit proceeds. The 
profits were mainly generated through the trafficking o f  cocaine and were then laundered 
through investments in real estate in the Costa del Sol and Galicia. Amongst other things 
seized or embargoed in this phase o f  the operation, were 35 buildings and funds in 
numerous bank accounts, which, in total, were worth more than 40 million euros311. Thus 
far, it seems that the majority o f  these kinds o f  police operations against money laundering 
have taken place in Málaga province, yet the Public Prosecutor o f  neighbouring province 
Cádiz has also recently expressed his fear that the emerging real estate sector there will also 
be used for laundering the illicit profits o f  criminal organisations312.
Without a doubt, money laundering, particularly through the real estate sector, is 
most notoriously associated with the Costa del Sol. However, money laundering is clearly 
carried out in other parts o f  Spain too. There is even some evidence o f this activity being 
carried out in Galicia313, despite one o f  the interview sources claiming that ‘there are not 
many obvious signs o f  it’ in the region314. For example, Tremlett relates a story involving a 
furniture retail warehouse that was used for this purpose315, and the O GD claims that, in 
Galicia, in addition to the real estate sector, the tourist industry, agriculture, sports, the 
fishing industry, die canning industry, the banking sector, trade in luxury goods and even 
public debt ‘continue to feed on drug funds’316.
310 MIR (Dirección General de la Policía), ‘La Polida desarticula en la Costa del Sol dos peligrosos grupos 
organizados’, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 28/01/06,
bílp;//www,mir,es/DGRIS/Notas Prensa/Policia/2006/npQ128Q4Jitm [accessed 18/08/08], Interestingly, 
what hindered tire police in their work in this operation was the involvement of a former English policeman, 
a former soldier from the British navy and a former military professional, who was instructing the rest of the 
members of the group on die techniques usually used by the police in such drcumstances.
311 See, for example, MIR (Dirección General de la Policía y de la Guardia Gvil), *La Polida desmantela la 
estructura financiera utilizada por narcotraficantes para el blanqueo de sus ganandas’, Ñ ola de prensa, Madrid, 
MIR, 26/10/06, http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas Prensa/Poliria/2QQfi/np l026Q2,htm and ‘Cae una red 
de narcotráfico que blanqueaba dinero en inversiones inmobiliarias en Andaluda y Galida’, elmundo.es, 
26/10/06. http://www.elmundo,es/eImundo/2006/10/26/cspana/l 161856908.hltnl |both accessed 
18/08/08],
312 See Fiscalía General del listado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l inicio del añojudidtdpor el 
Fiscal General del Estado, Eximo. Sr. D. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourón (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen I), ap. cit., p. 
703.
313 This point wras raised during interviews M2 and P15 and in questionnaires QE, QF and QL
314 Interview J l .  The OGD also daims that the dirty money generated in Galicia is invested elsewhere in 
Spain, and even as far as Venezuela. See OGD, op. cit., p. 91.
315 See Tremlett, Ghosts o f  Spain: Travels through a country’s hidden past, op. cit., p. 381.
3,4 OGD, op. cit., p. 91.
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Finally, this chapter on definitions must also address the concept o f  ‘transnational 
organised crime’ (TOC). In 1994, the UN adopted this term to show how ‘organised 
crime’ has become a global ‘threat’317. In the last couple o f  decades, with increasing 
globalisation and the opening o f  Europe’s borders, increased developments in travel and 
communication, advances in technology, and so on, we need to take into account the fact 
that criminal groups and activities are increasingly crossing national borders. As I,evi 
reminds us:
As with legitimate products — many products supplied by ‘organized criminals’ are 
grown and/or manufactured in far-distant parts o f  the world -  it is difficult to 
retain the nation state as a meaningful bounded unit o f  analysis for understanding 
the organized crime issue as a whole, even though most individuals involved in 
drug-dealing, extortion, credit card fraud, armed robberies, sex work, etc. may not 
do any international business as part o f  their daily routines.318
Thus, although some criminal groups’ scope o f  operations remains within national 
boundaries (or even within the groups’ own locality), many criminal groups throughout the 
world, in response to changing market opportunities, now commit crimes and operate in a 
number o f  different jurisdictions. Williams and Savona further argue that even those 
groups diat are still predominantly national in scope will increasingly operate on a 
transnational level in the future, as the incentives for them to do so also increase319.
We tend to refer to ‘organised crime’ as being ‘transnational’ when criminal groups 
that have a home base in one state engage in international activities or operate in one or 
more host states, where market conditions are more favourable or where law enforcement 
operations against them are not as strong320. The UN, however, has laid down a wider 
definition. According to this, an offence i s ‘transnational’ if:
a) It is committed in more than one state;
b) It is committed in one state but a substantial part o f  its preparation, planning, 
direction or control takes place in another state;
c) It is committed in one state but involves an organised criminal group that 
engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or
d) It is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.321
117 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Problems and Dangers Posed by Organised Transnational Crime in 
Various Rqp'ons o f  the World. Background document from the World Ministerial Conference on Organized 
Transnational Crime. (E/GONF.88/2), Switzerland, United Nations, 18/08/94.
318 Levi, ‘Organized Crime and Terrorism’, op. at., p. 776.
319 Williams and Savona, op. tit., p. 5.
320 See, for example, ibid., pp. 1-42; Phil Williams, Transnational Criminal Organisations and International 
Security’ Survival, Vol. 36, No. 1,1994, pp. 96-113.
321 Article 3(2) United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000,
http;//www,unciin org/Documenrs/CQovennons/dcatoc/fmal_dQcuments 2/cQnvention eng,pdf.
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Levi argues that these ‘cross-border dimensions are what makes both organized crime and 
white-collar crime different from other crimes for gain’322. However, even if  it is accepted 
that cross-border activity by criminal groups has increased in recent decades, the use o f  
term ‘transnational organised crime’ to describe this may not be without its problems. 
Rawlinson, for example, argues that
[...] when looking at TOC in action and how it is policed, in contrast to that which 
we describe simply as ‘organized crime’, it has less credibility as a distinctive term.323
That criminal groups commit crimes and exploit opportunities in other jurisdictions is not 
to say that ‘organised crime’ does not retain a local, cultural dimension. The global does 
not exclude the local; contemporary ‘organised crime’ combines tradition with modernity. 
As Arlacchi states:
The most influential criminal entrepreneurs in Colombia, Sicily and South-East 
Asia have a double cultural identity. For all their integration into multinational 
networks o f  personal contact and business dealing, and for all their adoption o f  
universal patterns o f  behaviour and consumption, they remain traditionalists, firmly 
tied to their native cultural world -  the world o f  the family, the kinship group, the 
village, the quarter, or the sect.324
As a result, some commentators distinctly emphasise that, in reality, the activities 
undertaken as part o f ‘organised crime’ and the response to it, as well as its victims and 
benefactors, actually exist in a ‘local’ as opposed to a ‘transnational’ space and will be 
affected by local conditions325. According to Longo, therefore, the best way to understand 
TOC is to see it as aw ay o f  acting or as a form o f  behaviour, in terms o f  creating 
functional links, rather than as a defining characteristic326.
TOC has a particular resonance in Spain. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
nationals o f  as many as 99 different countries participated in the known 471 ‘organised 
crime’ groups in 2005327, which underlines that Spain has become ‘an emerging criminal 
market in terms o f  global importance’328. That is not to say, however, that we should 
underestimate the importance o f  indigenous Spanish groups or criminals. Although 
Spaniards play a significant role in illicit enterprise throughout Spain (either with other 
Spaniards or in mixed nationality groups), criminal activity in Galicia (despite its connection 
with Colombian cocaine and its traffickers) is very much domestic in nature. Illicit 
enterprise (particularly drug trafficking) in Galicia is carried out, predominantly, by local
322 Levi, ‘Oiganized Crime and Terrorism’, op. a t ,  p. 776.
323 Rawlinson, op. at., p. 330.
324 Arlacchi, op. at,, p, 220.
325 Rawlinson, op. a t., pp. 330-331.
326 Longo, op. at., pp. 15-28.
327 Espaila. Ddincuencia Otgam%ada / 2005, op. at.,
328 Gomez-Cespedes and Stangeland, op. a t., p. 397.
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family groups, which are highly specialised and professional329 and, stemming from a 
historical smuggling tradition, they are rooted in the region’s history.
That ‘organised crime’ has both a local and ‘transnational’ dimension (both in Spain 
and elsewhere) clearly has implications for law enforcement. To effectively respond to 
‘organised crime’, law enforcement needs to operate on a number o f  levels, including the 
local and international levels. As we have seen, the growth in cross-border criminal activity 
has resulted in attempts to increase collaboration and cooperation between national law 
enforcement bodies and security services, which, in terms o f  the issues posed by different 
criminal justice and legal systems, cultures, languages and working practices and 
(unwillingness to share intelligence and information, has not been without its problems. 
Just as the law enforcement community has to adjust to the demands o f  working on an 
international scale, so too does ‘organised crime’. Criminal groups, for example, will have 
to make structural adjustments and demonstrate flexibility if  they are to operate in the 
international market330. This may partly explain why we are seeing a rise in the number o f  
analyses that emphasise networks as the current operational reality o f  ‘organised crime’ 
(discussed above)331. It also underlines one o f  the points made at the beginning o f  this 
chapter that definitions need to be constantly updated to take into account the changing 
nature o f  ‘organised crime’.
Having reviewed some o f  the existing academic and legal definitions o f  ‘organised 
crime’, we can appreciate why a commonly agreed definition o f  the phenomenon is so 
difficult to achieve. Indeed, definitions are likely to be specific to time and place, and to 
the purpose and perspective o f  the observer. For the purposes o f  this thesis, then, the 
fuzzy and all-encompassing term ‘organised crime’ does not provide the conceptual clarity 
needed for our analysis, and some o f  the definitions that have been discussed in dais 
chapter are either too broad, too specific, or they simply do not reflect the types o f  criminal 
activity occurring in Spain. It has therefore been argued that, because the nature o f  the 
criminal activities flourishing in Spain solely encompass either the supply o f  illicit goods 
and services and/or the provision o f  licit goods through illicit means, and that the groups 
engaged in these activities are motivated purely by money or profit, the so-called ‘organised 
crime’ that flourishes there constitutes a particular form o f  ‘organised crime*; that o f  illicit 
enterprise. Therefore, in allowing us to understand more accurately the types o f  activities 
and behaviours with which this thesis is concerned, the concept o f  illicit enterprise 
provides a clearer entry point from which we can begin our analysis into why Spain is
129 Interview P17.
310 See, for example, Rawlinson, op. at., p. 331.
331 Ibid..
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particularly susceptible to this specific kind o f  criminal activity. The next chapter will 
consider some standard explanations for this and discuss the development o f  the 
hypothesis that will be tested subsequently in this thesis.
-81  -
Chapter 3
Explaining Illicit Enterprise in Spain: Standard Explanations 
and the Development of the Hypothesis
As the Introduction explained, the purpose o f  this thesis is to provide a 
comprehensive understanding o f  the factors that facilitate ‘organised crime’ in Spain; by 
which, following the discussion in the previous chapter, we more accurately mean ‘illicit 
enterprise’. The first part o f  this chapter, then, will assess the factors relating to Spain’s 
social, economic and geographical characteristics which, as oudined in Chapter 1, are very 
commonly used to explain this kind o f  criminal activity in Spain. It will argue that, despite 
some initial scepticism as to the value o f  these kinds o f  explanations, these factors are 
indeed important (to a degree) when understanding why Spain retains a competitive edge 
when it comes to illicit enterprise. The second part o f  the chapter, however, will argue that 
these standard explanations only serve to give us a partial understanding o f  why illicit 
enterprise flourishes in Spain and that, in order to explain this fully, further factors must 
also be considered. The thesis therefore hypothesises that other key explanations relating 
to certain weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the political, judicial, legal, and law enforcement 
spheres, which are open to exploitation by criminal groups, are essential in understanding 
Spain’s particular susceptibility to illicit enterprise. Subsequent chapters will test the 
hypothesis by exploring and assessing factors such as corruption and a lack o f  transparency 
and accountability in the political, and other, realms; a lack o f  political and public attention 
given to the problem o f illicit enterprise; some legal and judicial deficiencies; and some 
apparent complexities surrounding law enforcement and policing structures, firstly, 
however, this chapter will discuss the standard explanations for illicit enterprise in Spain, 
the extent o f  their value, and how the hypothesis was developed as a result o f  their 
inadequacies.
Standard explanations for illicit enterprise in Spain
Purported explanations for the existence o f  illicit enterprise in Spain can be found 
in some press and official reports and in some o f  die scant academic literature that makes 
reference (usually only briefly) to ‘organised crime’ and its associated activities in Spain. 
From this, it becomes apparent that the existence o f  illicit enterprise in Spain is typically 
and simply explained by die fact that the country possesses a number o f  characteris tics 
(social, economic, geographical, and so on) that, when put together, make it an ideal
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environment for criminal activity o f  this nature. The following quotation provides a typical 
example:
[...] Spain has certain political, social and economic characteristics that make it 
‘especially attractive’ for the establishment o f  criminal groups: an open economic 
and financial system, mass tourism that guarantees anonymity and an economic 
structure that facilitates money laundering.1
Similarly, when explaining how Spain has achieved its leading position as Europe’s main 
importer o f  cocaine, Zaitch argues that Spain possesses a set o f  ‘competitive advantages’2, 
which include its geographical position and characteristics, as well as other factors relating 
to its history, culture and economy, especially tourism. Indeed, common explanations for 
the existence o f  illicit enterprise in Spain which typically involve some reference to the 
location and geography o f  Spain, the nature o f  Spain’s industry and economy and the 
presence o f  immigrant communities in Spain are generally quite prolific and this continued 
to be the case when the fieldwork and interviews for this research were undertaken. For 
example, when the interviewees were discussing why (they thought) ‘organised crime’ 
existed or flourished in Spain, or why Spain was attractive to criminal groups, a 
combination o f  such factors was mentioned in at least ten o f  the interviews conducted 
(notably in interviews with members o f  Spain’s police forces and judiciary, as well as in 
interviews with journalists who specialise in reporting on ‘organised crime’)3 and reference 
to the individual factors o f  geography and location, economy and industry, and 
immigration were mentioned by many more o f  the interviewees and questionnaire 
respondents. Some o f  these professionals even included factors such as the weather, the 
‘nice people’, and ‘the good life’ that Spain has to offer as reasons for the existence o f  illicit 
enterprise in Spain4. It seemed almost as though explanations such as these presented the 
‘official line’ on the causes o f  Spain’s particular manifestation o f ‘organised crime’, or at 
least the standard explanation for it that is wheeled out time and time again without any 
challenge or need for questioning. This is not particularly surprising: why would state 
officials, for example, want to discredit o r attribute any blame to the state that they 
represent?
A t the very beginning o f  the research process, it was assumed that the common 
reasons given to explain criminal activity in Spain (relating to geography, economic issues,
1 M. J. Cruzado, T3 TSJA insta a combatir el crimen organizado en la Costa’, sur.es, 21/Ü4/06, 
hitp://wwW:diariosurc5/píj<X)0421/prensa/(K)ticia5/Mii]aga/2(X)í>Qi/ 2 1/SlIE:-MAIrQ18Ttml [accessed 
10/10/08], quoting Augusto Mendez de Lugo, the president (at die time) of the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de 
Andaluáa (TSJA), (Supreme Court of Justice of Andalucía) (my translation).
2 See Damián Zaiteh, ‘Recent Trends in Cocaine Trafficking in The Netherlands and Spain’ in Dina Siegal,
1 lenk van de Bunt and Damián Zaitch (eds.), G lobalO rgani^dCrime: Trends and Developments, Dordrecht,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, p. 15.
3 Specifically, for example, during interviews P6, P9, P l l ,  P12.P13, P14, M2, J3 ,J7  and J8.
4 Interviews P12, P13, M2 and J8.
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immigration, and so on) were simply just too basic and not intellectually satisfactory, and it 
was anticipated (perhaps all too cynically) that they would turn out to be excuses, used to 
cover up some more complex or fundamental issues, or to deflect any blame that could be 
attributed to the state. A t that stage, it was tempting to dismiss these factors altogether. 
However, as the research progressed, it became increasingly apparent that those initial 
assumptions were incorrect: the oft-cited reasons for so-called ‘organised crime’ in Spain, 
as we will see below, do provide several benefits to, and facilitate the illicit enterprises and 
activities of, the many criminals there, and they may also have played a role in attracting 
‘transnational’ criminal groups to Spain in the first place. Before moving on to discuss how 
the hypothesis developed, then, the common factors used to explain criminal activity in 
Spain, and the reasons why these factors cannot be dismissed altogether, will now be 
considered in some detail. Throughout this section, and where relevant, examples from the 
regions o f  Madrid, Galicia and the Costa del Sol will be employed to illustrate particular 
issues.
The location an d  geographical characteristics o fS pa in
As discussed above, when explaining the existence o f illicit enterprise in Spain 
and/or why the country is ideal for criminal activity, it is clear that many view the location 
and geographical characteristics o f  Spain as important factors. For example, the 
geographical situation o f  Spain and/or geographical characteristics were mentioned as 
facilitating factors o f ‘organised crime’ in 17 o f  the interviews conducted for this research5, 
and 12 out o f  13 o f  the questionnaire respondents agreed or strongly agreed that ‘the 
geopolitical location o f  Spain as a whole is ideal for organised crime activities’ and/or that 
‘there are certain geographical features that facilitate organised crime*6. Furthermore, the 
remaining questionnaire respondent stated that ‘there exist geographical factors that make 
Spain a desirable country for organised crime*7 8. Similar arguments can also be found in the 
literature and in official reports*.
5 Interviews J1 ,J3 ,J7 ,J8 , PI, P3, P4, P6, P7, P8, P10, P l l ,  P12, P13, P16, FI and F2.
6 Questionnaires QA, QB, QC, QD, QE, QF, QG, QH, QI, QJ, QK and QM
7 Questionnaire QL (my translation).
8 See, for example, Observatoire Geopolititjue des Drogues (OGD), ‘Spain: Drug Gateway to Europe’, The 
World Geopolitics o f  Drugs 1998/1999A nnual Report:IV . Europe, April 2000,p. 89, 
http://www.ogd.org/2Q00/en/ogtl99 4cn.pdf [accessed 24/07/02]; Carios Rcsa-Nestares, Transnational 
Organized Crime in Spain: Structural Factors Explaining its Penetration’ in Emilio C. Vtano (ed.), Global 
O rganised Crime and International Security, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999, p. 57; Ernesto U. Savona, 
European Money Trails, Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999; library of Congress, Nations 
Hospitable to Organised Crime and Terrorism, Washington D. C , Federal Research Division, library of Congress, 
October 2003, p. 8, http://www.loc.fiov/rr/frd/pdf-filcs/Nat3 Hospitable.pdf [accessed 09/06/08]; 
Commission of the European Communities, *Commission staff working document accompanying the 
Communication from die Commission to the Council and die European Parliament on an EU Action Plan 
on Drugs (2009-2012) — Report of the Final evaluation of the EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008)’,
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Figure 4 -  Map o f  Spain
Situated in the south west o f  the European continent, the Spanish mainland 
borders with France, Andorra, the Pyrenees and the Bay o f Biscay in the north; the 
Mediterranean Sea in the east; Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean in the 
south; and Portugal and the Atlantic in the west. The Islas Baleares (Balearic Islands), in 
the Mediterranean, and the Islas Canarias (Canary Islands), located o f f  the coast o f  Africa 
in the Atlantic, are governed by Spain, and Spain also controls a number o f  territories in 
northern Morocco, including the enclaves o f  Ceuta and Melilla and the islands o f  Peñón de 
Vêlez de la Gomera, Peñón de Alhucemas and Islas Chafarinas* 9. Primarily, then, Spain is 
considered a natural ‘gateway’10 or ‘natural bridgehead’11 for drug traffickers (predominantly 
those from North Africa and Latin America) entering Europe. As De la Torre emphasises, 
the African coast and the Spanish coast are no more than 15 kilometres apart; Spain’s 
borders with France and Portugal are, together, more than 1,740 kilometres long major 
international airports in Madrid, Barcelona, and so on, form a bridge between three 
continents (in fact, Spain has good travel connections generally); and the Islas Canarias and 
Spain’s North African enclaves o f  Ceuta and Melilla have traditionally been considered as
SEC(2008) 2456, Brussels, 18/09/08, p. 75, http://register.cQnsilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/stl3/stt3407- 
ad03.en08.pdf [accessed 29/09/08].
9 See, for example, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘Spain*, Tht W'orld Factbook, Washington, DC, CIA, [no 
date!. https://www.cia.gov/library/publicatiQns/the-worid-factboQk/geQs/sp.hlml [accessed 08/06/08].
10 Interviews J7  and P3.
11 Savona, cp, at,, p. 107. The term ‘natural bridge’ was also used by the professional interviewed in interview 
J l ,  and the professional interviewed in interview F2 used the word‘platform*.
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‘free territories’12. Thus, it is not only inevitable that certain drug (and other) traffic will 
pass through Spain but also, as Resa-Nestares points out, the country is geographically 
close to the ‘logistical bases’ o f  powerful criminal organisations such as the Marseilles clans 
and the various Italian mafias13. Moreover, Spain’s 4,200 kilometres o f  varied coastline 
(rugged, craggy and uncontrolled in parts) provides numerous coastal landing sites for 
smugglers and traffickers14. Friman’s research15 into why some countries emerge as transit 
states for illegal goods also adds some credence to this argument. I Ie argues that countries 
that border the target (in this case, Europe), and especially those that serve as coastal access 
points for landlocked targets, appear to be prime candidates for transit points (especially 
where goods, for example hashish, are bulky)16. That geographical factors are commonly 
given to account for the criminal activity taking place particularly in the coastal regions o f  
the Costa del Sol and Galicia, therefore, can be expected.
Notably, the geographical location o f  the Costa del Sol (either generally or for a 
specific reason) is often highlighted as being a significant causal factor o f  criminal activity 
and illicit enterprise in this region17. Several o f  the interview sources, for example, 
mentioned the proximity o f  North Africa to this region as being one o f  the key facilitating 
factors o f  illicit enterprise in the Costa del Sol18, and considering that the majority o f  the 
drugs and people trafficked into Andalucía come from Morocco (as discussed in Chapter 2, 
and also as detailed in official reports19), this seems to be a plausible argument. In recent 
years, Morocco has retained its status as one o f  the world’s main producers o f  hashish 
(primarily exporting its crop to Europe)20. Thus, the fact that 70 per cent o f  the hashish
12 Carlos de la Torre, The Role of Spain’s Guardia Ovil in Combating Organized Crime and Drug 
Trafficking' in Susan Flood (ed.), M at Drugs and Organised Crime: Issues fo r  a Unified Europe, Chicago, IL, Office 
of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, 1991, p. 64.
13 Resa-Nestares, op. at., p. 57.
14 See De la Torre, op, at., p. 64. ’
15 See II. Richard Fri man, ‘Just passing through: transit states and the dynamics of illicit transshipment*, 
Transnational Organised Crime, Voi. 1, No. 1,1995, pp. 65-83.
16 Ibid.. : ■ ■
17 See, for example, 'IU denuncia que más de 120 grupos de la mafia internacional operan en la Costa del Sol’, 
akdesemlla.es, 05/01/06, http://www.ahcdesevilla.es/hememteca/histQricQr.Q5dIL-J306/sevilla/Andalucta/ip- 
defluncia-que-mas-de-120-pnipos-de-la-mafia-intemacional-opcran-eiilarCQSta-dflsQl 813462Q96368.html 
[accessed 10/10/08], quoting Antonio Romero, ex-membcr of the parliament of Andalucía for poli tical party 
IU. The geographical importance of this region was also raised during interviews PI, P i t ,  P12, P14, C2, J3, 
J7 , FI and F2.
18 Interviews C2.J2, PI, F l, J7 and PI 1.
19 See, for example, library of Congress, op. cit., p. 8, and Commission of die European Communities, op. a/., 
p. 74.
20 See, for example, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODQ), 2006 World Drug Repart, Volume 
2 : Statistics, Vienna, UNODC, 2006, p. 261, hm?;//www,uiiQtlc..Prg/rKÌf/\XD ILJ1006/wdr2(X16 volumelpdf 
[accessed 18/03/07].
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seized in Europe is seized in Spain21 is not really surprising given the proximity o f  North 
Africa to its southern coast.
Another geographical factor, which is often highlighted as a facilitating factor o f  
illicit enterprise in the Costa del Sol22, is the proximity o f  Gibraltar to the region (Gibraltar 
is linked to southern Spain by a narrow isthmus23 and thus it is only a short drive away 
from some o f  the popular western Costa del Sol towns, such as Marbella). Given that 
Gibraltar is a British self-governing colony, some o f  the interview sources emphasised the 
benefits o f  Gibraltar to British criminal groups in particular, suggesting, for example, that 
Gibraltar provides a nearby refuge for British criminals settled in the Costa del Sol and one 
that Spanish police cannot enter24. Several sources also place much emphasis on 
Gibraltar’s status as a tax haven and its potential use by criminal groups o f  all nationalities 
for money laundering purposes. For example, one interview source discussed how  
Gibraltar has several advantages in this respect, such as its many lawyers specialised in 
money laundering and ‘more businesses than people’ (thereby providing numerous 
opportunities to launder money)25; factors that are also highlighted in Spanish press (and 
other) reports. Indeed, such sources often stress that, within its territory o f  around just six 
square kilometres26, Gibraltar has more companies (some 80,000) than residents (between 
30,000 and 55,000, depending on the source)27, as well as 19 banks, 10 branches o f  
international companies, 17 insurance companies, more than 30 investment companies or 
financial brokers, 15 foreign exchange offices, an undetermined number o f  non-registered 
foundations and trusts, 115  lawyers and 28 law firms, whose activities are outside the 
supervision o f  any financial authority28 *. Moreover, it was reported in the Spanish press, in
21 See, for example, Luis Gómez, España Connection: 1m  implacable expansion del crimen organizado en  España, 
Barcelona, RBA libros SA, 2005, p. 18.
22 For example, during interviews J3, F2 and PI 1.
23 See, for example, ‘Gibraltar -  Home: The Meeting Place of Continents’, andalncia.com, 
http://ww.andalucia.com/gibraltar/home,htm [accessed 04/07/08].
24 This point was particularly raised in Interview P2, for example.
25 Interview M l. Additionally, during interview P14, the ‘good conditions’ in Gibraltar in terms of money 
laundering and organised crime were also discussed.
26 See, for example, ‘Gibraltar — I lome: The Meeting Place of Continents’, op. tit..
27 See, for example, Luis Gómez, ‘La red de blanqueo de dinero desarticulada en Marbella utilizaba más de 
mil sociedades’, E l País, 13/03/05, pp. 19-20 and ‘IU denuncia que más de 120 grupos de la mafia 
internacional operan en la Costa del Sol’, op. ai., ln actual fact, the figure for tíre ‘Usually-Resident Population 
of Gibraltar* (including families of servicemen) in the 2001 census was 28,240 (see Government of Gibraltar, 
Census o f  G ibraltar2001, [no datej, p. xvi,
http;//www.gibraltar.gov.gi/gov dcpts/Statisrics/Census o f Gibraltar..2QQLpdf  [accessed 15/10/08]) and 
the figure had risen to 28,875 by 2006 (see Government of Gibraltar (Statistics Office), Abstract o f  Statistics 
2006, The New Harbours, Gibraltar, Government of Gibraltar Statistics Office ]no date], p. 2, 
hitDi//www.gibraltar.gov.gj/gov depts/Statistics/2006/Abstract20Q6-Webpages,pdf [accessed 15/10/08]),
28 Luis Gómez and Jesús Duva, ‘España pedirá que Gibraltar vuelva a la lista negra de paraísos fiscales', 
elpais.com, 16/03/08,
http://www.elpais.rom/arriculo/ecQnomia/Espana/pedira/Gibral tar/vuelva/lista/n e^ / p araisos/fiscalcs/g 
]pepieco/20080316elpepieco 1/Tes [accessed 20/10/08]. Slightly different (but generally similar) figures are 
also given in International Monetary Fund (IMF) (The legal Department), G ibraltar Detailed Assessment Report
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March 2008, that the Spanish authorities were going to request that the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) revise Gibraltar’s status as a 
‘cooperative’ tax haven due, amongst other things, to Spain failing to receive any ‘useful’ 
information from Gibraltar in response to requests concerning money laundering matters 
and because Gibraltar is falling short o f  European Union (EU) and the Financial Action 
Task Force’s (FATF) standards and requirements in this respect29, accusations that the 
Gibraltar Government strongly denied30. The same report also stated that experts 
(including the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) have pointed out that Gibraltar is a 
particular and dangerous zone o f  influence (along with areas such as the south o f  Spain, the 
Costa del Sol and the north o f  Africa), where activities related to money laundering, 
corruption and drug trafficking happen frequently31. According to the IMF, the main 
money laundering risk to Gibraltar is lodged in its professional sector, which is likely to be 
involved (wittingly or not) in the layering and integration o f  the proceeds o f  crime, and 
there is also some risk, at the placement stage, in connection with drug trafficking, migrant 
smuggling, and ‘organised crime’ in southern Spain32 34.
When assessing the tenability o f  this aspect (the proximity o f  Gibraltar) as a 
facilitating factor o f  illicit enterprise in the Costa del Sol, it is worth pointing out that some 
o f  the major operations carried out by the Spanish police in recent years did, indeed, 
involve some element o f  laundering money in Gibraltar, such as the operations B allena  
B la n c h  and L a ik ? A (discussed in Chapter 2) and Operación H idalgo35 (which will be discussed 
in Chapter 4). I lowever, it may also be the case that the Spanish government and its 
people find it convenient to blame a foreign territory, and the Government o f  Gibraltar 
insists that it has a good record in relation to the regulation o f  financial services and
on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing o f  Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 07/157, 
Washington, DC, IMF, May 2007, http://ftW.itnf.otg/extefnaI/pubs/ft/scr/20Q7/crQ7.151cdf  [accessed 
20/10/08).
29 Gómez and Duva, op. at.. The point that Gibraltar does not always collaborate with Spain was also raised
during interview 18. ñt ¡ p. QZ http ://uw .owl.org/20Q0/en/Qgd90 4cn,cdf [accessed
24/07/02). '
10 See Government of Gibraltar (Press Office), Press Palease, Gibraltar, Government of Gibraltar Press Office, 
No. 57/2008.17/03/08 http://wwgibraltar.Pov.ei/latest news/press rdeases/2P08/57-2008.r?df 
[accessed 20/10/08).
31 Gómez and Duva, op. at.. One interview source also stressed die importance of drug trafficking and the 
smuggling of contraband tobacco in Gibraltar (interview PI 1).
32 See IMF (The Legal Department), op. ffif., p. 5.
33 See, for example, Gómez,‘La red de blanqueo de dinero desarticulada en Marbclla utilizaba más de mil 
sociedades’, op. at. and Izquierda Unida-Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía (IU-LV-CA), Aproximación a l 
Crimen Organizadoy la  A ctividad M afiosa en ¡a  Costa del Sol, II Informe: El Crimen Organizado en la Costa del 
Sol, Observatorio del Crimen Oiganizado de IU-LV-CA y Oficina de Comunicación de IU-LA-CA, Bole tin 
no. 2, Febrero de 2008, p. 23, hrtp://iurnaIa^ 2<l(f8.org/files/II%2t)InfQrm£%2(X^ m £n0/a2QQnraakadQl.pdf 
[accessed 06/10/08).
34 See, for example, Javier Martín-Arroyo, Tat policía desmantela en Málaga una red que blanqueó al menos
30 millones del narcotráfico’, III País, 22/05/05, p. 28.
35 See, for example, IU-LV-CA, op. at., p. 23.
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complies with practically all o f  the anti-money laundering regulations currently in place36. 
Moreover, although the IMF found that Gibraltar needed to take some further steps to 
completely fulfil the FATPs recommendations, it commended the Gibraltar authorities for 
the resources they have devoted to international cooperation in money laundering cases 
and other such matters37. Furthermore, one interview source seemed to dismiss the 
proximity o f  Gibraltar as a facilitating factor completely, claiming that Gibraltar is simply 
‘too risky* for the criminals because the border can be shut down at any time38. Thus, it is 
probably fair to argue that the geographical location o f  the Costa del Sol, especially in 
terms o f  its closeness to North Africa, may facilitate criminal activity in the area. However, 
the degree to which the proximity o f  Gibraltar (and the financial and business 
arrangements in Gibraltar itself) furthers illicit enterprise in the Costa del Sol is more open 
to debate, and very much dependent on opinion.
Factors relating to the geographical location and characteristics o f  Galicia are also 
frequently used to explain contemporary manifestations o f  illicit enterprise in that region, 
as well as the traditional smuggling activities that were discussed in Chapter 239. For 
example, according to some o f  the interview sources, the traditional smuggling activities 
were stimulated by Galicia’s proximity to Portugal: one source discussed how the poor 
relations between Spain and Portugal meant that the people o f  Galicia found it difficult to 
get goods from Portugal and so a demand for contraband arose40, whilst another suggested 
that the coastal residents on the border had always collaborated with the smugglers, in 
various ways, which had facilitated their activities41. Smuggling activities in Galicia have 
also been attributed to its location on the Atlantic coast42, and this factor is also believed to 
be a key cause o f  the extensive drug trafficking activities undertaken in the region. Along 
with die Portuguese coast, Galicia’s Atlantic coast is the first, or the natural, entry point 
into Europe from Latin America43, from where, as we saw in Chapter 2, virtually all o f  
Europe’s cocaine originates. Indeed, as we have seen in the previous chapter, many o f  the 
cocaine apprehensions relating to this region have taken place in Atlantic waters.
36 See Government of Gibraltar (Press Office), op. cit..
37 See IMF (The Legal Department), op, at..38 Interview C2.
39 See, for example, Tony Thompson and Giles Tremlett, ‘Ruthless, rich and bloody: now Europe’s most 
vicious drug lords taiget Britain’, guardiaH.co.uk, 12/06/05,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2005/jun/12/intemationaliiews [accessed 10/12/08]. The respondents of 
questionnaires QE, QF, QL and QM also agreed that Galicia has an ‘ideal geographical situation’ for carrying 
out organised criminal activities.
40 InterviewJ2.
41 Interview Pi 7.
42 Interviews J1 and P4.
43 Interview J3 and questionnaire QL.
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Furthermore, the characteristics o f  Galicia’s coastline are also seen as significant. 
Physically, Galicia’s coastline, which stretches for 1,659 kilometres44, is craggy and rugged. 
It is characterised by high cliffs (over 800 kilometres o f  them45), beaches (constituting 
nearly 300 kilometres in total46 47) and long, deep inlets or estuaries, known as ria s’1 (the 
largest o f  these is the Ria de Arousa at 37 kilometres long, with a maximum depth o f  69 
metres48). Many o f  the interview sources, for example, emphasised how the craggy and 
rugged nature o f  the coastline has facilitated the drug trafficking activities undertaken in the 
region49. It would appear that the numerous coves and beaches o f  the rias, many o f  them 
deserted, create perfect landing sites for the fishing boats and planeadoras that transport the 
drugs into Galicia50, as well as ideal hiding places for drugs and traffickers51. These areas 
are also protected by the traffickers’ ‘lookouts’ (which outnumber those o f  the police)52 53. 
Therefore, it is very difficult for the authorities to ‘control the coast’55. Away from the 
coast, the region is relatively green and mountainous54 (over half o f  its territory is situated 
above 400 metres in altitude55 and, in total, Galicia’s forests represent 30 per cent o f  the 
forest mass o f  the whole o f  the Spanish territory56). Once the drugs reach land and move 
through Galicia, it then seems that these other geographical characteristics may also aid 
trafficking activities. Indeed, as judge José Antonio Vazquez Tain said: ‘[...] from the air 
we can do nothing’57. These geographical aspects, then, have clearly proved to be 
beneficial for Galicia’s smugglers and traffickers (both now and in the past), and the fact 
that much o f  the illicit enterprise in Galicia occurs in the coastal provinces o f  A  Coruna
44 Turgalicia, ‘Galicia; The coast*, http://www.hirgalicia.es/Presentacion/G3Sta-ihlm [accessed 16/12/08]. 
Note, however, that another source from Turgalicia states that Galicia has 1,300 kilometres of coastline. See 
Turgalicia (Dirección Xeral de Turismo), ‘Galicia, Atlantic Destination’, Press Release, Santiago de Compostela, 
Turgalicia, [no date], accessed through:
http://www.turgalicia.es/tumoticias/tumoticias.asp?cidi=I&ctre=tumoticiaa [accessed 16/12/08],
45 Tutgalicia, ‘Galicia: l i te  coast*, op, at..
46 Ibid..
47 See, for example, Instituto de Turismo de España -Turespaña, ‘Galicia: Bathed by a sea and an ocean’, op. 
at..
48 Turgalicia, ‘Galicia: The coast’, bp. at.. Note, however, that another source from Turgalicia states that the 
ría is around 25 kilometres long, with a surface area of 200 square kilometres. See Turgalicia (Dirección Xeral 
de Turismo), ‘Galicia, Adantic Destination’, op. at..
49 Interviews PI, P2, P3, M l, J2, M2 and P17.
50 Thompson and Tremlett, op. at..
51 Interviews M l and P3.
52 Interview M l.
53 Interview P8.
54 See, for example, Instituto de Turismo de España -  Turespaña, ‘Galicia: Bathed by a sea and an ocean’, op. 
at. and Turgalicia,‘Galicia: The land and die people’,
httpi//www,turgalicia.es/ATerraeOsHomes/3terraeoshomes.asp?cidi=I&menu=12&subMenu 1=1
[accessed 16/12/08].
55 Turgalicia, ‘Galicia: The inland’, http://www.turgalicia,es/Presentacion/inter i.htm [accessed 16/12/08],
56 Hid.. \
57 José Maria Irujo, ‘La gran marea blanca’, E l Pats: Doming», 25/01/04, p. 3, quoting José Antonio Vázquez 
Tain, (at die time) a judge in Vilagarcía de Arousa (Pontevedra).
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and Pontevedra (as established by the official sources discussed in Chapter 1) may confirm, 
to some degree, that location is important in this case.
The presence o f  im m igrant communities in  Spain
A  further reason that is very frequently given to explain ‘organised crime’ and illicit 
enterprise in Spain (although not one that is unique to Spain) relates to immigration and 
ethnicity. Indeed, in the spirit o f  the alien conspiracy theory embodied in the hierarchical 
model discussed in Chapter 1, there is some consensus in the organised crime literature, 
and in some official reports, that the existence o f  ‘oiganised crime’ in a state can be at least 
facilitated, or even entirely explained, by the presence o f  immigrant communities or ethnic 
enclaves in that state58. As Bovenkerk summarises:
Every time signs o f  organized crime are discovered in modem, urban societies, with
striking frequency some ethnic minority [...] is singled out as the source o f the
trouble.59
Although we must be conscious o f  the extent to which stereotyping and scapegoating 
feature in examinations o f  this phenomenon, Bovenkerk’s research underlines that there 
are grounds for ‘at least wondering whether there might be some link’ between ‘organised 
crime’ and ethnicity60. Certainly, it is often argued that the network structures used to 
produce, supply and distribute illicit goods are strengthened by ethnic ties, and that the 
presence o f  immigrant communities is beneficial to criminal groups in a number o f  ways. 
Ethnic ties, for example, are believed to be functional to ‘organised crime’ because they 
maintain solidarity and secrecy and serve as an indicator o f  trust and loyalty61, thus 
enhancing effectiveness and minimising the costs o f  uncertainty in illicit transactions62. 
Similarly, linguistic and cultural barriers provide a competitive advantage for criminal 
groups because they ultimately make it more difficult for law enforcement personnel to 
penetrate the enterprise63 and, on a practical level, for example, police may find it difficult
58 See, for example, Frank Bovenketk, ‘Organized Crime and Ethnic Minorities: Is There a link?’ in Phil 
Williams and Dimitri Vlas sis (eds.), Combating Transnational Crime. Concepts, A ctivities and Responses, London and 
Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 109-126.
59 Ibid., p. 109.
60 Ibid., p. 110 .
61 See Damián Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2002, p. 19; Roger Waldinger, The “other side" of embeddedness: a case-study of the 
interplay of economy and ethnicity1, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1995, p. 561, quoting Lynn 
Zucker, Troduction of trust institutional sources of economic structure, 1840-1920’, Research in Oigani^stional 
Behatior, Vol. 8,1986, pp. 53-111; Bovenketk, op. at., p, 122; Letizia Paoli, The Paradoxes of Organized 
Crime’, Crime, Law & Social Change, Vol. 37,2002, pp. 85-86.
62 Boronia Halstead, The Use of Models in the Analysis of Organized Crime and Development of Policy’, 
Transnational Organised Crime, Vol. 4, No. 1,1998, p. 21.
63 Phil Williams and Ernesto U. Savona (eds.), The United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime, London 
and Pordand, Oregon, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996, p. 9; Phil Williams, The International Drug Trade: An 
Indus try Analysis’ in Graham H. Turbivdle, Jr. (ed.), Global Dimensions o f  High Intensify Crime and Low Intensity
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to recruit suitable interpreters to work at police interrogations or to translate tapped 
telephone conversations64. Ethnicity can also prove useful if  a particular ethnic group 
maintains a historic contempt or distrust for policing, because it then becomes unlikely that 
police will receive cooperation in the community65, yet a lack o f  cooperation may also stem 
from the community’s solidarity or be a result o f  intimidation66. For the same reasons, 
victims in the ethnic group may be less likely to seek police intervention, thereby presenting 
themselves as more helpless targets to criminal groups67. It may also be the case that police 
will simply leave the ethnic group alone for fear o f  being seen to be, or being formally 
reproached for, discriminating against minorities68. Finally, ethnic enclaves, it is argued, can 
generally provide cover, local knowledge and recruits for transnational criminal groups69.
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that immigration is often seen as a cause o f  
criminal activity and illicit enterprise in Spain, and especially so i f  we consider Spain’s 
recent experience in this regard70. Huge numbers o f  immigrants began arriving in Spain 
during the mid-1990s and, between 1999 and 2005, the number o f  immigrants settling in 
the country increased five-fold71. According to Spain’s National Institute o f  Statistics 
(Insiiu to N a tio n a l de E stad isticâ) (INE), there were 4,519,554 foreigners registered in Spain’s 
Municipal Registers in 200772, which means that, at that time, legal immigrants constituted 
roughly ten per cent o f  Spain’s total population, and we really cannot account for the 
number o f  illegal immigrants that are also present in the country (although it is estimated 
that at least one million immigrants live in Spain illegally73). Indeed, it seems that, within 
the EU, Spain receives the largest flow o f  immigrants74 *and, o f  all the members o f  the
ConjUct, Chicago, Illinois, Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1995, p. 
165.
64 Bovenkerk, op. a t., p. 113; Letizia Paoli and Peter Reuter, ‘Drug Trafficking and Ethnic Minorities in 
Western Europe*, European Journal o f  Criminology, Vol. 5, No. 1,2008, p. 24.
45 See Halstead, ep, a t , p. 20.
66 Bovenkerk, op. cit., p. 113; Paoli and Reuter, op. tit., p. 24..
67 See Halstead, op. tit., p. 20.
68 Bovenkerk, op. tit. p. 113-
69 Ibid., p. 123; Williams and Savona, op. a t., p. viii and p. 9; Paoli and Reuter, op. tit., p. 24; Eunopol, EU  
Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2006, The I Iague, Europol, [no date],
http:// www.europol.europa.eu/puhlications/ European O rganised Come JhreaLAssessmcflt-fQO’A)/Q CTA200C,pdf [accessed 18/12/06].
70 On Spain’s experiences of immigration generally, see, for example, John Hooper, The New Spaniards, 2nd 
edition, London, Penguin Books Ltd., 2006, Chapter 21.
71 See, for example, Katya Adler, ‘Spain stands by immigrant amnesty1, BBC News, 25/05/05, 
http;//news.hhc.co.uk/I /hi/world/enrope/4579127Jstm {accessed 18/03/07],
72 See Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), ‘Población extranjera por sexo, comunidades y provincias y 
nacionalidad’, Revisión del Padrón municipal2007. Datos a  nivel nocional, comunidad autónoma J  provincia, Madrid, 
INE. 2008 http://www.ine,es [accessed 02/07/08).
73 See, for example, Rocío Ruiz, ‘El INE revela que en España vive un millón de inmigrantes irregulares’. La 
Ra^ón, 18/01/08, p. 22.
74 See, for example, Giampaolo Lanzicri/Eurostat, ‘Population in Europe 2007: first results’, Eurostat: Statistics
in focus. Population and social conditions, 81/2008, European Communities, 2008, 
http://epp.eurostatec.europa.eu/carhe/ITY QFR3UB/KS-SF-03-081/JEN/KS:SF^8d}81:EN.PDl;
[accessed 29/09/08]; William Chislett, Inside Spain No. S I, Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, 17/12/08, accessed
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OECD, Spain is the second largest receiving country o f  immigrants behind the USA75. 
Many people in Spain (and quite often the press), therefore, associate crime generally with 
the recent increase in the number o f  foreigners living in the country76: a 2007 report, for 
example, revealed that more than 60 per cent o f  the Spanish population associated crime 
with immigration77. More specifically, several o f  the interview sources claimed that 
immigration was a facilitating factor, or even the key cause, o f  illicit enterprise in Spain78. 
Some o f  the reasons given during these interviews as to why immigration facilitated illicit 
enterprise included: the tendency for immigrants to engage in low paid employment (‘so 
they get more money from crime than work’79); the possibility that immigration could 
create ‘isolated’ communities (presumably for the reasons discussed earlier in this 
chapter)80; the feeling that multiculturalism brings with it a number o f ‘problems’81; the 
association o f  certain immigrant groups (such as Moroccans) with the drug business82; and 
the anonymity that the presence o f  foreigners can provide to criminal groups83. Some o f  
the interviewees, however, simply stated that immigration was a cause, or facilitating factor, 
o f  ‘organised crime’, but gave no reason as to why84 and some associated immigration from  
Eastern Europe, particularly, with ‘organised crime’85.
Just as immigration is used to account for illicit enterprise in Spain generally, it is 
also frequently used to explain illicit enterprise in particular regions o f  Spain. For example, 
issues relating to immigration and tourism (particularly in terms o f  the presence o f  a large 
number o f  foreigners as a result o f  these factors) are commonly viewed as facilitating illicit 
enterprise in the Madrid region. In Madrid, in recent years, population trends have been
William C h i s l Tel efóni ca,  S.A., 
January 2008, p. 11 , accessed through t , , r „ a
http://www.realinstituioelcano.org/rnateri illes/SPitin Going%20 Places /»»O Chisktlpdf  [ac esse
09/04/081. , ,
75 This is according to data from 2006. See, for example, Maria Elia Climent, "España es el segundo mayor
receptor de inmigrantes legales’, E l Mundo, 11/09/08, p. 21. ~ i <v>/ívi /m „
76 See Marga Luis, Tara el 62%, en España hay demasiados inmigrantes, 20 m m tos(A  Coruna), 22/03/07, p.
9, citing a report of the European Commission against Racism and Xenophobia. ,
77 See, for example, Eduardo Ridao, ‘Será eficaz el endurecimiento de las penas para combatir la delincuencia
organizada?1, La Tribuna del Derecho, 16/06/06 — 30/06/06, p. 5, . . . .  . ■ -
organizado elige los asaltos a los chalés de lujo como una de sus prioridades, ABC,^ 8/01 /06, p. 24. Note 
that diese particular reports focus predominandy on a quite recent phenomenon aJ»ng  ° en ro nes 
on houses and dwellings, which are undertaken by criminal groups in some parts of Spain. Many people in 
Spain fmcludingpohce officers), as well as the press, regañí this kind of activity as constituting organised 
crime’.
78 Interviews P3,P4,P6,P13,P14, C l, C2,J2 ,J5 ,J7  and ML
79 Interview PI 3.
80 Interview P4.
81 Interview C2.
82 Interview J7.83 Interview Ml.
84 Interviews PI4 and J5.
85 Interviews J2 and P3.
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driven by high levels o f  immigration. As a 2008 report by Observatorio Económico 
elucidates:
The arrival o f  substantial numbers o f  immigrants over the last few years means that 
there are now 555,000 immigrants living in the city. This represents about 17 per 
cent o f  the total population, compared to the 2.8 per cent o f  the population only 
eight years ago. On average, nearly 65,000 new foreigners chose Madrid as a place 
to live during each o f  the last seven years in a process which, although now slowing 
down, continues to be significant.86
According to the INE, there were actually 866,910 foreigners registered in the Municipal 
Registers for the Community o f  Madrid in 2007*7, which equates roughly to 14 per cent o f  
the Community’s population (although this rises to 17 per cent in the city o f  Madrid88 and, 
according to one o f  the interview sources, could be more like 30 per cent o f  the 
population, ‘or more’, in some areas89). Due to the common language90 and the fact that 
Madrid’s Barajas airport is the main European hub for flights to and from Latin America91, 
it would appear that Latin, or South, American immigrants are particularly prevalent in 
Madrid and this was specifically mentioned by some o f  the interview respondents92. The 
respondents also, however, variously slated that Eastern Europeans, Turks and North (and 
‘black’93) Africans formed part o f  the ‘melting pot’94 that is Madrid95. According to the 
OECD, Madrid’s immigrants and foreign workers have been attracted by the region’s 
dynamic and growing economy and, in turn, they have been a ‘driving force’ behind 
Madrid’s economic success96. According to several o f  the professionals interviewed and
86 Observatorio Económico, M adrid Economía 2007, Madrid, Ayuntamiento de Madrid (Área de Gobierno de
4¡df [accessed 27/06/08]. , . . ,
"  See INE, op. at.. According to this source, however, Madrid was not the oaly autonomous commumty w.th 
a relatively high number of registered foreigners in 2007. For example, Andalucía had 531,827, Valencia had
732,102, i d  C ataluña, w ith 972,507 foreigners, recorded a higher figure than Madrid. The professional
interviewed in interview FI, however, estimated that there were one million immigrants in the Madrid region. 
This figure was also given by the professional interviewed in interview P6, who additionally claimed that ten 
per cent of the population was foreign.
88 Observatorio Económico, op. a t., p. 6 and p. 8.
89 Interview P4.
90 Interview P8. #
91 Instituto de Turismo de España -  Turespaña, ‘Madrid: Getting there> ,
http;//www,spaindafo/IourSptin/D.eshnos/TipQl /ComQ%2QUcffir/0/CpmQ/^llcga^/a2Q28Q7^ CH)01,lit
m?Language=en [accessed 29/01/09]. According to Chislett, Madnd concenrcates around ^  f r cent of 
total air traffic between Europe and Latin America, and there are 29 daily fbghts from Madnd to Lahn  ^_  
American cities. See Chislett» Spain. Going Places. Economic, Politkal and Social Progress, - k % op. c t p.
92 This was mentioned in interviews J l ,  F2, P4 and P8, for example.
95 Interview C2.
94 Interview P2.
95 Interviews 11, PI, P2,P4 and C2.
96 See Otganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Public A f^ rs^ w sio n , Public 
Affairs and Communications Directorate, ‘OECD Territorial Reviews: Madnd, Spam., OECD Poicy Bnef, 
OECD Publishing, January 2008, p. 2 and p. 4, http://vww,oad,org/daiaQ£m 3/14/39A'5»M.:Pdt  
[accessed 05/07/08].
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questioned during the course o f  this research, however, it would appear that Madrid’s 
immigrants are also a driving force behind the region’s high levels o f ‘organised crime’97.
Similarly, the presence o f  a large number o f  foreigners as a result o f  both 
immigration and tourism is a factor that is often used to explain illicit enterprise on the 
Costa del Sol (this point will be discussed further below). The same factors that attract the 
numerous tourists to this region also attract a number o f  immigrants, both to the coastal 
provinces and to the mountain areas surrounding them, which, according to one interview 
source98, makes surveillance work in the latter more difficult for the law enforcement 
agencies. Thus, throughout the whole region and as one source commented: ‘it’s not 
unusual to have a foreign neighbour’99, a situation that seems to proliferate year by year if 
we are to believe to local press (which regularly publishes articles detailing the size o f  the 
foreign populations in various municipalities and how these have increased)100. In fact, in 
2007, in Andalucía, there were 531,827 foreigners registered in the Municipal Register and a 
great proportion o f  these were registered in the provinces in which the Costa del Sol 
resorts are located (for example: 219,955 foreigners were registered in Málaga province; 
48,874 in Granada; and 36,888 in Cádiz)101. Typically, high levels o f  immigration in this 
area102 are seen as contributing to an anonymous environment where the many foreign 
criminals active in the region can hide and carry out their illicit enterprises without 
attracting too much attention.
According to official sources, the majority o f  the immigrants living in the Spanish 
territory originate from Morocco, Romania, Ecuador, the UK, Colombia, Bolivia,
Germany, Argentina, Italy, Bulgaria and China103. As we can see, Latin American 
immigrants feature quite prominently in this list. Indeed, as Chislett reminds us, Latin
97 Immigration was stated as being a cause, or facilitating factor, of ‘organised crime in Madrid in interviews 
J l ,  PI, P2, P4, C2, J2, P6, FI and P8, and questionnaire QD.
98 Interview C l.99 InterviewJt.
100 See, for example, ‘One in every four people on the Marbella local census is foreign’, Sur in English, 
28/10/05 -  03/11/05, p. 43; Mairelys Ramírez, ‘Málaga, la gran capital que más habitantes ha ganado’, 20 
minutos (Málaga), 22/11/05, p. 2; Isabel Jarillo and Agencias, ‘Málaga lidera la contratación de extranjeros en 
Andalucía',j2#/ (Málaga), 22/11/05, p. 6; ‘Una jomada para reflexionar sobre trabajo e inmigración’, E l 
N oticien, 02/12/05, p. 11 .
101 See INI7., op. cit..
102 However, it must be noted that Andalucía was not die autonomous community that had the most number 
of foreigners registered in die Municipal Register in 2007. Other autonomous communities had more. For 
example, Cataluña registered 972,507 foreigners, Madrid registered 866,910 and Valencia registered 732,102. 
See INE, op. cit..
103 This list represents the top eleven countries o f origin of immigrants in Spain in 2007 fin that order) (see 
INE, op. a t)  and there has been little change in diis since the beginning of 2006. At the start of 2006, the top 
ten countries of origin of immigrants in Spain were Morocco, Ecuador, Romania, the UK, Colombia, 
Germany, Aigentina, Bolivia, Italy and China (together, these represented 63.52 per cent of all legal 
immigrants) (see INE, ‘Explotación Estadística del Padrón municipal a 1 de enero de 2006. Datos 
definitivos’, INE Notas de Prensa, 01/03/07, ]
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Americans account for the largest share (more than one-third) o f  Spain’s immigrants104 and 
it is often argued that Colombian communities in Spain have helped make the so-called 
Colombian cartels one o f  the most renowned, and most established, o f  all the criminal 
groups operating there105. This is because Colombian organised criminals (just like others 
from Latin America) benefit from the historic, cultural, linguistic, political and economic 
links between Spain and Latin America106. Spanish communities started settling in Latin 
America from as early as the turn o f  the twentieth century107 and, in return, many 
Colombians settled in Spain, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. Among these 
migrants were some key members o f  the Colombian cartels, such as Carlos Lehder, 
Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela and Jorge Luis Ochoa, who settled in Spain after fleeing the 
pressure exerted on them at home from both the Colombian authorities and the American 
Drug Enforcement Administration. Once established, they began to make contacts and 
organise new cocaine markets in Spain and Europe108. Since then, Colombian criminals 
have continued to arrive in Spain and, as we have seen in Chapter 2, they have traditionally 
formed partnerships, and worked with, indigenous Spanish groups in Galicia.
Indeed, just as in other regions o f  Spain, immigration is a factor that is also often 
considered important when understanding illicit enterprise in Galicia109, but for different 
reasons. Contrary to the trend in many other regions o f  Spain, the population o f  Galicia 
barely increased during the twentieth century and, in comparison with many o f  the other 
autonomous communities, Galicia has a relatively small foreign population110. Yet, 
historically, the region has experienced some significant changes in its population as a result 
o f  some considerable waves o f  immigration and, particularly, emigration. Indeed, in the 
search fo r a better life, an estimated 900,000 people left Galicia in the nineteenth century,
See Chislett, Spain. Going Places. Economic, Political and Social Progress, 197S-200&'op,at p. 13, p. 16 and p. .■ 
147. According to INE data, there were: 427,099 Ecuadorians; 261,542 Colombians; ^ ,4 9 6  Bohviwis, and 
141,159 Aigentineans, for example, registered in Spain’s Municipal Registers in 2007. See 1NL, ‘Poblauon 
extranjera por sexo, comunidadcs y provincias y nacionalidad, op. cit..
105 See, for example, Paoli and Reuter, op. cit., p. 24. , . . n ,
m  See, for example, Resa-Nestares, op. cit.. Similar points were also raised during interviews P6,  l  /,C1,J3
107 See, for example, Savona, op. cit., p. 107; Axel R. Reeg, ‘Drugs and the Law in Post-Franco Spain’ in
Harold H. Traver and Mark S. Gaylord (eds.), Drugs, U w  and the State, N ew  Brunswick NJ, Transaction
Publishers, 1992, p. 51; Joseph Harrison and David Codull, Span: A Modern European Economy, Aldershot 
Ashgate Publishing lim ited, 2008 (reprint), pp. 34-35. See also Chislett, Spain. Go,ng Places. Economic, Pohtual
and Social Progress, 1975-2008, op.cit., p. 147.
108 See Resa-Nestares, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
109 This point was raised during interviews J2, F2, and P14, for exampie. . , . ;n 'nvn
»»  According to the INE, the number of foreigners registered in die Mumcipid Register fo ■ Gabcia M  
was 81,442. To compare with just the other case study regions, for example, there were 866,910 foreigners 
registered in the Community o f Madrid in the same year, 531,827 foreigners registered in Andalucía, and 
219,955 in Malaga province alone. See INE, Toblacion extranjera por sexo, comunidades y provmuas y
nacionalidad’, op. at..
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followed by more than one million in the twentieth century"1. In total, some 2,500,000 
people emigrated from Galicia between 1836 and 1980; a figure that almost equals Galicia’s 
present day population"2. Although some o f  Galicia’s people have returned to die region 
since 1980, due to the recent economic development; it is claimed that there are still 
currendy 1,396,000 o f  them working all over the world"3. By and large, many o f  Galicia’s 
emigrants favoured Latin, or South, American countries as their choice o f  destination"4 
and, in return, many South American immigrants have settled in Galicia"5, perhaps, it is 
claimed, as a result o f  the region’s fishing industry. For example, during the course o f  one 
o f  the interviews, it was claimed that South American immigrants chose to settle in Galicia 
because ‘they are fishermen and that’s where the fishing industry is’ ” 6. According to 
several sources, it is this long history o f  migration between the two continents, encouraged, 
undoubtedly, by the common language"7, which has facilitated the criminal links between 
Spain and South America, especially Colombia"8. This reasoning is certainly credible and it 
is easy to understand how the strong ties between Galicia and Colombia that have emerged 
due to migration (coupled with some associated political and economic links, and the 
linguistic and cultural commonalities) have facilitated criminal relationships between 
traffickers across the Atlantic. Furthermore, these circumstances will have given the 
Colombian traffickers certain advantages when they were looking to establish a new market 
in Europe and find an initial entry point for their cocaine. Thus, it is easy to understand 
why immigration and its associated factors are so often used to explain illicit enterprise in 
Galicia.
As for the other immigrant groups that do not share the language and culture o f  
Spain, the arguments mentioned previously could convincingly facilitate illicit enterprise in 
Spain (especially the argument that ethnic loyalties and barriers o f  language and culture can 
provide built-in defence mechanisms, and so on"9). Language issues appear to cause 1*346789
111 GilesTremlett, Ghosts o f  Span: Travels through a au n ty 's bidden past, london, Fat>er and Faber Limited, 2006, 
p.385. On emigration from Galicia, generally, see also I looper, op. at., pp. 268-270.
1,2 Turgalicia, ‘Galicia: Galicia en el mundo’, httr ://www.tiimaliC)a.f?/PrescntaciQi.l/{-,mkra...,lh lm [accessed 
16/12/08]. For further details about emigration from Galicia, also see Sharif Gemie,j4 Comise l listoty o f 
Galicia, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2006, Chapter 2.
113 Tuigalicia, ‘Galicia: Galicia en el mundo’, op. at..
114 Tremlett, op. at., p. 385. This point was also raised during interview J2.
us por example, there were 8,037 Colombians registered in rite Municipal Register for Galicia in 2007 (wilh 
respect to the foreign population, these Colombians were only outnumbered by Portuguese residents (15,562) 
and Brazilians (8,236)). See INE, ‘Población extranjera por sexo, comunidades y provincias y nacionalidad’, 
op .d t..
116 Interview C2.
117 During interviews P2, M l, C2, J3  and P16, for example, it was emphasised how the partnerships lie tween 
Galicia’s organised criminals and their counterparts in Colombia were facilitated by their common language. 
See also Resa-Nestares, tp , #r., p. 59. •
118 Interview J 2.
119 Indeed, a similar point to this was raised during interview C l.
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particular problems, with some Spanish police stations lacking permanent interpreters. 
Indeed, a press report published in 2004 showed how, at best, it can take a minimum o f  24 
hours to have a tapped telephone conversation translated into Spanish . As we can also 
see, Moroccan and Romanian immigrants take first and second places respectively on the 
list o f  immigrants given above121. The fact that 889 Romanians and 767 Moroccans were 
found to be participating in ‘organised crime’ groups in Spain in 2005 (these figures only 
being topped by the number o f  Spanish nationals)122 perhaps, then, gives credence to the 
argument that the presence o f  a large number o f  immigrant communities is a further 
explanation for criminal activity in the country.
S pain 's economy an d  the nature o f  its  industry
As noted at the beginning o f  this chapter, it is also commonly argued that 
economic factors can explain the existence o f  illicit enterprise in Spain. Economically, 
post-Franco Spain has progressed enormously. As Chislett reminds us, its formerly 
autarchic economy is now the seventh-largest in the developed world on the basis o f  
market exchange rates (the eighth globally i f  China is included) and one o f  the most open 
economies (in terms o f  exports and imports as a percentage o f  Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP))123. Moreover, since Franco died, the economy has grown 150 per cent in real 
terms, and Spain now accounts for two per cent o f  world trade and is the sixth-largest net 
investor abroad124. The structure o f  the Spanish economy has also changed. As the 
importance o f  agriculture has declined125, the importance o f  services has increased . Spain 
has die world’s eighth-largest motor industry127, two o f  the biggest banks in Europe and, 
o f  course, a hugely significant tourism industry129. Notably, the construction sector has
120 Luis Gomez, *La costa del crimen otganizado', £ / 1 2 / 1 2 / 0 4 ,  pp. 1-3. . . , .  c , ,
121 According to INE data, there were 582,923 Moroccans and 527,019 Romanians registered m Spam 
Municipal Registers in 2007. See INE, Toblacion extranjera por sexo, comumdades y provmcias y
122 Espaifa. D ilincuenda Otgam'zada / 2005, internal annual report on organised come in Spam produced by the
S C S S *  ^ W W * . * * ™  a — ;
124 Ibid,.
125 In 1960,41 per cent o f the working population was employed in agmcidtoe. This compares with: 29 per
cent in 1970; 22 per cent in 1975 (2.8 million people); and 4.8 per cent in 2006 (g«neratmgclose to four per 
cent of Gross Domestic Product). See ibid., p. 79. See also Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), C om ity Profile 
2007: Spain, London, EIU lim ited, 2007, p. 30jh M 1m m , ^ ce**ed q
^d^cbicohostcpmwamleed5acuk/(diost/re5ultsAid~7&hid=109^d-^/aMl^OM-^c^ a-»* .
I9h44c303871%40<!fssionm{>rl06 faccessed 08/06/08]; Hamson and CorkiU, op. at., Chapter 3-
127 See Chisiett, S p in ! G ang Places. Economic, P olitica lcm dSodd Progress, 1975-2008, op. at., p. 82, citing OICA 
and Ward's.
128 J f o J  n  7 9
According to Chislett, not only does the tourism sector employ around two million people (roughly one in 
every ten people with a job) and generate around 12 per cent of GDP but it also p ayed a role m Spam s 
democratic development (4 it brought Spaniards into contact with different people and ideas and broadened
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become ‘one o f  the mainstays o f  the Spanish economy’* 130. Some o f  the professionals 
interviewed or questioned during die course o f  this research131 believed that the recent and 
notable growth in Spain’s economy (which one source called the ‘Spanish miracle’132), and 
its subsequent stability, had attracted criminal groups to the country. One source also saw 
the changing nature o f  the country’s e c o n o m y , and the decline o f some traditional activities 
(such as fishing), as a cause o f  criminal activity133.
Economic growth is a factor that is particularly used to explain illicit enterprise in 
Madrid. Since the mid-1990s, the Madrid region has enjoyed one o f the highest expansions 
o f  economic growth in Europe134 and, even in the mid-1980s, Madrid was identified as 
being one o f  the fastest growing regions o f  Spain, with a self-sustaining development 
capacity135 1367. Undoubtedly, die ‘strength o f  the dynamic Madrid economy clearly stands out 
in Spain’13* and, economically, Madrid ‘is one o f  the richest regions in the country’13. 
Madrid is one o f  the seven regions o f  Spain where GDP per head is above the national 
average138, and the G D P per capita for the city o f  Madrid, measured both in nominal terms 
and in purchasing power, is the highest in Spain139. The growing economy o f  Madrid is 
characterised by a high level o f  specialisation in service sector industries140, particularly 
those related to transport and communications, business services, financial services, 
property services, and health and education141. Tourism is also important, and growing, 
especially in the city o f  Madrid: Madrid is now the fourth most popular tourism destination
their horizon [.. .]*). See ib id , p. 87. See also Joaquín Manso, ‘El sector turístico se ve perjudicado por la 
“falta de respeto” al español’, E l Mundo, 08/07/08, p. 1- ■ , ,
130 The Construction sector directly employs more than 2.5 million workers (which is 14 per centof the 
labour force and double the euro zone average) and generates more than 17 per cent of GDP. See Chislett, 
Spain. Going Places. Economic, Poli deal and Social Progress, 1975-2008, op. at., p. 83.
m Interviews 12, J3 and P9 and questionnaire QC . , ■ . .
132 Interview J2. The interviewee emphasised that ‘In 15 years, Spam became one of the richest countries m
Europe’.
“  According to the OECD, for «am p le , between 1905 and 2005, Madrid registered ait >»era|i a|lr|nai 
growth rate of 3.7 pe, cent, which was above Spain’.  3.3 pe, cent, and tww. the average growth rate o f the 
EU for the same period. See OECD, Public Affairs Division, Pubbc Affairs and Oimmimtcanons 
Directorate, ®. «C p . 2. Accotdrng to Obsctvatotio Económico’.  2007 report (published in 2008), durmg the 
period 2000-2006, the growth rate of die Madrid region exceeded that for Spam as a who e by 1.4 percentage 
points, and that of the European Monetary Union by almost 13 per cent Moreover, Madnd has been die 
Spanish region that has grown the most over the last three years, by 12.1 per cent, compared with a »abona! 
average of 11 percent See Observatorio Económico, op. ri/.,p. 13. . . _ .... ,
135 See Harrison and Corkill, op. at., pp. 186-187, quoting J. A. Zaragoza Rameau Los desequilibrios 
regionales en España: su corrección’, Economía Industrial, Vol. 269,198 ,pp.
136 Observatorio Económico, op. át., p. 13. . .. , , _  • .
137 Hamilton M. Stapell, ‘Reconsidering Spanish nationalism, regonahsm, and the centre-^nphery model in 
th e post-Francoist period, 1975-1992’, International Journal o f  Iberian Studies, Vol. 20, No, 3 ,2007,p .176. See 
also Chislett, Spain. Going Places. Economic, Political and Soaal Progress, 1975-2008, op. o/.,pp. 46-47.
138 The seven regions are: Madrid, Navarra, Pais Vasco, Cataluña, Islas Baleares, La RiO|a and Aragon. See 
EIIJ, op. a t., p. 29.
119 Observatorio Económico, op. át., p. 14. , . . .  - . y , ,  c
«o Service sector activity comprised 82.1 per cent o f the total activity of the city of Madnd m 2006. See ,kd„ 
p, 10, u sin g  figures published by the DG Statistics of Madrid City C ouna.
141 Observatorio Económico, op. cit., p. 6 and p. 11.
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in Europe (after London, Paris and Rome)142. Tourism, which is particularly related to 
business activities, conferences and trade fairs143, provides employment for a significant 
proportion o f  the region’s population144 and, in 2007, this activity contributed 12,230 
million euros to the Madrid economy (6.3 per cent o f  the region’s GDP)145 146. Furthermore, 
the construction sector has been very active in recent years145. Indeed, in 2006, for 
example, it was this sector o f  the region’s economy that experienced the most growth147. 
The Madrid region is also the third in Spain in terms o f  the export o f  goods (behind 
Cataluña and Valencia), the second (behind Cataluña) in terms o f  imports148, and it holds 
first place when it comes to attracting investment from abroad149. The rate o f  company 
start-ups in Madrid is the highest in Spain150, many o f  Spain’s largest companies have their 
head offices in the region, and Madrid is also Spain’s leading financial centre151. 
Economically, therefore, Madrid is one o f  the most important and dynamic regions within 
in Spain. Additionally, as the capital city accommodates the headquarters o f  the Public 
Administration, and is home to the central Spanish Government, the Spanish Parliament 
and the Spanish royal family, Madrid is also ‘the focal point for both national and 
international politics’152.
When asked to comment on (what they perceived to be) the causes, or facilitating 
factors, o f  ‘organised crime’ in Madrid, many o f  the professionals interviewed or 
questioned during the course o f  this research included the statement ‘it’s the capital’153 as 
part o f  their answer, and it would, indeed, appear to be the case that many o f  the common 
reasons given to explain illicit enterprise in this region relate to Madrid’s status as the 
capital city o f  Spain and the circumstances, issues and consequences that have occurred, or 
do occur, as a result o f  this. For example, some o f  the sources highlighted the fact that
142 OECD, Public Affairs Division, Public Affairs and Communications Directorate, op. a t , p. 3. See also 
Observatorio Económico, op. at., p. 6 and p. 1 1.
142 Major investment has been made in congress and exhibition centres, and the region ranks among the top 
ten places worldwide for international conferences. See OECD, Public Affairs Division, Public Affairs and 
Communications Directorate, op. at., p . 3. See also Observatorio Económico, op. at., p. 6.
144 This is particularly in the hotel and catering industry, transport, and the leisure industry. See Observatorio 
Económico, op. a t., p. 11. It has been reported that tourism provided work for some 192,828 madrileños in 
2007. See Alejandro López, ‘200.000 personas viven del turismo en la región’, aDn (Madrid% 17/07/08, p. 4, 
citing a report by Impactur.
145 See López, op. at..
146 Construction activity comprised 9.6 per cent of foe total activity of foe city of Madrid in 2006. See 
Observatorio Económico, op. at., p. 10, using figures published by foe DG Statistics of Madrid Gty Council,
147 Observatorio Económico, op. at., p. 13.
148 In 2006, the Madrid region accounted for 10.7 per cent of the exports and 21.9 per cent of the imports of Spain as a whole. See ildd., p. 24.
149 In 2006, foe Madrid region attracted 75.3 per cent of all Spain’s investments and 43.2 per cent of 
investments made by other countries in Spain. See ibid., p. 25.
150 See ibid., p. 13.
151 See ibid., p. 21,
152 Stapell, op. at., p. 176.
153 Interviews J l ,J 4 ,  El, PI, P8, P9 and P14, and questionnaire QD.
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Madrid is a large city with a very concentrated population154, which it certainly is. Indeed, 
the region, as a whole, has experienced high levels o f  growth in its population over the last 
few years155 and, now, it is home to more than 13.5 per cent o f Spain’s national 
population156. Some o f  the interview respondents claimed that Madrid’s concentrated 
population makes it easier for criminals to ‘hide’ there157 and provides numerous customers 
for drugs, and a lot o f  property and vehicles to steal158. Furthermore, some o f  the sources 
argued that, in every large group or city, there is a percentage o f  crime159 (as one source 
claimed, ‘it’s natural’160). Predominantly, however, many o f  the interview sources seemed 
to correlate the financial and economic opportunities available in the capital with the 
existence o f  illicit enterprise in Madrid. Many respondents, for example, highlighted the 
economic conditions and circumstances discussed above and pointed to the growth and 
strength o f  the Madrid economy and the fact that Madrid is the centre o f  business and 
industry, as well as one o f  the richest regions o f  Spain161. Thus, according to these sources, 
the economic attributes that attract businesses and workers to the region also attract 
criminals: further, these conditions mean that ‘it’s logical that organised crime goes 
there’162 *. Moreover, some o f  the respondents argued that, as the capital, Madrid has more 
facilities than other regions, which can be used and exploited by criminals. For example, 
the fact that Madrid has many lawyers’ offices was mentioned by one source165. Indeed, 
another o f  the interview sources claimed that some lawyers in the Madrid region work for 
‘organised’ criminals164 (and the respondent o f  one ques tionnaire agreed that there were 
corrupt lawyers in Madrid165), and one respondent discussed how lawyers’ officers were 
used for money laundering purposes166. Mostly, however, this point was made in relation 
to the region’s transport facilities167, which effectively link the region with the rest o f  Spain, 
Europe and the world168. Certainly, this point seems a very valid one: we have already seen
154 Interviews PI and J2, and questionnaire QD.
155 According to the OECD, for example, the population grew by 15.4 per cent in 2000-2006. See OECD, 
Public Affairs Division, Public Affairs and Communications Directorate, op. at., p. 2.
156 Ibid. -
157 Interview C2. A similar point was also raised during interview PI.
158 Interview J 2.
159 Interview P8 and questionnaire QD.
160 Interview P8.
161 Interviews PI, C2, P3, P4.J2, P5 and P14.
162 Interview P14.
161 Interview P10.
164 Interview P9.
165 Although he doubted whedter diere was more ‘organised crime’ in die region as a result of this. 
Questionnaire QD.
166 Interview F2.
167 Interviews C2, P10 and P14.
168 See, for example, Observatorio Económico, op. a t., p. 6; Instituto de Turismo de España -  Turespaña, 
‘Madrid: Getting there*, op. át. and Instituto de Turismo de España -  Turespaña, ‘Madrid: Transport 
networks’,
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in Chapter 2 how drugs frequently enter Madrid through Barajas airport169, and there is 
some evidence that Madrid’s public transport network is used for the transit o f  drugs170. 
Indeed, although some o f  the reasons discussed above seem somewhat superficial, there 
appears to be no evidence to suggest that they would not facilitate illicit enterprise in 
Madrid, and it is reasonable to see how they could attract criminals to the region and 
provide a beneficial environment for criminal activity.
Economic factors may also facilitate illicit enterprise in Galicia (but for very 
different reasons than in Madrid). One o f  the interview respondents, for example, claimed 
that the economy was a ‘fundamental’ cause o f ‘organised crime’ in the region171. Galicia 
has been described as one o f  Spain’s ‘low-growth, backward regions’172. As Tremlett points 
out: ‘Progress came later to Galicia than the rest o f  Spain’173 and, it seems, (despite some 
notable developments in recent years) its economy still shows signs o f  late development174. 
Economically, the region was traditionally dependent on agriculture and fishing and these 
sectors are still important today. For example, although less than one fifth o f  Galicia’s 
population currently works in the agricultural sector (compared with 1975, for example, 
when about half o f  the population worked in this sector), this is still more, relatively 
speaking, than in Spain as a whole175. With its origins in fishery salting and preserves, the 
agro-food industry has the largest number o f  companies and employees176 and almost one 
half o f  the boats in Spain’s fishing fleet (the largest in Europe) are concentrated in 
Galicia177. Vigo is Europe’s largest fishing port17* and Galicia’s Has are die world’s largest 
producers o f  mussels179. The shipbuilding industry is also important180 and, as a result o f  
Galicia’s strategic position (on sea routes), the automobile sector has become Galicia’s
http://www.spain.info/TniirSp3in/Destinos/CCAA/Mflflnfo/0/InfrflPStTuctura!i<>//o~913htm?Lanpuage=:en
[accessed 29/01/09].
169 The respondent o f questionnaire QD also indicated that Madrid’s airport facilitated organised criminal 
activities.
170 For example, in 2005, police detained a man at Madrid’s South Bus Station with 2.2 kilograms o f cocaine 
in his luggage. See José L. Muñoz and N. de Cardenas, 'Barajas se está conviniendo en el mayor punto de 
entrada de cocaína’,Q ui) (Malaga), 17/11/05, p. 8.
171 Interview P15.
172 See Harrison and Corkfll, op. a t , pp. 186-187, quoting J. A  Zaragoza Rameau, 'Los desequilibrios 
regionales en España: su correción’, Economía Industrial, VoL 269,1989, pp. 63-73.
173 Tremlett, op. a t ,  p. 370.
174 Gemie, op, dt., p. 127.
175 Ibid.
174 Turgalicia, ‘Galicia: The wort’, http: / /www.tunr.dir,’« es /Presentacion/trabalUiitm [accessed 16/12/08].
177 The majority of these are small local vessels. See E IU , nif., p. 31.
178 See ibid, and Turgalicia (Dirección Xeral de Turismo), 'Galicia, Atlantic Destination, op. at,. See also 
‘Vigo, motor del eje atlántico’, E l Pais, 12/06/05, p. 24.
179 Turgalicia (Dirección Xeral de Turismo), 'Galicia, Atlantic Destination’, op. rit.,
180 For example, the company Navantia has an important shipyard in Ferrol (A Coruña), which employs 2,349people. Mainly, the company builds military ships for die Spanish navy (and others). However, it also
undertakes repairs of other kinds of vessel. See, for example, “Navantia: Buques desde Ferrol para la Armada 
española’, Cinco Días: Gaàaa, 16/04/08, p. 6. In terms of exports, the naval business is the fourth most 
important in Galicia, See S. Acosta and A. Simón, ‘Un amplio tejido empresarial, Cinco Días: Galicia,
16/04/08, pp. 6-7.
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leader in terms o f  income and exports181. Additionally, construction in Galicia is growing 
faster than in most o f  the rest o f  Spain and there has also been some expansion in the 
tourist sector182. Such developments meant that, in 2007, Galicia reached third place in 
respect o f  the autonomous communities o f  Spain that had experienced the most growth, 
with the industrial sector (followed by the services sector) being the main driving force o f  
the economy183. Thus, economically, it is undoubtedly the case that Galicia has developed 
very noticeably in the last few years, and is likely to continue doing so. Moreover, Sharif 
Gemie’s observation is certainly true. He states:
While economists and sociologists will still argue that Galicia is a relatively deprived 
area within the EU, no one could doubt the extent to which Galicia has changed in 
recent decades [.. .].184 1856
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the numbers working in industry and the services in 
Galicia are still significantly lower than in the rest o f  Spain , wages are low and, 
although there have been some signs o f  improvement in recent years, unemployment has 
often been regarded as a serious problem187. Furthermore, although Galicia does not 
feature at the bottom o f  the tables in terms o f  Spain’s poorest regions, its level o f  wealth is 
well below the Spanish average188, and there are ‘many indications that Galicia remains 
relatively deprived’189. This perception o f  Galicia as a ‘deprived’ and backward region was 
confirmed during several o f  the interviews undertaken for this research. Indeed, the 
picture o f  Galicia that emerged from these was one o f  a very poor region with low  
employment, with the main legal economic activities being based around agriculture and
181 See, for exsmple, Turgalica, ‘Galicia: The work*, ofi. a t:, TSA-Peugeot Citroen: Puesta a punto para un 
nuevo Ianzamiento’, G nco Dias: Galicia, 16/04/08, p, 6-
182 Gemie, op. at., p. 128. . „ . .  <A
■» The growth rate ™  4 per cent (the national averag: was 3.8 per cent). See Mareos lizquem , Avance. en
el reto de converger en desarrollo', G nco D iiti: Ga&aa, 16/04/08, p. 2.
184 Gemie, op. at., p. 140.
185 p . 128.
186 According to Gemie, for example, in late 2004, the average Spanish worker earned 1,641 euros per month, 
while in Galicia the average monthly salary was 1,391, the third lowest of the seventeen autonomous
communities. See iUd., p. 129. , , „  . . .  .
187 Gemie argues, for example, that, in 1999 and 2000, unemployment levels were, on average higher m
Galicia than in die rest of Spain (a problem that was felt particularly bymdustnal workers). 1 Ie also argues, 
however, that, in 2004, them was a sustained seven-month period m wh.ch new ,obs m semces and industry 
more than compensated for the loss of work in the agricultural and fishing se cto rs . See iM , ^
188 For example, in terms o f Spain’s regional per capita Gross Domestic I roduct (GDP) tn 2004  ^(GDP per 
inhabitant, 2004 PPS, EU-27 = 100), Galicia scored 81.0. Only three regions had scoresbelow dm. 
Andalucía (77.6); CastiUa-La Mancha (79.1); and Extremadura (67-l)_hhidad h«d the lughest score at 13-1. 
See Chislctt, Spain. Going Places. E a m m  Political and Social P rogm s,1975 -2m  op a t p. 47 a m g  B um tat. By 
2007, Galicia had experienced some growth in this respect the GDP per inhabitant was 19.80f) euros. 
However, it was still below the Spanish average (23.396 euros) and on y die «gums of Murcia, CastaHa-La 
Mancha, Andalucía and Extremadura were poorer/worse off. See INE ‘Contabihdad Reg,ond de^^pana 
base 2000 (CRE-2000). Producto Interior Bruto regional. Afio 2007. Ponapaje* resultailos, INL Noras de
-Vv/m/n« p a, }lTt? /^ww.ine.es/pren5a/flp425j^f [accessed04/07/08].
«»  Gemie, op. at., p. 1 2 ^ 1 ^ ^  as low house PnceS and ^  UW met aCCCSS-
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fishing190. Specifically, during some o f  the interviews, it was emphasised how the people o f  
Galicia, therefore, have to work very hard in manual jobs, but still earn vety little and this, 
it was claimed, is another reason why some o f Galicia’s citizens are tempted into criminal 
activities191 for, in contrast to the honest population, the gangs involved in illicit enterprise 
are perceived as being very powerful and very rich192 193and smuggling and trafficking 
activities have brought wealth to some citizens and parts o f  the region195.
Furthermore, Galicia’s dependence on the fishing and seafood industries is also 
seen to play a part in the criminal activities carried out there. For example, it was claimed 
during one interview that these traditional industries have made the people o f  Galicia ‘good 
sailors’194 and that the vast number o f boats present in the region have proved 
advantageous to criminals because it is difficult for the authorities to identify those which 
are legitimate fishing boats and those which are not195. Moreover, the criminal clans make 
use o f  the numerous ba tea s (the platforms used to cultivate mussels in the ria s) for their 
smuggling and drug trafficking activities196 and, unlike the police, the traffickers know every 
path and sea route to these mussel platforms and are capable o f  driving and sailing at night, 
without lights, which makes it very difficult for the police to catch them197. The fact that 
the traffickers also typically use faster boats than the police198 creates a situation, according 
to one interview source, where it becomes a ‘cat and mouse game between the mussel 
platforms*199. It is conceivable, then, to accept that Galicia’s traditional industries, 
particularly fishing, may facilitate the trafficking activities o f  its clans, and the late 
development o f  Galicia, economically, may, indeed, have tempted some o f  its citizens into 
illicit activities.
For many, however, what makes Spain really attractive to criminal groups, is the 
nature o f  its industry, which comprises o f  a significant tourism sector and a major 
construction industry, as both industries facilitate, and are typically used for, money 
laundering200. Again, this is certainly a credible argument. In 2007, around 59.2 million 
international tourists arrived in Spain, making it the world’s second most popular
190 Interviews P2, M l, C2, P 4 J2 .J4 , FI, F2, P8 and P15. This was also identified in questionnaires QE, QF 
and QL.
191 Interviews J2,J4 and M2. A similar point was also made in questionnaire QL.
192 Interview PZ
193 Tin's issue was also seen as a facilitating fa cto r  b y  die professional interviewed in interview P17.
194 Interview P4. A similar point was also raised during interviews P8 and PI 6.
195 Interview P3.
196 Interviews P15 and P17.
m  Interviews M l andj2.
198 During interview M l, for example, it was claimed that the boats used by die traffickers run around 60-70 
mph, whilst the police ships only run around 40-45 mph.
199 Interview M l.
200 See, for example, Resa-Nestares, op. at., p. 58 and Luis Gomez, ‘La semana record de la lutha contra el 
blanqueo’, E l Pats, 17/04/05, p. 31 Similar points were also raised during interviews P14.J3.J7 and FI.
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destination behind France in terms o f  both arrivals and receipts201. In fact, every year,
Spain is accustomed to setting new records for the number o f  international tourist
arrivals202, and the World Tourism Organization projects that the number o f  tourists
visiting Spain will reach 74 million in 2020203. As far as construction is concerned, the
number o f  housing starts averaged more than 600,000 per year between 1999 and 2006,
and the peak o f  800,000 new homes built in 2006 was more than in France, Germany, the
United Kingdom (UK) and Italy combined204 — a situation which has resulted in some
commentators using the expression ‘urban-development tsunami’205 to describe the recent
intense increase in housing development in Spain. In fact, according to Chislett:
More cement has been consumed in recent years in Spain than anywhere else in 
Europe and the fifth-largest amount worldwide after China, India, the US and 
Japan; almost everywhere you turn die skyline is dominated by construction 
cranes.206
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the real estate sector is, indeed, one o f  the most 
utilised channels for money laundering by criminal organisations in Spain, and construction 
and urban activity was viewed as a facilitating factor o f  illicit enterprise by several o f  the 
interview and questionnaire sources207. Tourism was mentioned frequently too208. Tourism 
brings with it large volumes o f  foreign currency, which facilitates money laundering, and 
investing in real estate, hotels, restaurants and other services related to tourism is another 
effective way to clean dirty money, or mix it with legitimate money, because restaurants, 
and so on, can act as ‘front’ businesses. Moreover, the construction and tourism sectors 
also have other advantages. Along with some o f  die interview sources, Resa-Nestares, for 
example, makes the very valid point that the large number o f  foreign tourists, which are 
present in Spain at all times o f  the year, provides an anonymous environment for foreign
201 See World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), Tourism Highlights 2008 Edition, UNWTO, [no date], p. 6, 
http://unwto.org/fact$/eng/pdf/hiphl‘ph^/t ’NWTP HighlinhtsOS en HR.odf [accessed 16/03/09] (note 
that these are provisional figures).
202 See Chislett, Spain. Going Places. Economic, Political and Social Propress, 1975-2008, op. at., p. 87. In 2008, 
however, tourism figures declined for the first time since 1995. See William Chislctt, Inside Span No. 53, 
Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, 18/02/09, accessed through
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano eng/Iostdespain [accessed 18/02/09], citing 
Instituto de Estudios Turísticos.
203 See Chislett, Spain. Going Places. TLconomic, Political and Social Progress, 1975-2008, op.cit., p. 87, citing World 
Tourism Organization.
204 See ibid., p. 83.
205 See Fernando Jiménez, ‘Building Boom and Political Corruption in Spain, South TLuropean Society and Politics, 
Vol. 14, No. 3,2009, p. 263, citing R. Fernández Duran, E l tsunami urbam'zador españolj  mundial, Madrid, 
Marcial Pons, 2006.
206 Chislett, Spain. Going Places. Economic, Political and Social Progress, 1975-2008, op.cit., p. 83. A similar point was 
also raised during interview PI4.
207 Interviews P7 ,P 9, J l  and L2  and questionnaires QA, QB and QG
208 Tourism, generally, was mentioned as a facilitating factor o f otganised crime in interviews J3, P9 and P l l  
and in questionnaires QA, QB and QG The OGD also claims that Spain’s role in the international 
trafficking of drugs is due to (amongst other factors) the tourist industry (but does not specifically state why). 
See OGD, op. tit., p. 89.
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criminals209. Contributing to this, the recent construction boom on the costas has saturated 
the Mediterranean coast with urbanisations, where foreigners have holiday or second 
homes (27.5 per cent o f  land within two kilometres o f  the Mediterranean is now built 
upon210 and around two million Spanish homes are owned by foreigners211). Moreover, one 
o f  the professionals interviewed during the course o f  this research argued that tourism may 
facilitate illicit enterprise in Spain’s most popular tourist areas because law enforcement 
attention and resources may be more focussed on minor law  and order’ issues, such as 
policing the holidaymakers who misbehave, than on ‘trying to look at the major criminals 
there’212.
The importance o f  the tourism and construction sectors is often considered to be 
specifically important in the case o f  the Costa del Sol213 and may explain, to a degree, why 
criminals choose to operate in this particular region. The construction sector makes a 
particularly significant economic contribution to the Costa del Sol214 — in fact, construction 
is classed as the most important industrial activity, and practically the only industrial activity 
in some municipalities215. Between 1999 and 2003, there were more new properties built in 
the province o f  Málaga than in any other region o f  Spain216, and the majority o f  these are
m  Interviews PI, P13, C l, J l ,  J3 and J7; Resa-Nestares, op. at., pp. 59-60. ^
¡10 This figure has increased from 22 per cent in 2005 and 16 per cent in 1987. The amount of land near to 
ill of Spain’s coastline upon which homes were built between 2000 and 2005 increased by 22 per cent See 
□lisle tt, Inside Spain No. 51, op. at., citing a satellite survey by the National Geographic Institute, part of the 
Public Works Ministry.
!il See Stephen Burgen, ‘Pirates of the Mediterranean’, Times Online, 30/07/ ,
ittp://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ljfe style/article69Q36l£Cfi faccessed 14/11/06}.
¡12 Jfi(£fvi£W 0 1» •
For example, during interviews J l ,  PI and P12, tourism was highlighted as being a key cause o f ‘organised
:rime’ in this region. . . . . .  . ,
!1< EURES (die European Job Mobility Portal),‘Labour Maiket Information. Spain-Andiducia, _
ttp://www.eiimpa.en.int/eiires/main.isp?)ang=en^aci,o-imi&carU1~45?v,kcovintryld h S t e giQnM-h«S6& 
/ - * !  I _____ f  I  A i  / / V T  / / \ 0 1
5?, ■-http://www,plancostadelsnl.org/docs/I%20rnfonnE%yrhílgnosricn0'/o29rie%201a%20G>.sta%2Qdri?<o2QSol
%20Qcridental.pdf [accessed 07/08/08],
216 In the province of Málaga, there were 5,630 housing starts in 1991 and, twelve years later in 2003, diis 
figure had multiplied fourteen times to 83,274 (exceeding the figures for provinces such as Madrid and 
Barcelona). Although Málaga province fell to fourth place in die ranking of housing starts in 2004 (with 
42,214 properties), and to sixth place in 2006 (with 32,794 properties), this still reflects a high level of urban 
activity in this region and one wliich does not correspond even with the region's increase in population. See 
José Luis Diez Ripollés and Alejandra Gómcz-Céspedes, ‘La corrupción urbanística: Estrategias, de análisis’, 
R etista Española de Investigación Criminológica, Artículo 5, No. 6,2008, p- 8,
http:// www.criminologia.net/pdf/reic/REICA5N6(20Q83,odf faccessed 11/08/08J, quoting data from die 
Spanish Ministry of Housing (Ministerio de Vivienda, Número de ririendas Hbrcs iniciadas: Serie 1991-2006, 
Viviendas libres por comunidades autónomas y  provincias, Madrid, 2007, httplZ/wanKJ ttvty^s/e^/). 
According to Chislett, 313/300 homes were built in the province between 1996 and 2005. See Chislett, Spain. 
Going Places. Economic, Political and S od d  Pngress, 1975-2008, op. at., p. 88. It is also interesting to note here 
that, since 2007, there has been a gradual downturn in terms of die construction, promotion and buying and 
selling o f property in Spain generally. For data concerning the fall in construction o f new properties in die 
province o f Málaga since 2007 see Jesús Hinojosa, ‘La construcción de viviendas sufre una fuerte caída en el 
primer trimester del año’, sur.es, 17/04/07, hrtp://wttw.diariQSUC£s/ptr nsa/2QQ7PiI2/m al^X ûm iIU ixiatt:
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located along the coastal strip (by 2007, 59.5 per cent o f  land within the 500 metre strip 
away from the coastline in Málaga province had already been built upon or developed* 217). 
The extensive building work and high level o f  construction in this region is considered as 
fundamentally important by some sources, as it is common to invest in property here for 
money laundering purposes218. The examples given in Chapter 2 (and others that will be 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis) serve to demonstrate that criminal groups are highly 
involved in laundering large sums o f  money, gained from their illicit activities, in the real 
estate sector o f  the Costa del Sol. It is plausible to assume, therefore, that the high level o f  
construction in this area, which undoubtedly facilitates, and presents several opportunities 
to carry out, such activity219, is a factor that attracts these groups to this region. Certainly, 
in 2006, Augusto Méndez de Lugo, the president (at the time) o f  the T ribunal Superior de 
Justicia  de A n dalu cía  (TSJA), (Supreme Court o f  Justice o f  Andalucía), made a direct 
correlation between the ‘urban boom’, money laundering and the establishment o f ‘mafia 
organisations’ in the Costa del Sol220. When presenting the annual report o f  his 
organisation, Mendez de Lugo was reported as saying that the ‘urban boom’ has allowed 
‘massive’ construction on the Costa, which has served, in many cases, as an important 
‘refuge’ for laundering money. He continued to say that, in Andalucía, there are 840 
kilometres o f  coast, a great part o f  which pertain to Málaga, and, under the umbrella o f  
tourism, ‘mafia organisations, who have wanted to get a slice o f  this important economic 
growth’, have established themselves221.
Certainly, tourism also drives the economy o f  the Costa del Sol222. Indeed, with 
regard to tourism, the mild climate223, coastal location and good transport
ytviendas-su fre-fue rte 20070417.html and Amanda Salazar. ‘Los constructores proyectan la mitad de 
viviendas que hace un ano’, sur.es, http://www.diariosur.es/2QQ80705/tnillilga/COtlStnJCtQres-prQyectait: 
mitad-vivicndas-2fflK070S html {jjoth accessed 01/09/08], Interestingly, however, the data shows that, in the 
first half of 2008, resorts such as Martella and Torremolinos again experienced a growth tn the building of 
new properties.
217 This figure reaches 85 per cent in die town of Mijas and 82 per cent in Martella. The average for
Andalucía was 22.2 per cent The Provincial Environmental Committee estimates diat one million new 
residences will be constructed iri Málaga in die next decade. See Greenpeace, *Destruction at all Co(a)sts: 
Greenpeace report about the Spanish coast situation’ (English summary), Madrid and Barcelona, Greenpeace 
Madrid and Greenpeace Barcelona, June 2007, pp. 14-15, ^ 2 l f [  . d
07/08/08].
218 Interviews P2.J7 and P14.
219 Interviews P7, P10 and PI 1.
^ S ee , for example, M. J . Cruzado, Til TSJA insta a combatir el crimen orgamzado en la Costa’, sur.es, 
21/04/06, http://www.diariosur.es/pg060421 /prensaZnpricias/Mitliigit/2Q0604/2t/SUR-MALP.19htffll
[accessed 10/10/08]. A similar point was also made during interview J 6.
221 See, Cruzado, or. (my translation).
222 See, for example, OECD, Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development, Globalisation, 
SMEs and Tourism Development, Case Study: The R olf o f  Andalusian SMEs in Tourism Global Value Chains, OECD, 
19/02/08. pp. 2-3. http://www.oecd.otg/dataoecd/44/57Z4Q12242Lpdf [accessed 05/07/08],
221 The region enjoys a very pleasant climate almost throughout die whole year. The average annual 
temperature is approximately 18° centigrade (registering, at the highest, approximately 30° centigrade in
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communications224, along with other leisure attractions such as the numerous golf courses, 
make the Costa del Sol one o f  Spain’s most popular tourist destinations (the number o f  
tourists arriving just in the province o f  Málaga in 2007, for example, was approximately 
9,518,00o225, and almost 26 million tourists visited the wider area o f  Andalucía in the same 
year226). As noted above, the very same reasons, and the glamorous ‘play boy’ lifestyle that 
the Costa del Sol offers227 (for example, as one interview source claimed, ‘if  you have a flat 
in Marbella, you have social stature’228), further explains why many people choose to 
emigrate to the region and also why the area is a popular choice for foreigners to have 
holiday homes and second residences. Indeed, the recent construction ‘boom’ along this 
part o f  the Spanish coast offers interested purchasers a wide choice o f  properties in which 
to invest. Referring to studies carried out by specialised firms, the Costa del Sol Tourist 
Board & Convention Bureau states that almost 90 per cent o f  the real estate developments 
built along the coast are monopolised by foreign buyers, one third being British and the
August and, at the lowest, approximately 12° centigrade in January), and it is estimated that there is an 
average o f 320 days of sunshine and less than an average of 500 mm nunfidlon t h e e a c h . 
Costa del Sol Patronato de Turismo & Convention Bureau, Press D ossier2008, Malaga, Patronato Provincial 
de Turismo de la Costa del Sol, 2008, p. 3, accessed through . r  , , .
http://professionals.visiteostadr'^ l  ram /hd/ficheros p]ip?modula=3 [accessed 26/06/08], Costa del Sol 
Tourist Board and Convention Bureau, Topulation, size and climate, _
bttp^/wwwyisitcostadcbolcom/contnit/vtfw/MS/HSZ. [accesse / / j .  ,  .
224 The Costa del Sol is well served by the Autovía del Mediterráneo, die main dud carnagpw^hat runs the 
length of the coast from Neija to Manilva, and die toll road AP-7 » « * *  * « •  al! °  f°
Fuengirola on the western Costa del Sol, and to Alora in the Guadalhorce Valley. Since ¿ P 7*a
new AVE {Alta Velocidad Espawlct) high-speed railway Une has connected Madnd with ^ “8* » d* * e 
Costa del SoL National and, predominandy, international visitors to the Costa del Sol also arrive by way of 
Malaga’s Pablo Ruiz Picasso Airport, which is currendy undergoing development in order W almost d<wWe 
its capacity for passenger traffic. Four shipping companies also operate out of Malaga, hnking t e a ty  w.th 
ports in northern Morocco. Additionally, the cruise sector is buoyant, with numerous ^ > . p s  cdluigat 
Malaga’s port See, for example, Costa del Sol Tourist Board and Convention Bureau, 1 opul ti n, .e and 
cUmate’, op. cit.; Costa del Sol Tourist Board and Convention Bureau, ’ , , <, ,
hap://www.visitcostadekol.com/contenlZBeg/M3/115¿b¿flA [accessed 26/06/081, Costa del Sol 
Patronato de Turismo & Convention Bureau, op. at., p- 23. ■ , e  , w /t
225 Data gathered by the Costa del Sol Tourist Board &
Provincial Delegation’s Planning and Development Society (SOP E). c „ ' T '
Turismo & Convention Bureau, op. cit., p. 9 and also die various reports y
http;// w w ,5opde ei/cshtdiQsJnfotTnci /pubUca«on££Zhfflm£taspqetn^; , , Andalucía!
^  See Instituto de Estadística de Ldalucía(Cbnsejenade Economía y Haciend.tjunta d eA n ^ u aa ) ,
•Datos al día. Información Estadística de Andalucía. Encuesta de Coyuntura íunsticade Andalucía. 1 timer
Trimestre 2007. Datos provisionales’, Sevilla [no date], ^  , __A*
httpi//ww.juntadeandaluria f s /ica/turismo/tnfoiea/tnn0107 /tun&lQTJi^i- Jn formación Hs tadís tica
Andalucía (Consejería de Economía y Hacienda, junta de Andalucía), Tlatos al ^  ? Intormauon Estadística
de Andalucía. Encuesta de Coyuntura Turística de Andalucía. Seguiu o nmes . /tnri0207 him1
f:“ ;S c fd ^
Información Estadística de Andalucía. Encuesta de Coyuntura Turística de Andalucía. Temer 1 muestre
de Andalucía. Encuesta de Coyuntura Turística de Andalucía. Cuarto ’
Sevilla [no date]. http://www.iuntadtandalMria^  taU aCCeSSCti
05/07/08],
227 Interviews M l, C1,C2,P4 and J2.
228 Interview P4.
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rest from other European nations, as well as Arab investors229 230. 1  he 300,000 or so 
foreigners, who have second or holiday homes in the region, swell the official population 
statistics, with the result that the Málaga province should, more accurately, be ranked first, 
in terms o f  the total population, o f  the provinces o f  Andalucía . Indeed, it is commonly 
accepted that the real population figures for this region are notably higher than those stated 
in the census data231. Residential tourism232 is most dominant on the (relatively lesser 
developed) eastern Costa del Sol, whereas the western region (encompassing the renowned 
holiday resorts o f  Torremolinos, Benalmádena, Fuengirola, Marbella and Estepona), 
overwhelmingly, features a large hotel infrastructure233. Indeed, in terms o f  size and quality 
o f  services offered, the Costa del Sol provides one o f the most significant hotel 
contributions in Spain234. Such factors therefore mean that, at all times o f  the year, the 
Costa del Sol is visited, and populated by, a whole host o f  foreign nationals. Indeed, as one 
interview source estimated, at certain times, ‘there are 300,000 to 400,000 Brits in the 
region alone235 *. As has been discussed previously, and which is also emphasised by the 
interview and questionnaire sources, this situation provides an anonymous environment 
where the many foreign criminals active in the region can hide, or get lost in and, as 
tourism is the region’s main source o f  income, the authorities, it is claimed, do not like to 
interfere in this237. Such a high number o f  foreigners, and the expatriate communities that 
they create, also appear to pose further problems for the police. For example, one
229 See Costa del Sol Patronato de Turismo & Convention Bureau, op. at., p . 4.
230 See ibid., p. 4. Spain’s INE gives a figure of 219,955 foreigners registered in the Municipal Register for the 
province of Málaga in 2007. See INE, ‘Población extranjera por sexo, comunidades y provincias y 
nacionalidad’, op. át..
231 See, for example, Asociación MADECA, Mancomunidad Costa del Sol Occidental and Area de Juventud, 
Deportes y Formación de la Diputación Provincial de Málaga, op. át., pp. 21-23.
232 ‘Residential tourism’ can be defined as ‘development housing of touristic use’. See OECD, Centre for 
Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development, op. tit., p. 9, fh 2.
233 See Costa del Sol Patronato de Turismo & Convention Bureau, op. at., p. 4.
234 For example, almost all hotels in the region are above the three star rating and Málaga is the second 
province in Spain in terms of the number of five star hotels, representing 75 per cent of the total in 
Andalucía. Establishments also offer a variety of services to their guests, including swimming pools, sauna 
and massage services, discotheques, games rooms, tennis and squash courts, golfing facilities, and so on. See 
Costa del Sol Patronato de Turismo & Convention Bureau, op. (it., p- 5.
235 Interview P2. According to INE, the actual number of persons from die United Kingdom registered in 
the Municipal Register in 2007 was 56,898 for Málaga province and 88,446 for Andalucía. See INE, 
'Población extranjera por sexo, comunidades y provincias y nacionalidad’, op. át.. However, it is commonly 
argued that the official statistics do not usually present an accurate reflection of the true number of foreign 
residents due to the fact that many foreigners, for various reasons, do not formally register their residence in 
Spain. See, for example, Karen O’Reilly, The British on the Costa del Sop Transnational Identities and Local 
Communities, London and New York, Routledge, 2(X)0.
23fi Interviews J l ,  P2, M l, P4.J3.J4, P10,J7,J8 and Questionnaire QC. See also Diez Ripollés and Gómez- 
Céspedes, op. át., p. 23 and ‘IU denuncia que más de 120 grupos de la mafia internacional operan en la Costa 
del Sol*, gbcdeseiilla.es. 05/01 /06. http://www.abcdesevilla.es/hcineroteca/hLHtOiDCO-05-01- 
2ffiíi¿s£villa/Andaluria/iii-deniincia-que-mas-de 120-grupos-de-larmafia-intcmacjondzOP£raa-£n-la-CQSta- 
ddraol 81.3462096368 html [accessed 10/10/08J, quoting Antonio Romero, ex-member of the parliament of 
Andalucía for political party IU. It seems that the ‘anonymity* o f the Costa del Sol is a factor that attracts 
n°n-criminal migrants to the region too. See, O’Reilly, op. á t., particularly p. 27,
237 Interview P2.
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interview source claimed that it is difficult for Spanish police to enter British or German 
bars because they are immediately noticed218. Clearly, these factors go some way in 
explaining why the Costa del Sol (and, undoubtedly, other tourist regions along the 
Mediterranean coast) is an attractive operational base for criminals engaged in illicit 
enterprise and, in support o f  this argument, a brief look at some statistics does show that 
foreigners have, indeed, been heavily involved in, for example, the many drug trafficking 
offences undertaken in this region in recent years, f o r  example, between 1999 and 2004, 
Andalucía was the autonomous community with the highest number o f  foreigners arrested 
for drug trafficking-related offences219.
To some extent, tourism may also facilitate illicit enterprise in other parts o f  Spain. 
For example, as noted above, tourism is also important, and growing, in the Madrid region. 
Madrid’s efficient transport facilities, and a substantial and expanding hotel sector^40, allow 
tourists to very easily visit and stay in the area. Indeed, according to Observatorio
Economico, almost seven million tourists visited the city o f  Madrid in 2006 and it has 
been reported that some nine million national and foreign tourists visited the region, as a 
whole, in 2007242. For one o f  the interview respondents, then, tourism was seen to be a 
facilitating factor o f  illicit enterprise in Madrid, not only for the fact that it provides 
criminals with more people to steal from, and more customers for their drugs and 
prostitutes241, but also for the beneficial environment that it generally offers, especially to 
foreign criminals. Indeed, as in the Costa del Sol, it would appear that both tourism and 
immigration are seen as facilitating illicit enterprise in this region because these factors 
provide a degree o f  anonymity or ‘camouflage’ to the many (presumably foreign) 
criminals that are active there. One o f  the questionnaire respondents, for example, made
the point that immigrants (and presumably also tourists) in Madrid do not stand out, 
because many people who live in Madrid, even the Spaniards, are from other places. 1  he 
respondent stated: *[...] todos lo que m im os en M adrid  no somos de M a d rid  ([ ...]  all o f  us who 
live in Madrid are not from Madrid*)* 2401345. Certainly, as we have seen, these factors may prove 
to be advantageous to foreign criminal groups, and the evidence from the interview sources
218 Interview P2. See also TremU'tt, op. at., quoting police Commissar Valentin Bahut.
219 See Elisa Gaida España and Fátima Pérez Jiménez, Seguridad G adadanaj Actividades Policiales, Informe del 
Observatorio de la Delincuencia en Andalucía 2005, Málaga, Instituto Andaluz Interuniversitario de 
Criminología and Fundación El M onte, 2005, pp. 147-148-
240 In May 2007, for example, the city of Madrid had more than 68,000 beds tn over 830 establishments (61 
per cent o f tírese beds are in 4 or 5 star hotels). See Observatorio Económico, op. (it., p. 12, citing tire 
National Statistic Institute’s H otel Occupation S m vy, May 2007.
241 See ibid., p. 1 1 .
242 See Alejando López, *200.000 personas viven del turismo en la región*, aDn (Madrid), 17/07/08, p. 4.
243 Questionnaire QD.
244 Interview J2. ; t
245 Questionnaire QD (my translation). A similar point is also raised in I.ola Galán, Madrid, la fuerza del
caos1, F J Pals: Domingo, 16/01/05, p. 3.
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discussed above, as well as statistical data, does show that foreigners have been involved in 
offences related to illicit enterprise in Madrid in recent years. For example, between 1999 
and 2004, the autonomous community o f  Madrid followed Andalucía in terms o f  having 
the highest number o f  foreigners arrested for drug trafficking-related offences246.
Do these factors fully explain illicit enterprise in Spain?
As we have seen above, factors relating to the location and geography o f  Spain, the 
presence o f  immigrant communities and the nature o f  Spain’s economy and industry 
undoubtedly facilitate illicit enterprise in the country to some degree because, by their very 
nature, criminal groups will endeavour to exploit any environment that will further the 
pursuit o f  their activities and interests. These factors may also help to reduce the risks 
involved in illic it enterprise and they may give some groups a competitive advantage.
When searching for the facilitators o f  illicit enterprise in Spain, then, these factors cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant, as initially thought. However, although these explanations might 
provide a starting point for our understanding, are they (even when combined together) 
enough to fully explain illicit enterprise in Spain?
A  brief consideration o f  some simple points may lead us to question the total 
usefulness o f  the explanations given above. For example, although it can certainly be 
argued that no other European country has experienced such a rapid rise in immigration as 
Spain in recent years and that the country stands as die second most popular tourist 
destination (as discussed above), it is also the case that Spain is not unique in Europe in 
having a large number o f  tourists or immigrant communities. Indeed, Germany, the U fs  
Italy and France also have large immigrant populations247 248and, in some years, other EU 
countries have received more immigrants than Spain24*, Additionally, o f  course, other 
European countries also have extensive coastlines, numerous airports and borders with 
other states.
Furthermore, tourism and immigration are not factors that can be used to explain 
all incidences or examples o f  illicit enterprise in Spain, just as they are not factors that can 
be used to explain illicit enterprise in all regions o f  Spain. The view o f  one o f  die 
professionals interviewed during the course o f  this research, for example, was that tourism, 
in terms o f  the anonymity that it provides to foreign criminals, is a facilitating factor that is
246 See Garcia España and Pérez Jiménez, op. cit., pp. 147-148.
247 See, for example, Chislett, Spain. Going Places. Ecotwmic, PoM cd and S oád  Progress, 1975-2008, op.át., pp. 18-
19 and Giampaolo Lanzieri/Eurostat, op. cit.. _
248 See, for example, Eurostat, Pion-naúonal Populations in the HU Member Slates, I-uxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2006,
h ttD://epp.eurosfíit.pc.riiropa.eu/cadie/ITY QFFPUB/KSrHK-DftTÍX^ /FfN/hS-NK-Oft-OOSEN.FHP
[accessed 18/03/07].
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relevant only to the coastal areas o f Spain249 and tourism certainly cannot be used to explain 
illicit enterprise in Galicia. Compared with the Costa del Sol and other regions o f  Spain, 
fo r example, there is very little tourism in Galicia. Despite the coastal lo c a tio n  o f  s o m e  o f  
its provinces, the Atlantic climate250 and the nature o f  its landscape mean that Galicia does 
not conform to the typical image o f  Spain that we often see featured in holiday brochures. 
As one o f  the interview sources said:
In Galicia [...] it rains a lot. The water is cold. The climate is bad. The beaches
are not that good.251 25*4
Unquestionably, the famous O  Cam ino de Santiago (Way o f Saint James) has always
attracted a number o f  visitors to the region and, in more recent years, there have also been 
attempts to advertise Galicia as a tourist destination. Such attempts tend to play on the fact 
that Galicia is ‘different’ from the popular ‘sun and sea’ holiday resorts o f  Spain and 
Galicia is marketed as being part o f  the unspoilt, un-commercialised, Green Spain 
‘Rural Tourism’, festivals, National Parks, health resorts and historical centres are especially 
promoted255 *. As a result, there has been a significant increase in the number o f  tourists 
(especially Spanish tourists) visiting Galicia in the past few years . Nevertheless, the 
number o f  foreign tourists that visit the region is still small when compared with the total 
numbers who visit Spain generally257. Therefore, whereas tourism may help us to explain 
criminal activity in some other regions o f  Spain, particularly (as is often claimed) because it 
provides an anonymous environment for foreign criminals, tourism is not a factor that can
249 Intendewjl.
250 Galicia has been described as having an ‘Atlantic climate’: damp and mild, with temperatures ranging from  
8° centigrade on die coast to 15° centigrade inland, with an annual average temperature fo r  the whole region 
o f  around 13.7° centigrade. See Instituto de Turismo de España —1 urespana, Galicia: Atlantic clim ate, 
http://www.spain.info/TourSpmn/Destinos/CCAA/Masl nfo/.Q/D u M tolog a%2Ü12.hftnH¿anguage-en  
[accessed 16/12/08]; Turgalicia, ‘Presentation o f  Galicia, introduction, geographical situation’,
hftp.7 / www,turgalicia.es/Presenración/enropa i.htm [accessed 16/12/08]. Galicia’s weather can be 
‘unpredictable and unforgiving' (See Tremlett, op. at., p. 372) and certainly contrasts with that of die Costa del
Sol and other Mediterranean regions o f Spain.
251 Interview P8.
252 This is the popular, and historic, pilgrimage to the cathedral in Santiago de Compostela where, according 
to tradition, the remains of Sairit James The Apostle are buried. For full and interesting accounts of this, see, 
for example, Tremlett, op. a t., pp. 388-393 and Turgalicia (Dirección Xetal de Turismo), ‘Galicia, Atlantic
Destination’, op. at..
2S1 See Gemie, op. at., pp. 145-148.
254 The regions, and provinces, of Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, the Basque Country, Navarra and Castilla y 
León are normally categorised as ‘Green Spain’. See, for example, ‘Green Spain (Northern Spain),
255 See, for example, Turgalicia (Dirección Xeral de Turismo), ‘Galicia, Atlantic Destination, op. at..
254 For example, in the month of August 2000,357,343 Spanish tourists and 72,870 foreign tourists visited 
Galicia. During the same month of 2003, these figures had risen to 423,226 Spanish tourists and 88,046 
foreign tourists. See Gemie, op. a t.,p . 147,quotingTincuestade ocupación en alojamiento turísticos’, 
w m Á nm  [consulted 18/07/04]. In 2006, a total of 5,303,840 tourists visited Galicia (which included 832,703 
foreign tourists) and, in 2007, these figures had risen to 5,726,827 tourists in total (which included 899,112 
foreign tourists). See Turgalicia (Dirección Xeral de Turismo), ‘Galicia, Atlantic Destination, op. at..
257 For example, the 88,046 foreign tourists who visited Galicia in August 2003 represented only 2 6 per cent 
o f the total number o f foreign tourists who visited Spain in that month. See Gemie, op. a t., p. 147.
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help us to understand illicit enterprise in Galicia258. The fact that there is little foreign 
tourism in Galicia may, perhaps, explain why there are fewer foreign criminal groups active 
in the region than in other areas o f  Spain, for example — as one o f  the interview sources 
said: ‘foreigners can’t hide’ in Galicia259 260— but this factor does not, in any way, otherwise 
explain the extensive criminal activity undertaken in this region.
Additionally, only the transnational (that is, the foreign) criminal groups in Spain 
will gain from any possible benefits brought by immigrant communities and ethnic 
enclaves in Spain. Immigration does not explain indigenous criminal activity in Spain (and, 
as we are aware, some indigenous groups, such as the clans in Galicia, are long established) 
and some statistical data indicates that it is, in fact, native Spanish criminals that are 
participating most predominantly in the activities associated with illicit enterprise in the 
country. For example, according to the 2005 Spanish police report, 4,026 Spaniards were 
found to be participating in ‘organised crime’ groups in Spain in 2005 . Indeed, by some 
margin, Spaniards topped the statistics in this respect: as noted earlier in this chapter, 
Romania and Morocco followed Spain in terms o f  the country o f origin o f  criminals found 
to be participating in ‘organised crime’ groups in Spain in that year, but with much lower 
figures o f  889 and 767 respectively261. Furthermore, in 2006,482 ‘organised crime’ groups 
were detected in Spain, and 5,446 (or 47.5 out o f  100) individuals found to be members o f  
these groups were Spaniards262. Spaniards were present in 80 out o f  100 ‘organised crime’ 
groups that year and represented the main nationality in 265 o f  them (that is, in 55 out o f  
100 groups, Spaniards had a prominent role)263. Also in 2006, there were 16,766 arrests for 
drug trafficking crimes and the majority o f  those arrested were Spanish nationals (by 
nationality, 10,334 were Spanish; 5,605 were foreigners; and nationality was not indicated in 
827 cases)264. Moreover, even the criminal groups that could benefit from the presence o f  
immigrant communities and ethnic enclaves in Spain may not, in practice, actually confine 
themselves to utilising them. As Morrison argues265, if ‘organised’ criminals are rational 
actors, they will work with criminals from different ethnic backgrounds, if  that association
p rom ises to  be th e  m o re  rew ard in g  on e. Indeed, as E dw ard s contends.
258 This point was also raised during interview J l .
259 Interview PI 5.
260 España. Delincuencia Organizada ]  2005, op. cit»
261 Ibid..
202 See Fiscalía General del Estado, Memoria elevada a l Gobierno de S. M. presentada a l tmcto del año ju d ia d  p or el 
Fiscal General d el Pistado, Exorno. Sr. D. Cándido Qmde-Pumpido Touron (2007) (Capitulo III, Volumen l), Madrid, 
2007,p .698, ■' ' ¿ ¿ r ’ j M i .  . i  'hflp :/ / v w ,fiscal-c5/csblob/ y L f A P3-pdf!l?lohcnl-wddata8d^bheaaer-applM^MUft^pdgdaolikey=i 
&blohtahle=:M,,n^Rlnh^.hlnhwhete=11092482W9m £sbiaag=mi£ [accessed 07/09/08).
263 See ibid»
264 S ee ibid., a . 185. . , . „  . .
265 See Shona Morrison, The Dynamics o f illicit Drug Transshipment and Potential Transit Points for
Australia', Transnational Organised Crime, Vol. 3. No. 1,1997, pp. 6-7.
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[...] networks premised on ethnicity limit the scope fo r expansion and 
diversification into multiple sectors for the production, exchange and consumption 
o f illicit goods and services.266
Finally, and returning to Friman’s argument regarding geographical location267: 
although he acknowledges that geography can play a part in a state becoming a transit point 
fo r illegal goods, he also argues that other factors may decrease the importance o f  
geographical location (for example, economic linkages, or even immigrant communities) 
and that a country’s openness to transit hinges on the likelihood o f  goods successfully 
passing through it. This, he argues, depends on one o f  two things: either successful 
passage will happen by choice (the authorities allow it or participate in it), or the state is too 
weak to stop it happening (for example, there is limited territorial control, problems with 
corruption, weak legal provisions, and so on)268, which returns us to the discussion relating
the development o f  the hypothesis.
The development of the hypothesis
From the outset o f  the research process and with reservations that the explanations 
discussed above were, by themselves, simply too superficial, some alternative or extra 
explanations were searched for in the wider organised crime literature that specifically 
focuses on why ‘organised crime’ occurs in certain states. Within this, convincing 
explanations relating to state weaknesses appear quite regularly. Indeed, if  we review the 
existing literature and research in the field o f ‘organised crime’, and look at the reasons 
given for the existence (or upsurge) o f  ‘organised crime in a state, we see that organised 
crime’ typically takes root and flourishes where die state is weak, absent, dysfunctional or 
ineffective: consequent power and fiinctional vacuums left by the state or its institutions
are thus filled by criminal groups.
In relation to Sicily and Italy, for example, several works incorporate what has 
become a standard explanation to account for the origin and nse o f  die Sicilian Mafia, 
which ultimately blames die weakness or absence o f  the Italian state . In essence, it is 567
56 Adam Edwards, ‘Transnational Organised Come’ in James Sheptycki and Air Wardak (eds.), "Transnational 
nd Comparative Criminology, London, Glasshouse Press, 2005, pp. 220-221.
57 Priman, op. tit..
'* Ibid., pp. 71-74.
w See, for example, Anton Blok, The M afia o f  a  Sicilian V itine, 1860-1960:A Study o f  Violent Peasant 
Entrepreneurs, Prospect Heights, Illinois, Waveland Press Inc., 1988 (first published 1974); I lenner I less, Mafia 
>M afiosi: Origin, Power andM jtb, London, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd-, 1998 and also Henner Hess, The 
radi donai Sicilian Mafia: Organized Crime and Repressive Crime* in Robert). Kelly (ed.), Organised Crime: A 
Global Perspective, Totowa, New jersey, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1986, pp. 113-133; Joseph L  
dbini, The American Mafia: Genesis o j a Legend, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971, pp. 126-134; 
inu/arr» a iw i.net,. (in,m io*dCrim e. 7* edition, Belmont, California, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2
* ^  ‘  *'* ’  ■ »  I T .  . I
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generally argued that the end o f feudalism in the nineteenth century created an increase in
property rights, which the Italian state could not protect because it was too weak, or absent
altogether — the state could not assume authority, guarantee public security or provide
protection through a legitimate monopoly o f the use o f  force. This created a demand for
private protection and the void was filled by ^ to to -m q fio si. Once established, the Mafia
then took advantage o f  other opportunities, increased its power, and continued to grow
and flourish until, arguably, the Italian state became strong under Fascism. Indeed, i f  it can
be argued that the Sicilian Mafia emerged because the state was weak (or absent), then it
follows that when the Italian state became strong, we can envisage a weakening or
disappearance o f  the Mafia and many argue that this was the case . Certainly, under the
instruction o f  Mussolini, Prefect Cesare Mori succeeded in imprisoning, torturing, killing or
driving abroad many m afiosi21'. However, shortly after the demise o f  Fascism, the Sicilian
Mafia re-emerged, arguably stronger than ever, and it continues to prosper in contemporary
times. This indicates that there are again certain weaknesses in die Italian state, which
allow the Mafia to flourish. Writing in the 1970s, Servadio argued:
The mechanisms o f  the State -  the legal structure and the police forces -  are still 
lamentably weak, and invite the contempt o f  the Sicilian population at large.
More than two decades later, Jamieson, in a similar vein, argues that die Sicilian Mafia
continues to fill the vacuums left by weak or absent public institutions.
[...] substituting itself for the State in functions such as the maintenance o f  public 
order, the use o f  force, economic regulation and the administration o f justice
[•••]•*”
Indeed, she believes that addressing such weaknesses proactively could be the key to 
defeating the Mafia. She states:
[.. .1 to make the State work is the real challenge that Italy’s politicians and 
administrators face at the end o f  the twentieth century. Tt c s or goo 
governance at national and local level; die orderly functioning o f  schools, hospitals, 
public services and courtrooms [.. •]; efficiency, integrity and accountability in
South’, S ocia l& ljgdS tu d ies, Vol. 3 ,1994, pp. 267-279;Jane ” d *
Antimafia, and the Question of Sicilian Cultum’, M * r  drS oa®  V * 22 N a 2  June W94 pp. 237 258 
Michele Pantaleone, TkcM afia W J W f e  ^ o n  C h a^
History o ftb t M rfa jrom  its O ngns to tbt NewYodc The Free Pmss, 1988; Oriana
-atanzaro, Men o f Respect: A Sodal History o f the Sicilian M^fia, , A t,. « n W  u a(i3- Theory ami
Sandier», Tamd Refo™, the M o te  for Pmtecóo», and 1
Evidence’, Journal o f Law, Economics d r  Organisation, Vol. 19, °- » iS ,achusett$  Harvani University 
jam ben»! The S iÁ m  U * c  Ti,  Bm m , ./P m «  Pnt t » .  C m * * »  I taach usem , Harearf U ,»vm ,ty
. ress, 1993. 7. Ahadinskv 149-151; Pantaleone, op. cit.,170 See, for example, Blok, op. cit.. particularly Oiaptet 7, Ahadinsxy, op. m ., u
Chapter 4.
7t See, for example, Servadio, op. at., Grapter 5.
72 Und., p. 118.
7J Jamieson, op. cit.,p . xxi.
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public office-holders and transparency in their activities; freedom o f  competition,
and from harassment, for all forms o f legal business enterprise.
Thus, Italy/Sicily, both during the nineteenth century and today, serves as a prime 
example o f  how criminal groups fill the vacuums left by an absent or ineffective state. 
Moreover, the Italian case can prove to be instructive in understanding other cases in 
which the shortcomings o f  the state have also played a role in the development o f  
‘organised crime’. Gambetta, for example, suggests that, if  the circumstances that led to 
the emergence o f  the Sicilian Mafia in the nineteenth century are the same, a need for 
protection (and the subsequent emergence o f  criminal groups as the suppliers o f that 
protection) can happen elsewhere275. Indeed, the literature shows that indigenous 
‘organised crime’ groups in both Russia and Japan emerged, or significantly developed, 
under strikingly similar conditions to those relevant to the rise o f  the Mafia in post feudal 
Sicily.
In relation to post-Soviet Russia, for example, Gambetta outlines how the number 
o f property owners and the number o f transactions involving individuals with property 
rights increased with the end o f  socialism (just as they did with the end o f feudalism in 
Sicily). A t this time, the fear o f  being cheated and o f  losing property also increased, which 
led to a demand for trust and protection, which was not met by the state but by a plethora 
o f  private suppliers276. Other scholars have pursued this line o f  research. Varese, for 
example, also argues drat the Russia Mafia, as he defines it, emerged as a consequence o f  
an imperfect transition to the market’277. The extensive privatisation that took place during 
the transition meant that there was a significant increase in the number o f  people owning 
assets, which produced a demand for protection against, for example, attempts to take 
those assets away. However, the state in post-Soviet Russia did not emerge as an impartial 
and credible protector o f  property rights. Some actors were able to influence state agencies 
and obtain a privileged distribution o f assets and tax concessions, but others rights were 
weakly protected27*: ‘A  generalized provision o f  protection and clearly defined property 
rights was lacking1279. Distrust for institutions o f  authority (the police, courts, political
Ibid., p. jorii.
!75 Gambetta, op. at., pp. 252-254.
™ &L a u  ™ a  If,' Federico Varese The Trans,ion to the Macke! and Coemption in P o st-so d * , 
f n . ^ :  w S S f c v i x L V . l w i p p .  579-5% ; Federico Varese,'What is the Rn„„n 
'»tensity Conjbrt & Law Enforcement, Vol 5, No. 2,1996, pp. pp. 1 -  
79 Varese, The Russian Mafia, op. at., p- 36,
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in stitu tion s, an d  so  on) w as rife280 an d  Russian citizens did n o t  exp ect fa ir  treatm en t fro m  
g o ve rn m e n t offic ia ls , legal in stitu tions and th e  police281. M o reo ve r, V arese ’s stud y o f  the  
C o u rts  o f  A rb itra tio n , w h ich  h a ve  ju risdiction o v e r  com m ercial disputes and p ro p erty  
claim s, sh o w s th a t the decisions o f  these courts cou ld  n o t  b e  en fo rced  and that the law  in 
this area w as n o t  Svork in g ’282 *. T h e  Russian state a t this tim e w as sim ply n o t  a credible o r
e ffic ien t su p p lie r o f  p ro tectio n , and as V o lk o v  rem inds us:
W h ere  p ro p e rty  rights are u n clear o r  the state is incapable o f  en fo rc in g  them , 
p riva te  en fo rce rs  are  likely to  em erge and b en efit fro m  the state s w eakness.
H ence, d ie  dem and fo r  p ro tectio n  in p o st-S o v ie t Russia w as m et b y  alternative  sources, by  
p eo p le  tra in ed  in  th e  use o f  v io len ce  th at suddenly fo u n d  them selves un em p loyed  a t the  
tim e o f  th e  tran sition , such as red u n d an t servicem en, po licem en an d  sp ortsm en  . F rom  
th ese  so u rces, va rio u s kinds o f  p riva te  p ro tecto r, o r  w h a t V o lk o v  calls ‘vio lence-m anaging  
agencies’285, em erged  an d  am on gst these w ere  th e  crim inal p ro tecto rs  that becam e kn ow n
as th e  ‘R ussian M afia’.
A s  w ith  the case o f  S icily  th en , w e  can see h o w  ‘organised crim e has supplanted  
m an y o f  th e  fu n ction s o f  th e  state ’286; h o w  crim inal groups have  stepped  in  to  fill the  
vacu u m s le ft  b y  in e ffec tive  an d  d ysfun ctional state institutions. W illiam s, h o w eve r, argues 
th a t th e  inability o f  th e  state to  p ro v id e  p ro tectio n  and con trac t en fo rcem en t is o n ly  on e
fo rm  o f  w eakn ess. H e states:
A s  im p o rta n t as th e  inability o f  th e  state to  fu lfill certain  p o sitive  fu n c tio n s th a t are  
necessary  fo r  th e  d eve lo p m en t o f  a  flou rish in g  m ark et econ om y, is its inability to  
p re v e n t crim inal actions fro m  taking place. W h ils t th e  firs t  w eakn ess is re flec ted  in  
th e  failure to  p ro v id e  a  legal an d  reg u la to ry  fram ew o rk  to  facilitate th e  tran sition  to , 
an d  m anagem en t o f , th e  n e w  econ om ic  system , th e  secon d  is m an ifes t in th e  
w eakness in  th e  legal system 287.
280 Ibid., pp. 38-39, citing the 1994 New Russia Barometer survey, cited in R. 38
Society; A Constitution without Gtizens’, East European ConststutumalRmew, Voi. 4, No. 3,1995, p. 38.
281 See Varese, The Rusrian Mafia, op. at., pp- 39-42. _ _
282 See ibid  on 42-54 and Varfese, *What is the Russian Mafia?’, op. a t., p. u j . ' . , , ,iv , ;’ pP' “A , .  * tc We-ik? Violent Entrepreneurship in Russia s Emerging
Eurasia in Comparative Perspective, Washington, DC, Woodrow ‘ s£n , Rimian^Miifia?’ ot> a t n 133 
“ * See Varese, The RussianM afia, op. a t.. PP. 55-59 and Varese, What is th e f t»  .
285 Volkov armies that ‘violence-managing agencies’ are the main unit of Violent entrepreneurship, u htth hevoncov argues mat violence manag h b  - s that enable die conversion of Organised
defines as a set of organisational solunons '^ ^ n t b a s i s .  The main function of Violence-
violence into money or other market resourees on a pe _  the profit-motivated use of
o f c e L l  conidon, « e ™ *  fo,
Volkov, op. a t., pp. 83-84 and pp. « ■. Rconomic and Political Aspects of Organized Crime in
286 Yuriy A  Voronin, The Emerging Criminal State. E o m o n w *  l  Publishers 1997
Russia’ in Phil Williams (ed.), Russian Osgam^d Crime: TbeN ew 7 W .  Ixmdon, Prank Cass Publishers, 1997,
« ’ Phil Williams, ‘Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?’ in Williams, op. at., p. 8.
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T h e  in effectiven ess o f  the legal system  appears to  stem  fro m  a n u m b er o f  in terrelated
facto rs. F irstly, despite som e recognition  o f  the th reat caused by co n tem p o ra iy  ‘organised
crim e ’288 in p o st-S o v ie t Russia, it is argued th a t th e  legislation and th e  legal to o ls  to  deal
w ith  it m ay still rem ain  inadequate an d  incom prehensive, especially against th e  n ew
crim inal organ isations and crim inal p ractices th a t have  em erged since th e  tran sition289.
S econ d ly , variou s p ro b lem s p ervad e  th e  Russian law  en fo rcem en t organ s, such as a  lack o f
equ ipm ent, facilities, p e rson n e l, experience, m o n ey  and m orale290. Finally, th ere  m ay also
h ave  been, in certain  secto rs o f  the security, intelligence and law  en fo rcem en t services, a
lack o f  w ill to  figh t th e  tru e  co re  o f  ‘o rganised crim e’ and co rru p tion 291. ITius, the
w eakness o f  th e  legal system  m eans th at th e  state is unable (o r unwilling) to  address the
g ro w in g  ‘organ ised  crim e’ p rob lem . In  sum , then , it can be  seen th a t Russia serves as
a n o th e r  case in  w h ich  th e  w eakn ess o f  th e  state, in  certain spheres, has fundam entally
co n trib u ted  to  the d eve lo p m en t, o r  burgeoning, o f ‘organised crim e’.
S tate  w eaknesses also ap p ear to  h ave  p layed a ro le  in the d eve lop m en t and g ro w th
o f  the Jap an ese  crim inal gangs th at w e  com m o n ly  call yaktt^a  g rou p s, o r  w h a t P e te r Hill
re fe rs  to  co llec tive ly  as the Ja p a n ese  M afia ’292 293. M ilhaupt and W est2 believe th at Ja p a n
shares sim ilarities w ith  S ic ily  an d  Russia. T h ey  argue:
P o st-feu d a l Ja p a n , [ . . .]  like p o st-feu d a l Italy an d  p o st-S o v ie t Russia, is characterized  
b y  dram atic  increases in fo rm al p ro p e rty  rights. Sim ilar to  these o th e r  countries, 
p o st-feu d a l Ja p a n  also is characterized  b y  a  w eakness o f  com p lem en tary  
e n fo rce m e n t m echanism s. T h e  Jap an ese  transition  o u t o f  feudalism  le ft a vo id  fo r  
p riva te  tran saction -m akers an d  righ ts-en forcers th at w as filled  b y  a hod gep od g e o f
groups, which in Japan included an amalgam of disenfranchised samurai,
h o o d lu m s, and p o o r  peasants. T his m ism atch betw een p ro p e rty  rights and
288 See, for example, Voronin, op. at., p. 58; RobertJ. Kelly, Rufus Schatzberg and Patrick J. Ryan, Primitive 
Capitalist Accumulation: Russia as a Racket* in Patrick J, Ryan and George E. Rush (eds.), Understanding 
Organised Crime in G lobal Perspective: A Reader, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, Inc., 1997,p. 182; 
Varese, What is the Russian Mafia?*, op. cit., p. 137; Tanya Frisby, The Rise of Organised Crime in Russia: Its 
hoots and Social Significance’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1,1998, pp. 39-41.
289 See Williams, ‘Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?*, op. at., pp. 8-9; Voronin, 
op. at., pp. 57-59; Kelly et d , op. at., p. 80, citing M. Joutsen, ‘Organized Crime in Central and Eastern Europe’ 
in J. S. Albanese (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Organised Crime, Monsey, New York, Willow Tree, 1995, pp. 201- 
211.
290 See Williams, ‘Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?*, op. at., p. 9; Voronin, op. 
at., p. 58; Frisby, op. at., pp. 29-30; Kelly e ta 4 op. at., p. 80, citing M. Joutsen, ‘Organized Crime in Central and 
Eastern Europe’ in J. S. Albanese (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Organised Crime, Monsey, New York, Willow
Tree, 1995, pp. 201-211.
291 See, for example, J. Michael Waller and Victor J. Yasmann, ‘Russia’s Great Criminal Revolution: The Role 
of the Security Services’ in Ryan and Rush, op. at., pp. 187-200, particulady pp. 198-200,
292 Peter B. E. Hill, The Japanese M afia: Yakuba, Law, and the State, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
Other researchers prefer to use the term boryokudan to collectively refer to Japanese organised crime 
syndicates. For example, see Frank F. Y. I luang and Michael S. Vaughn, ‘A Descriptive Analysis of Japanese 
Organized Crime: The Boryokudan from 1945 to 1988’, International Criminal Justice Retiew, Vol, 2,1992, pp,
293 Curtis J . Milhaupt and Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical 
Analysis of Organized Crime’, Umiersi/y o f  Chicago Law Retiew, Vol. 67,2000, pp. 41-99.
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enforcement mechanisms leads to organized crime — the dark side o f  private 
ordering.294
Milhaupt and West identify the Meiji Period (1868-1911) as being one o f  the most fertile 
environments for the development o f ‘organised crime* in Japan, characterised as it was by 
a rapid transition from an agrarian, feudal society to a modem, industrialised economy, 
which caused a boom in property rights. However, they argue, the increases in the number 
o f people owning assets and in the number o f  economic transactions were not matched by 
the development o f  complementary state enforcement mechanisms .
Hill questions the significance o f  the Meiji period to the development o fya k u ^ a  
groups296. However, by identifying the Tokugawa period in the early nineteenth century as 
a time when baku to  groups flourished297, he nevertheless concurs with the thesis that state 
inefficiencies were arguably to blame for the development o f  criminal groups in Japan 
because, during this time:
[ . 1 the Tokugawa military government became increasingly weak as the growth o f  
a wealthy merchant class supplanted a hereditary landholding aristocracy as the 
main source o f  economic power.
So that:
[...] by the Tenpo period (1830-1844), many areas were effectively unpoliced; 
gambling groups openly defied the law by wearing swords; the regional officials 
were unable to take steps against them.
Moreover, he claims that this example o f  a simultaneous weakening o f  formal state 
controls coupled with a growth o f  criminal groups is not completely at odds with the 
mechanism we identify as being responsible for the development o f  the Sicilian and
Russian mafias’300.
Another example demonstrating how a weak state contributed to the development 
o f yaku^ a  groups is provided by the period following the Second World War. As I Ml
argues:
The 43-year period between the end o f  the Second World W ar and the death o f  the 
Showa emperor (1989) saw enormous changes in Japan and, in response to the 
opportunities and challenges that these changes offered, organised crime in Japan
developed profoundly, too.301 *2
Ibid., p. 49.
See Milhaupt and West, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
Î 2 & 5  Vaughn alio claim that M t »  gn»P* '¡omed other o u « «  to fotm the modem boryotudW 
ring the Tokugawa period. See Huang and Vaughn, op. at., p.
2 ,  dtingH, Jwai,ByôriShüdan no K o$,Tokyo, Seishin-Shobô, 1963,p. 42.
Hill, op. àt., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 42.
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Particularly significant were the Allied occupation years immediately following the end o f  
the Second World War, or the time that Hill has called the ‘period o f  postwar confusion’302 304.
Kaplan and Dubro argue that:
The occupation had, by sweeping away the top layer o f control in government and 
business, left a power vacuum [... into which hadjjsprung a degenerate boss 
system reminiscent o f  the Capone gangster days .
Moreover, Milhaupt and West claim that the second boom in property rights in Japan
occurred during this time, as occupation reformers ‘designed a new constitution containing
a more extensive list o f  recognized economic rights [• • •] • Yet, once again, this expansion
o f  property rights was not matched by the development o f complementary enforcement
mechanisms305.
Furthermore, what was clearly important to the development ofyaku tpa  groups was 
the Japanese black market, which evolved very rapidly during this period o f economic 
exhaustion, devastation, rationings starvation and high unemployment, and over which 
ja k u ^ a  bosses quickly assumed control. The Japanese police forces were unable to respond 
and enforce public order because they were too weak: they had been effectively disarmed, 
disempowered and discredited as a result o f reforms imposed by the Supreme Commander 
o f  the Allied Powers (SCAP) authority, which had led to decentralisation o f  the police 
forces. The police suffered a lack o f  fad in g , which stimulated corruption, as well as a lack 
o f trained personnel and equipment, and the decentralised forces were unable to coordinate 
their operations and share information306. Additionally, sections o f  the SCAP authority 
were reluctant to intervene in areas over which they did not have a jurisdictional monopoly, 
and did not treat policing the underworld as a priority307. Thus, the state was left largely 
powerless to control the black markets and the flourishing criminal j a k t a p  activities. As
Hill argues:
[...] this disruption o f  the police played a major part in ensuring that Japanese 
society in the immediate postwar era was deficient in sources o f public protection. 
This deficiency was in turn a crucial factor encouraging the development o f  
alternative sources o f  protection.308
302 See ibid.> Chapter 2. Huang and Vaughn, op. (it., similarly call fliis the ‘Confusion Period, In their 
discussions of the historical evolution of Japanese organised crime groups, these authors, Uke Hill, are 
following die historical periods used by the Japanese Ministry of Justice in its 1989 White Paper on Crime
(Ministry ofJustice, Hanzai Hakusho, Tokyo, Ministry of Justice, 1989).  ^ , , ,
303 David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakxz«: The Explosive Account o f  Japan s  Cmmnal Underworld, London, 
Queen Anne Press, 1987, p. 49, quoting Gordon Walker, Christian Science Monitor, November 1947.
304 Milhaupt and West; <5!». (it., p. 52.
305 See ibid., pp. 52-53.
306 See Hill, op. at., Chapter 2 and Peter Hill, lecture presented at die European Science Days ^ 5  Summer 
School on *Economicsf Rxtra4-egal Protection and Organised Crime, Steyr, Austria, 09/07/05 —15/07/05.
307 See Hill, The Japanese Mafia, op. at., Chapter 2.
308 Ibid., p.254.
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Hence:
This is therefore the period by which we can claim that the transition o f  th e ja k u ^ a  
to a mafia [...] became complete.309
The low use o f  the law and the legal system in Japan is also worth some
consideration. Apparently, in comparison with European countries and the United States,
there is an extreme reluctance in Japan to make use o f  formal legal procedures (both in the
criminal and civil legal spheres) and the comparative number o f  legal professionals is
‘tiny’310. Hill claims that, in 1998, Japan had only one legal professional (judges,
prosecutors and lawyers) for every 5,995 head o f  population, which compared to ratios o f
1:1,641 for France; 1:724 for Germany; 1:656 for Great Britain; and 1:285 for the United
States311 312. This means that Japan’s courts have traditionally been congested with a backlog
o f  lawsuits, resulting in a judicial system that is incredibly slow and expensive to use
Milhaupt and West argue that the failure o f  the state (even currently) to provide an
effective enforcement framework in areas such as dispute resolution, crime control and
finance is then exacerbated by this shortage o f  legal (and other) professionals and the
sluggish legal system, which further encourages the resort to extra-legal mechanisms o f
enforcement in Japan313 3145. They cite a 1993 government survey, which found that 12 per
cent o f  the Japanese public believed that Japanese ‘organised criminals were a necessary
evil’ precisely because o f  the slowness o f  the legal system in resolving civil conflicts .
Whatever the ultimate reason for the low use o f  the law in Japan , and although the
barriers to litigation appear to be reducing in recent years316 317, as Hill states:
[...] it should be apparent that aversion to the use o f  formal law is o f  considerable 
significance to the ja k u ~ a . [...] the failure o f  the state to afford a system by which 
citizens can seek to protect their interests and redress grievances provides a market 
niche to those who would provide such a system privately.
309 Ibid., p. 44.
310 Hill, The Japanese Mafia, op. at., p. 262. See also MUhaupt and West, op. at., p. 59, who additionally detail a 
scarcity of odier professionals capable of assisting in the rights-enforcement process, such as accountants, 
bailiffs and credit-rating agencies.
311 Hill, The Japanese Mafia, op. at., p. 262, citing Yomiuri Shinbun, 03/08/98. This state of affaire is due, in laige 
Part, to the Lawyers Law of 1949, which ensured that only those graduating from the Hgal Research and 
Training Institute (LRTI) could enter the legal profession. Admissions to the LRTI have been limited to 
approximately 500 trainees a year for most of die postwar period (see Hill, The Japanese Mafia, op, at., p. 264).
312 I fill, The Japanese Mafia, op. at., p. 264.
313 See Milhaupt and West, op. at., pp. 53-73.
314 Ibid., pp. 71-72, citinn Twelve Percent of Japanese Consider Mobsters a “Necessary F.vtl’M, Agence Frame 
Presse, 19 April 1993.
315 See Hill, The Japanese Mafia, op. a t , Chapter 7, for an account of posited reasons.
316 See ibid., Chapter 7.
317 Ibid., p. 265.
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To summarise then, it seems that the development and flourishing o f ‘organised crime in 
Japan, as elsewhere, has been a response to certain weaknesses or shortcomings o f the state 
in that country.
In so far as it can be argued that the state in Italy, Russia and Japan has proved to 
be inadequate during periods in which private property rights have expanded and increased, 
the cases discussed here have provided us with some, quite similar, examples o f  how the 
state can be ultimately blamed for the rise, or burgeoning, o f  organised crim e. In this 
particular respect, however, these cases are not helpful to our analysis because the literature 
discussed here does not fit the case o f  Spain exactly — in this regard, it can certainly be 
argued that Spain and its illicit enterprise cannot be immediately or easily compared to the 
states discussed above. ‘Organised crime’ in Spain did not emerge under the same 
conditions as it did in Italy, Russia and Japan, for example -  unlike in those states, 
‘organised crime’ did not develop in order to supply the protection that was lacking from  
the state at times when private property rights were expanding and increasing. Moreover, 
the literature discussed above primarily seeks to explain the development o f  indigenous 
criminal groups in these countries and, in that respect, cannot easily be applied to Spain 
where, as we know, a considerable amount o f  illicit enterprise is undertaken by foreign 
groups. Although manifestations o f ‘organised crime’ are likely to be particular to each 
state, the countries discussed above share at least one commonality in that they are all the 
home o f  some o f  the most significant and infamous domestic ‘mafias’ that exist on a much 
larger scale and appear more penetrative and dangerous than any domestic group in Spain. 
Spain, o f  course, is also a home state to criminal groups -  as we have seen, there are some 
domestic groups in Spain and some o f  these, such as the Galician clans, are particularly 
entrenched -  but these Spanish groups are different to the indigenous groups in the 
countries discussed above. Not least, and as discussed in Chapter 1, it can be argued that 
the indigenous criminal groups in Italy, Russia and Japan constitute those o f  the mafia or 
‘power syndicate’ type, whereas criminal groups in Spain are motivated by money and 
profit, engage in illicit enterprise, and are solely involved in activities relating to the supply 
o f illegal goods and services and/or the provision o f  licit goods through illicit means. 
Indeed, (although the states discussed above also undoubtedly experience crime o f  an 
enterprise type, and play host to transnational criminal groups) die nature o f  the ‘organised 
crime’ affecting Spain is different to that affecting the countries discussed above. Thus, 
this literature cannot simply be picked o ff the shelf and applied to Spain, but that is not to 
say that it cannot be usefUl. The Veak state’ theories used to explain ‘organised crime’ in 
other states may not help us explain exactly why illicit enterprise emerged in the ways and 
forms that it did in Spain, but it may alert us to the fact that certain weaknesses and
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inefficiencies associated with the state could be facilitating it and allowing it to flourish.
The literature discussed above, therefore, has provided a stimulus to move on from the 
common explanations discussed earlier in this chapter and focus on how effectively the
state functions in certain spheres.
Furthermore, surely if  it can be argued that indigenous groups flourish where their 
home state is weak or ineffective in some way, then, as some authors argue , it follows 
that transnational criminal groups will also find weak or ineffective states congenial 
environments for their activities. As Albini e t a l posit319, when individuals involved in 
‘organised crime’ migrate to another country, they naturally take with them their criminal 
values and techniques, but whether they are successful in effectively instituting their 
criminal enterprises in the host country ultimately depends on whether the social system o f  
that country is amenable to such development. Moreover, they argue, criminal groups 
could migrate to another country, as a group, and if their style o f  criminality is new to that 
country, then we may be able to speak o f  these groups as having exported a new form o f  
crime. However, i f  that form o f  criminality already exists m the host country, then these
groups can hardly be said to have exported it. So, the point is.
In either respect, [...] whether these groups are successful in implementing their 
criminal operations depends on the socitd, economic, p o ta d ,  and other condmons 
o f  the country into which they migrate.
In other words, it is die conditions in the country that are important, and so we need to 
look at these.
In this respect, the review o f the literature in relation to Italy, Russia and Japan 
could prove insightfol because it also highlights vulnerabilities in some o f the mechanisms 
o f the state in those countries. As we have seen above, in relation to those states, factors 
such as a weak legal system, weak police forces, poor governance, corruption, an ineffective 
judicial system, a lack o f  resources and a lack o f  political will were amongst those identified 
as also contributing to the weakness o f  the state. Furthermore, theories relating to the 
weakness o f  the state have also been proposed to account for the flourishing o f  ‘organised 
crime* in cases other than these321 (albeit for different reasons to those discussed above), 
and these kinds o f  factors can also be found in the literature pertaining to these. T or 
example, in explaining the development o f  the illegal psychoactive drugs industry *n
118 See, for example, Williams and Savona, op. (it., pp. 10-11 ; Alison Jamieson, The Transnational Dimension
3f Italian Organized Crime', T ra n sn a tio n a l O rg a n ise d  Crime, Vol. 1, No. 2,1995, pp. 154-155. 
m  Joseph L. Albini, Roy E. Rogers, Victor Shabalin, Valery Kutushev, Vladimir Moiseev and Julie Anderson,
Russian Organized Crime: Its History, Structure, and Function' in Ryan and Rush, op. (it., pp. 153-174.
120 Ib id ., p, 159.
121 See die review by Phfl Williams and Roy Godson, ‘Anticipating Organized and Transnational Crime’, 
Crime, Law & Social Cbangt, Vol. 37,2002, pp. 315-322.
- 123 -
Colombia, Thoumi argues that, since the Second World War, there has been an increasing 
process o f  regime ‘delegitimation’ in Colombia, a growing inefficiency o f its political and 
economic institutions and a general weakening o f  the state, to the extent that [.. •] the 
majority o f  the population does not accept the current system as legitimate or worthy o f  
respect’322. As a result o f  die country’s retention o f  many o f  its pre-capitalistic 
characteristics, such as a strong individualism (owing to the isolation o f the country s 
regions from one another) and a political tradition o f  clientelism , Colombia suffers from  
extremely high levels o f  violence, widespread corruption, rent-seeking and predatory 
behaviour, inefficient government, a paralysed judicial system and the growth o f
underground economies, which have, in turn:
[., .1 weakened the government’s ability to perform some o f its most fundamental
functions, such as providing justice and a conflict resolution system, police services,
and personal security.324
Thoumi argues that this situation has allowed the illegal drugs industry to develop, which 
has then further contributed to the state’s decline. Indeed, the weakness o f  the state tn 
Colombia also means that the government cannot implement anti-drug policies or 
legislation with any real effect or great success325. The weakening o f the state in Mexico, 
which accompanied the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, has also been 
blamed for an increase in ‘organised crime’ there. During the seven decades o f  political 
monopoly’326 by the Partido Revofadonario In stitu tion al (PRI) (Institutional Revolutionary 
Party) (‘a “patron-client’’, authoritarian type o f  system’327), ‘organised crime’ was controlled 
and managed by the authorities and used as ‘a source o f  funding and illicit enrichment for 
the political elite and their social control agents’328. When the PRI became forced to share 
legislative powers with opposition parties, however, and authoritarianism ended in 1997, a 
‘power vacuum’ ensued, which was epitomised by the erosion o f  institutional authority, an 
absence o f  professional law enforcement, an ineffective system o f  laws and a lack o f  
confidence in the justice system329. As a result, the criminality that had previously been 
held in check became ‘rampanf330. It has also been suggested that state weaknesses can
----------------------------------- -- ' . r„ / in CÆmtia Boulder, Colorado and London, Lynne322 Francisco E. Thoumi, Political Economy and llk gd  Drug »
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995, p, 2.
323 See ik'd-. Chapter 2.
324 Ibid., p. 2.
325 See ibid,. Chapters 7 and 10, _■ . . flrul Politics in Mexico’, T m idsia Organised Crime,
326 Stanley A. Pimentai, The Nexus of Oigamzed Came and l out.es m
Vol. 4, Part 3,1999, p. 9. 
327 Ibid..
328 Ibid., p. 14.
329 See, for example, ibid., pp. 22-25.
330 Pimentai, op. a t., p. 23.
See also Williams and Godson, op. tit., pp. 316-318.
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account for the emergence o f  ‘community dons’ in Jamaica331. Johnson and Socters, for
example, argue that ‘Jamaica’s dons are considered to be a prime example o f  “rogue
leadership” in the civil sphere’332 and that:
‘Rogue leaders’ in civil society emerge where and when the state is too weak o r too 
involved with other priorities to control the monopoly o f  violence and ensure good 
governance, safety and public order in everyday life333 34.
Finally, Milhaupt and West comment briefly on the USA, a state that is not normally
perceived as weak or inefficient. Nevertheless, they assert that:
Even die U.S. experience with organized crime suggests a linkage between 
ineffective or ill-advised state structure and organised crime activities .
In all o f  the states discussed above, then, ‘organised crime’ has emerged, or 
significantly developed, because a weak or absent state has left a power vacuum. The 
weaknesses in each case may have arisen in different ways and the power vacuums may 
have been caused by different factors, but the result in all o f  these cases is the same: these 
states are (or have been) weak, dysfunctional or ineffective in some way and this has 
allowed ‘organised crime’ to flourish. These kinds o f  explanations relating to state 
weaknesses, therefore, are particularly convincing because they explain organised crime’ in 
so many cases. They could, therefore, prove insightful in examining die case o f  Spain,
Some pertinent questions thus arise: can this literature, and the theoretical assumptions 
contained therein, be used as a preliminary stimulus to help us to understand illicit 
enterprise and criminal activity in Spain? Particularly, do vulnerabilities o f  the kinds 
highlighted latterly (inefficient political institutions, corruption, ineffective legal systems, 
weak law enforcement; poor governance, ineffectual judicial systems, a lack o f  resources 
and a lack o f  political will, and so on) exist in Spain? In sum, does Spain also have 
weaknesses, inefficiencies o r power vacuums that may have allowed illicit enterprise to 
develop and flourish?
Skaperdas notes that conditions and circumstances which facilitate power vacuums 
in a country or region include geographical and social distance from the centres of political 
decision making, the prohibition and distribution o f  certain goods and services that are in 
high demand, and major political change such as a transition, regime change or 
revolution335. Some examples o f  these circumstances can be seen in the cases discussed
331 See Hume N. Johnson and Joseph L, Soetcrs, 'Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers and the Chances of a 
“Reversible Destiny”', Political Statties, Vol. 56, No. 1,2008, pp. 166-167.
332 Ibid., p. \66.
333 Ilxd., pp. 166-167.
334 Milhaupt and West, op. tit., p- 49.
335 See Steigios Skaperdas, The political economy of otganized crime: providing protection when the state 
does not*, Zconomics o jG ovm am , Vol. 2,2001, pp. 173-202; Stergios Skaperdas, lecture presented at the
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above: for instance, some areas o f  Colombia are so geographically distant that they are 
controlled more by drug traffickers and guerrilla groups than by the government; Colombia 
is also an example o f  a power vacuum that is created from the legal prohibition o f  a 
commodity in high demand (drugs); and major political change can be seen m Italy 
following unification, and in Russia during and after its transition to democracy336.
Some o f  these circumstances are also relevant in the case o f  Spain. Indeed, if  we 
consider the historical and political development o f  Spain and the nature o f  the Spanish 
state, we can see that there are some very good reasons why it may suffer vulnerabilities. 
Spain, too, has relatively recently experienced a transition to democracy. Since the death o f  
Franco in 1975, Spain has moved auspiciously from 36 years o f  dictatorship to fully 
consolidated democracy. Indeed, th e ‘remarkably bloodless transition to democracy 
under King Juan Carlos I is seen by some as ‘the most striking example o f  successful 
démocratisation o f  the last three decades'338, worthy o f  praise to the point o f  being upheld^ 
as a paradigm case for the study o f  subsequent political transitions339. Yet, some scholars34 
highlight that transition processes are inevitably accompanied by a weakening o f state 
structures and thus argue that the transition in states such as Mexico and the former Soviet 
Union was the trigger that unleashed an upsurge o f ‘organised crime’ in these states. As 
Skaperdas argues, once the previous political authority has gone, it takes time for new 
institutions to become established341 and, in the meantime, ‘organised’ criminals have an 
opportunity to exploit these developing institutions. It may, thus, be o f  little coincidence 
that the generalised expansion o f  illicit enterprise in Spain occurred in the years after the 
transition342; a time when Spain was experiencing a period o f  political and economic 
turmoil343. Also, how many legacies o f  Franco’s dictatorship still remain? Some academics
~ ~ Extra-Local Protection and Organised Crime’,European Science Days 2005 Summer School on Economics, extra w.g,u
of’ Austria’ 99/07/05 -15/07/05. • orovidine protection when the state does not’, op.36 Skaperdas, 'The political economy of organized crime, pro
^ C h is lX lM « .  Going Places. Economic, P odticd and S ocid  Progress, m
138 Omar G. Encamacion, ‘Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy m Spam, Pohtnd la en ce
¡ » 2 * %  V° l  116,’ N? ’ J ' S 0,1*P' 5m  rviomet Transitions by agreement- modeling the Spanish way*,
3 Sef»for example, ibid., 55;Josep M. 1283- Harrison and CorkiJl, op. cit., PP. 1-2.
American P oM cd Science 'Retiew, Vol. 85, No. 4, Dec 1991, p- *
2  ? fe*fot «am ple , Williams and G o d s o n ^ p .d iP 3 i • pm teC tion  when the state does nof, op.
41 Skaperdas, The political economy o f organized enme. pro g (
1 O
-nminal Policy for “Oiganised” Crime' in Eyniie rijnaut anu u u im a * » »  -------- ------- ——v
Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrect, Springer, 2004, pp. 795-796,
5ting B. Garzón, T i tráfico de drogas como instrumento del crimen oiganizado' in B. Garzón and E. Megías,
Van», Valencia, Germania, 1997, p. 48.
43 See, for example, Femando León Solis, ‘23 F -  redemption or derailment of Spanish democracy, 
'atem ationd Journal o f  Iberian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3,2007, p. 208.
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note an element o f  continuity with the previous authoritarian regime , yet some believe 
there is a reluctance on the part o f Spanish officials to return to the past, or do anything 
that appears to involve the re-imposition o f  control over society, which has led to a lack o f  
democratic accountability in some institutions and incidences o f  corruption
Moreover, the transition in Spain brought with it political decentralisation. Spain s 
Constitution3“ , approved in 1978, recognised autonomous communities within Spain 
(albeit somewhat ambiguously347). Today, the country has 17 autonomous communities 
(administrative divisions) and two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) and it is one o f 
the most decentralised nations in Europe’348, but what effect has the ever increasing 
autonomy o f  the regions had, and could decentralisation create distrust for central 
government and lead to power vacuums in some areas? It is certainly reasonable to foresee 
the remoteness o f  the region o f Galicia as one explanation for why some parts o f  this 
autonomous community have become smuggling paradises. If this situation has resulted in 
Galicia receiving little economic, or other, interest from central state authorities (as indeed 
it will be argued in Chapter 5), then (returning to Skaperdas’s arguments discussed above349) 
a power vacuum may have been created, which has been filled by smuggling and drug 
trafficking organisations. Factors such as these, then, justify why a focus on the 
vulnerabilities o f  the Spanish state (and its behaviours, systems and institutions) may 
provide us with a deeper understanding as to why illicit enterprise flourishes in Spain.
This chapter has shown that, in attempting to understand why illicit enterprise 
flourishes in Spain, the factors discussed initially, relating to geography, economic issues, 
immigration, and so on, cannot be ignored -  as we have seen, in some cases, they play a 
significant role in facilitating this type o f  criminal activity in Spain. This chapter has also 
suggested, however, that these factors provide us with only a partial understanding and that 
other factors must also be considered i f  we are gain a more comprehensive understanding 
o f why illicit enterprise occurs in the country. In this regard, although not directly 
applicable to Spain, the literature discussed in the second part o f  this chapter, relating to 
Italy, Russia, Japan, Colombia and other states, has served as a stimulus to focus attention 
towards the nature o f  the Spanish state and to question how effectively its institutions and
* See, for example, José M. Magone, Contemporary Spanish Politics, 2nd edition, London and New York, 
audedge, 2009, p. 435; Colomer, op. at., 1294. Colomer, for example, argues dial, after die dictatorship,
ere was no breakdown in the armed forces or any purge of die political police.
5 See, for example, Jean Grugcl and Tim Rees, fra n co ’s  Spain, I-ondon, Arnold, 1997, pp. 189-190.
5 For further details on the Constitution, see, for example, Elena Merino-Bianco, Spanish Law and Legal
'stem, 2nd edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 2006, pp. 24-27.
7 See Chislett, Spain. Going Places. E conome, Political and Social Progress, 1975-2008, op. at., p. 47.
8 Ibid., p. 45.9 Skaperdas, The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state diies not, op. 
p.180.
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systems work and function. In turn, this has led to the development o f  the hypothesis 
proposed by this thesis that other explanations relating to certain weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in the political, judicial, legal, and law enforcement spheres, which are open 
to exploitation by criminal groups, are essential in understanding Spain’s particular 
susceptibility to illicit enterprise and, in order to test this, the following chapters will 
examine some o f  the institutions, mechanisms and systems o f the Spanish state. These 
chapters will show how particular vulnerabilities in these are revealed through some 
incidences o f  political (and other types of) corruption, some legal and judicial deficiencies, 
some apparent complexities surrounding law enforcement and policing structures, and a 
lack o f  political and public attention given to the problem o f  illicit enterprise. Further, and 
in support o f  the hypothesis developed in this chapter, it will, indeed, be argued that such 
vulnerabilities serve to further facilitate this form o f criminal activity in Spain.
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Chapter 4 
Corruption in Spain
Corruption scandals, and incidences o f  corruption more generally, can tell us a lot 
about the relative strengths/weaknesses and levels o f  effectiveness/ineffectiveness o f  
certain public bodies and state institutions: most notably, they can reveal a lack o f  
transparency and accountability in these spheres and uncover examples o f  bureaucratic 
incapacity. This chapter will discuss the nature and extent o f  corruption in Spain and it will 
argue that the presence o f  corruption there, o f the forms and types discussed in this 
chapter, facilitates illicit enterprise in the country. Essentially, the vulnerabilities inherent in 
die political, judicial and law enforcement spheres, which are revealed dirough incidences 
o f  corruption, are exploited (direcdy or indirectly) by criminal groups engaged in this kind 
o f  criminal activity.
The definition o f  corruption (just like ‘organised crime’) is very much open to 
debate but it is generally accepted1 that corruption involves ‘the abuse o f  public office for 
private gain’2. However, as I leywood argues, such a definition may be o f  ‘very little 
practical utility when it comes to understanding the reality o f  corruption in any given 
country’3, because corruption takes a multiplicity o f  forms which may have different causes 
and consequences. Thus, in order to understand the ‘reality’ o f  corruption in Spain and 
how this facilitates illicit enterprise, it is useful to identify, and give some examples of, die 
types o f  corruption that occur there. As this chapter will show, different types o f  
corruption take place at various levels and locations in Spain but, before discussing die 
nature o f  this corruption, it is worth considering its extent and die degree to which Spain is 
particularly prone to corruption. Is Spain more corrupt than its European neighbours, for 
example?
The extent of corruption in Spain
According to some international indices, it would, indeed, appear that Spain is a 
relatively corrupt country in comparison to its neighbours4. In 2010, Spain ranked joint
1 See, for example, Paul M. Heywood, ‘Corruption in Contemporary Spain’, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 
40, No. 4,2007, p.695.
2 Transparency International, ‘Policy and Research -  Surveys and Indices: Frequently Asked Questions’,
3 I ley wood, op. at., p. 695.
4 For a discussion of Spain’s position in these indices, see, for example, Fundación Alternativas, Report on 
Democracy in Spain 2009: A lliancesfor a New Spanish Prosperity -  Towards a  New Global Deal, Mat! rid, Fundación 
Alternativas, 2009 (Entdish version^ Chapter 7. http://ww.falternativas.orjr/la-
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thirtieth place in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions In dex  (CPI), making it 
one o f  the more perceived corrupt countries o f the EUS. Generally, southern European 
countries tend to rank lower than their northern neighbours in the CPIs but, with a few 
exceptions, higher than the former communist countries o f  eastern Europe6. Spain’s 2010  
CPI score o f  6.1 is higher than it was in 1995 when Transparency International first 
released its annual CPI (in 1995, Spain had a score o f 4.357 89). Spain’s score reached a low o f  
4.31 the following year®, but dien it improved, reaching a high o f  7.1 in both 2002° and 
200410 *. Over the last few years, however, Spain’s score has started to slightly decrease 
again". In fact, the CPI scores show that perceptions o f  corruption have worsened when 
power has been held by the Partido S oda tista  Obrero E spañ ol (PSOE) (Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party) compared to when power was held by the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) 
(People’s Party) — the low score o f  1996 came at end o f  the period o f  office o f  socialist 
leader Felipe González (1982-1996) and, after having climbed to an all time high during the 
time in power o f  the PP under José Maria Aznar (1996-2004), the scores started to worsen 
again when the PSOE regained power in 2004. This trend seems to conform to the view 
that socialist administrations are more prone to corruption titan conservative ones12, and it 
is true that several notorious scandals came to light during the González era (including 
those involving the deputy Prime Minister, the former Finance Minister, the Governor o f  
the Bank o f  Spain and the head o f  the Civil Guard, amongst others)13. However, although
f»ndaciQn/documentos/librQS-e-informes/infQrme-sobre-la-dcmocracia-en-cspana-2009-version-en-iiijfr!i 
[accessed 28/04/11],
5 With a score of 6.1, Spain shared thirtieth place with Israel. See Transparency International, Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2010, http://www.transparency.org/policy research/surveys indices/cpi/2010/results 
[accessed 30/04/11J.
6 See the discussion in I leywood, op. at., p. 696.
7 See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 1995,
8 See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 1996, 
b-ttp;//wwdransparency,org/policy researeh/surveys indices/cpi/prevÍQüi..£pÍ [accessed 30/04/11].
9 Transparency International, Corruptions Perceptions Index 2002,
http://www,transparency.org/policy research/surveys inclices/cpi/2002 [accessed 30/04/1.1],
10 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index2004,
n  Although, in 2009, Spain ranked joint thirty-second place (again with Israel and with a score of 6.1) (see 
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index2009,
30/04/11]), in 2008, with a score of 6.5, Spain shared twenty-eighth place with Qatar and Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines (see Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index2008,
In 2007, Spain ranked joint twenty-fifth (with Uruguay) with a score of 6.7 and, in 2006, it ranked twenty- 
third with a score of 6.8. See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index2007,
[both accessed 15/01/09]. -
12 See, for example, Meywood, op. at., p. 696, citing D. Singer, The Stench of Corruption: letter from
Europe', The Nation, VoL 2,1995.
u For details of such corruption scandals, see, for example, Heywood, op. at., pp. 696-697.
corruption scandals may not have been as frequent or as regular under the Aznar 
administration as they were under the González administration, several important 
corruption cases also surfaced during the PP’s period o f office (allegedly involving, for 
example, the Foreign Minister, the PP treasury secretary and Aznar’s long-time friend, die 
head o f  Telefónica)14, showing that corruption in Spain ‘can hardly be seen as distinctly a 
socialist disease’15.
So, how do we account for these fluctuations in the CPI ratings, given that
corruption has been a fact o f  life in Spain no matter which political party has been in
power? Clearly, part o f  the answer to that question lies in die fact tiiat the index is based
only on perceptions o f  corruption16 (which may not correspond to actual levels o f
corruption), and perceptions, o f  course, may be based on all kinds o f  experiences and
factors including, for example, the visibility o f  scandals. This may be why Jiménez argues
that the fall in Spain’s CPI score since 2004 is primarily attributable to the increase in the
number o f  cases o f  urban planning corruption that have surfaced over the last few years17
(discussed below), which have been very visible in the press and which may have led to
perceptions o f  corruption increasing. Related to this, the think tank fundación
Alternativas argues that the (higher) scores awarded for the previous period were probably
‘over-optimistic’ because the corruption cases that are now being unravelled actually
originated between six and ten years ago, so that:
[...] there has been an adjustment in the perspective because o f  the large number o f  
cases which have [recently] come to light. We can say, therefore, that adjustments 
are being made to an earlier perception based on insufficient knowledge which 
generated a false view o f  the phenomenon.18
Heywood also points to further problems with the CPIs. For example, he argues that the 
kinds o f  questions used in the surveys that contribute to the CPI tend to be directed at 
business executives and focus on bribes (and bribe-takers) rather than other forms o f  
corruption, which may only result in a partial picture o f  the reality o f  corruption. Further, 
he highlights that we do not know what the survey respondents actually understand by the 
term corruption, underlining that what is seen as corruption by one person may not be by
14 For details see, for example, ibid., p. 697.
,s Ibid., p. 697.
16 See Transparency International, Tolicy and Research — Surveys and Indices: Frequently Asked Questions’, 
op. a t_
17 Fernando Jiménez, ‘Building Boom and Political Corruption in Spain’, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 
14, No. 3,2009, p. 255, citing annual reports by Transparency International’s Spanish chapter.
18 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in Spain/2010: Tire Erosion o f  Confidence and Well-being. Against 
citizens' disaffection, Madrid, Fundación Alternativas, 2010, Chapter 4, http://www.faltemativas.ory7la- 
fiüldjtciori/tlocumentosZliImi-rerinfQrmes/dcmocracy-in-spain-2010-the-erosion-of-confitlenrp-and writ-
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another19. Additionally, people’s perceptions, o f  course, may simply be based on their own 
experiences and on what they have read and heard20. Some o f  these factors may account 
for the differing views in relation to the extent and nature o f  corruption in Spain amongst 
the professionals interviewed during the course o f  this research who, interestingly, were 
interviewed during the period when the numerous scandals relating to urban corruption 
were regularly dominating the headlines. This may (or may not) be why one o f the 
interviewees claimed that, in Spain:
Corruption is enormous [...] it has always been so. It’s endemic [...] it always has 
been [...] it’s a way o f  life.21
Yet, many o f  the other interview sources (from a mix o f  professions) were very keen to 
emphasise the opposite: that corruption in the country is not endemic, generalised, 
widespread or, even, particularly unique to Spain22. The view o f  these professionals, 
however, does not seem to conform to that o f  the majority o f Spanish citizens surveyed for 
a 2008 Special Eurobarom eter report, which revealed that 83 per cent o f  the Spaniards 
surveyed considered corruption to be ‘a major problem’ in their country23 24. So, what is the 
reality?
Corruption appears to have a long tradition in Spain. As Heywood notes:
[...] Spain’s entire political history since the monarchical restoration o f  1875 has 
been marked by corruption in one form or another.23
Certainly, accounts o f  clientelism and political corruption are well documented in the 
literature and especially damning examples can be found during the dictatorship ot General 
Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), the Second Republic (1931-1936), the Franco regime 
(1939-1975) and, as we have seen above, particularly during the period o f  office o f  the 
PSOE under González (although it is also true that the PP and some other political parties 
were embroiled in corruption scandals during this time too)25. Since then, accusations o f
19 Heywood, op. at-, pp. 697-608.
20 Fundación Alternativas, Report o» Democracy in Span/2010: The Erosion o f  Confidence and Well-being, Agtanst 
citizens' disaffection, op. cit., Chapter 4.
21 Interview J7.
22 Interviews P6, P8, P9, P10, PI3, P16,J6,J8, M2 and FI,
23 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 291: The attitudes o f Europeans towards corruption, Special 
Eurobarometer 291 / Wave 68.2. -  77V.f Opinion & Social pp. 4-5,
b.ttp://ec europaru/public _t)pinipp/archiv£s/cbs/cbs.^ 9 1 ...ciLfHlf (accessed 30/04/11],
24 Paul I leywood, ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy: Changing Forms of Corruption in Spain’ in Donatella 
della Porta and Yves Mény (eds.), Democracy and Corruption in Europe, I.ondon, Pinter, 1997, p. 68.
25 See, for example, ibid., pp. 65-69 and p. 72; Joseph Harrison and David Corkill, Spain: A Modern European 
Economy, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited, ¿>08 (reprint), p. 5; Paul I feywood, ‘Gmtinuity and Change: 
Analysing Political Corruption in Modem Spain’ in Waller little and Eduardo Posada-Carfxi (eds.), Political 
Corruption in Europe and Latin America, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1996, pp. 115-118; John Giblions, 
Spanish Politics Today, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, pp. 81-84 and pp. 122-124; John 
Hooper, The New Spaniards, Revised edition, London, Penguin Books Ltd., 1995, Chapter 5 and pp. 440-441; 
Christopher J. Ross, Contemporary Spain: A Handbook, London, Arnold, 1997, pp. 59-61 and p. 229.
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political corruption have continued to touch officials o f  all political persuasions (and at all
levels), and a recent report by Fundación Alernativas claims that, in current times:
There is a good deal o f  data to indicate that the real levels o f  corruption are very 
much higher than the international indices imply.26
Moreover, the report argues that ‘corruption in Spain does not appear to be on the 
decline’27 and, although Spanish corruption may not be ‘extensive’ (in that it claims that 
only a minority o f  individuals appear to be directly implicated), it, nevertheless, ‘seems to 
be highly intensive, involving large sums o f  money’28. In relation to the amount o f  police 
activity related to corruption that has taken place between 2004 and the end o f  2009, the 
Cuerpo N acion a l de P olicía (National Police) has carried out 232 operations involving 
corruption, and specialised agents from the national and regional units under the command 
o f  the General Commission o f  Judicial Police have arrested 943 suspects and confiscated 
goods valued at more than 3,000 million euros29. In this respect, Fundación Alternativas 
argues that:
Possibly, the successes o f  the courts, Civil Guard, and police, in conjunction with 
the end o f  the housing boom, are causing a real decline in corruption at the 
moment; but this will only become clear in a few years time when corruption cases 
arise, hopefully, with less frequency. I f this is proven not to be the case and 
corruption becomes a recurrent problem, we will have to say that Spain has entered 
a consolidating phase o f  corruption which would be the start o f  a systematic and 
not exceptional trait.30
The forms of corruption in Spain
In terms o f  the type and forms o f  corruption taking place in Spain, (as noted 
above) it is corruption relating to land, planning, construction and real estate which appears 
to have been particularly widespread in Spain in recent years31 *. In addition to the 
important cases affecting some particular regions, which will be discussed in some detail 
below, scandals have affected many parts o f  the Spanish mainland (including, amongst
26 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in Span 2009: A llianctsfor a New Spanish Prosperity ~ Towards a 
New Global Deal, op. a t., p.209.
27 Ibid..
28 Ibid..
29 In 2004, die anti-corruption unit only intervened in 104 cases (thus their investigations more than doubled 
in five years). The National Police arrested ten suspects in 15 investigations in 2004 and, in 2009 alone, it 
carried out 252 arrests in 54 separate operations. See See Fundación Alternativas, Report on D emocrag in  
Spain/2010: The Erosion o f  Confidence and Well-being. Against citizens’ disaffection, op. cit., Chapter 4, citing an 
Interior Ministry press release issued on 10/12/09.
30 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in Spain/2010: The Erosion o f  Confidence and Well-being. Against 
citizens' disaffection, op, cit., Chapter 4.
31 The professionals interviewed in interviews PI, P3, P l l ,  J3, J7 ,J8  and M2 all mentioned corruption of this
kind.
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other regions, Cataluña32, Toledo33, Murcia34, Sevilla35 and the Comunidad Valenciana36), as 
well as the Islas Canarias (Canary Islands)37 and Islas Baleares (Balearic Islands)38. In fact, 
the number o f  corruption cases relating to town planning and land regulations in Spain 
(either reported or under investigation) increased from 2,016 in 2004 to 3,279 in 2005, and 
to 3,846 in 200639 and, at various times during the course o f  this research, it seemed that a 
new scandal was being exposed almost on a weekly basis. Indeed, irregular practices 
relating to the reclassification o f  land and die granting o f building permits (and so on) are 
now seen by many to be the main origin or source o f  corruption in Spain40 and so deserve 
particular mention.
32 See, for example, Manuel Villoría, ‘Country reports: Spain’, in Transparency International, Global Corruption 
Report2006, London and Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press in association with Transparency International, 2006, p. 
252, http:// www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/dQwnlQad ccr/downloild K f 2006 [accessed 
08/10/08]; Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in Spain/2010: The Erosion o f Confidence and Well-being. 
Against admens' disaffection, op. tit., Chapter 4.
33 See, for example, ‘Editorial: Marbclla, un pozo de corrupción sin fondo’, E l Mundo, 15/11/06, p. 3; EFE, 
‘El mapa de la corrupción urbanística’, elpais.com, 17/06/08,
http://www.clpaÍ3.com/aiticulo/espana/m¡ipa/comipeion/urbanistica/dDCOt.)CSp/2W8Q617clrK:punac 12/ 
Tes [accessed 29/07/08].
34 See, for example, EFE, op. tit:, Cristina Ordaz and E. Iluelin, *La costa mediterránea, salpicada de casos 
similares al de Marbella’, aDn2 (Barcelona), 05/04/06, p. 9; Tono Calleja, ‘Detenido por corrupción urbanística 
el ex alcalde socialista de Los Alcázares’, E l País, 17/01/08, p. 26; Tono Calleja, ‘Dos detenidos en Los 
Alcázares acumularon 100 millones’, E l País, 18/01/08, p. 19.
35 See, for example, M. J. Albert, ‘IU expulsa al alcalde de Camas y pide que dimita por el supuesto soltorno’,
1:7 País, 18/09/05, p. 28.
36 See, for example, Ordaz and I Iuelin, op. tit:, V. Villaplana, ‘Los promotores de Catral legalizaban las obras 
en un parque natural con informes manipulados’, ABC, 19/10/06, p. 14; Ievante-EMV, ‘La juez ordena 
prisión sin fianza para el concejal de San Fulgencio que cobró un soborno de 5.000 euros’, L evantelllM ercantil 
Valenciano, 23/10/08, p. 24; Santiago Navarro, ‘El concejal de San Fulgencio va a la cárcel por sorbomo’, E l 
País (Commumdad Valenciana), 23/10/08, p. Z
37 See, for example, Manuel Villoría, ‘Country reports: Spain’ in Transparency International, Global Corruption 
Report2008: Corruption in the Water Sector, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, 
Sao Paulo and Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 273,
38 See, for example, F’undación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in Span/2010: The Erosion o f  Confidence and 
Well-being. Against citizens' disaffection, op. tit., Chapter 4; Villoría, ‘Country reports: Spain’ in Transparency 
International, Global Corruption Report 2008: C orruptions the Water Sector, op. tit., p. 274; EFE, op. tit:, Agencias, 
‘Cinco detenidos por corrupción urbanística en Andratx’, Malaga I lo j, 21/11/06, p, 40;Biel Mesquida, 
‘Mallorca, con estrés de comipción’, E l Periódico de Catalunya, 10/12/06, p. 7; Andreu Mantesa, ‘Fi ex alcalde 
de Andratx sale de prisión tras pagar la fianza’, E l País, 14/12/06, p. 22; Andreu Mantesa, ‘13 fiscal pide 
cárcel para el portavoz de Unió Mallorquína, socio clave del PSOE’, E l País, 23/10/08, p. 14.
39 Villoría, ‘Country reports: Spain’ in Transparency International, Global Corruption R eport2008: Corruption in  
the Water Sector, op. til., p. 272, quoting Memoria de la Fiscalía General del Estado, 2004,2005 and 2006, 
www.fiscal.es. For full details, and a chronological list, of the very numerous cases of alleged urban 
corruption and irregularities in this sphere reported between 15/02/00 and 15/02/07, see Fundación 
Alternativas, Urbanismo y  democracia. Mapa de presuntas irregularidades y  actos de corrupción urbanística 2(8)0-2007,
Vol. II. Madrid, Fundación Alternativas, [no date], http://wwwfaltemativas.org/la- 
fiandacion/doQimentos/libros-e-informes/informe-urb¡tnismQ-y-dcmQiLracta-mapa-prcsuntas-iiTegtilaridaites-
12/08/08].
40 See, for example, William Chislett, Spain. Going Places, Economic, Political and Social Pmgress, 197S-2008, Spain, 
Telefónica, S.A., January 2008, p. 85, accessed through
http-//w w ,realinstitutoelcanoorg/materi¡tles/Spaia-GQÍiig%2Q Fliices%20 C3tislett.pdf [accessed 
09/04/08]; Giles Tremlett, Ghosts o f  Spain: Travels tlm ugh a country’s  hidden past, London, Falter and Falter 
Limited, 2006, pp. 132-133; Izquierda Unida-Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía (lU-LV-CA), 
Aproximación a l G imen O tgank¿doy la  A ctividad M ajiosa en la Costa é l  Sol, II Informe: El Crimen Organizado en 
la Costa del Sol, Observatorio del Crimen Organizado de IU-LV-CA y Oficina de Comunicación de IU-LA-
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Undoubtedly, it is the Costa del Sol region that has witnessed the most spectacular 
examples o f  urban corruption in the whole o f  Spain in recent years: as one interview source 
stated, the building sector really is the W a k  spot’ in this region as far as corruption is 
concerned* 41. The most sensational o f  example o f  urban corruption in die Costa del Sol 
began to unfold in Marbella in the spring o f  2006 with Operación M alaya. During the three 
phases o f  this operation (in March, July and November 2006), police arrested almost 100 
people42, including the town planning advisor (Juan Antonio Roca), a former mayor o f  
Marbella (Julián Muñoz), the mayor o f  Marbella at the time (Marisol Yagüe), her deputy 
mayor, the second deputy mayor (who became acting mayor after the arrests o f  the mayor 
and first deputy mayor), the former chief o f  Marbella’s police, numerous former town 
councillors (from various political parties), court officials, bank employees and construction 
entrepreneurs (although many o f  those initially imprisoned after arrest were freed after 
paying large bail deposits). Police also seized or embargoed more than 2.4 billion euros in 
property, along with helicopters, thoroughbred horses, fighting bulls, luxury cars, works o f  
art and antique guns. The investigations centred around alleged money laundering 
offences, property development offences (such as granting permission to build on land 
protected from development), the acceptance o f  bribes, the manipulation o f  public tenders, 
and so on. The outcome o f  the investigations was that Marbella’s town council was 
dissolved (an unprecedented move since Spain’s transition to democracy) and the 
municipality was governed by administrators, appointed by a regional authority, until the 
local elections o f  May 2007, when the PP took over the municipal governance o f  
Marbella43.
Operación M alaya  uncovered a pattern o f  corruption, at local government level, on a 
truly shocking and magnificent scale. Undoubtedly, it has been one o f  the worst cases o f
CA, Boletín no. 2, Febrero de 2008, p. 7,
41 Interview JÍ .
42 Prosecutions have been initiated against 86 people. See F. J. Pérez and J. Viudez, ‘Guía de los juicios más 
esperados de la Costa, elpiis.com , 05/10/08,
htta://www elpais.com/artículo/andalucia/Guia/iuicios/espcradas/Casta/ril3epicsDand/2Q08lOOix,lpand 2 
/ l i s  [accessed 08/10/08|.
43 For further details about tisis operation, see, for example, ibid:, latís Gómez and Diego Narvaez, Til valor 
de lo incautado supera los 2.400 millones de euros', epas.com , 31/03/06,
]; Rafael Turnes, ‘til Gobierno disolverá el viernes el Ayuntamiento de 
Marbella’, aDn3 (Barcelona), 04/04/06, p. 9; J. Martín-Arroyo and D. Narváez, ‘El juez asesta otro golpe a la 
red de corrupción marbellí con el arresto del ex alcalde Julián Muñoz’, E l País, 20/07/06, p. 17; José Gados 
Villaneuva, ‘Maite Zaldívar y  González de Caldas detenidos por la corrupción marbellí, E l Mundo, 15/11/06, 
p. 1 and p. 8; Mana Eugenia Yagüe, “‘La madrina” despechada’, E l Mundo, 15/11/06, p. 9; José Luis Diez 
Ripollés and Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes, ‘La corrupción urbanística: Estrategias de análisis’, Revista P.tjutSpf.r 
de Investi&aáón Criminológica, Artículo 5, No. 6,2008, pp. 17-18 and p. 29,
http;//www,criminologia.net/pdf/reic/RF,lCA5N6(2008).pdf [accessed 11/08/08]; Chislett, op. á t p. 35 
and, generally, the Spanish press during this time.
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urban corruption to hit Spain in recent years. Yet, as a 2006 report in The Econom ist stated: 
‘The truly disturbing thing about this scandal is that nobody was surprised’44. Indeed, 
Marbella has been associated with rampant corruption since Jesús Gil y Gil, who founded 
and led the political party G rupo Independiente L ib era l (GIL) (Independent Liberal Party), 
became mayor in 19914S. Several o f  the interview sources, for example, recalled how Gil 
involved the Marbella town hall and the local courts in a web o f corruption lasting years46, 
and one even claimed that he ‘opened the door to organised crime’47. Gil’s council is 
accused o f  sheltering ‘organised’ and Svhite collar* criminals and drug traffickers by, for 
example, affording die local police force with the technical resources to block the 
investigations o f  the National Police and by removing ‘hostile’ judges48. Particularly, the 
Gil administration is also associated with the granting o f  illegal property licences. A  
newspaper report published in 2003, for example, detailed how between 10,000 and 15,000 
properties had been built each year since die arrival o f  Gil in Marbella and, at the time o f  
that report, more than 10,000 o f  those were deemed illegal and had been challenged by die 
Government o f  Andalucía49. Despite this, however, Gil remained popular with the local 
population, who felt that he protected them and their economic interests50, and who 
appreciated his efforts to clean up Marbella by cracking down on small-time criminals, 
petty thieves and prostitutes51. Consequently, he was re-elected twice52. When he died in 
2004, Gil was being investigated on 15 counts o f  corruption and links to Italian and 
Russian m afiosi (and he had already served time in prison)53 *. Since 1991, he had been 
involved in over 80 court cases and, in one o f  those, he was disqualified from holding
44 ‘Costalot’, The Economist, 08/04/06, p. 48.
45 For a particularly interesting and colourful account of Gil and his time in office, see Tremit tt, op. a t., pp. 
114-116.
46 Interviews PI, P2, C2, P4 and J4.
47 Interview P4. A similar point was also raised during interview P12.
48 See, for example, José Luis Barbería, ‘Las mafias echan sus tentáculos en la construcción', etpm.com ,
03/10/06,
hítp;//www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/mafias / echan/tentaculos/CQflS,tmcckffl/elppQiE3p/20061003elpepi 
nac 16/Tes/ [accessed 10/10/08J.
49 José María Imjo and Pablo Ordaz, ‘Marbella, el lado oscuro del paraíso’, E l País: Domingo, 13/07/03, pp. 1-
50 Interviews P4 and P14.
51 See, for example, Barbería, op. àt..
52 ‘Costalop, op. at..
5î See Leslie Crawford, ‘I lot money pays for boom on Spain’s (ios ta del Crime’, Vinancid Times, 23/03/05 and 
Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), ‘Spain: Drug Gateway to Europe*, The World Geopolitics o f 
Drugs 1998//999A nnudR eport: IV. Europe, April 2000, p. 93. http://www.o^.oq>/2n00/en/o(»l00 a,.» 
[accessed 24/07/02]. Specifically, for example, in 2000, investigators alleged that Calabrian (southern Italian) 
mafia operations enjoyed Gil’s protection. See Library of Congress, Nations Hospitable to Organised Crime ami 
Terrorism, Washington D. G, Federal Research Division, library of Congress, October 2003, p. 141,
Drug Studies (Association d'Etudcs Géopolitiques des Drogues (AEGD)), ‘Spain: The New Route o ( °  
Colombian Traffickers’, GeopoSticdD rug Newsletter, No. XX, July/August 2001, p. 3, 
http://www.geodmgs.net/mini-lettres/AHGD5GB.pdf [accessed 24/07/0?)
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public office for 27 years54. Even after his death, Gil’s name continued to be heard in 
Spanish courtrooms. For example, on 10 October 2008, the Saqueo case, dubbed by one 
newspaper as ‘the most important trial against urban corruption to be held in Spain in the 
last 30 years’55, finally opened in the National Court (A udiencia N a tion a l). Investigations 
into this case began in 2002 and Gil, Juan Antonio Roca (who was also arrested as part o f  
Operación M alaya  and who, by 2008, had over 40 lawsuits pending against him56) and 
another five associates are accused o f  diverting 36 million euros from the Marbella town 
hall to private companies between 1991 and 1995 (by way o f  fictitious municipal 
companies, false invoicing, and so on)57. In respect o f  Gil, the prosecutor could ask that 
his heirs are held vicariously and civilly liable for 3,09 million euros58.
For Marbella, however, the fall o f  Jesús Gil did not mark the end o f  an era in terms 
o f  corruption and rot; as one newspaper report claimed: ‘[...] only some o f  the actors have 
changed, because the film is the same’59. Indeed, after Gil’s judicial disqualification from 
office, Julián Muñoz became mayor o f  Marbella, followed subsequently by Marisol Yagiie 
(both o f  whom were also arrested as part o f  the O peraáón M alaya  investigations) and, it 
seems, the absence o f  law in town planning matters, the collecting o f  illegal commissions 
and the rampant enrichment o f  some local government officials continued to be 
characteristics o f  this municipality60. Muñoz, himself, has also faced his fair share o f  
judicial trials and investigations. Before the Operación M alaya  investigations in 2006, he was 
already involved in some 40 legal proceedings and he has been sentenced numerous times 
for crimes related to urban planning61 (the first sentence resulting from his conviction for
54 Sce, for example, Teople — Jesús Gil: Politician & businessman (1933 — 2004)’, aHdaluda.com,
55 Antonio Rubio, ‘Arranca en la Audienda Nacional el juicio por el “saqueo de Marbella’”, elmundo.es,
10/10/08, http://www.elmundo.es/clmundo/2008/10/10/espana/12236235Q2httnl [accessed 14/10/08J 
(my translation).
56 See, for example, Javier Martín-Arroyo, Ttoca empieza a tirar de la manta’, dpais.com, 04/08/08, 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Roca/empieza/rirar/maiitaZdpeDksp/200808Q4elpepinac S/Tfo 
and Juana Viudez, ‘14 juicio del “caso Saqueo” peligra tras la tenunda del abogado de Roca’, epcus.com, 
19/09/08,
ui i n  [tumi accessed 14/10/08}.
57 For details of this case see, for example, Viudez, <y>. dt:, Rubio, op. dt:, Manuel Altozano, ‘Roca niega que la
Audiencia Nacional pueda juzgarle por el “caso Saqueo”', epdsxom , 11/10/08,
httn://www.elpais.com/articulo/andaluda/Roca/niepfl/Audiencia/Nacional/pueda/juzgaile/raso/Saqurp/
riDePuesr>and/20081011cloand 8/Tes faccessed 14/10/08| and ‘Saqueo corruption case in Marbella, opens
114/10/08].
58 Rubio, op. dt..
59 Irujo and Ordaz, op. dt., pp, 2-3 (my translation).
40 See, for example, José María Irujo, ‘Marbella, un cielo de grúas paradas’, E l Pats, 16/11/03, pp. 22-23. 
61 See, for example, Diego Narváez, “De camarero a delfín de Jesús Gil’, E l País, 20/07/06, p. 18; ‘Munoz 
jailed again’, TheEuro Weekly News (Costa del Sol), 27/10/05 -  02/11/05, p. 36 ;‘Julián Muñoz tiene hoy su 
cuarto juicio’,Q ué (Málaga), 11/11/05, p. 6 and ‘Conceden el tercer grado penitenciario a Marisa Alcalá, 
imputada en el caso Proinsa’, La Gaceta, 01/12/06, p. 6.
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urban prevarication in the “Banana Beach’ case in 200562). As o f  October 2008, Muñoz was 
serving time in prison for a further three cases related to town planning crimes (for which 
he was convicted after the M alaya  case) and was facing new charges, along with ten other 
ex-councillors, for granting an illegal building licence in 1999 (however, after already 
serving three years in prison for all o f  his urban crimes and after establishing a plea deal, 
this new case is largely ‘academic’ for Muñoz)63.
For almost twenty years, therefore, Marbella has been associated with sleaze and 
corruption, particularly in relation to urban planning. As a result; it was estimated in 2005 
and 2006 that, out o f  the 80,000 houses and apartments in Marbella that were included in 
the latest census, some 30,000 o f  these (around 37 per cent) had been built illegally and 
were thus in ‘legal limbo’, with some property owners currently fearing that their homes 
might be demolished64. Indeed, according to Greenpeace, between 2004 and 2007, the 
T ribu n al Superior de Justicia  de A n dalu cía  (TSJA) (Supreme Court o f Justice o f  Andalucía) 
issued over 30 judgments cancelling construction licences handed out by Marbella town 
council, which affected 2,800 residences, and the Government o f  Andalucía had called for 
the destruction o f  334 o f  these65. However, control mechanisms such as diese are not
particularly effective. The sluggishness o f  the legal system (which will be discussed in the 
next chapter) means that a judgment annulling an unlawful building licence can be passed
several years after it was granted, at a time:
[...] when the evils generated are irreversible: the building has already been 
completed, the houses have been occupied generally by bona fide buyers, and die 
demolition o f  the illegal construction in question may give rise to greater harm than 
that o f  not executing the sentence.66
Furthermore, Jimenez claims that a large number o f  town councils have been reluctant to 
pursue breaches o f  town planning in their municipalities and, in reality, the demolition o f
62 Banana Beach is a block of 238 apartments in Marbella. Muñoz and six other councillors were accused of 
granting illegal planning permission for these buildings. See, for example, Diego Narvaez, ‘l a  maldición de 
Banana Beach', epcas.com , 17/11/06,
httDj7/www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/maldiriQn/Baiiana/Beach/elpCDÍautand/2iX)61117elpand 6/Tes 
L [accessed 01/09/08] and Fernando J . Pérez, *200 kilometres de muralla de cemento’, E l País, 01/11/07, pp. 
24-25.
62 See, for example, l ü  ex regidor del GIL Julián Muñoz logra el tercer grado’, elpats.com, 13/10/08,
bttp://wwwielpais.com/ articulo/andalucia/ex/reridor/GIL/lulian/MuilQZ/lQgra/ torcer/grado/elpepirspap
13/10/08] and ‘New building irregularity case in Marbella’,
typicatiyspanish.com, 14/10/08, ]
14/10/08].
64 See, for example, Emelia Viaña and Fernando Leguina, ‘M artilla no podrá planificar su suelo’, j£f#í 
(Málaga), 30/11/05, p . l l  and ‘Costalot’, op. cit.. Regarding tire possible demolition of the Banana Beach 
complex specifically, see also Narvaez, ‘La maldición de Banana Beach’, op. cit.,
65 Greenpeace, ‘Destruction at all Q>(a)sts: Greenpeace report alxmt the Spanish coast situation’ (English 
summary), Madrid and Barcelona, Greenpeace Madrid and Greenpeace Barcelona, June 2007, p. 16, 
bttK.//www,ereenpeace,org/raw/cQntent/espana/repQrts/resumen-destrucci-n-a toda-cos-2.pdf [accessed 
07/08/08].
66 Jiménez, op. ait., pp. 261-262.
unlawfully constructed buildings has been virtually non-existent Rather, demolition has 
been replaced with (low) fines, the payment o f  which has been treated as a defacto  
‘legalisation’67. Moreover, many boroughs have simply introduced amendments to the 
town plan, ‘so permitting urban development to take place where licences had been 
annulled by the courts precisely because they were not in compliance with the plan in 
force’68.
Although Marbella is undoubtedly the most notorious town in the Costa del Sol for 
its association with crimes related to planning matters and so on, it is, however, by no 
means the only community in this area that has been affected by urban corruption. For 
example, in 2007, in the town o f  Alhaurin el Grande (Málaga), a short drive inland from 
Marbella, the mayor (Juan Martín Serón) and his planning boss were detained and charged 
with demanding 121,600 euros in commission, in exchange for not paralysing the 
construction works o f  a local developer and, a few months later, in the second phase o f  the 
so-called Operación Troya, 19 local businessmen were also arrested, accused o f  paying bribes 
in exchange for building licences69. Police believed that the town hall had received at least 
600,000 euros in ‘donations’ from businesses in the housing sector between 2005 and 
200670, Also, early in 2008, it was reported that Juan Vera, the mayor o f  Tolox (Málaga), 
was facing 23 separate charges for planning crimes relating to the granting o f  licences, 
between 2004 and 2006, for the building o f  more than 2000 homes on land that was not 
classified for this purpose (the municipal secretary, a municipal architect and a legal advisor 
were also charged in some o f  the cases)71. Another municipality outside o f  Marbella that 
has also been affected by urban corruption is Estepona (Málaga). In rite summer o f  2008, 
as part o f  Operación A sta p a , 26 people were detained (and 15 people were charged) for a 
range o f  crimes, including money laundering bribery, peddling influence, embezzlement 
and prevarication. Those arrested included the mayor o f  Estepona at the time (Antonio 
Barrientos), the temporary mayor (Rafael Montesinos) who replaced Barrientos after his
67 Ibid., p. 260,
68 Ibid..
69 See, for example, Perez and Viudez, op. at..
7° ‘New Audi and 50,000 house bought in cash as Alhaurin mayor’s lifestyle analysed’, The OHvt Press, 
28/03/08, http://www.theolivrpress.es/2008/03/28/new-aiidi-and-50000 house-bought ín-casll-as- 
alhaurin-mayors-lifcstyle-analyscd/ [accessed 08/10/08].
71 See, for example, Miguel Angel Reina, ‘La mayoría de los ayuntamientos de Málaga han sido investigados’, 
laopiniondemalaga.es, 18/06/08,
httt?;//www,laopiniondcnial¡i{;a.es/scccioncs/noricia.jsp?pRcf=2W80618(>0 2 187165 Malaga-mayoria- 
aruntamicntos-Malaga-sido-invesfigados [accessed 11/08/08]; Tolox mayor faces 23 separate trials for 
planning crimes’, typically Spanish.com, 30/03/08,
de Tolox de 23 delitos urbanísticos por licencias para 2.000 casas’, Ltopmondemaljpa.es, 31/03/08,
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imprisonment for these charges, various town hall officials, technical experts, architects, 
lawyers and business people. The bank accounts o f  91 companies and 78 people were also 
frozen. The corruption plot, it was alleged, was linked to the irregular financing o f  
Estepona’s town hall and involved the reclassifying o f  public land (so that it could be sold 
o ff  to contacts at below-market prices) in return for receiving irregular donations from 
developers72.
The examples discussed above give us an insight into the kinds o f  urban corruption 
prevalent in the Costa del Sol region, but they are not anomalies. Indeed, it seems that 
such irregularities are widespread in this area73. For example, in 2006, the Prosecutor’s 
office in Málaga processed more than 200 reports o f  abuse and systemic corruption related 
to the real estate and construction industries, which resulted in judicial action against 20 out 
o f  100 mayors in the province74. Moreover, during 2007, the Public Prosecutor o f  Málaga 
opened 238 investigative proceedings and 189 judicial proceedings for urban crimes in the 
province (of which 96 corresponded to Málaga capital, 38 to coastal municipalities and 55 
to inland towns)75. In fact, the Public Prosecutor is even quoted as saying that:
|T]he list o f  municipalities that have not been denounced would be much shorter
than die list o f  those that have had some proceedings initiated against them [.. .].76
72 For details of this operation see, for example, Ministerio del Interior (MIR) (Dirección General de la Policía 
y de la Guardia Gvil), ‘La Policía Nacional desarrolla una operación contra la corrupción urbanística en
Es te pon a*, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 17/06/08,
http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas Prensa/PDF notas de prensa/2QQ8/npQ61IQ¿.Dáfc EFE, ‘Imputado el 
alcalde accidental de Estepona por blanqueo, cohecho y tráfico de influencias’, elpm .com , 15/07/08, 
hitp;//www.elpais.com /articulo/espana/Imputndo/alcalde / accklental/Mcpona/blanqueQ/cohecho/trafico 
/influcncias/elpepuesp/20080715elpepiinac 11/Tes: EFE, ‘La juez mantiene la imputación de otros cuatro 
implicados en el caso As tapa’, elpm .com , 21/07/08,
http://www.clpais.com/articulo/espana/juez/mantiene/imPUtítcÍQn/otros/imnlicados/caso/Astapa/elpepu 
esp/20080721elpepunac 22/Tes [all accessed 30/07/08]; Nick Allen, ‘Football stars’ resort mired in 
corruption scandal’, The D aly Telegraph, 28/06/08, p. 17 and Juana Viudez, ‘Estepona o la lógica de la 
corrupción’, tlpdssom , 22/06/08,
h itp;//www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/Estepona/lopica/coiruDCÍQnZriQeBuesPafld/20Q80622dpand 3/ 
Tes [accessed 11/08/08].
73 For details and a chronological list of all cases in Andalucía (and indeed elsewhere) between 2000 and 2007, 
see Fundación Alternativas, Urbanismo y  democracia. Mapa de presuntas irregularidades y  actos de corrupción urbanística 
2000-2007, ep, át., pp. 11-21 and pp. 169-219. A study carried out in 2002-2003, which looked into 
corruption activities in the construction sector of the Costa del Sol and its vulnerability to penetration by 
criminal groups, also produced some interesting findings in this respect See José lu is  Diez Ripollés, Ana 
María Prieto del Pino, Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes, Per Stangeland and Diego José Vera Jurado (cds.),
Prácticas ilícitas en la  actítidadurbanística: Un estudio de la  Costa ddSol, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch and Instituto 
Andaluz interuniversitario de Criminología, 2004.
74 See United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, March 2008,
75 See Reina, op. at., citing die annual report of the Public Prosecu tor corresponding to 2007.
76 See ibid, and EFE, 'Las administraciones tienen “una actitud complaciente” con los delitos 
medioambientales', laopiniondemalaga.es, 05/09/08,
http ://w w laopiniondenitilaea.es/sccrioncs/.noricia.isr?pRcfE2LKBJ905(X) 2 203232 Mahiga-
the annual report of the Public Prosecutor corresponding to 2007 (my translation). ^ ^
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Urban corruption has also affected Madrid. It has been noted previously in this 
thesis that Madrid’s construction sector has been very active in recent yean, and growth in 
this sphere has, indeed, been quite remarkable. The construction o f  new properties in the 
Community o f  Madrid increased from 15,334 in 1991 to 40,226 in 2003, for example77. 
Furthermore, in 2004, there were more new properties built in the Madrid region (60,113 
properties) than anywhere else in Spain and, in 2006, Madrid still topped the rankings in 
this respect (with 51,586 new properties constructed in that year)78. Moreover, it would 
appear that this huge urban expansion is set to continue79. Indeed, urban development in 
Madrid is so extensive that Beatriz Lobon from the capital’s Gerencia de Urbanism o 
(Management o f  Town Planning) has been quoted as saying that it is ‘unparalleled in 
Europe’80. Perhaps inevitably, however, it would appear that such massive development 
has been accompanied by widespread corruption in the real estate sector.
In Madrid, just as in the Costa del Sol, numerous accusations relating to the 
reclassification o f  land, planning matters, the granting o f  irregular licences and preferential 
treatment in exchange for commissions, and so on, have also resulted in various mayors, 
public officials, town councillors, developers and even the ex-director general o f  Town 
Planning o f  the Community o f  Madrid, Enrique Porto81, being denounced for a range o f  
offences including bribery, prevarication, corruption, influence peddling, embezzlement 
and prohibited negotiations82. In recent years, urban corruption has also been so 
widespread in diis area that scandals have affected many o f  Madrid’s municipalities (from 
the very smallest towns, such as Sevilla la Nueva or Aldea del Fresno (both southwest o f  
the capital), to the laigest, such as Ciempozuelos (south o f  the region) or Torrelodones
77 See Diez Ripollés and Gómez-Céspedes, op. at., p. 8, quoting data from the Spanish Ministiy of I lousing 
(Ministerio de Vivienda, Número de viviendas libres iniciadas: Serie 1991-2006, Viviendas libres por comunid«ales 
autónomas y provincias. Madrid, 2007. http://www mviv.es/es/).
7® To compare: in 2006, diere were 51,531 new properties built in Barcelona; 37,058 in the Murcia region; 
36,537 in Alicante; 34,291 in Valencia; and 32,794 in Málaga. See ibid..
19 A newspaper article in 2005, for example, reported that there are plans to build 300,000 new dwellings with 
the capacity to house 900.000 people. See Ixila Galán, ‘Madrid, la fuerza del caos’, III Pais: Domingo, 
16/01/05, p. 1.
80 Ibid, p. 2, quoting Beatriz Lotion from the capital’s Gerencia de Urbanismo (Management of T'own Planning) 
(my translation).
Rt See, for example, 13 ladrillo agita al PP y al PSOE’, Metro (Madrid), 18/10/06, p. 4; M. Oliver, ‘13 juez 
admite a trámite una querella de Anticorrupción contra Porto’, ABC, 02/10/07, p. 51; and f  undación 
Alternativas, Urbanismoy democracia. Mapa de presuntas irregularidades y  actos de corrupción urbanística 20002007, op. 
cit., p. 119, p. 123 and p. 293.
82 For details of some individual cases see, for example, Fundación Alternativas, Urbanismo y  democracia. M¿tpa 
de presuntas irregularidades y  actos de corrupción urbanística 2000-2007, op. cit., pp. 119-127 and pp. 285-298; Manuel 
Cuéllar, 13 PSOE exige al PP que pare las operaciones urbanísticas relacionadas con los querellados', Til País, 
22/06/03, p. 23; ‘Atasco en Anticomipción’, E lM undo:M 2,15/11/06, p. 1; Pedro Blasco, *PP y PSOE se 
pegan en Anticomipción’, E l Mundo: M 2,15/11/06, p. 2; and Natalia Junquera, “‘A ver qué se atreve a 
derribar esto’”, E lPaís, 14/11/06, p. 23.
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(northeast o f  the region)83). Indeed, Fundación Alternativas lists some 73 cases o f  alleged 
urban corruption reported between 1986 and 200684, and Madrid is seen as being another 
o f  Spain’s ‘hottest spots’ for this type o f  illegal behaviour85 86. Furthermore, although the 
prolific incidences o f  corruption and irregular behaviour in this sphere provide the ‘perfect 
accompaniment’ to the public fights and quarrels between Spain’s two main political parties 
(with each party often presenting q u erella d  against the other in this respect)87, scandals have 
also affected some o f  the smaller political parties in die municipalities o f  the region88. As 
such, the examples o f  corruption related to real estate and planning matters in the Madrid 
region are too numerous to discuss in full. However, as a typical illustration, it is worth 
providing some further commentary on the Ciempozuelos corruption case; a case that is 
also regarded as the ‘most famous case o f  urban corruption in Madrid’ and ‘one o f  die 
most important cases in the country’ in recent times89. In October 2006, Pedro Antonio 
Torrejón resigned from his position as mayor o f  Ciempozuelos amid allegations that he, 
and his predecessor Joaquin Tejeiro (who was mayor o f  the town between 1991 and 1995), 
had received a commission o f  40 million euros in a suspicious land rezoning operation. 
Torrejón was accused o f  approving die building o f  more dian 5,000 new homes by the 
construction company Esprode and overseeing the approval o f  new zoning rules in the 
town to the benefit o f  that company: Esprode had reportedly bought land for around 500 
million euros after paying the commission to Tejeiro, who had apparently promised to have 
some rural land reclassified for construction purposes. It was also revealed that both o f  the 
former mayors had bank accounts in Andorra, and it was thought that these accounts were 
used to invest the money received from such commissions. In November 2006, bodi 
Torrejón and Tejeiro were charged with bribery and money laundering, and imprisoned -  
although they were subsequendy released on bail90.
83 Fundación Alternativas, Urbanismo y  democracia. Mapa de presuntas irregularidades y  actos de corrupción urbanística 
2000-2007, op .á t.,p . 120.
84 See ibid., pp. 285-298.
85 See ibid., p. 119 (my translation).
86 In Spanish law, a querella n  a type of formal complaint, made to a court, with a request to carry out 
investigations. This can start criminal proceedings. See, for example, Elena Merino-Bianco, Spanish la w  and 
L egal System, 2"** edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 2006, pp. 153-154.
87 Fundación Alternativas, Urbanismoy democracia. Mapa de presuntas imegularidadesy actos de corrupción urbanística 
2000-2007, op. dt., p. 119. See also ‘Atasco en Anticorrupción’, op. cit. and Blasco, op. cit..
88 Fundación Alternativas, Urbanismo y  democracia. Mapa de presuntas imegularidadesy actos de corrupción urbanística 
2000-2007, op, cit., p. 119 and pp. 285-298 generally.
89 Ibid, p. 121 (my translation). •'
90 For hill and farther details of this case, see, for example, ibid., pp. 121-122 and p. 296; Villoría, ‘Country 
reports: Spain’ in T ransparency International, Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the W ater Sector, op. cit., 
p. 273; ‘Socialist mayor steps down over rezoning scandal’, E l Pais (English edition with the International 
Herald Tribune), 18/10/06, p. 1; ‘El ladrillo agita al PP y al PSOE’, op. ate, Miguel Oliver, ‘FJ ex alcalde dc 
Gempozuelos pactó repartir los 40 millones según el éxito de sus gestiones’, ABC, 19/10/06, pp. 10-11; José 
Antonio Hernández, ‘El ex alcalde de Ciempozuelos tenía 30 plumas tic oro en la caja fuerte de un banco’, F J 
País, 14/11/06, p. 20; Pablo I lerraiz, ‘La Fiscalía quiere rebajarlas fianzas’, E l Mundo: M 2 ,16/11/06, p. 6;'
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Galicia, too, has also been tainted by revelations o f  urban corruption. According to 
a report by Greenpeace, in recent years, Galicia has experienced the greatest number o f  
land reclassifications in its history and, in the next few years, there are plans to build 
800,000 new homes in the region’s coastal towns (a figure that is almost comparable to 
what has been built on the coasts o f  Galicia in all o f  its history (816,000 homes))91. This 
increase in building activity, however, appears to have been accompanied, in recent years, 
by an escalation in crimes related to urban development, which Carlos Varela, the chief 
prosecutor in Galicia, sees as a ‘source o f  risk o f  corrupt behaviour’, which ‘combines badly 
with the absolute fiasco that is the control systems o f the public administration’92. 
According to Greenpeace, the lack o f  control exercised by town councils is proved by the 
high number o f  mayors and councillors recently charged with urban development and 
land-use planning offences in Galicia93. Indeed, Fundación Alternativas lists over 40 cases 
o f  alleged urban corruption reported between January 2000 and December 200694, and the 
2007 annual report o f  Galicia’s F iscalía Superior (Chief Prosecutor) highlights an increase in 
the investigations and inquiries related to urban development matters, especially in the 
provinces o f  A  Coruña and Pontevedra (with 72 per cent o f  legal proceedings related to 
urban planning in that year occurring in Pontevedra province alone)95. In total, in 2007, 
urban development crimes and crimes relating to planning matters in Galicia led to 123 
criminal investigations by provincial prosecutors, the lodging o f  32 complaints relating to 
alleged illegal buildings, and 58 inquiries initiated by the courts o f instruction96.
It is quite clear why corruption o f  this kind occurs: local governments are poorly 
funded97 and so this helps to increase the salaries o f  councillors and mayors and aids the 
financing o f  the town halls, which, it would appear, have come to depend on the income 
received from the granting o f  licences, land sales and property taxes, allowing local mayors
EFE, 111 mapa de la corrupción urbanística’, op. cit:, ‘Los seis imputados en el “Caso Gempozuclos” 
comienzan hoy a declarar’, ABC.es, 23/02/09, http://ww ahc.es/20090223/madrid tnadrid/seis-impntíidos- 
caso-cicmpozuelos-20090223.html: Javier S. del Moral, ‘Vuelve el "caso Gempozuclos”*, elpm .com , 24/02/09, 
httn;//ww.clpais.com/articulo/madrid/Vuelve/caso7Q&npPZudi»/clttCPÍcspmad/20090224clpmad 3/T 
CS [both accessed 24/03/09J. ‘
91 See Greenpeace, op. cit., p. 47.
92 See Pablo López, ‘El fiscal denuncia en el Parlamento la escalada de delitos urbanísticos’, eipm .com , 
11/11/08,
hitp;//www,elpais.com/articulo/Galicia/fiscal/denuncia/PariamcntQ/escalada/dclitos/urhanÍ?ticos/elpepifl 
utgal/2008Hllelppnl fi/Tes [accessed 10/12/08] (my translation). See also Xosé Manuel Pe miro, 
‘Corrupción civil’, eipms.com, 20/11/08,
hítn;//www.clpais.com/artiriilo/Galicia/Comjprion/rivil/elpepiautial/20081120clppal 29/Tes [accessed 
10/12/08].
9J Greenpeace, op. cit., p. 47. See also p. 74 for examples of urban corruption cases in Galicia,
94 See Fundación Alternativas, Urbanismoy democracia. Mapa de presuntas irregularidadesy actos de corrupción 
urbanística 2000-2007, op. d i., pp. 99-107 and pp. 275-283.
95 See López, op. át., citing die 2007 annual report of Galicia’s Fiscalía Superior (Chief Prosecutor).
96 Ibid..
97 See, for example, Diez RipoUés and Gómez-Céspedes, op. cit., p, 23.
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to spend more on vote-gaining projects98. Indeed, it is estimated that local councils in the 
Costa del Sol region, for example, depend on such practices for as much as 70 per cent o f  
their income99. Further, Jimenez argues that urban corruption is caused by a confluence o f  
three major factors: the peculiarities o f  the Spanish town-planning model; some alarmingly 
defective oversight mechanisms for municipalities; and the extraordinary growth o f  
housing construction during the last decade or so100. According to Fundación Alternativas, 
other factors that may help to explain the persistence o f  corruption in Spanish local 
councils include: political power being concentrated in the hands o f  one particular party; 
the ‘strong mayor’ form o f  municipal government that is typical o f  countries with a high 
degree o f  corruption; a legalistic rigidity which blocks the higher echelons o f  the 
bureaucracy from involvement in the design and decision-making processes o f  government 
and limits them to a merely passive role; and the size o f  the local district which is both 
heterogeneous (making comparison and competiveness between local governments more 
problematic) and small-scale (favouring the consolidation o f  clientele networks and 
corruption centred around small groups o f  people)101.
Whatever the true cause, the cases uncovered in recent years and discussed above, 
both in terms o f  their quantity and severity, show that we must recognise the seriousness o f  
this kind o f  activity, and what is particularly significant in terms o f  the overall argument o f  
this thesis is that this pervasive urban corruption in various regions o f  Spain highlights 
some clear vulnerabilities in the political system, at local government level, that could be 
exploited by criminal groups. A t the very least, this type o f  corruption shows how local 
politicians, and so on, can easily be tempted by bribes and kickbacks, which will always 
provide a favourable environment generally for illicit enterprise. Furthermore, in order to 
reap the benefits o f  their crimes, it is imperative that criminal groups launder the money 
gained from their illicit activities, and we saw in Chapter 2 how ‘organised’ criminals are 
already doing this in the construction sector. Thus, in relation to die urban corruption 
scandals discussed here, although there is no evidence to say that die bribes accepted by die 
mayors and local officials in these particular cases came directly from criminals engaged in 
illicit enterprise, we do not need to stretch our imaginations too far to see how such 
practices could happen, because it is certainly clear that ‘organised’ criminals are willing to
98 Interview PI 1. See also Jennifer Sands, ‘Organized Crime and Illicit Activities in Spain: Causes and 
Facilitating Facto«’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2,2007, p. 224 and ’Building Blocks’, Ecommist.com, 
14/09/06.hftp://www.economist.com/displayStorv.cfTnPstory id-7912923 [accessed 18/0.3/07].
99 Interview J l ;  ‘Building Blocks’, op. dt:, and ‘Costalot’, op. at..
100 See Jiménez, op. a t., pp. 255-272.
101 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in  Spain 2009: Alliances fo r  a New Spanish Prosperity -  Towards a 
New Global Deal, op. at..
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corrupt and that politicians (and others) in Spain are willing to be corrupted102 1034. Certainly, 
as Antonio Romero, ex-member o f  the parliament o f Andalucía for the political party 
Izqu ierda U nida  (IU) (United Left) said, this kind o f  urban clientelism can ‘lure’ mafias’03.
Despite the seeming prevalence o f  this kind o f  corruption, however, incidences o f  
political corruption are not limited to urban planning matters. In the Madrid region, for 
instance, there are examples o f  other kinds o f  political corruption at various levels o f  
governance. For example, one o f  the professionals questioned during the course o f  this 
research, highlighted the existence o f  corruption related to the awarding o f  contracts and 
permits to businesses'04 and, perhaps, one o f the most notable and recent examples o f  this 
type o f  corruption would be that revealed by O peraáón G uateque, which unravelled at the 
end o f  2007, and which one newspaper called ‘the largest operation against this type o f  
municipal corruption carried out in the capital’105 106. In November 2007, 16 public officials 
from Madrid’s city hall were detained, and accused o f  crimes involving influence peddling, 
bribery and prevarication, for allegedly forming a network that was charging fees in 
exchange for the granting o f  licences. The officials, apparently, were charging commissions 
o f  between 3,000 and 18,000 euros to expedite the delivery o f  licences needed for the 
opening o f  entertainment and leisure establishments (which otherwise could take up to two 
years to gain), or to delay sanctions to such businesses (which were imposed when a change 
had been made to the premises). Also implicated in the case were a number o f  lawyers, 
architects and business owners (who had illegally obtained the licences). By February 2008, 
25 people had been charged as suspects in this case105.
Furthermore, it is worth briefly mentioning the recent C a rte l case, as it involves 
allegations o f  political corruption at regional and also national level, providing us with a 
‘true illustration o f  high-level corruption’107. In Februaiy 2009, an investigation by die 
National Court judge Baltasar Garzón, the Anti-Corruption Public Prosecutor and die 
U n idad  de D eüncuenáa Económicaj  F isca l ( U D E F )  (Unit o f  Economic and Fiscal Crime)
102 This point was also made by this author in Sands, op. át., p. 225.
103 See ‘IU denuncia que más de 120 grupos de la mafia internacional operan en la Costa del Sol’, abcdesmlia.es, 
05/01/06. http;//ww.abcdesevilla.es/hcmcrot(xa/historico-05-Ql-a)MA cviIl;i/Andaliicia/iu-d(:nnnria- 
flU£-mas-de-120-gnipos-de-la-mafia-intemacional-opetan-en-la:£Q5la^ld:aaI.J1 1 462096368;hlir>l [accessed 
10/10/08], quoting Antonio Romero, ex-member of die padiainent of Andalucía for the political party III.
104 Questionnaire QD,
los See ‘“Sin un kilo, no hay licencia’”, E l Pari: Madrid, 15/11/07, p. 1 (my translation).
106 For further details of this case, see, for example, ibid., pp. 1-2; Raúl Rejón and Saray Marques, Trama de 
corrupción’, aDn (Madrid), 15/11/07, p. 3; Ana G. Arias, ‘Comisiones por licencias’, Metro (Madrid), 15/11/07, 
p. 2; ‘Los presuntos cabecillas de la Operación Guateque se verán las caras ante el juez el próximo Lunes’,
28/01/08, http://gwat1ii^s/loc.ll/madrid/2Q080í28/NWiS-ll9ú-iaialcauerdecl¡iradon-cahecillíi<!.. 
carco.html: and ‘Another suspect in the Guateque corruption case in Madrid’, typicailySpamh.com , 19/02/08,
107 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in Spain/2010: The Erosion o f  Confidence and Well-being. Against 
citizens’ disaffection, op. cr/., Chapter 4-
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culminated in the disclosure o f  an alleged framework o f  corruption linked to the PP. It 
would appear that Spain’s ‘most important’10® recent corruption scandal involves PP 
politicians and officials (predominantly in the Madrid and Valencia regions), being accused 
o f  receiving backhander commissions and kickbacks in exchange for the granting o f  
contracts to various companies. For example, it has been reported that the companies 
involved in the corruption plot had obtained contracts from public administrations 
governed by the PP, and that the PP had received various services from such companies 
during public events and elections (relating to catering, publicity, the organisation o f  
elections, and so on). The scandal also appears to involve an element o f  urban planning 
corruption. Initially, five people were detained and another 30 people were implicated in 
the case. By II February 2009, however, the number o f  people charged had risen to 37, 
and there were six arrests109 and, on 27 March 2009, it was reported that the number o f  
people implicated in the scandal had reached almost 70uo. Eventually, 90 people were 
charged in the affair111 (several politicians have also resigned, or been dismissed, from the 
PP as a result o f  the investigations). Those implicated in the case have included a number 
o f  leaders o f  the PP, such as Luis Barcenas, the then treasurer o f  the party and senator; 
Jesus Merino, a national member o f  parliament for the PP; Francisco Camps, president o f  
the Valencia region; Ricardo Costa, (at the time) the PP’s second-in-command in Valencia; 
and various councillors from the Madrid regional government112, as well as four ex-mayors 
from the Madrid region, a number o f  lawyers (who were acting as managers or 
administrators o f  the companies involved), business people from the construction and real 
estate sectors (who were using the network’s connections to obtain land deals or  
reclassifications from town halls governed by the PP) and, even, a Member o f  the 
European Parliament (MEP). The accusations made against these people involve crimes o f  
bribery, influence peddling, money laundering fiscal fraud and illicit association113, and it is
108 See ilnd..
109 See, for example, ‘Judge indicts a further 34 people in the P.P. corruption case’, ppkdiySpanish.cam, 
10/02/09. hrtp://www.t^pirally<ipanish.com/news/puhlish/artick. 2CX)05 ahlml faccessed 11/02/09).
110 See, for example, EFE and ELPAÍS.com, 'Garzón imputa a otras 10 personas en el "caso GürteJ” de 
corrupción’, elpais.com, 27/03/09,
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Gar2on /imputa/Qtras/pfcnQnas/caSQ/Gvirtcl/cprnipciQn/elpepues
m Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democraiy in Spain/2010: The Erosion o f  Confident* and W'eU-being. Against 
admens’ disaffection, op. a t., Chapter 4.
1,2 Ibid.
tu por fy j ¡jjjJ  further details of this case, see, for example, Francisco Mercado, ‘Garzón desmantela una gran 
trama de corrupción política vinculada al PP’, ttpais.com, 07/02/09,
haD;//www.elpais,com/arttculo/c3piuia/Gai2.on/de8mimtda/gtan/trama/corroDriQa/gQlitica/vinculatla/P 
P/elpepiesp/20090207elpepinac 1 /Tes: ‘Resignations and another arrest as die P.P. corruption scandal 
continues', tjpicaiptspamshjom, 10/02/09,
imputados', elpms.com, 11/02/09,
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possible that the corrupt activities are linked to party financing . In response, the PI has 
argued that the G iir te lcase is a political attack on the party1 . However, the data presented 
by the prosecution does not support this allegation. In November 2009, the Attorney 
General, appearing before the Parliament, reported on the on-going corruption cases 
against public officials, and o f  a total o f  730 cases, 264 pertained to PSOE members and 
200 to PP members (and members o f  other parties were also involved in the cases), 
indicating that the PP was no more persecuted than the PSOE . Other recent corruption 
scandals involving the PP, however, include, for example, the F U N D E S C A A d  case, in May 
2009, it was revealed that the PP had used a foundation, linked to the party, to finance 
electoral meetings and so on* 14617 *.
I laving discussed some o f the most scandalous and notable Spanish corruption 
cases that have surfaced in recent years, it is now worth posing two questions, firstly, as 
this chapter has so far focussed mainly on examples o f  political corruption, can we say that 
this is the only, or most important, type o f  corruption occurring in Spain? Secondly, given 
the focus o f the thesis, is any o f the corruption occurring in Spain caused by, or linked to, 
‘organised crime’ or illicit enterprise (and, for the purposes o f  the hypothesis, does this 
matter)? These are questions which will be addressed in the remaining parts o f  this 
chapter.
According to Fundación Alternativas, the corruption occurring in Spain is most 
predominantly linked to ‘the activity o f  politicians, especially in the field o f  urban
ac^/Tes^f l l l ^  Popular corruption case takes on new level', fypicalfyspanish.com,
26/02/09, http://www.typicallyspanish.com/tiews/Xiubkh/art»;k .20325'shtml; Jane Walker, riop  Spanish 
judge accused of exceeding his powers’, irishtimes.com, 26/02/09,
it ‘Judge Baltasar Garzón
« a « . » !™ «  i  -w  « . , »  .- t » « - . « - r  ■ T -------------------
steps down from the Gürtel case’, typicaifyspanish.com, 06/03/09, 
http://www.typicallyspanish.cotn/news/publish/artkle 20341shtffll fall accessed 25/03/09]; ‘Judge indicts a 
further 34 people in the P.P. corruption case’, op. at. and EFE and ELPAÍS.corn, op. at..
114 See Fundación Alternativas, 'Report on Democracy in Spain/2010: The Erosion o f  Confidence and Wellbeing.
A gainst admens’ disaffection, op. at., Chapter 4.
,IS At die end o f February 2009, as well as accusing judge Baltasar Garzón of leaking confidential information 
to the press, the PP also issued a formal complaint against him, insinuating that he was guilty of perverting 
the course of justice for refusing to transfer the case to die regional 1 iigh Courts (as the case allegedly 
involves deputies, a senator and an MEP, parliamentary privilege means that the case is prohibited from 
investigation by the National Court). Early in March 2009, however, Garzón handed the Gürtel case over to 
the High Courts in Madrid and Valencia. See, for example, ‘Partido Popular corruption case takes o n  n ew  
level’, op. at:, Walker, op. at:, and ‘Judge Baltasar Garzón steps down from the Gürtel case’, op. at.. Spain’s 
Justice Minister from the governing PSOE, Mariano Fernandez Bermejo, has also been caught up in the 
scandal. He resigned in February 2009 after being criticised for going on a hunting trip with Garzón. The PP 
accused Fernández Bermejo, who also did not have the relevant hunting licence, of interfering in Garzón’* 
investigations in order to discredit the PP ahead of regional elections in the Basque Country and Galicia on 
01/03/09. See, for example, Walker, op. cit. and ‘Spanish justice minister resigns’, BBC News, 23/02/09,
116 See Fundación Alternativas. Report on Democracy in Spdn/2010: The Erosion o f  Confidence and Well-being.
A gainst admens’ disaffection, op. a t,, Chapter 4.
1,7 See ibid..
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development, local council administration and, to a large extent, to party funding’118. 
However, as we will see below, corruption in Spain does not just occur in the political 
sphere; it reaches other arenas too (such as the judiciary and law enforcement), and it 
implicates other professions (such as customs officials119). Opinions on the extent to which 
it does so, though, differ. In relation to the police forces, Fundación Alternativas argues 
that corruption is ‘almost totally absent* in the police forces120 and that bribes paid to the 
police are ‘practically non-existent’121. A  minority o f  the interview and questionnaire 
respondents agreed with this view122. However, during the course o f  nine o f  die interviews 
undertaken for this research (five o f  them with police officials), those interviewed either 
mentioned specific examples o f  police corruption or talked about corruption generally 
involving members o f  the police forces in Spain123 (and the respondent o f  one 
questionnaire agreed that there was corruption in the police124). Similarly, in relation to the 
judiciary, Hooper, for example, argues that ‘the corrupting o f  judges is disturbingly 
commonplace’125 126in Spain (and five o f  the interview/questionnaire respondents mentioned 
corruption in the judiciary120). A  prominent example o f judicial corruption would be that 
involving Luis Pascual, a former judge in Barcelona and one-time member o f  the General 
Council o f  the Judiciary, who, during the early 1990s had accepted bribes and run an 
‘extortion racket’ (which also involved the high profile lawyer, Joan Piqué Vidal)127. Yet, 
despite examples such as these (and others that will be given below), two o f  the interview 
sources claimed that there is no corruption in the judiciary (at least not nowadays)128 and 
the respondents o f  two o f  the questionnaires disagreed or strongly disagreed that there is
119 The professional interviewed in interview C2 claimed that customs officials were the most corrupted’ and 
tilts was a result of poor pay. According to this source, corruption in this sphere usually involves an official 
giving information about a particular operation. The professional interviewed in interview M2 also 
mentioned past cases of corruption involving customs officials. See also ‘Annex 3: Case Study ~ Spain’ in 
Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Examining the Links between Organised Crime and Corruption, 
CSD/European Commission, 2010, pp. 194-195, http://cccuropaeu/hoffl-fc
affairs/doc centre/crime/(W s Atufo m  hnks between omnised-.chm&..and_.comiPiion .enpclf  {accessed 
10/04/11J.
120 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Demacran/ in Spain 2009: Alliances fo r  a  New Spanish Prosperity —  Towards a  
N ew Globed Deed, ep. at^ pp. 233-234.
121 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy in Spain/2010; The Erosion o f Confidence and Well-being, Against 
citizens’ disaffection, op. at., Chapter 4, citing Transparency International, Global Barometer on Corruption, 2<X)9.
122 It was argued during interview FI that police corruption was ‘rare’ and the respondent of questionnaire 
QB showed their disagreement with die viewpoint that diere was corruption in die police.
123 Interviews PI, P2, P3, P8, P9,J3,J8, Ml and M2.
124 Questionnaire QA.
123 See John Hooper, The New Spaniards, 2nd edition, London, Penguin Books Ltd., 2006, p. 335.
126 Interviews PI, P9, P14 and J3, and questionnaire QA
127 Paul M. I Ieywood, ‘Corruption in Contemporary Spain’, op. cit., p. 697. See also 'Annex 3: Case Study -  
Spain’, op, cit., pp. 197-198.
128 Interviews P3 and Ft.
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judicial corruption129. The reasons behind these differing opinions are not clear. As 
discussed above and elsewhere in this thesis, it is likely that opinions are based on people’s 
own personal circumstances and their own realities and experiences o f  corruption. It may 
also be true that corruption in the law enforcement and judicial spheres is not as extensive 
(or visible) as corruption in the political sphere. However, that is not to say we cannot find 
examples o f  police or judicial corruption in Spain (as we will see below), which would 
appear to support the hypothesis advanced in this thesis.
Yet, how much o f  the political, judicial, police and other corruption occurring in 
Spain is connected to ‘organised crime’ or illicit enterprise? Results from the European 
Commission’s 2008 S pecial Eurobarom eter shows that public opinion in Spain is divided as to 
whether most o f  the corruption in Spain is actually caused by ‘organised crime’130 and, in 
relation to some o f  the corruption cases discussed above, there is no suggestion at all that 
they have any link with illicit enterprise. Yet, as will be argued subsequently, even these 
cases may still provide a favourable environment generally for criminals because they 
highlight areas o f  weakness that could, potentially, be exploited by them. Furthermore, 
worryingly, some cases o f  corruption in Spain are linked to ‘organised crime’ and examples 
such as these directly serve to aid criminals and facilitate illicit enterprise in one way or 
another. By way o f  quick illustration here, for example, we could mention the arrests, in 
2007, o f  Eduard Planells (a former sub-delegate o f  the central government) and other 
officials in Barcelona for their alleged links with members o f  the Russian Mafia131, or the 
law enforcement officers posted in the small towns around Cádiz who are systematically 
bribed to the point that these officers actually seem to regulate the trafficking o f  drugs and 
people across the Strait o f  Gibraltar132, or even the cases involving the ‘loss’ or removal o f  
evidence and judicial documents pertaining to ‘organised crime’ cases from some Spanish 
courts133. However, the discussion o f  the case o f  Galicia below particularly illustrates the
^  The respondents of questionnaires QB and QJ disagreed and strongly disagreed (respectively) that there is 
corruption in the judiciary.
,J0 European Commission, op. cit., p. 17. „ , '
»» See, for example, Nando García, *Detenido el ex subdelegado del Gobierno en Barcelona por dar 
“papeles” a la mafia rusa’, El Mundo, 17/07/07, p. 18; Marta Rodríguez, ‘Detenido por corrupción un ex 
subdelegado del Gobierno’, aDn (Madrid), 17/07/07, p. 6; ‘Cataluña activa su redada imtimafia Mrm, ;  
(Madrid), 17/07/07, p. 6; J. Yoldi, *El juez deja en libertad con cargos al ex subdelegado Planells, h i  1 ais, 
18/07/07, p. 22. . . .  „
See Alejandra Gómez-Cespedes and Per Stangeland, ‘Spain: The Flounshmg Illegal Drug Haven in 
Europe’ in Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Pohaes 
in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Sponger, 2004, p. 102 / .
133 p0y example» in February 2006, various topes incriminating drug traffickers wcte lost in the National 
Court. In August 2001, it was reported that at least 15 |udicjal records (connected to Jesus Gil) went missing 
from the Marbella courts. See ‘Annex 3: Case Study — Spain, op. cit., p. 197, fit 103 and fit 104. For other 
examples of‘organised crime’-related pólice corruption, see, for example, Confirman la pena de once anos de 
cárcel para Masa por narcotráfico’, ABC. 05/05/04, p. 18; luis Gómez, ‘Delincuentes con placa’, El País, 
16/01/05, p. 28; Levante-EMV, TI policía detenido por supuesto tráfico de drogas es sobrino y ex escolta de
link between some cases o f  corruption and ‘organised crime and how corruption can make 
a region more vulnerable to illicit enterprise.
Undoubtedly, some o f  die examples o f  corruption in Galicia have facilitated, or 
created a favourable environment for, the criminal activities earned out in die region. 
However, before discussing these specific examples more fully, and in order to highlight 
the general attitude to, and the context of, such behaviour in Galicia, it is perhaps worth 
noting primarily that cadquism o (caciquism)134, as a form o f  organised electoral corruption, 
worked ‘extremely well* in this part o f  Spain in the nineteenth century . Furthermore, 
despite some subsequent protests and movements against this , forms o f  cadquism o, or 
clientelism (as a re-creation o f  the old cadquism o), seem to have continued in Galicia, 
perhaps even until very recently. Several writers, or commentators, for example, still allude 
to the persistence o f  such practices in certain spheres in contemporary times and, in 
2005, a survey undertaken by Institute Opina138 revealed that 10.4 per cent o f Galicia’s 
citizens viewed the ‘political situation and cadquismo' as the region s most pressing 
problem139. This background, then, perhaps explains why acts o f  corruption o f  all kinds 
seem to have occurred frequendy in this autonomous community.
In terms o f corruption that is direedy related to the smuggling and criminal
activities in Galicia, several examples can be offered. Primarily, the smuggling activities 
carried out historically in Galicia enjoyed ‘the important complicity o f  the police forces and 
financial institutions’, and ‘the social and political context was extremely benevolent with *435789
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Fabra’, Levante-El Merrandl Vaiendano, 23/10/08, p. 8; ‘El “enzaina” detenido por narcotráfico dirigía la 
banda’, tlpM S.com , 18/11/08,
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/pais/vasco/ertzaina/dctenido/natCQtraficQ/dinaa/biindfl/elpCDloppvs/20 
Q81118clpvas 11/Tes/ {accessed 10/12/08).
134 Gemie, for example, defines caciquismo as an informal, but effective, agreement between the main political 
parties to decide the results of elections between themselves, by using bribes, sermons, the threat of violence, 
and so on, to influence voten about which party they should vote for. See Sharif Gemie, A Concise IUstury o f  
Galicia, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2006, pp. 33-38.
435 See ik'd, and also pp. 141-142.
136 See, for example, ibid., Chapter 3.
437 For example, in an article about construction in Galicia, Víctor López refers to the presence of an 
‘immense’ caciqismo. See Victor López, Heridas de cemento en el paisaje’, E lPais, 12/06/05, p. 24. likewise, 
Fermín Bouza makes reference to such a system in a 2005 press article titled The fatigue of being Galician’, 
See Fermín Bouza, ‘El cansancio de ser gallego', E l P a’s, 05/06/05, p. 19 (my translation). Also, Camilo 
Nogueira accuses Galicia’s governments of practising a clientelistic distribution of public money (see Camilo 
Nogueira, *La hermana atlántica’, E l P a’s, 05/06/05, p. 19) and, in a 2005 interview published in E l Pa's, 
Emilio Pérez Touriño, who was the President of Galicia from 2005 until die elections of 01/03/09, discussed 
his plans for changing a power system based on clientelism (see Xosé Hermida, Interview with Emilio Pérez 
Touriño, Presidente electo de Galicia, E IPais, 31/07/05, p. 24).
438 Instituto Opina is a Spanish company that carries out public opinion polls and market research. See
439 In effect, this issue was revealed as the fourth most pressing problem: most of the people surveyed (50.9 
per cent) viewed unemployment as the most pressing problem, which was followed by infrastructure (¿5.3 
per cent) and the economy (16.1 per cent). See *E146,9% cree que Galicia es peor tratada que otras 
comunidades’, E l P a’s, 08/05/05, p, 19, citing the results of a survey carried out by Instituto Opina (my 
translation).
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this state o f  affairs’140. Indeed, in 2001, José Ramón Barrai Martínez, the mayor o f
Ribadumia (Pontevedra) for the PP, was arrested for his involvement in the smuggling o f
half a million packets o f  contraband tobacco. Apparently, however, he was not a
newcomer to such activities: three decades ago, he was one o f  the main introducers o f
contraband in the Ría de Arousa, working with some o f those who later became major
drug trafficking capos, and he is seen as a key figure in the development o f  illegal activities in
Arousa (Pontevedra)141. A t die time o f  his arrest, it was said that his detention resuscitated
‘old phantoms about the collusion o f  politicians o f  the right with contraband tobacco in
Arousa’142. Indeed, accusations o f  corruption against the PP under Manuel Fraga (the
President o f  Galicia between 1989 and 2005) were frequently made143 and these have
transcended the allegations relating to contraband tobacco. For example, the Observatoire
G éopolitique de D rogues (OGD) (Geopolitical Drugs Watch) has argued that the hegemonic
power o f  the PP in Galicia (since the restoration o f  democracy in die late 1970s until 2005)
and the conservative ideology o f  the region’s drug traffickers ‘have led to more dirty money
accruing to the PP’144. However, criticism is also directed at the PSOE, which, in the past,
has governed cities such as A  Coruña, Santiago de Compostela and Vigo and which, the
O GD  claimed, had also succumbed to the temptation o f  drug money145. As such:
Drug money has served to assure die long-term stability o f  the powerful patronage 
networks supporting die Galician political system, and to build fortunes for 
prominent local politicians.146
However, it is not just politicians in Galicia that have been corrupted by ‘organised’ 
criminals: members o f  the police forces and the judiciary have been embroiled too (by 
acting as informants for drug traffickers, for example147). With regard to police corruption 
in Galicia, although one interview source believed that cases were few in number, hut 
continuous’148, another claimed that local officers from both the National Police and the 
Civil Guard, who receive modest salaries, are easily ‘paid o f f 149, and another stated that die
140 Carlos Resa-Nestares, Transnational Organized Crime in Spain: Structural Factors Explaining its 
Penetration’ in Emilio C. Viano (ed), G lobal O rganised G rim  and International Security, Aldershot, Ashgafe 
Publishing Ltd., 1999, p. 53.
141 See, for example, Xose Ilermida, ‘Una “sorpresa” poco soiprendente’, E l Pais, 18/05/01, p. 24.
142 Ibid, (m y  translation).
141 Gemie, op. a t., pp. 144-145. For further details about Fraga and his political career, see also, for example, 
Gcmie, op. a t., Chapter 5.
144 OGD, op. a t., p. 91.
» « m  ■
146 Ibid.. During interview PI, it was also claimed that many mayors in Galicia have been promoted with the 
funds from smuggling and trafficking, and the professional interviewed in interview P4 also talked of 
corruption involving local politicians.
,47 OGD, op. a t., p. 90. 
l4> Interview J2.
149 Interview P2, A similar point was also raised during interview PI.
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police in Galicia simply ‘turn a blind eye’150. Moreover, Resa-Nestares recalls the 
symptomatic case concerning the head o f  the S e n t do  F isca l de la  G uardia C iv il (Fiscal Service 
o f  the Civil Guard) who, during a police investigation into smuggling bands in Galicia, told 
the newspaper with the largest circulation in Spain that an important network o f  telephone 
taps had been set up in the region and that the authorities had dossiers on almost 3,000 
people who, potentially, had some connection to smuggling activities. Such ‘advance 
warnings’ clearly damage police operations, i f  not render them impossible151. In respect o f  
the judiciary, the O GD  gives an example relating to drug baron Sito Minanco (discussed 
further in Chapter 5) who, some years ago, attracted attention when one o f  his friends, 
Rafael Mendizabal, helped his lawyer, Gerardo Quintana, convince the Constitutional 
Court that charges against him should be dropped. Both Quintana and Mendizabal were 
close to Miguel Moreiras, then a judge o f  the National C o u r t (in  charge o f  investigating 
international drug trafficking cases), who was later expelled from the judiciary for various 
wrongdoings152.
The types o f  corruption in Galicia that have been discussed here (as well as others 
relating to urban corruption and so on), therefore, uncover some clear weaknesses in the 
region’s political system and state institutions, which could not only be potentially exploited 
by criminals engaged in illicit enterprise, but which actively and comprehensively are. The 
examples o f  corruption and complicity involving politicians, law enforcement officers and 
members o f  the judiciary, which are explicitly linked to illicit enterprise, have directly aided 
smugglers and traffickers in this region and facilitated their activities. Although one o f  the 
interview sources asserted that corruption was not a problem in Galicia, at least in recent 
years (claiming ‘it’s not like in the Costa del Sol*),153 and another claimed that corruption 
was ‘not widespread’154, the view o f  another professional interviewed for this research was 
that, ‘the gangsters are so powerful [...] they can do whatever they want’155. I f this is the 
case, the weaknesses revealed through the instances o f  corruption discussed above may 
allow us to understand more fully why this region is so vulnerable to illicit enterprise.
Galicia, however^ is not the only region in which we can find examples o f  
corruption directly related to illicit enterprise, nor is it die only region in which we can find 
examples o f  judicial and police corruption. Indeed, although political corruption, related to 
real estate and construction, appears to be the most prevalent kind o f  corruption that we, at
150 Interview J6.
151 See Resa-Nestares, cp. cii., p. 59.
152 See OGD, cp. a t., p. 90.
153 Interview Jt.
154 Interview P8.
155 Interview P2.
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least, know o f  in the Costa del Sol, we can also find incidences o f  other types o f  corruption 
in this region. A t this pointy therefore, it is worth discussing Operación H idalgo, which 
started to unravel in Marbella in April 2007. More than 20 people (including economists, 
lawyers, notaries and their employees and clients) were detained for laundering money, 
derived from ‘organised’ criminal activities on an international scale (mainly drugs and arms 
trafficking and prostitution). It is thought that the money was laundered through some 800 
‘ghost’ companies, which were set up expressly for the purpose. During this operation, 92 
million euros were seized, along with 553 properties, 60 luxury cars and numerous jewels 
(exceeding even the magnitude o f  what was seized in the notorious Ballena Blanca case o f  
2005)156. In addition to the cases discussed in Chapter 2, therefore, this operation gives us 
a further insight into the extensive money laundering taking place in the Costa del Sol. 
Additionally, however, this operation also allows us to observe an example o f  judicial 
corruption. The initial examining magistrate in this case, francisco Javier de Urcjuia, was 
suspended in July 2007 and charged with prevarication and bribery in connection with the 
M alaga  corruption case (discussed above). These charges centred on the judge knowingly 
passing unjust sentences and accepting bribes (particularly, he is accused o f  accepting 
78,300 euros from Juan Antonio Roca so that he could buy a property, in return for giving 
legal favours to Roca and for stopping the broadcast o f  a television programme that was 
going to examine and investigate Roca’s huge financial assets) . In August 2008, De 
Urquía was sentenced to two years in prison for these offences . Before this, however, in 
February 2008, it was reported that further, and unrelated, criminal proceedings had been
1515 For details o f this operation see, for example, ‘Detenidas 21 personas en una operación contra el blanqueo 
de dinero’, Iavozdigtal.es, 17/04/07, http://wsvw.lavnydigital.es/cadiz/20Q7Q41.7Zf3Pitna/A-lenidai-personas- 
malaga-delito 200704171052.html: *21 arrests in new swoop against money laundering in Marbella',
(Dirección General de la Policía y de la Guardia Civil), ‘La Policía Nacional detiene a dos personas reclamadas 
por su implicación en la operación “Hidalgo” contra el blanqueo’, Nota de prensa, 06/06/07, Madrid, MIR, 
http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas Pmnsa/Policia/2(I)I/nDQ6Q6Qilllml; luana Viudez, ‘Dos nuevos 
detenidos en la operación I íidalgo contra el blanqueo’, elpads.com (Andalucía), 07/06/07,
Uffrt, / _____ ;____ /_.»•_ i - y . . j .« - /---------/.i-j.— ’ -i --
_______  3/Tes [accessed 20/11/08]- , , ,  , ,,, ^  .
' See, Jbr example, ‘Suspenden al juez de la “operación I Iidalgo” por su relac.on con M^  20mtnm s.es, 
06/07/07. http://www.20minutQS¿eaZnQliaa/256218/4upy/l>Hliilgp/malayaZ [accessed 29/07/08) and 
Martín-Arroyo and Altozano, op. át„ , ' . „  , ,"  . .
t »  gee, for example, Juana Viudez, ‘El juez Torres, testigo en la Segunda causa contra Urqura, elpm .com , 
04/09/08,
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started against him. Again, he was accused o f  alleged crimes o f  prevarication and bribery 
and, particularly, the later proceedings were investigating whether De Urquía (together with 
a businessman and a magazine editor) participated in attempts o f  extortion in relation to 
some o f  those implicated in the H idalgo case (for example, by releasing some o f  the people 
concerned from prison, in exchange for money)159. De Urquía is not the first judge to be 
suspended in Marbella, however. In 1999, judge Pilar Ramirez, then a senior member o f  
Marbella’s courts, was suspended for the alleged commission o f  two serious offences, 
which included, for example, her tampering with cases involving Jesús Gil (who was mayor 
at the time) and two supposed Italian m afiosi, who apparently had close economic relations 
with some members o f  her family160.
Additionally, we can also find examples o f  corruption and impropriety involving 
the police forces in the Costa del Sol. Examples here range from some comparatively 
minor matters, such as the demanding o f  money by 19 agents o f  the Civil Guard (who were 
arrested in February 2006), in exchange for ‘speeding up or omitting’ the formal steps 
relating to the inspection o f  suitcases in customs at Malaga’s airport161, to more serious 
matters, such as members o f  the police forces being implicated in illicit enterprise, fo r  
example, in 2001, four Civil Guards (three in active service and one retired) were detained 
in Málaga and Sevilla for their alleged participation in a drug trafficking network. The 
agents were accused o f  giving information to the criminal group about the surveillance o f  
marinas in die Costa del Sol (where the drugs were being smuggled)162. More recendy (in 
March 2008), four senior members o f  the Costa del Sol’s U n idad de D rogas y  Crim en  
O rganizado (UDYCO) (Drugs and Organised Crime Unit) were accused o f  corruption and 
detained for crimes including the illegal possession o f  arms, the revelation o f  confidential 
information, bribery, embezzlement and the dereliction o f  duty. The case related to alleged 
payments received from Russian citizens for information on police surveillance 
operations163. From time to time, smaller stories also appear in the local press, which reveal
159 See, for example, ibid:, Martin-Arroyo and Altozano, op, {it:, and Viudez, Una nueva investigación de 
blanqueo reactiva el “caso Hidalgo’”, op. cit.. . . .
m® See, for example, Manuel Cerdan. Antonio Rubio and Eduardo Inda, Proponen la expulsión de la juez 
Ramírez’, E l Mundo, 17/12/99,
http://www.elmundo.es/papel/hemetoteca/1 *>*>9/12/ 17/esPMa/.78908Qáltinl (accessed 23/11/08] and 
Irujo and Ordaz, ep. dt., p. 4. y
1É1 Questionnaire QA and interview P2. See also Pérez and Viudez, op, at.. , , ,
162 for example, E, Peláez, ‘Detenidos cuatro guardias civiles vinculados a una red de narcotráfico, X./
País, 03/08/01, p. 16.
t «  See, for example, José Carlos Villanueva, ‘Decretan prisión pata el jefe y  un inspector de la Udyco de la 
Costa del Sol’, elmundo.es, 14/03/08,
http;// www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/03/14/cspana/1205525811 html (accessed 11/08/08]; ‘More than 
40 National Policemen questioned in Málaga as corruption investigation continues’, typicallyspanish.com, 
16/03/08, http://www.tvnicallvspanish.com/news/oublish/article 15598.shtml faccessed 21/11 /n«i anj
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that individual members o f  die police forces are actually involved in illicit enterprises 
themselves. For example, in 2005, in La Palmilla (Málaga), a police agent was detained, 
suspected o f  being involved in the small-scale trafficking o f  drugs164 and, in 2006, a 
member o f  the Local Police, working in Málaga, was arrested for being part o f  a cocaine 
trafficking network that was operating in Málaga, Madrid and Valencia165. Again, these 
examples o f  corruption and inappropriate behaviour on the part o f  state officials in this 
region highlight weaknesses that could be exploited by ‘organised’ criminals. Even if  these 
examples are atypical or infrequent, it is clear (as some o f  the interview sources highlighted) 
that those working in the police forces and in the judicial and legal systems can be tempted 
by bribes as much as those employed in local politics166, which creates a situation that can 
only be beneficial to criminals engaged in illicit enterprise.
Furthermore, although one o f  the interview sources believed that incidences o f  
corruption in Spain were more common ‘in local areas’167, in addition to the examples o f  
political corruption discussed earlier in this chapter, we can find other examples o f  
corruption in the Madrid region168. Indeed, for a relatively recent example o f  police 
corruption, we could look to the town o f  Coslada (east o f  the city o f  Madrid). In May 
2008, 26 agents from the Coslada Local Police force, including the head o f the force, Ginés 
Jiménez, were arrested in what one publication called ‘the largest anti-corruption inquiry to 
take place inside the Spanish police force’169. It was alleged that the law enforcement 
officials arrested during the so-called Operación Bloque acted like ‘a mafia’170, terrorising 
residents by extorting businesses, fabricating cases against people (and then agreeing to 
drop the charges in return for payment), obtaining free services from prostitutes by using 
threats and blackmail, and bringing in women from Eastern Europe to work in the sex 
trade industry171. As such, they were accused o f  crimes involving (amongst other things) 
coercion, threats, injuries, illicit association, sexual abuse, fraud, the theft o f  money, and
Graham Keeley, ‘Spanish police charged with bribery and embezzlement in Costa del Crime*, guardian.co.uk, 
17/03/08. http.7/www.guardian.co.uk/world/2ty8/mat/12/Spaifl faccessed 07/07/08}.
164 See, for example, ‘Un policía traficante’, 20 minutos (Málaga), 02/12/05, p.3 and Detienen a un policía en 
una operación contra el tráfico de drogas en La Palmilla’,Q ui filó loga ), 02/12/05, p. 15.
165 See, for example, ‘Detenido un policía local de Málaga que integraba una red de tráfico de cocaína’, Málaga 
boy, 29/11/06,p. 18.
166 Interviews P2 and P4.
167 Interview C2.
m  Indeed, the professional interviewed in interview P2 and the respondent of questionnaire QD, for 
example, alluded to cases of corruption in the Madrid region.
169 Marty Delfín, ‘Fear in a small town’, In Madrid, Vol. 13, Issue 6, June 2008, p. 10. ^
170 See ibid . See also F. Javier Barroso, ‘La Comunidad carece de indicios para expedientar a Coslada’, l i l  Pms 
(Madrid), 22/05/08, p. 5.
171 See Delfín, op. at..
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illegal levies172. Although, on the face o f  it, this case would not appear to be directly related 
to ‘organised crime’ (however, some possible links will be discussed below), examples like 
this show that some law enforcement officers are willing to abuse their position, engage in 
improper behaviour, and act against citizens’ interests, which provides a favourable 
environment generally for criminals who seek to exploit such circumstances to further their 
activities. Moreover, there is also evidence that some law enforcement officers in the 
Madrid region are involved in behaviour that does directly facilitate illicit enterprise.
Recent reports from the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
(o f the United States Department o f  State), for example, point to some cases involving 
senior police officials, such as the arrest, in October 2007, o f  the Jefe de Estupefacientes (Chief 
o f  Narcotics) o f  Móstoles Police Station (southwest o f  central Madrid), who was accused 
o f  drug trafficking173, or the 2008 arrests o f  the Chief o f  Police in El Molar and two Civil 
Guards in Guadalix de la Sierra (both north o f  the city o f  Madrid) in an operation to 
combat drug trafficking in the Madrid region, and the arrest o f  a police Deputy Inspector 
in a case involving the dismantling o f  a drug dealing and illegal immigration network that 
operated out o f  Barajas airport174. Although it is claimed that these are ‘isolated cases’175, 
they serve to highlight that explicit ‘organised crime-related police corruption, and even 
the involvement o f  police officers in criminal activities, occurs in Madrid, which directly 
serves to facilitate illicit enterprise in the region. Furthermore, a 2010 report by the Center 
for the Study o f  Democracy suggests that the large scale scandals, such as the one in
Coslada,‘are indicative o f  systemic problems rather than “rotten apples’”176.
172 See, for example, Barroso, 'La Comunidad carece de indicios para expedientar a Coslada ,o p  a t.and P. 
Poveda, 'La Audiencia confirma la prisión para cuatro policías de Coslada, La liaron : Mucho Madrid, 
Í8/07/08, p. 44. For forther details of this operation, see also, for example, Amaya Izquierdo, Los vecinos 
de Coslada arremeten contra torios sus alcaldes*, E l País (Madrid), 03/06/08, p. I, MíimPiÚMiio, Una 
veintena de pruebas vinculan al alcalde con la trama de Coslada’, La Ragym: Mucho Madnd,25/0()/0ñ, p. 41; 
and Amaya Izquierdo, ‘Coslada no halla culpables en el 'caso Bloque’, pero releva a un edil, ttpais.com, 
14/01/09,
173 See United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
2008 International Narcotics Control Strategic Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2008, p. 505, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/t0089Q.pdf. [accessed 19/09/08],
174 See United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Qsemical Control, March 2009, p. 535, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organizatiQn/120054 Pdf, [accessed 04/03/09]. For another example of a 
case involving police officers from Madrid collaborating with drug traffickers, see, for example, J. Duva and 
F. J. Barroso, ‘La muerte a tiros de un policía destapa un grupo de agentes corruptos’, E l País, 09/01/05, p.
26 and Luis Gómez, ‘Delincuentes con placa’, E l Pat's, 16/01/05, p. 28.
175 United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, op. at., p. 505 and United 
States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2(X)9 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, op. cit., p. 535,
176 Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Examining the lin k s betmen Orgatnsed Crime and Corruption, 
CSD/European Commission, 2010, p. 83, ’
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Furthermore, some Spanish press reports have made allegations which link 
Operations Bloque and G uateque (discussed earlier in this chapter) directly with organised 
crime’, and which show how some o f  those implicated in these cases have been linked to 
members o f  various criminal groups. For example, in May 2008, some press reports not 
only linked those implicated in Operación Bloque with a Romanian ‘mafia’ involved in 
prostitution, but also implied that Ginés Jiménez, the alleged corrupt head o f  the Coslada 
Local Police force, had been providing ‘cover’ to the Bulgarian and Romanian criminal 
groups that were supposedly supplying security (doormen) to some o f  the nightclubs in the 
capital (several o f  which were also the focus o f  the investigations in Operación G uateque)111. 
Furthermore, several press reports have claimed that the murder o f  the Romanian
nightclub doorman (known a s ‘Cata’) in a settling of scores between criminal gangs
(discussed in Chapter 2) reveals more than the existence o f  a battle for the control o f  
Madrid’s nightclub security business. These reports, for example, refer to the 
investigations o f  a Civil Guard unit, which constituted a separate part o f  the Operación 
G uateque case (however, no charges were brought as result o f  these investigations and this 
part o f  the case was discontinued). During these investigations, the Civil Guard tapped the 
telephone o f  Acisclo Fernández, who was the owner o f  one o f  die premises investigated in 
the G uateque case and the son o f  Joaquín Fernández de Castro (former head o f  
Environmental Assessment in Madrid’s City Hall) who was charged in the case and 
imprisoned. The investigations revealed connections between Acisclo Fernández and a 
Colombian, known as Tauro’, who was allegedly involved in cocaine trafficking. Ih e  
tapped telephone conversations also revealed links between Lauro and Ivo the Bulgarian, 
who was, supposedly, the leader o f  one o f  the ‘mafias’ that controlled the nightclub security 
business, and for whom ‘Cata’ worked at the time o f  his murder. Indeed, Cata, who was 
linked to some o f  those implicated in O peration Bloque, was present at Ivo s wedding in April 
2008, as was the judge Carlos Nogales. Nogales was investigated during Operación Bloque 
and charged with die crime o f  coercion against a witness (although the case was later 
closed). Additionally, Ivo’s rival gang in the nightclub security business, Tx>s Miami (the 
gang drought to be behind the shooting o f  ‘Cata*), also appears in these reports. Ihe head 
o f  this gang shared a lawyer with Tauro’, the Colombian. Tire lawyer was murdered in
affairs/doc ccntre/crime/docs/smdy on links betwccn orgatlhed xnmiLjaiíd-.CPmiPtiün. en.pdf [accessed 
10/04/1 lj.
177 See, f o t  example, Europa Press, ‘Ginés abastecía de porteros a las discotecas investigadas en la “operación 
Guateque’, tlmundo.es, 27/05/08, http://raCT,elnumdoes/elmundQ/2fid8ZQ5/2T/iTiadrid/12119Q9380.html 
[accessed 28/03/09].
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2005 and both were suspected o f committing this crime . I f these allegations by the press 
have any real foundation, they are particularly perturbing because they further reveal a web 
o f  illicit associations involving politicians, judges, police officials and criminals, which 
highlights how some o f  the public and state institutions in Spain are open to exploitation 
by those involved in illicit enterprise.
In sum, the examples given in this chapter show how corruption in Spain can, and 
does in some cases, directly facilitate illicit enterprise and give protection to the criminals 
involved in i t  Even when corruption is not directly related to illicit enterprise, the 
presence o f  corruption in an institution or system reveals certain inefficiencies in that 
institution or system, such as a lack o f  transparency and accountability and weak 
governance and control, which criminal groups will inevitably abuse if they can. It is 
therefore argued that the presence o f  corruption in Spain, o f  the forms and types discussed 
in this chapter, reveals vulnerabilities in die arenas (and the institutions and systems) in 
which it takes place. These vulnerabilities, together with others that will be discussed in the 
next chapter, facilitate the undertaking o f  illicit enterprise in Spain and thus support the 
hypothesis advanced in this thesis.
m  For full detafls, see, for example, D. Verdú and Á. De Cózar, ‘Cata destapa la noche más turbia’, tfrú ja m .
http;//www.elpais.com/arikulo/madiM/Cflta/dC5tapil/no<-hc¿turi?l¿/elp|Lpi£^ r^ , . . . . . . . . . .  - -
a [accessed 19/01/09]. See also M elchor Sáiz-Panlo and Colpisa, 1-as mafias oscurecen la noche m adrileña, 
ékormdimiaL htfp://www.eleoa£.Qdig!M^ om/vugcaya/2QQ90ll9/pvagcQ-£spiiüii/ii>afiai:OSxiurEcc.O- noche:
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Chapter 5
The Response to Illicit Enterprise in Spain
The last chapter showed how incidences o f  corruption revealed weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in the political, judicial and law enforcement spheres in Spain, which are 
exploited by criminals, and it argued that illicit enterprise in the country is thus facilitated 
by corruption. However, an understanding o f  why illicit enterprise occurs in Spain may 
also be found by examining how the state and its institutions respond to this kind o f  
criminal activity. This chapter will argue that, when examining how the Spanish state 
responds to illicit enterprise, a number o f  clear problems can be identified. These are 
manifest in the level o f  political priority and the degree o f  attention given to illicit 
enterprise and its associated activities by the Spanish authorities, as well as in some 
apparent weaknesses in the law enforcement, legal and judicial spheres which, again, are 
open to manipulation by criminal groups. Further vulnerabilities that support the 
hypothesis o f  this thesis, therefore, will be identified in this chapter.
Lack of political attention/political will
Gômez-Céspedes and Stangeland open their 2004 chapter (as noted in the
Introduction: one o f  the very few accounts written in the English language on ‘organised
crime’ in Spain) with a story about the President o f  Spain s 2001 Address to the Nation,
which focussed on the topic o f  justice and public safety. In this address, the President at
the time, José Maria Aznar, discussed numerous issues (the increase in the rates o f  crime
(especially property crime), immigration, terrorism, particular circumstances in the Basque
country, the economy, the general strike happening across the country and the relationship
with the United States), yet he did not touch upon the subject o f  organised crime » This
provides a very telling account about the Spanish state s attitude to the illicit enterprise and
‘organised crime’ affecting the country. As Gômez-Céspedes and Stangeland state.
It was rather unexpected for anyone looking into serious and organised crime in 
Spain that the President o f  the country excluded any reference to the scale and 
nature o f  these phenomena.1 2
1 Alejandra Gómea-Cespede* and Per Stangeland, ‘Spain: The nourishing Illegal D m gl laven in Europe’ in 
Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli (eds), Organised Crimt in E m p i: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the 
Emnpean Union and Beyond, Dordrecht, Sprillar, 2tX)4, pp, 387-412.
2 Ibid., p. 387.
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Indeed, it is the argument o f  this thesis that there has been (and may still be) a lack o f  
political attention and priority given to the problem o f  illicit enterprise in Spain, and/or a 
relative lack o f  political will to fight i t
When specifically asked their opinion about this particular matter, the interview and 
questionnaire respondents expressed mixed opinions. On the one hand, some respondents 
expressed a belief that the Spanish state recognised, and gave importance to, the problem 
o f  illicit enterprise (or what they referred to as ‘organised crime’). Four o f  the 
questionnaire respondents (two journalists and two professionals from the law 
enforcement fields), for example, indicated disagreement with the statement: ‘there is a lack 
o f political will to fight organised crime’3. Three o f  these same respondents (plus one 
other) also disagreed with the statement: ‘organised crime does not have importance on the 
national political agenda’4 and one o f  the interview sources (a high ranking police officer) 
expressly stated that this matter did have importance on the political agenda5.
Furthermore, another interview respondent from the law enforcement field claimed that 
politicians in Spain took the problem ‘seriously’6. Interestingly, two o f  the interview 
sources (both police officials) appeared to suggest that the strength o f  the state response to 
illicit enterprise might depend on which political party was in power (one saying that ‘it 
depends on the left or right wing*7 and the other emphasising that the cu m n t government 
gives the problems associated with illicit enterprise ‘a high priority’8). On the other hand, 
however, the majority (nine) o f  the questionnaire respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement: ‘organised crime does not have importance on the national political 
agenda’9 and six respondents also indicated some level o f  agreement with the statement: 
‘there is a lack o f  political will to fight organised crime’10. Moreover, two o f  the interview 
respondents (a police officer and a journalist) suggested that government officials know 
that ‘organised crime’ or illicit enterprise is a problem but they do not admit it because ‘it’s 
not politically correct to say so’11 and ‘it is against their pride [...] it is hard for them to 
admit incompetence’12. A  further interview respondent (a lawyer and former regional 
parliamentarian) simply claimed that the Spanish government was ‘not interested* in these
3 Questionnaires QD, QF, QL and QM.
4 Questionnaire QE, QF, QL and QM.
5 Interview P8.
6 Interview P3.
7 Interview P2.
8 Interview P12
9 Questionnaires QÀ, QB, QC, QD, QG, QH, QI, QJ and QK.
10 Questionnaires QC, QE, QH, QI, QJ and QK.
u  Interview PI 3,
n  Interview J8.
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problems13. As discussed in Chapter 1 and elsewhere in this thesis, there may be several
reasons why the opinions o f  the questionnaire and interview respondents differ. On this
particular matter, different views are held within the same professional field (for example
within law enforcement), so it may simply be the case that respondents are expressing their
personal opinion (rather than any ‘official line’).
In any case, a look at some o f the wider source material shows apparent support for
the latter view; that illicit enterprise is given little political priority or attention. Certainly, in
recent years, the state and its institutions have faced some severe criticism from the press in
relation to the problems associated with corruption and illicit enterprise in the Costa del
Sol region, for example. For instance, a damning newspaper article about corruption and
money laundering in Marbella, published in 2003, asked: ‘[...] why has no one put a stop to
this debauchery? Where are the authorities, the judges, the police .. .?’14, In response,
Carlos Castresana (then an anti-corruption Public Prosecutor) is quoted as saying:
One can say that the State does not reach Marbella. And if  this is not remedied 
soon, [Marbella] will be converted into an island, into a territory o f  illegality where 
people from the entire world will come to obtain gigantic capital gains and pay 
commissions for everything. [...] [Marbella] is a powder keg, a territory without law, 
like the Wild West. It is as if a single guard were watching over an enormous arms 
depot. The number o f  lawsuits is much higher than a town o f  100,000 inhabitants 
should have.15
Castresana even likens Marbella to Sicily:
And there exists an additional problem: the judge that takes this seriously [in 
Marbella] is, as Falcone said, a servant o f  the State in a land o f  infidels.16
Indeed, the article uses the example o f  the judge Santiago Torres, who prosecuted the likes 
o f  Jesús Gil (discussed in Chapter 4) and who, as a result o f  threats and denigrations, lived 
‘through scenes more appropriate to Sicily than a town o f Andalucía’, before asking for a 
transfer to Madrid17. Despite Castresana’s warnings, however, the Spanish state and the 
regional government have continued to be criticised by the press for their ineffectiveness in 
this area. A  newspaper editorial, for example, published after the third phase o f  the M alaya  
investigations in 2006, stated:
[...] what continues to cause the greatest surprise is that the successive 
Governments o f  the Nation and the Government o f  Andalucía did not dare, during
u Interview Ï2 .
14 José Maria Irujo and Pablo Ordaz, 'Marbella, el lado oscuro del paraíso’, E l Pats: Domn¿o, 13/07/03, p. 4 
(my translation).
15 Ibid., quoting Carlos Castresana (my translation).
16 Ibid., quoting Carlos Castresana (my translation). Giovanni Falcone was the Sicilian judge, who fought 
tirelessly against the Sicilian mafia, which murdered him in 1992. See, for example, I Ioward Abadinsky, 
Organised Crime, 7* edition, Wadsworth/Thomson learning, Belmont, CA, 2003, pp. 135-156.
17 See Irujo and Ordaz, op. at., p. 4 (my translation).
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all o f  these years, to intervene in such a paradise o f  Spanish and international 
crime.18
Likewise (and perhaps not surprisingly), opposition political parties have also been critical 
o f  the national and regional state response to the criminal activities undertaken in the Costa 
del Sol. The 2008 report o f  the political party Izqu ierda U nida (IU) (United Left), for 
example, criticises the governments o f  Zapatero and Chaves19 for not making enough 
progress in the fight against ‘organised crime’ by, for example, not granting enough 
resources or legal instruments to the judiciary and to the security bodies. Additionally, the 
report accuses the state o f  not adopting any serious initiatives in relation to Gibraltar and 
other tax havens and, in the field o f  money laundering, it claims that the state’s failure is 
categorical and that the government o f  Andalucía is ‘lifeless’20.
What may explain the Spanish state’s apparent lack o f attention to illicit enterprise 
is that other issues, such as (illegal) immigration21 and, particularly, terrorism, seem all- 
consuming in the political and public debate in Spain, which is not surprising given the fact 
that Spain has suffered four decades o f  violence from the Basque terrorist group ETA 
(E u q k a d i ta  A ska tasu n d) (Basque Homeland and Freedom) as well as the major terrorist 
attack on 11 March 2004 (when Islamist terrorists killed 191 people, and injured many 
more, in four train attacks in Madrid). Terrorism has thus had a far stronger impact in 
Spain than ‘organised crime’ or illicit enterprise (especially in terms o f  casualties o f  
innocent people)22. Although one o f  the interview sources believed that terrorism and 
‘organised crime’ were given the same level o f  political priority in Spain23, five o f  the 
interview respondents claimed that terrorism was seen as the top political priority in the 
country24. I f that is the case, the Spanish state’s preoccupation with matters other than 
illicit enterprise may well be one o f  the very factors that has allowed it proliferate to the 
degree that it has. Indeed, according to Bratton, one ‘unintended consequence’ o f  the 
reaction to 9/11 in the USA was an expansion o f  organised crime there:
18 ‘Editorial: Marbella, un pozo de corrupción sin fondo’, E l Mundo, 15/11/06, p. 3 (my translation).
19 Manuel Chaves González wás die socialist president of the Junta (Government) of Andalucía for 19 years 
(from 1990 until April 2009). For his biography, see Junta de Andalucía, *La Junta: Presidente: Biografía’,
20 Izquierda Unida-Los Verdes-Convocatoria por Andalucía (IU-LV-CA), Aproximación a l Crimen O rganizadoj 
la A ctividad Mqfiosa en la Costa del Sol, II Informe: El Crimen Organizado en la Costa del Sol, Observatorio del 
Crimen Organizado de IU-LV-CA y Oficina de Comunicación de IU-LA-CA, Boletín no. 2, Febrero de 2008, 
hflp;//iumalaga2QQ8-org/file5/H%2QInfonne%20Crimen%20Qrganizadol .pdf {accessed 06/10/08].
21 The professional interviewed in interview PI, for example, claimed diat immigration was the first priority 
for die public and, therefore, the politicians in Spain. A similar point was also raised during interview P it .
22 ‘Annex 3: Case Study -  Spain' in Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Examining the Links between 
Organised Crime and Corruption, CSD/Iiuropean Commission, 2010, p. 186, http://ec.eqropa.eu/home- 
affain/doc xentre/crime/docs/study on links between organised crime and corruption en.pdf [accessed 
10/04/11].
23 Interview F2.
24 Interviews P4, P14, P15, P16 and J2,
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Unwittingly, as law enforcement reacted to the aftermath o f  9/11, and the United 
States’ federal dollars and priorities shifted, organized crime groups were able to 
exploit the reduction in law enforcement attention and moved aggressively to 
establish new “trade routes” and alliances.25
Unlike in the USA, however, in Spain, the attention and the priority given to ‘organised
crime’ or illicit enterprise may never have been there in the first place and, if  a lack o f  state
interest correlates to a lack o f  resources being assigned to the institutions involved in
curbing this kind o f  criminal activity, this could highlight some further inefficiencies and
vulnerabilities that would serve to facilitate illicit enterprise in Spain.
In this regard, a 2001 study by Mapelli Caffarena et a ldid indeed corroborate the
lack o f  government interest in the anti-organised crime agenda in Spain in terms o f  the lack
o f  human and material resources allocated to anti-organised crime units in the country26.
More generally, a lack o f  resources can be evidenced in all o f  the case study regions. In the
Costa del Sol, for example, some o f  the questionnaire respondents claimed that ‘organised
crime’ does not hold much ‘importance’ on the local political agenda27 and thus the local
budgets for fighting the types o f  crime that occur there are ‘inadequate’28. Diez Ripolles
and Gomez-Cespedes argue that the resources allocated to the security forces for fighting
economic crime in this area are usually smaller than those allocated for combating more
common crimes: customarily, more emphasis is put into the areas that are most likely to
cause material or physical damage, or which shake public opinion29. Furthermore, back in
1996, a newspaper article, published in The Independent, informed us that:
Police complain that the contest [between the police and criminal groups in the 
Costa del Sol] is as unequal as that between David and Goliath. They say they are 
hopelessly outsmarted by 200 criminal gangs with bottomless purses, yachts and 
powerful vehicles, while their investigations are stymied by something as mundane 
as the lack o f  a translator.30
It seems that little has changed since then. Indeed, the IU’s 2008 report claimed that there 
were still only seven interpreters for the whole o f  the Costa del Sol and the province o f  
Malaga31, and there have been regular complaints about the lack o f  police resources
25 William J. Bratton, The Unintended Consequences of September 11th’, Policing, Vol, 1, No. 1,2007, p. 21.
26 Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op, a t., p. 388, citing B. Mapelli Caffarena, M. González Cano and T. 
Aguado Correa, Estudios sobre delincuencia organizada. M eáos, instrumentosy estrategias de la  investigación policial, 
Seville, Mergablum, 2001. See also Lydia Garrido, ‘La costa del delito’, E l País: Domingo, 20/10/02, p. 6. A 
similar point was also raised during interviews J2 and M l.
27 Questionnaires QH, QL QJ and QK.
28 Questionnaires QH, QJ and QK.
29 See, for example, José Luis Diez Ripollés and Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes, ‘La corrupción urbanística: 
Estrategias de análisis’, Revista Española de Investigación Criminológica, Artículo 5, No. 6 ,21KJ8, p. 26, 
h ttp ://w w tcriminplogia.-.iiet/pd£/reic/REICA5N6(2008),pd f [accessed 11/08/08]. -
30 Elizabeth Nash, ‘Costa del Sol’s image is tarnished by lead’, Tlx Independent, 15/10/96, 
htto;//findarricles.com/p/articks/mi qn4158/is /ai n!4086266 [accessed 07/07/081.
31IU-LV-CA, op. cit., p. 24.
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generally in the province (which typically arise after an episode o f  ‘organised crime’-related 
violence). For example, in 2004, a councillor from Marbella’s Town Hall blamed the 
central government for the violence occurring in the municipality, remarking that; in 
Marbella, it was not ‘normal’ to have 80 personnel from the National Police with only three 
vehicles, and also that the Local Police was not provided with the infrastructure to fight 
these problems32. Also, more recently, in October 2008 (after the shootings mentioned in 
Chapter 2), the Marbella town hall, the opposition parties and the Centre for Tourism 
Initiatives all called for more police on the streets o f  Marbella (as well as more cooperation 
between the Local Police and the National Police), in order to remedy a situation that was 
‘insufficient’, especially given the increase in the town’s population in recent years33. Even 
the central government’s sub-delegate in Málaga has admitted that the number o f  police 
personnel continues to be inadequate for the criminal and demographic characteristics o f  
the province (despite a 20 per cent increase in personnel since the start o f  the current 
government’s term o f  office)34. Some o f  the questionnaire respondents (including a 
member o f  the Local Police and a Civil Guard) identified a lack o f  police resources in the 
Costa del Sol too. These included a lack o f  human resources (such as translators and 
administrative personnel)35, a lack o f  technological resources and/or other equipment (such 
as vehicles, arms, and so on)36 and a lack o f  economic resources37, as well as a lack o f  
professional personnel in relation to ‘organised crime’, in terms o f  specialised training, 
knowledge and/or experience38. This lack o f  resources also appears to be reflected in the 
judicial system. In 2008, the Chief Public Prosecutor o f  the T ribunal Superior de Justicia  de 
A n da lu cía  (TSJA) (Supreme Court o f  Justice o f  Andalucía), Jesús García Calderón, asked 
the government o f  Andalucía to provide the judicial system with more human and 
information technology resources, and he underlined the need to organise and coordinate
32 See ‘Un muerto y un herido en un ajuste de cuentas por drogas en Marbella', E¿ País, 04/01/04, p. 27, 
quoting Carlos Fernández, then councillor for Gtizen Security in the Marbella Town Hall.
33 See M. J. Cruzado, “Latest shooting in Martella sparks calls for more police patrolling the streets’, 
SH rinengtisb.com , 05/10/08, http://ww.surinenplishxom/2QQ810Q3/news/costasol-malaga/latest-shooting- 
marbella-spatks-200810031433.html [accessed 06/10/08]. The respondents of questionnaires QH, QJ and 
QK also agreed that there was a lack of cooperation either between different police squads, or between 
different police forces, or both.
34 See Gema Martínez T i Gobierno admite que Málaga necesita más policías por sus características delictivas’, 
sur.es, 03/10/07. http://www,diariosur.es/2œ7f003/malaga/gohierno-admite-malaga-necçsita-
20071003hfml [accessed 11/08/08], citing Hilario López Luna, the Spanish Government's sub-delegate ¡n 
Málaga.
35 Questionnaires QG, QH, QI, QJ and QK. «
36 Questionnaires Q11, QJ and QK
37 Questionnaires QH. QJ and QK.
38 Questionnaires QG, QH, QI, QJ and QK.
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the multidisciplinary teams o f  investigation that tackle ‘organised crime’39 (this issue will be 
discussed later in this chapter).
The judicial system and the police forces appear to suffer a lack o f  resources in 
Madrid too. For example, it is claimed that there is a lack o f  resources in the penal courts 
(particularly, in terms o f  human resources and computerisation)40 and, despite the apparent 
efforts o f  the Spanish government since 2004 to increase police resources and personnel in 
the Madrid region41, there still remain problems in this sphere. For example, in June 2008, 
it was reported that the National Police in the Community o f  Madrid suffered a deficit o f  
1,327 agents (that is, 11.6 per cent o f  staff vacancies were unfilled)42. Apparently, low 
salaries and the dangerous and high-risk nature o f  police work in Madrid mean that many 
police officers, given the choice, would prefer to work elsewhere43. As a result, police 
officers from other cities have to be brought in to support the Madrid personnel44.
Likewise, in Galicia, the bodies responsible for tackling illicit enterprise in the 
region also appear to suffer a lack o f  resources (especially if  these resources are compared 
with those o f  the smuggling and trafficking clans) — although it is interesting to compare 
the responses o f  two o f  the questionnaire respondents on this matter (both high-ranking 
professionals employed in the law enforcement field in Galicia): one respondent indicated 
that there was a lack o f  specialised professional personnel, trained in ‘organised crime’- 
related matters in the region, as well as a lack o f  personnel generally45, whereas the other 
disagreed with this view and identified only a lack o f  technological resources46.
Nevertheless, other sources have emphasised the need for more resources in the fight 
against drug trafficking in the region. For example, in a press release issued by the national
39 See ‘El fiscal del TSJA alerta ante las “disfunciones y graves deficiencias" del sistema judicial’, akdesmUa.es,
05/09/08, http://www.sevilla.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-05-09-2008/seyilla/Andaliicia/el~fiscal~tifl~fija- 
akrta-ante-las-disfuncioncs-y-graves-deficiencias-del-sistema-judicial .■8CHDlQ54356.html [accessed 
10/10/08].
40 See, for example, ‘Atasco record en los juzgados de lo Penal’, Metra (Madrid), 07/05/08, p. 5.
41 In January 2009, die Interior Minister, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, stressed the efforts made by his 
Government, since 2004, to increase the police personnel in Madrid (in order to recoup the numlier of 
officers that had declined in previous years). He is quoted as saying that police staff in die Community of 
Madrid *had increased, increased and increased [ ...] ’. See, for example, Agendas, 'El crimen organizado, 
primera prioridad de la Policía' en Madrid’, e lp d s .co m , 13/01/09,
hítp;//www,elpais.cQm/articulo/espana/crimcn/QreanÍ2adQ/prim£ra/prioridad/Policia/Madrid/elpepiiesp/ 
20090113clpcpunac 11/Tes [accessed 19/01/09], (my translation). For some further details and figures 
relating to this increase, see also, for example, F. Javier Barroso, ‘Madrid recibe la mitad del total de los 
nuevos policies nadonales', E l Pea's, 14/11/06, p. 37. It would appear, also, that efforts have been made to 
furnish Madrid’s police officers with more modem equipment For example, in July 2007, it was reported 
that the total number of police vehicles in Madrid would increase by 24.54 per cent through the addition of 
1,010 new vehicles to the regional fleet See, for example, ‘Madrid tiene 1.010 coches policiales más’, Metro 
(Madrid), 17/07/07, p. 3 and Pablo Iletraiz, ‘Mil patruDas “llave en mano’”, E lM m do:M 2,17/07/07, p. 5.
42 See, for example, Diana Valdecantos, ‘Madrid tendrá mil policías menos’, La Rattfn: Macho Madrid, 
16/06/08, p. 39.
43
44 These officers, apparently, receive generous remunerations for this work. See ibid..
45 Questionnaire QF.
46 Questionnaire QM.
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union CIG (Confederación Intersindical Galega) (Galician Intersindical Confederation) in 
August 2008, it was claimed that the vessels and boats in three o f  the six maritime bases o f  
Galicia’s S e n iá o  de V ig ilan do  A du an era  (SVA) (Customs Surveillance Service) were more 
than 24 years old; the helicopter that covers the north o f  the region only had a flight range 
o f  two hours; and, at the port o f  Vigo, the scanner for prohibited merchandise entrance 
control, which had been installed for one year, had not entered into operation47. CIG  
therefore argued that if  human and material resources were increased, Galicia’s SVA could 
multiply ten-fold the seizures o f  drugs and planeadoras in the region48. Significantly, CIG 
even claimed that a lack o f  resources correlated with the recent reappearance o f  Galicia’s 
coasts as a principal entry point for drugs (as discussed in Chapter 2) and the reason why 
traffickers were, once again, using the region as an access route for getting drugs into the 
rest o f  Europe49. In this respect, one o f  CIG’s particular complaints was that officials 
‘accommodated in offices in Madrid’ were ‘absolutely ignorant’ o f  the reality occurring on 
Galicia’s coasts50, which, perhaps, is indicative o f  how Galicia is treated generally by the 
central Spanish state.
Several sources have documented the estranged relationship between Galicia and 
the central Spanish state. Physically, Galicia is set apart from the rest o f  Spain by the 
natural barrier o f  the Cordillera Cantábrica mountain range51. IE  is has made building an 
infrastructure very difficult; and some would argue that this ‘difficult connection’ with the 
centre o f  Spain is perhaps the main cause o f  the region’s historic delay (economically)52.
Yet, there is a certain remoteness that is felt in other ways too. For their part, it appears 
that the inhabitants o f  Galicia possess an important ‘indifference’ to the institutions o f  the 
central state and the government53 and, given Galicia’s history o f  emigration, it is argued 
that, in the most remote village, there is a closeness, or a memory, towards places such as 
Havana, Buenos Aires, Río de Janeiro, and so on, that is not felt towards Madrid, which is 
seen as ‘very distant’54. Reciprocally, it would appear that the rest o f  Spain has ‘forgotten’ 
this part o f  the country and Galicia has been described as being like a little island in
47 See, for example, Elisa Lois; ‘La policía refuerza la vigilancia en la costa para frenar la entrada de droga1, 
dpms.com, 20/08/08,
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/Galicia/policia/retuej2a/yiffllancia/costa/jfrenar/entrada/dropa/elpepiaiim 
al/20080820elpgal 6/Tes [accessed 20/08/08] and ELE, *La CIG reclama más medios para poder multiplicar 
las aprehensiones de droga’, law'^degalida.cs, 20/08/08,
http://www,lavozdegalicia.e5/galicia/2008/08/19/00Q3121.914418641184Q992,htm [accessed 20/08/08], 
quoting a press release by the Confederación Intersindical Galega (CIG) (released on 18/08/08).
48 EFE, up. at..
49Ibid..
50 Ibid, (my translation).
51 Giles Tremlett, Ghosts o f Spain: Travels through a country’s  hidden past, London, Faber and Faber Limited, 2006, 
p. 370.
52 Marco Ezquerra, ‘Avances en el reto de converger en desarrollo1, Cinco Días: Galicia, 16/04/08, p. 2.
53 See Fermín Bouza, ‘El cansancio de ser gallego1, E l País, 05/06/05, p. 19.
54 Ibid, (my translation).
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Spain’55 56, or ‘a colony, subordinate to the political dynamics o f  the Spanish state [..
Indeed, it has been forcefully argued that Galicia has not entered into the strategic priorities
for the economic and territorial development o f  the Spanish state57, and a survey carried
out by Instituto Opina in 2005 found that 46.9 per cent o f  Galicia’s inhabitants believed
that the region was more poorly treated by the Spanish government than the other
autonomous communities o f  Spain58. Tremlett even relates how:
[...] other Spaniards looked down on Galicians for centuries. They were the 
country’s cheap labourers. A  strong back and an obedient attitude were their only 
virtues.59 60
This remoteness and estrangement, from both Madrid and the rest o f  Spain, was seen by 
some sources as facilitating the criminal activities in Galicia and, i f  this situation has 
resulted in a lack o f  resources and attention being given to the problem o f  illicit enterprise 
in the region (as may seem to be the case), it can only be seen as a serious shortcoming o f  
the Spanish state in this regard.
Indeed, as we have seen, a lack o f  resources in the law enforcement and judicial 
spheres can be evidenced in all o f  the regions discussed above, and this appears to be the 
consequence o f  a lack o f  government attention or priority being given to illicit enterprise. 
Whilst it remains an unfortunate reality that those engaged in this kind o f  criminal activity 
will always have more resources than governments, it is clear that the state could do more 
in this regard. I f  the bodies responsible for fighting illicit enterprise lack resources, this 
evidently hampers their effectiveness, which creates a beneficial environment for illicit 
enterprise.
A  further consequence o f  any apparent lack o f  government interest in ‘organised 
crime’ and illicit enterprise may also be a lack o f policy formation in this area. Although 
anti-organised crime operations have sometimes been included as a priority in declarations 
made by the Ministry o f  the Interior61, De la Cuesta argues that it is only recently that 
‘organised crime’ has appeared as an independent topic in the Ministry’s official reports and 
plans (and, then, official information is aimed more at presenting quantitative data than at 
explaining the priorities, aims and objectives o f  official policies for crime reduction or
55 InterviewJ2.
56 See Sharif G em ie.A  Conàst History o f  GaBàa, Cardiff, University ofWales Press, 2006, p. 131.
57 See Camilo Nogucira, ‘La hermana atlántica’, Til Puts., 05/06/05, p. 19.
58 T3 46,9% cree que Galicia es peor tratada que otras comunidades’, E lPaís, 08/05/05, p. 19, citing the 
results of a survey carried out by Instituto Opina (my translation).
59 Tremlett, op. (it., p. 387.
60 Interview J2  and questionnaire QL.
61 See, for example, *297 detenidos en una operación contra el crimen organizado’, E lPaís, 10/03/06, p. 29.
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prevention)62. It has been argued, however, that this recent increase in the attention given 
to ‘organised crime’ on the part o f  the Spanish state may simply be the result o f  
international and European pressure in this field63 rather than the representation o f a true 
concern, whilst the fight against terrorism (in terms o f  the resources and attention given to 
it) continues to take prevalence, as it traditionally has done64. It may also be the case that 
the public and media reaction to the recent scandals over urban corruption, or the reaction 
to ‘organised crime’-related violence, has stimulated government activity65 6(and this will be 
discussed further subsequently).
Yet, whatever the cause, it is clear that some measures to help combat illicit 
enterprise and corruption have been put in place in recent years. Generally, for example, 
specialist prosecutors have been deployed throughout Spain and there has been an increase 
in the number o f  agents in the Judicial Police and o f  personnel in both the National Police 
and Civil Guard (the Ministry o f  the Interior, for example, has recently claimed that the 
number o f  police ‘troops* active against ‘organised crime’ has nearly doubled in the five 
years between 2004 and 2009)64. Furthermore, specialised anti-organised crime police units 
and teams have been created. These include UDYCO (U nidad de D tv g a s j Crimen 
Organi^add) (Drugs and Organised Crime Unit), and also GRECO (G rupos de Respuesta 
E specia l p a ra  e l Crim en Organi~add) (Special Response Groups for Organised Crime) and 
UDEF (U nidad de Delincnencia E con om ica l F isca l (Unit o f  Economic and Fiscal Crime) for 
the National Police and ECO (E qu ipo C ontra e l Crim en Organi^ado) (Team Against Organised 
Crime) for the Civil Guard. In the legal sphere, some significant legal and penal reforms 
have been implemented, such as changes to the Spanish Penal Codes, a hardening o f  
punishments for ‘organised-crime’ related offences and the introduction o f  new 
intervention methods and administrative measures to prevent ‘organised crime’67. Some 
reforms have also been taken with regard to urban corruption. These include the creation 
o f  environment and urban-planning departments in every prosecutor’s office (under the 
coordination o f  a prosecutor who acts as a delegate o f  the Attorney General) and the
62 José Luis de la Cuesta, ‘Organised Crime Control Policies in Spain: A “Disorganised” Criminal Policy for 
“Organised” Crime’ in Cyrille Fijnaut and Letitizia Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and 
Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrect, Springer, 2(X)4, p. 796.
63 This point was argued during interview P2, for example.
64 See De la Cuesta, op. cit., pp. 795-796.
65 See, for example, ‘Annex 3: Case Study — Spain’, op. cit., pp. 186-187.
66 See Gobierno de España (Ministerio del Interior (MIR)), Comparencias ludia contra e l crimen organizado en 
España, Madrid, MIR, 02/11/10,
http://wsyw.interior.pob.e5/DGRIS/Bal¡mcc£/.P¡llance^2Q1Q/ndf/bal crtmcn_orpnnr/ado noviembre prese
67 See, for example, De la Cuesta, op. cit..
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setting up o f  police units against town-planning crimes68, as well as the passing o f  the ‘Land 
Law* (Act 8/2007,28 May) which:
[...] introduces substantial innovations into the Spanish town-planning system such 
as new land value assessment measures, more exacting requirements to change land 
classification, greater transparency in procedure, as well as a policy to fight the most 
serious conflicts o f  interests in those responsible for town-planning policy.69
The very undertaking o f  the major operations discussed throughout this thesis 
(such as B allena Blanca, M alaya, H idalgo and A s  tapa), and the seizures and arrests that were 
made as part o f  these, as well as police successes in terms o f  hashish and cocaine seizures, 
and so on, are testament to the success o f  some o f  these initiatives. Indeed, the Ministry o f  
the Interior reports that, between 2004 and 2009, Spanish police broke up 1,892 ‘organised 
crime’ groups and detained 28,792 persons associated with ‘organised crime’ and, between 
2007 and 2009, seized almost 60 tons o f  cocaine, 365 tons o f hashish, 732 kilograms o f  
heroin and more than 665,000 doses o f  ecstasy, as well as goods worth more than 400 
million euros70. Thus, it would be unfair to accuse the state o f  being entirely inactive or 
ineffective in relation to illicit enterprise and corruption. Indeed, an increase in state 
attention can be seen in all o f  the case study regions. In the Costa del Sol, for example, it 
would appear that the increasing number o f  scandals there has stimulated public policy in 
this area and more, and better, resources have been given to institutions in order to more 
effectively fight these types o f  crime71. Anti-corruption prosecutors have been appointed 
in Málaga, and the Costa del Sol was one o f  the first areas to be given the specialised police 
units, such as UDYCO and GRECO72 73. It must also be recognised that the autonomous 
administration o f  Andalucía and the TSJA have, little by little, started to act against tire 
kinds o f  irregular and corrupt behaviours that so frequently occur in this area by, for 
example, challenging illegal building licences and passing sentences on those responsible 
for these infractions71 and, in October 2005, the government o f  Andalucía passed a new 
law, allowing it to take the power o f  making planning decisions away from the town halls, 
in the case o f  serious irregularities, for a maximum o f  five years74.
The spate o f  ‘organised crime’-related violence that occurred in the capital in 
January 2009 (discussed in Chapter 2), and the public concern that this generated, has also
68 See, for example, Fernando Jiménez, ‘Building Boom and Political Corruption in Spain’, South European 
Society and Politics, Vol. 14, No. 3,2009, p. 255-272.
69 Ibid., p. 269, citing M. Villoría, ‘Las nuevas medidas al servicio de la transparencia, la participación y el 
control en el gobierno local en la Ley del Suelo', G udady Territorio. Estudios Territoriales, Vol. 29, Nos 152-153 
pp. 1-21.
70 Gobierno de España (Ministerio del Interior (MIR)), op. cit..
71 Diez Ripollés and Gómez-Céspedes, op. át., p. 26.
72 See, for example, ibid., pp. 26-27.
73 On this point, see also ibid., pp. 27-30.
74 See, for example, ‘Land laws’, Surin Engi'sh, 28/10/05 -  03/11/05, p, 5.
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had the effect o f  forcing political attention on to the problem o f  ‘organised crime’ and illicit 
enterprise in the Madrid region (for the time being, at least). A t that time, Francisco 
Granados, (the regional government’s Presidency, Justice and Home Affairs councillor) 
placed responsibility with the central government and called fo r an increase in material and 
human resources in the field o f  criminal investigations in order to tackle ‘organised crime’
in Madrid75. Specifically, he argued that:
We all must act, but it is the Ministry o f  the Interior that has to put in place
measures to ensure that these mafias disappear from our streets.76
In response, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, Spain’s Interior Minister, reportedly announced his 
intention to increase police presence on the streets o f  Madrid, and he pledged to strengthen 
the state’s economic efforts in security matters77. Apparently, however, when asked by 
Granados to elaborate on the additional measures that the ministry was going put in place 
to fight ‘organised crime’, Rubalcaba could not give any specific details7®, and Granados 
accused the Interior Minister o f  being ‘more concerned with statistics than with the labours 
o f  investigation’79. Some o f  the police unions also claimed that Rubalcaba’s announcement 
was ‘demagogic’80. Only time will tell whether any further initiatives will be implemented 
to address the problems associated with illicit enterprise in Madrid (or whether all this is 
merely an example o f  political squabbling). However, the recent attention that has 
seemingly been given to the problem does perhaps show that both the regional and 
national governments have now, at least, acknowledged the threat that this phenomenon 
poses in Madrid.
Furthermore, progress has been made in Galicia too. Many o f  Galicia’s infamous 
drug barons have, eventually, faced justice and are now serving prison sentences. This is 
significant because it shows that these characters are not as untouchable as they once were
75 See, for example, Agendas,*#», cit. and EFE, ‘Granados: “El crimen organizado se ha adueñado de 
Madrid’”, eipm .com , 14/01/09,
76 Ibid, quoting Frandsco Granados, the consejero d i Presidencia, Justicia e Interior (councillor of Presidency, 
Justice and Home Affairs) in Madrid’s regional government (my translation).
77 See, for example, Agendas, 'Madrid, una de las capitales europeas más seguras’, elp a is.com , 15/01/09, 
htta/ / %iww,elpais,coro /articulo /esoana/Madrid/capi t¡tle?/eutx?rcas/semras /clncpug£p/2QQ90i 1 5elpf  ■ 
- li/Tes (accessed 19/01/09).
78 See, for example, ‘“Las mafias actúan con impunidad’”, ep m s.com , 15/01/09,
htttr/ /vrmrrtr r nm/flíTiruln/madrid/mafias/actuan/ininunic? *J  fnX___
L [accessed 19/01/09].
79 Ibid., quoting Frandsco Granados, the consejera de Presidencia, Justicia e  Interior (councillor of Presidency, 
Justice and Home Affairs) in Madrid’s regional government (my translation).
80 Ik d.
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(this will be discussed further below). As Carmen Avendaño Otero81 said, after the
sentencing o f  Manuel Charlin Gama (the head o f  the Charlin clan82 83) in 1999:
From when the major drug traffickers were untouchable here [in Galicia] to today, 
the situation has changed. Now they are rejected and they are starting to carry outQX *
sentences.
Moreover, in September 2008, the Anti-Drug Public Prosecutor o f  Pontevedra, Marcelo de 
Azcárraga Urteaga, pointed out that, in the preceding year, at least four organisations had 
been dismantled in Galicia and some key leaders, such as Rafael Bugallo Piñeiro84, had been 
arrested85 *, f ie  attributes this success to the police forces being ‘more prepared’85. He also 
argued that the Public Prosecutor’s office, the police and the Tax Agency have all doubled 
their human and material efforts in this area, with the addition o f  new specialised units 
such as GRECO, for example87. One o f the interview sources also singled out for praise 
Galicia’s UDYCO, which, he claimed was ‘very efficient’ and which had seized some ‘very 
important’ quantities o f  drugs in the past few years88. Manuel Ameijeiras, the central 
government’s delegate in Galicia, has stated that such actions show that ‘[w]e are aware o f  
our problem. We are not complacent’89.
81 The President of Fundación Érguete-Integración, which will be discussed further below.
82 The Charlin clan will be discussed further below.
83 Yanel, Agustín, “La Audiencia condena a 20 años de cárcel a Manuel Charlin’, E l Mundo, 05/02/99, 
http: //www.elmundo.es /1999/02/05/sociedad /05NQQ62,.html [accessed 10/12/08], quoting Carmen 
Avendaño Otero, President of Fundación Érguete-Integración (my translation).
84 Rafael Bugallo Piñeiro was arrested in August 2008, along with seven other people (including Fernando 
Prado Rey, a cousin of Sito Miñanco), after 3,500 kilograms of cocaine were found floating in the waters of 
the Ría de Arousa. Bugallo Piñeiro, also known as Filo or e l Mulo (the ‘mule1), started his career piloting 
planeadoras for Sito Miñanco in the 1980s. In 2000, he was detained in Portugal for his alleged participation in 
the transport of 2,300 kilograms of cocaine (but was acquitted at trial). In 2005, the National Court called 
him to testify in relation to the smuggling of 4,000 kilograms of cocaine and, a year later, after 2 tonnes of 
cocaine were found in a van that was intercepted in Tui (Pontevedra), he managed to flee during a police 
chase. Six months later, he was detained in Vilagarcia. See, for example, Susana Luaña, Detenido un piloto 
de Miñanco por el alijo de la lancha incendiada’, lai'ozdegalieia.es, 21/08/08,
http://www.lavo2degalicia.es/gaIicia/2008/08/22/0003 7079550,htm: Antonio Ojea and Colpisa, ‘Detienen 
al “narco” Rafael Bugallo junto a siete personas y 3.500 kilos de cocaína’, ekorreodigital, 23/08/08, 
http://www,elcorreodigital.com/vi2caya/2008Q823/pya5CQ.-.espana/detkn£Q.-.narcp-tafaeFbuga11o- 
2QQ80823.html: Elisa Lois, 'Rafael Bugallo “El Mulo" ingresa en la prisión de A Lama’, epas.com , 23/08/08, 
htto;.//www.elpais.com/articulo/Galicia/RafaeI/Bugá[la/MulQ/in.ere5a/cñsÍQn/Lama/£lpepuespgal/200808 
23elpgal 9/Tes [all accessed 04/02/09],
85 See Elisa Lois, '“Más que repunte del narcotráfico hay exceso de confianza en algunas bandas’”, (interview 
with the Anti-Drug Public Prosecutor of Pontevedra, Marcelo de Azcárraga Urteaga), epois.com , 01/09/08, 
httD;//ww.elpais.com/articulo/Galicia/reounte/fla.rc&.ttafic.Q/hfly/em¿Q/confianza/alpunn5/bandas/flpf 
piaiitgal/20080901elpgal 9/Tes/ [accessed 10/12/08], citing Marcelo de Azcárraga Urteaga, Anti-Drug 
Public Prosecutor of Pontevedra.
*W d..
87 Ibid.. Galicia’s Grupo de Respuesta Especial para e l Crimen Organizado (GRECO) (Special Response Group for 
Organised Crime) was set up in February 2006. See, for example, MIR (Dirección General de la Policía y de 
la Guardia Civil), ‘El ministro del Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, presenta en Algeciras el nuevo GRECO 
del Campo de Gibraltar’, Nota de prensa, Madrid, MIR, 03/05/08,
http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas Prensa/Policia/2QQ.8./npQ5Q30LhtmJ [accessed 04/02/09].
88 Interview P15.
89 See Giles Tremlett, Tluthless heirs of cocaine trade tighten their grip on a smugglers’ paradise’, The 
Guardian, 16/02/06, p. 23, quoting Manuel Ameijeiras, the Spanish Government’s delegate in Galicia.
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Nevertheless, despite the increased attention o f  the Spanish state and the growth in 
number o f  measures undertaken by it in recent years, traditionally, the formulation o f  an 
efficient and extensive policy against illicit enterprise and ‘organised crime’ in Spain appears 
to have been lacking. Even the Spanish Attorney General, Cándido Conde-Pumpido, has 
admitted that Spain has not reacted with sufficient energy against the installation o f  
transnational criminal organisations90. The political authorities in Spain have, for many 
years, denied the true extent o f  ‘organised crime’ and illicit enterprise in the country, 
sustaining that ‘organised’ criminals have gone to Spain purely to take refuge91, and in terms 
o f policy, Spain has acted more reactively than proactively92. Thus, and as De la Cuesta 
argues:
[...] action against organised crime has mainly consisted o f  specific (one-off) 
interventions [...] and mostly provoked by international pressure, without a public 
debate and lacking a systematic approach.3
The action that has been taken in recent years, therefore, may amount to too little, too late. 
It is clear that weaknesses remain and that the state is still ineffective in certain areas: as we 
have seen above, still more resources are needed and, undoubtedly, still more measures 
need to be taken94. The police performance indicators may appear impressive, but what do 
these really mean (how can we really tell, for example, whether a criminal group or activity 
has been disrupted or destroyed)? Even if  the state response to illicit enterprise continues 
to improve in years to come, the criminal groups active in Spain have already created 
networks, developed their activities, and implanted their structures in the country. 
Moreover, other vulnerabilities remain. The remaining sections o f  this chapter will thus 
discuss some further inefficiencies apparent in the law enforcement and policing structures 
and in the legal and judicial spheres which, it is argued, can be very easily exploited by 
criminal groups.
Inefficiencies surrounding law enforcement and policing structures
The level o f  attention and priority given to the illicit enterprise affecting Spain by 
the Spanish police forces would appear to contrast with that given by the political 
authorities (which has been discussed above). The 2001 study by Mapelli Caffarena d  al,
90 José Luis Barbería, ‘Las mafias europeas eligen España para lavar su dinero’, E l Pas, 02/10/06, p. 26, citing 
Cándido Conde-Pumpido, the Spanish Attorney General.
91 See, for example, Luis Gómez, España Connection: La implacable expansión del crimen organizado en España, 
Barcelona, RBA libros SA, 2005, pp. 25-26. A similar point was also raised during interview J3.
92 Ibid., citing José Antonio Rodríguez González, advisor to the Spanish Attorney General. Interestingly, 
however, the professional interviewed in interview P4 believed that 'the reaction of the Spanish state was 
quite quick’ and that‘there is still time to sort it out1.
93 De la Cuesta, op. at., p- 814.
94 Jiménez, for example, argues that the reforms that have been taken with regard to urban corruption may be 
insufficient. See Jiménez, op. a t., p. 269.
- 1 7 2 -
for example, revealed that 41.79 per cent o f  officers working in the central UDYCO  
believed that medium priority is given to the fight against ‘organised crime’ in the National 
Police95. Further, 25.37 per cent o f the officers involved in the study believed it is given 
high priority and 13.43 per cent believed it to be very highly prioritised96. Moreover, it has 
been argued that the Spanish National Police and Civil Guard units work tirelessly in this 
area and can be described as the true ‘experts’ on ‘organised crime’ in their country, with a 
precise knowledge and consciousness o f  the seriousness o f  the problem97. Nevertheless, 
some problems can be identified in the law enforcement and policing spheres in Spain 
which, arguably, also facilitate illicit enterprise there. As discussed above, some o f  the 
problems experienced by the Spanish police forces stem from a lack o f resources and, 
despite the recent attempts by the Ministry o f  the Interior to improve these problems, 
some argue that the police forces still lack resources and equipment98 and others highlight 
that the increase in police resources that have been made have been directed at fighting 
terrorism and not ‘organised crime’ or illicit enterprise99. Yet, a lack o f resources (and even 
the police corruption discussed in the previous chapter) only partially reveals the problems 
inherent in these spheres. As will be discussed below, other issues, particularly those 
related to some clear inefficiencies surrounding the law enforcement and policing
structures in Spain, also deserve some consideration.
Since the death o f  Franco and the onset o f  democratisation, the police forces in
Spain have been significantly transformed. Undoubtedly, this has been necessary. As
Palacios Cerezales describes, during the dictatorship:
[...] police legislation and practice stressed the importance o f  political loyalty to the 
government instead o f  service to citizens. Political and social dissent was 
criminalised, the political police hunted and tortured activists, shock-police units 
dealt harshly with demonstrations and the gendarmerie forces were often seen as a 
kind o f  occupation army rather than as a public service. The police enforced the 
dictatorial rules and curtailed civil liberties (...]. When the police resorted to illegal 
violence there were no mechanisms to make them accountable.100
95 See De la Cuesta, <»/>. <j7.,p. 813, citing Mapelli Caffarena #>. <76, p. 26.
96 lin'd.
97 A. Zarzuela, ‘“España es un centro neurálgico del crimen organizado’“, interview with Luis Gómez, Cambio, 
27/06/05, p. 29, quoting Luis Gómez, journalist and author. This fact also became very dear to me during 
interviews and meetings with National Police and G vil Guard personnel during the fieldwork undertaken for 
this research.
98 See, for example, ibid,, citing Luis Gómez, journalist and author. Issues relating to a lack of police 
resources were also raised during interviews C2.J2, J8, P8 and P14, and identified in questionnaires QA and
q b . ■ ■ , : : • •
99 See, for example, Ana del Paso, ‘Los extranjeros disparan la inseguridad’, B/w», 23/06/06 _  29/06/06, p. 
14.
100 Diego Palacios Cerezales,‘Repressive Legacies and the Democratisation of Iberian Police Systems’, South 
European Society and Politics, VoJ. 15, No. 3,2010, pp. 430-431.
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During the Franco era, the Spanish public associated the police with the repressive political 
regime. Therefore, during the transition, democratic credibility required a break from the 
past and a renewal o f  the police forces101. As a result, the Moncloa agreements o f  1977 
included some clauses regarding police reform that were met in a 1978 Police Law and, 
eight years later, further reforms were implemented102. During démocratisation, then, 
Spanish police forces have undergone a raft o f  changes, including changes in relation to 
their structure, accountability, training, the definition o f  their goals, and even their 
uniforms103.
What has emerged from the respective reforms, however, is a rather complicated 
contemporary police structure104. Currently, Spain has two national police forces. Firstly, 
there is the National Police (Cuerpo N a tio n a l de Policia). Formed in 1986, this is an armed 
civilian force, accountable to the Ministry o f  the Interior, which is mainly responsible for 
policing urban areas (yet it also handles matters such as the identity card system and 
passports; enforces laws on foreigners; controls private security agencies; and is responsible 
for cooperating with international police forces)105. Secondly, there is the Civil Guard 
( G uardia C ivil), whose history can be traced back to 1844106. This is an armed military force, 
accountable to the Ministry o f  Defence, which is mainly responsible for policing rural areas 
as well as frontiers, ports, airports, the movement o f  prisoners and traffic control outside 
o f  the main urban centres107. Additionally, regional devolution and municipal authority 
have also transformed the organisation o f  the police in Spain108. Reforms undertaken in 
1986 allowed for the development o f  regional and local police forces109 and thus some 
autonomous communities o f  Spain have their own forces. For example, there are also 
police forces in the Pais Vasco (Basque Country) (called the E rt^ ain t^ d), Cataluna (the 
M ossos dE squ adrd ) and Navarra (P o M a  F orai)110. There are also the various municipal police 
forces (policias m unicipales), which are recruited and administered at local level (funded by the 
town or city council, their job is to uphold the local by-laws and much o f  their work is
101 See, generally, ibid..
103 Ibid.. -
103 Ibid.. Also see, for example, John Hooper, The New Spaniards, completely new and revised edition, 
London, Penguin Books, 1995, Chapter 15.
104 Although not one necessarily more complex than under authoritarianism. To compare, see, for example, 
Palacios Cerzales, op. at., pp. 431-432.
105 Amor Diez-Ticio, Maria-Jesus Mancebon and Celilio Mar Molinero, The Efficiency o f  the Spanish Police Sertice: 
An Application o f  the M ultiaclm ty DEA Model, Discussion Papers in Accounting and Management Science, No. 
00-154, Southampton, University of Southampton, May 2000, pp. 4-5.
106 See I Iooper, op. at., p. 213.
107 Diez-Ticio et al, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
108 See Palacios Cerzales, op. at., pp. 439-440.
109 Ibid., p. 440.
110 See, for example, Interpol, *European police and judicial systems; Spain,
http://www.iiiterpolint/pi.iblic/Rei:rion/F.UJOP£/pl?yStcms/.Spai,n.a5p^ [accessed 18/03/07]; John Hooper, 
The New Spaniards, 2nd edition, London, Pengutn Books Ltd., 2006, pp. 342-343.
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concemed with traffic)111. Furthermore, there is also the customs police service from the 
Customs and Excise Department.
What is significant to the argument o f  this thesis is that, with the exception of, 
probably, the municipal police forces, all o f  these forces are active in operations related to 
illicit enterprise, thus their competencies overlap. For example, both the National Police 
and the Civil Guard conduct operations against drug trafficking, immigration crime, 
prostitution, fraud, money laundering, and so on112, as do the regional police forces in 
certain autonomous communities. Yet, clearly, this is not the most effective or efficient 
way to tackle illicit enterprise. As Gregory highlights, when it comes to intelligence-led 
(and other kinds of) policing, a structure comprising o f different police forces is bound to 
result in a diversity o f  procedures, performances and tactics113. Furthermore, different 
police forces in Spain may well be involved in investigations concerning the very same 
criminal group or activity, yet operations are managed separately 14. Moreover, some argue 
that cooperation in the field o f ‘organised crime’ between forces, and even between units 
within the same force, is lacking115. Although five o f  the questionnaire respondents in this 
study either disagreed or strongly disagreed that there are problems with cooperation in this 
regard116, another six o f  the questionnaire respondents agreed or strongly agreed that there 
are problems with inter-institutional and/or intra-institutional cooperation between and 
within the law enforcement bodies in Spain117, and thirteen o f  the interview respondents 
(including seven professionals working in the law enforcement field themselves) also 
identified problems with cooperation in the police forces118. Additionally, the study 
undertaken by Mapelli Caffarena et a im  2001 revealed that 29.85 per cent o f  the officers o f  
the central UDYCO believed that cooperation between the National Police and Civil 
Guard in connection with organised crime was low, and 28.35 perceived it as very low  
(only 4.47 per cent o f  officers thought that it was high)119. Collaboration between UDYCO
111 See Hooper, The New Spaniards, 2nd edition, op. cit., p. 338.
1,2 Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. tit., pp. 391-392, fh 14.
113 See Frank Gregory, 'Classify, report and measure: The UK Organised Crime Notification Scheme' in 
Adam Edwards and Peter Gill (eds.), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on globa l security, (paperback 
edition), London and New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 84-85.
1,4 Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. cit., pp. 391-392, fit 14.
115 See, for example, Stephen Burgen, ‘Pirates of the Mediterranean', Times Online, 30/07/06, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life and style/arflde69Q365jECC [accessed 14/11/06], citing Ines Barba, 
criminal lawyer (Malaga).
116 Questionnaires QB, QE, QF, QL and QM.
117 Questionnaires QA, QC, QD, QH, QI and QK.
1« Interviews J2 .J5 .J6 , PI, P2, P4, P l l ,  P13, P14, P16, C l, C2 and M2.
119 See De la Cuesta, op. cit., p. 813, citing Mapelli Caffarena eta l, op. cit., p. 31.
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and the Ert%aint%a and the M ossos d'E squadra was also perceived as scarce120. Some also 
argue that the police forces need to collaborate more with the judiciary121.
De la Cuesta argues that the main reason behind this very limited collaboration is 
the ‘absence o f  institutional mechanisms o f  coordination and information exchange, as well 
as the inadequate legal distribution o f competencies’122 (although it has to be acknowledged 
that measures, such as a central unit o f  criminal intelligence {Centro de Inteligencia de Crim en 
Organi^ado (CICO) (Organised Crime Intelligence Centre))123 and the M ando Unico (literally, 
Single Command), have recently been put in place in order to improve coordination124).
For others, the lack o f  collaboration is the result o f the jealous protection o f  intelligence as 
a commodity between investigation teams within the same agency as well as between 
different agencies125 (which, according to Harfield, is a problem that is also experienced in 
the UK126). What is crucial is that criminals engaged in illicit enterprise will naturally take 
advantage o f  such lacunae in cooperation. Thus, although the problems relating to law 
enforcement structures (and also the lack o f  resources) that have been discussed in this 
section are perhaps not unique to police forces solely in Spain, they demonstrate 
weaknesses in the law enforcement sphere, which could potentially facilitate illicit 
enterprise in the country. One factor that may be unique to Spain, however, is the 
accusation that Spanish politicians are simply not paying attention to the police, above all 
when they alert them to serious problems, such as ‘organised crime’, which can have grave 
implications. In this respect, Gomez makes an analogy with terrorism: he argues that 
politicians did not heed the police warnings about Islamist terrorist elements in Spain and 
the consequence, in March 2004, was almost 200 deaths (and, he says, the effects o f
‘organised crime* can be equally devastating, albeit in different ways)1 .
Inefficiencies in the legal and judicial spheres
As stated earlier in this chapter, in the legal sphere, some significant legal and penal 
reforms to aid in the fight against ‘organised crime’ have been implemented. However, 
although these reforms have progressively introduced new instruments to combat
120 Ibid.. , . ,  ,
121 See, for example, Zarzuela, op. at., p, 29, citing Luis Gomez, journalist and author.
122 De la Cuesta, op. a t., p. 813. . . .  , ,  . . ,  , ,
13 CIc o  was created in 2006 to develop strategic intelligence and establish the entena for operational 
coordination in the field of oiganised crime. See Gobierno de Espada (Ministerio del Interior (MIR)), op, at..
124 For details of some problems (in terms of concept and execution) with the Mando Unico, however, see 
‘Cuestión de mando', ABC, 16/04/08, p. 4.
125 This was particulady emphasised during interview PI.
126 See d iv e  Harfield, The criminal not the crime: Practitioner discourse and the policuig of organized crime 
in England and Wales’ ’ in Felia AUum, Francesca Longo, Daniela Irrera and Panos A  Kostakos (eds.), Defining 
and Defying Organised Crime: D istóm e, pm eptions and reality, London and New York, Routlcdge. 2010, p. 38.
127 Zarzuela, op. at., p- 29, citing Luis Gómez, journalist and author.
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‘organised crime’ and illicit enterprise, it is argued that they have only been implemented 
gradually and not really in a very systematic way128. Moreover, it is claimed that the new 
legal provisions have been adopted “without important debate’129 and have been 
‘sometimes, literally copied from [...] principal international conventions and agreements’130. 
As such, they contain contradictions and have been criticised by both academics and police 
officers131, “who demand more developed regulations and resources’132.
Additionally, and as noted in Chapter 1, a basic flaw in the legal sphere is that 
Spanish domestic law lacks an explicit definition o f  ‘organised crime’. The primary piece o f  
criminal legislation in Spain, the Código P en al (Penal Code), does not define ‘organised 
crime’ at all. The Penal Code foresees ‘belonging to a criminal association’ as an 
aggravating circumstance in some crimes (for example, in drug trafficking, prostitution, 
money laundering, the illegal trafficking o f  immigrants, and so on133), but it was not until 
very recently (see below) that a formal definition o f  even this was included in the Code. 
Until then, the task o f  establishing the concept o f  ‘criminal organisation’ was left to 
jurisprudence. In order to classify inmates, Spanish penitentiary legislation also takes into 
consideration the membership o f  a criminal organisation134 (but no definition o f  this is 
provided here). Although L ey Orgánica 5 /2 0 1 0  de 2 2  de ju n io , (which modified L ey Orgánica 
1 0 /1 9 9 5  de 2 3  de noviembre o f  the Penal Code, and which came into force in December 
2010) now defines ‘criminal organisation’135, there is still no definition o f  the concept o f  
‘organised crime’ within the Penal Code itself. Indeed, the only place a criminal definition 
o f  ‘organised crime’ can be found is in Article 282¿>/r(4) o f  the the L ey de E njuiciam iento 
C rim in al (Criminal Procedure Law) (after the reform introduced by L ey Orgánica 5 /1 9 9 9  de 
13 de enero), which relates to the use o f  undercover agents136. However, as De la Cuesta
128 See De la Cuesta, op. cit., p. 808.
129 Ibid., p. 814. See also ‘Annex 3: Case Study -  Spain’, op. cit., p. 186, fn 82.
130 De la Cuesta, op. at., p. 814.
133 See ibid..
132 Ibid., citing Mapelli Caffarena et at, op, at., p. 52.
133 See, for example, De la Cuesta, op. cit., p. 800.
134 Belonging to a criminal organisation serves as a basis to send inm ates to  a closed establishment or to a 
special department. These facilities are reserved for inmates classified in the first degree of penitentiary 
treatment (characterised by principles of security, order and discipline, and with a restriction of common
activities and die intervention of communications). See ibid., p. 805.
135 Article 570fc> states that a ‘criminal organisation’ is a group of two or more persons, with a stable or 
indefinite character, which distributes tasks in a concerted and coordinated manner, and which functions to
commit crimes or repeated offences (my translation).
136 This states (my translation): ‘4. For the purposes mentioned in the section of this article, organised crime 
will be considered as the association of three or more people in order to carry out, either permanently or
repeatedly, behaviours that constitute any of the following offences:
a) Offences relating to the kidnapping of persons referred to in Articles 164 to 166 of the Penal Code,b) Offences relating to prostitution referred to in Articles 187 to 189 of the Penal Code.
c) Offences against property and the socioeconomic order referred to in Articles 237,243,244,248 and 301 
of the Penal Code.
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argues, this definition ‘cannot be considered as the Spanish criminal law concept o f  
organised crime’137, because the aim o f  L ey Organica 5 /1 9 9 9  de 13 de enero was merely to 
establish the cases in which an undercover agent can intervene; it was not to fix a legal 
definition o f  ‘organised crime* within Spanish law. Problems such as this, therefore, give 
support to those who argue that the current legislation and legal provisions in Spain remain 
insufficient to fight ‘organised crime’ and illicit enterprise138. Others, however, believe that 
the law, and the legislation in place, is sufficient (or, at least, getting better)139. Thus, for 
some, the problem lies in the lack o f  its enforcement140 and, moreover, in the fact that 
punishments for these types o f  crime are low in Spain compared with other European 
nations141 (rationally, ‘organised’ criminals will be attracted to countries where punishments 
are lower). Indeed, despite the reforms that have been made in this area, it would seem 
that there still remain impediments and inefficiencies in the legal sphere that, arguably, are 
facilitating ‘organised crime’ and illicit enterprise in Spain.
Other problems can also be identified in relation to criminal procedure and the 
admissibility o f  evidence in criminal trials. Indeed, some examples from the case o f  Galicia 
serve to illustrate how particular issues in these areas have undoubtedly facilitated illicit 
enterprise in that region, for instance. Although it is the case that many o f  Galicia s major 
drug capos (whose names have become legend have ultimately faced justice and are now  
serving prison sentences for their crimes, for many years, these figures appeared almost
d) Offences relating to intellectual and industrial properly referred to in Articles 270 to 277 of the Penal 
Code
e) Offences against the rights or workers referred to in Articles 312 and 313 of the Penal Code.
f) Offences relating to the trafficking of threatened species of flora and fauna referred to m Ameles 332 and
334 of the Penal Code. , ,  , c  t
g) Offences relating to the trafficking of nuclear and radioactive matenals referred to in Article 345 of die
h) Offences'against public health referred to in Articles 368 to 373 of the Penal G)de.
i) Offences relating to the counterfeiting of currency referred to at Article 386 of the Penal Code.
j) Offences relating to the trafficking and deposition of arms, ammunition or explosives referred to rn
Articles 566 to 568 of die Penal Code. n  .
k) Offences relating to terrorism referred to in Articles 571 to 578 of the Penal Code. .
l) Offences against die «Patrimonio Histórico’ (Histone Patnmony) referred to in Article 2.1.e) of Organic
Law 12/1995, of 12 December, o f  repression o f  contraband.'
U7 De Id O-if stá op cit p 797«
1JaSee. for example, Burgen, op -or., citing Ines Barba, cñminal lawy« (Málaga). Similar points were also 
raised during interviews P4( P5, P6. P1 1, P13, C2, J3, J4, J5 andJ6, The respondents of questionnaires QA,
QB, QC, QG, QH, QI, QJ and QK also agreed or strongly agreed that diere are problems with the
the respondents of questionnaires QD, QE, QF, QL and QM, and interviews P3,P8, PI 1, P12,
i «  &e,2for example Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op, cit:, Cruz Morcillo and Pablo Muñoz, ‘El “efecto 
llamada” del crimen organizado’, ABC, 15/01/06, p. 30. Similar points were also raised dunng interviews J7,
TWjjxwnt was raised during interviews P l l ,  P13, P14«ndJ6. See also fotexample, Ana del Paso, W ,  
extranjeros disparan la inseguridad’, Época, 23/06/06 -  29/06/06 pp. 12-15; T I enmen organizado esta cada 
año más arraigado en la comunidad de Madrid’, 20rmnutos.es,,2\/ / > 
hitp://nurw.20min,jto..rs/notiria/* lK103Q2¿ [accrssed W02/K-], anng H «  » u ™  ■
“  See Tremiere, C im a ^ S f é t :T m * t iI b » « ! * « ' h i é n p x t ,  op. a l . ,p. 380.
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untouchable, and several o f  the cases involving the region’s drug traffickers have bordered 
on the farcical. For example, Gomez-Cespedes and Stangeland have called the Necora case 
a ‘big fiasco’, due to the acquittal o f  many o f  the defendants on the basis that the legislation 
at that time did not admit the evidence used in the case (this included tapped telephone 
conversations and a statement o f  a collaborating witness)143. The Necora case was Spain’s 
first drug trafficking maxi-case144, which National Court judge Baltasar Garzon145 
investigated in 1990. Some 54 defendants were accused o f  importing 600 kilograms o f  
cocaine from Colombia and, although they were initially sentenced, many o f  the defendants 
were absolved, or freed on appeal, because the procedures used during the investigation 
were deemed ‘illegal’146.
Although the reform o f  the Spanish Penal Code in 1995 relieved some o f  the 
criminal procedural setbacks that hampered the N ecora case147 *, there are numerous 
examples o f  drug barons in Galicia either having their sentences reduced, or being 
acquitted (time and time again) on the grounds o f  a lack o f  evidence, or because the 
evidence used was inadmissible. For instance, in 1994, Laureano Oubina (known as e l 
p a ja rito u i (little bird7)), a historic tobacco smuggler (and also considered to be one o f  the 
main, and most powerful, drug capos o f  Galicia), was acquitted o f  drug trafficking in the 
N ecora  case but sentenced to a 12-year prison term for receiving stolen goods (benefiting 
from laundered money, originating from drug trafficking) and tax offences. Subsequently, 
the Supreme Court (T ribunalSuprem o) reduced th e  se n te n c e s  and Oubina left prison in 
October 1996149 *. Less than a year later, he was arrested in Vigo as part o f  a police 
operation, during which three tonnes o f  hashish were seized . In October 1999, and after 
a ‘tip o f f ,  Oubina fled Galicia, just as the authorities were preparing to arrest him on
143 Gómez-Céspedes and Stangeland, op. (it. p- 389.
t44
ludije Baltasar Garzón is quite famous in Spain. As Tremlett notes: ‘Baltasar Garzon, known as the
su p erju h  the super-judge, is Spain’s most controversia, crusadmg m agnate  -  the>cou„tr/s answer to die 
Clean Hands judges of Italy*. See Tremlett, Ghosts ofSpatn: Tratéis t/mugh a country s  kd^ n  past, op. a t p. 134. 
i «  Some defendants, however, were tried again in 1999 and subsequently sentenced. See Gomez-Cespedes 
and Stangeland, cp. cit. p. 389.
147
us See, for example, Elizabeth Nash, The truck driver and bingo caller who became the drug lords of 
Galicia’, The Independent, 03/12/00,
and-hingo-r-fll1er-who-hecame-the-dwg4Qltá5-0fifial!CI3r6»»748&htn3l [accesse / / ].
i S J v o  Carbajo, “El presunto capo Laureano Oubma, apresado en una redada antidroga en Vigp’,
ht^//^^llp l^jQm/arm]]a¿£iPaiii PlnFiRO/ ^ U S EAHQ/.F.SPAnA/SpSVICIO i)F ,-
v i o i l a n c t a AnnANpwA /svA/pm4i1nto/capo/Laureano/PnlnAa/8Pt!££ada/retlatla/antidrQ£a¿^tm 
/elpepiesp/19970709elpeDÍna£-líi¿l£sZ [accessed 11/12/08].
<*> Ibid..
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another hashish smuggling charge151 152. Three days after his escape, he was charged with drug 
trafficking offences and sentenced in his absence. Although Oubiña first entered prison in 
1983 (charged with tobacco smuggling), he was later acquitted and freed, a pattern that 
recurred throughout the years, until he was found in Greece in 2000 and finally imprisoned 
in Spain after more than a year ‘on the run’ .
Brief mention must also be made here o f  Sito Miñanco (whose real name is José 
Ramón Prado Bugallo). Bom into a humble family o f  sailors, known as L o s M itlancos, from 
Cambados (Pontevedra), he became involved in contraband tobacco smuggling at die start 
o f  the 1980s153. Subsequently, he acquired what has been called the most brilliant 
curriculum o f  all the drug capos o f  Galicia154. Highlights o f  this include his involvement in 
the transport o f  some five tonnes o f  cocaine seized at sea in August 2001. As the leader o f  
a drug trafficking organisation that was working with a Colombian group belonging to the 
Medellin cartel, he is believed to have supervised the transfer o f  the drug from one boat to 
another, just o f f  the coast o f  Ecuador155. He was immediately detained in Madrid, put in 
preventative prison and, in 2004, sentenced (along with 14 other people, including his 
lawyer) to a prison term o f  16 years and 10 months (and a fine o f  390 million euros)156. A t  
the time o f  this arrest, he was already on bail fo r another offence. Yet, two months after 
his detention, and like so many o f  his contemporaries, he was acquitted o f  having managed 
the disembarkation o f  a consignment o f  hashish (whilst he was serving a previous sentence,
during 1997, in Madrid’s Alcalá M eco  prison) fo r  lack o f  ev id en ce157.
Some further commentary relating to the Charlin dan (described as the ‘most 
famous criminal clan’158 in the whole o f  Spain) also serves to highlight how the Spanish 
legal and procedural systems appear flawed, disorganised and inconsistent. The head o f  the 
Charlin dan, Manuel Charlin Gama (otherwise known as elpatriarca  (the partriarch))159 was 
also acquitted in the N ecora  case. By the age o f  25, and during the 1960s and 1970s, Charlin 
Gama already controlled one o f  the most important gangs involved in contraband tobacco
151 See, for example, Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), ‘Spain: Drug Gateway to Europe*, The 
World Geopolitics o f  Drugs 1998¡ 1999 Annual Report: IV. Europe April 2000, p. 90, 
http://www.oed.org/2QQQ/en/oed99 t a u a i f  [accessed 24/07/02] and Nash, at,.
152 See Nash, op. tit..
'5J See, for example, EFE, ‘“Sito Miñanco, condenado a 16 años de cárcel y 390 millones de multa', elmundo.es,
17/07/04. http://TOTirw.clmqndo.es/elmnndo/2Q04/Q7/l-6/-SCickdad/lQ.89921086-html {accessed 10/12/081- 
™ Ibid.,
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
)57 Ibid..
158 See Diego G Manilo, ‘Chariín Sociedad Clandestina’, ekorreogalkpp.es, 02/06/08,
http: / /www.elrorreogillepo.es /indev.php?idEdicioa=9QiaádNüti.d a=3Q7806 [accessed 10/12/08] (my 
translation).
159 See, for example, Yanel, op. tit..
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smuggling160. Police investigations into the alleged adventures o f  Charlin Gama as a 
hashish importer then began in 1980 when, apparently, he made contact with Moroccan 
suppliers161. Subsequently, it seems, he moved into the cocaine business. In 1999, for 
example, he was sentenced to a 20 year prison sentence (and a fine o f  225 million pesetas) 
for having organised the transport o f  600 kilograms o f  cocaine from Colombia to Galicia in 
1989162. Several o f  Charlin Gama’s children have also been accused of, and sentenced for, 
drug trafficking crimes. Primarily, Josefa Charlin Pomares was considered to be her 
father’s ‘right arm’ (especially whilst he was in prison) and a key member o f  the clan, 
involved in both its financial framework and drug trafficking activities163. In 1994, she 
became the most wanted woman in Spain164, and was eventually captured in Portugal in 
2001165. Manuel Charlin Pomares was sentenced in a 1985 ruling (signed in March 1986) to 
a three-year prison sentence for a crime against public health and, in a ruling dated April 
1991 (signed July 1993), to four years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking166. He was also 
prosecuted for his alleged participation, at the beginning o f  1990, in the transport o f  some 
500 kilograms o f  cocaine167. However, in April 2008, it was reported that he had been 
absolved o f  drug trafficking offences, which implicated him as a member o f  an 
organisation that introduced two consignments o f  hashish through the coasts o f  Galicia 
and the Mediterranean (the tapped telephone conversations involved in the first case were 
annulled and his participation in the second case could not be proved)168. As o f  June 2008, 
he was free and living in Arousa (Pontevedra)169. Another son, Melchor Charlin Pomares, 
was sentenced in 1998 to 18 years imprisonment and fined for the unloading and 
distribution o f  600 kilograms o f  cocaine in 1989, and for the transport, introduction,
160 Marino, op. at.. 
m UitL
1« Previously, Charlin Gama had served three yean in prison for kidnapping and, in a sentence signed in 
September 1987, he was condemned to four years’ imprisonment for a crime against public health (drug 
trafficking. He was also prosecuted for transporting 500 kilograms of cocaine at the beginning of 1990. As 
of June 2008, he was still in prison. See, for example, ibid:, Yanel, op, at. and ‘Salen a subasta varias 
propiedades de los Chariines valoradas en mas de 342.000 euros’, lavo%degalicia.ts, 27/05/08,
l6J Marino, op .d t.. ’
164 Josefa, for example, has been prosecuted for her alleged participation in tire transportand introduction 
into the Peninsula of 600 kilograms of cocaine in 1989; her alleged participation in the transport of 500 
kilograms of cocaine at the beginning of 1990; the transport and introduction into Spain of more than 800 
kilograms of cocaine at die start of 1991; and the transport and introduction of 1,000 kilograms of cocaine at 
the end of 1991. See ibid, and also Tony Thompson and Giles Tremlett, ‘Ruthless, rich and bloody: now 
Europe’s most vicious drug lords target Britain’, gtmràan.co.uk, 12/06/05, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/nrws/2005/fun/12/intei~natiQnjlncai [accessed 10/12/08],
165 As of lune 2008, she was still in prison. See Mariño, op. at..
Ibid..
“«Ibid,
168 See Agencias, Xa Audiencia absuelve a Manuel Charlin de contrabando de drogas’, 09/04/08, 
http://www.laopiniQnroruna.es/secciones/notiCia.lS.PpcIkfr^D&QdO'XH) 4 18Û497. Galicia-Audir»r ¡¡t- 
absuclve-MamiehCharlin-contrnbando-drogas [accessed 10/12/08].
169 Mariño, op. at..
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unloading and distribution o f nearly 4,000 kilograms o f hashish in the same year. He was 
also prosecuted for introducing another 3,500 kilograms o f hashish into Spain in 1991 (as 
o f  June 2008, though, he too was not in prison)170. Furthermore, Adelaida Charlin 
Pomares was prosecuted for her alleged participation in the transport and introduction into 
Spain o f  more than 800 kilograms o f  cocaine at the beginning o f  1991 and also for the 
transport and introduction o f 1,000 kilograms o f  the drug at the end o f  that year171. Other 
members o f the Charlin family have also acquired criminal prestige. For example, Manuel 
Charlin Gama’s brother, José Luis Charlin Gama, served part o f  the longest prison 
sentence (36 years) given for cocaine trafficking in Spain, and his girlfriend, and at least two 
o f his daughters, have also spent time in prison172. Manuel Charlin Gama’s other brother, 
José Benito, died in 2005 whilst he was on bail awaiting trial for the transport o f  three 
tonnes o f  hashish from Algeciras (Andalucía)173. Police considered him to be the ‘most 
skillful’ o f  the three brothers because, in his long and productive smuggling career, he had 
managed to avoid their numerous ‘traps’174. In 2003, the National Court condemned 14  
members o f  the Charlin clan to sentences o f  between four and 15 years in prison and to 
fines o f  between 300,000 and 5,700,000 euros175. As a result o f their drug trafficking 
crimes, and in order to pay the numerous fines imposed on them, the seizure o f  the capital 
resources o f  the Charlin clan was ordered and it seemed possible that the family would be 
deprived o f an estate worth, at one time, more than 30 million euros176. In 2006, however, 
it was reported that the National Court had acquitted 20 members o f  the clan, including 
Manuel Charlin Gama, o f  some drug trafficking crimes, which they were initially accused o f  
backin 19 9 4 , for lack o f  evidence’177. The National Court considered that:
jilt had not proved the existence o f  an organisation, dedicated to the introduction
o f cocaine into Spain, nor that the defendants participated in operations in which
they had supposedly transported 3,000 kilograms o f  cocaine in two years.
One day later, it was then reported that the Supreme Court {T ribu n al Supremo) had ratified 
the sentences against Manuel Charlin Gama based on the very same arguments that the
170 See ibid..
171 See ibid..
™ Ibid.
‘71 Ibid..
™ Ibid.
115 ‘Salen a subasta varias propiedades de los Chadines valoradas en más de 342.000 euros’, op. cit..
176 See, for example, ibid, and *E1 Supremo confirma la pena por blanqueo contra los Chadines’, Im Vo^de
Galicia, 27/03/07, http://ww.lavozdepaIicia,es/hemerotecaZ2Q(IZ/Q3Z27/5668526.shtml [accessed
10/12/08].
177 See ‘Absueltos los veinte acusados del “clan de los chadines” por falta de pruebas’, abc.es, 15/02/06, 
http://www.alv-es/hpmemieca/histoflco-15-02-20P6/ahc/NacionaI/absueltos-lOs.veinte-acusqrios-del-cl<m- 
de-lns-rharlinpii-por-fdta-de-pruebas 132291084482.html [accessed 10/12/08],
178 Ibid. (my translation).
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National Court had used to absolve him179. Thus, although it will certainly be true, as some 
o f  the interview and questionnaire sources indicated, that the prosecution o f  Galicia’s drug 
traffickers and smugglers has provided few results due to the fact that the criminals employ 
specialised lawyers who find loopholes in the law180, o r because they engage in judicial 
corruption (as discussed in the previous chapter), it is also clear that examples from this 
case study reveal some general problems and weaknesses in the Spanish legal system, 
related to admissibility o f  evidence and procedural matters, for example, which are further 
exploited by criminals engaged in illicit enterprise.
In addition to the problems in die legal system, there also appears to be some 
inefficacy in the judicial sphere in Spain. Most notably, it moves very slowly -  according to 
Tremlett, for example, it can take more than a decade to resolve a case in Spain181. Chislett 
attributes the slowness to some obsolete information technology and to poor coordination 
between the central government’s Justice Ministry and the administration in regional 
governments182. The result, however, is that the courts are overloaded with a backlog o f  
cases. Indeed, the backlog o f  cases reached a total o f  2.5 million at the end o f  2008183 *and 
the worst delays, according to a report released by the Cornejo G eneral d e l P oder Judicial 
(CGPJ) (General Council o f  Judicial Power) in 2008, are experienced with regard to the 
number o f  cases awaiting sentencing (269,405 cases at the end o f  2007) . Tins ts a 
problem that appears to be felt more acutely in Madrid dian in most o f  the other regions o f  
Spain -  at the end o f  2007, with a reported total backlog o f  around 37,500 sentences 
waiting to be executed, Madrid was one o f  the three autonomous communities o f  Spain 
with the most sentences pending for criminal ofFences185 186. One cause o f  this delay, it was
claimed, is a lack o f  resources in the penal courts
Additionally, the judicial system has also been accused o f  ineptitude, laziness and 
disinterest, and o f  being unprepared, uncoordinated and lacking the capacity, transparency
179 ^  C  Morcillo, ‘Eil Supremo condeno alos charlines
wf  claimed that each
of Galicia’s dans has its own lawyers and, sometimes, lawyer8 become 0£ i  6 C^ ’ ■ . , ,
181 See Tremlett, Ghosts o f  Spain: Travels through a country s  hidden past, op. at., p. 137. This point was also raised
Sec WBlIam'ciisfett, Inside Spain No. 44, Madrid, Real Institute» Elcano, 15/04/08, acMssed through
...................  - pain [accessed 16/04/08}.
183 See, for example, William Chislett, Inside Span No. 53, Madrid, Real Instituto Ekano, 18/02/09, accessed
See, for example, J . A. Hernandez and M. Altozano, l a  Inspección destapa el colapso en los juzgados que 
ejecutan las sentencias’, EiPa/s, 07/05/08, p. 19; ‘Atasco recoret en los juzgados de lo Penal’, op. dt:, María 
Miranda, ‘El Poder Judicial trata de atajar el colapso de las ejecuciones penales*, La Tribuna é l  Derecho,
01/05/08-15/05/08, p. 26.
185 The other two autonomous communities were Cataluña and Valencia (with 56,000 and 40,000 sentences 
waiting to be executed respectively). See, for example, ‘Atasco record en los juzgados de lo Penal’, op. dt..
186 Particularly, in terms of human resources and computerisation. See ib id .
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and experience to fight the types o f criminal network engaged in illicit enterprise 
Indeed, the case o f  the Costa del Sol illustrates many o f  the problems associated with the 
judicial system in Spain. Primarily, for example, it seems that the wheels o f  justice turn 
especially slowly here and many o f  the major corruption and ‘organised crime’ cases 
discussed previously in this thesis are either still awaiting judgement, or have yet to 
otherwise reach their final conclusion. For example, the hearing for the Saqueo corruption 
case only began in October 2008, despite the fact that the investigations started back in 
2002188. Furthermore, as o f  October 2008, the trial for those implicated in Operación Tnryd™  
was still pending and, as o f  November 2009, the judicial investigation into the famous 
M alaya  corruption case had still not been concluded’90. Moreover, until the end o f  2008, it 
seemed that the H idalgo  money laundering case had been paralysed due to the lack o f  a 
judge191. However, in November o f  that year, judge Maria Jesús del Pilar Márquez revived 
the case with the opening o f  a new investigation (this judge being the third substitute for 
the initial examining magistrate, Francisco Javier de Urquia, who (as discussed in Chapter 
4) was suspended and charged with prevarication and bribery in connection with the 
M alaya  case)’92. Some o f  the questionnaire respondents (which included some officials 
working in the legal system in this area) also agreed that the judicial process was ‘inefficient’ 
in this region and/or that there was too much bureaucracy in the judiciary and the courts193, 
and some identified a lack o f  transparency in the judiciary194. Clearly, sometimes, delays in 
the judicial procedure are due to tire complexity o f  die particular cases in question and the 
need to ftilfil certain formalities; a situation, it may be argued, which could be improved 
with the allocation o f  more human and material resources’* 945. Sometimes, however, there
187 ^  for example, Hooper, The New Spaniards, 2nd edition, op. at,, pp. 314-335; Zarzuela, op. at., p. 28, 
quoíng u iis S Í  (joumaiist and author); Morrillo and Muñoz, *  «L  Also interviews PI, P4, P14. C2.J2
for example, Juana Viudez, T i juicio del “caso Saqueo” peligra tras la renuncia del abogado de Roca’,
a]Hlalüria/intcio/ca?o/dkquco/peligra/rümnciit/al>ogadQ¿EQca^ rip£pkspa 
nd/2nn«001 O c l ^ T ^ T ^ ccessed 14/10/08] and Manuel Altozano, ‘Roca niega que la Audiencia 
Nacional pueda juzgarte por el “caso Saqueo”’, elpait.com 11/10/08 .
http://wwu,elp^
^ e K J d f e , '  andj^ CvSdez/Gma de los juicios más esperados de la Costa, elpms.com, 05/10/08, 
http://www .elpnis.com/articulo^ andaliicia/G»a/ivttuQs/esperatlos/CQüta/elp<ipiispati.d/i.008100.1)d.p>tnd.J , 
/Tes [accessed 08/10/08].
190 See, for example, Jiménez, op. at., p. 269.
191 Pérez and Viudez, op. cit.. .. , . .  . . „
192 gee, for example, Juana Viudez, ‘Una nueva investigación de blanqueo reactiva el caso Hidalgo
etpms.com, 08/11/08,
d/2tX>81108cIpand 3/Tes {accessed zu/ n/uoj.
Questionnaires QG, QH, QI, QJ and QK (although the respondent o f QK, who was woridng in die leral
system, disagreed d>at the judicial process was inefficient, but agreed that there was too much bureai.r™Ji
94 Questionnaires QH.QI and QJ. lureaucratyy
,9S See, for example, ‘Roca, en la Calle’, A B C , 16/04/08, p. 4.
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may be other reasons for a judicial delay, including a lack o f  receptiveness or support on 
the part o f  die judiciary. It has been suggested, for example, that some o f  die q u m lla i96 
presented to the courts by Public Prosecutors in this region have advanced with a 
‘suspicious’ slowness196 97. Whatever the cause, however, die result is clear inefficacy in the 
judicial sphere.
It is clear that the inefficiencies and weaknesses o f  both die judicial and the legal
systems, which have been discussed in this section, can be, and are, manipulated and
abused by criminals engaged in illicit enterprise. In support o f  the hypodiesis, dierefore, it
is argued that the vulnerabilities inherent in these spheres facilitate this kind o f  criminal
activity in Spain. Furthermore, the problems discussed above all contribute to a situation
whereby a good part o f  Spanish public opinion maintains the impression that the criminal
justice system as a whole is not very efficient and excessively permissive with criminals19*.
There is a feeling, amongst the public, for example, that «white collar’ crimes receive a
degree o f  benevolent o r favourable treatment (especially when those implicated in major
operations, such as Juan Antonio Roca and others like him, are still yet to be legally tried
and judged and/or are repeatedly released from prison)199. It is also suggested that some
sections o f  the Spanish population believe that drug trafficking is a low risk occupation,
which receives little criminal sanction200 201. Perceptions like these can, in themselves, also
se rve  to  fu rth e r  facilitate crim inal beh aviour. A s  J im en ez  suggests, a  c lim ate o f  im punity:
[ ] encourages the commission o f  new illegalities, which, together with the higher 
visibility o f  the inefficiency o f  contentious jurisdiction in the face o f  ever more 
cases, generates an even greater feeling o f  impunity, in turn giving rise to the
growth o f  illegal behaviour, ad infinitum.
Related to this, Jimenez makes another very important point and thus it is worth quoting 
from him ftirther. With respect to a climate o f  impunity, and specifically in relation to the
kinds o f  urban corruption discussed in the last chapter, he states:
In the face o f  such a sorry scenario, the hope o f  fighting corruption in urban 
planning seems to be limited to the area o f  criminal jurisdiction. However, [...] 
penal justice has shown itself to be a limited control mechanism in this field. As a 
general principle, criminal law is only effective when prosecuting behaviour that 
clearly deviates from the accepted social norm. There are rather more problems 
when the behaviour to be prosecuted is tolerated by a wide sector o f  society.®*
196 In Spanish law, a qutnlla is a type of formal complaint, made to a court, with a request to cany out 
investigations. This can start criminal proceedings. Sec, for example, Plena Nlenno-Blanco, Spatttsb h u t  uud 
L egal System, 2nd edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 2006, pp. 153*154.
197 See Inijo and Onlaz, op. a t . ,  p- 4.
198 See, for example, Barberia, op. dt., p- 26.
199 See, for example, 'Roca, en la Calle’, op. a t-
200 Interview P17.
201 Jimenez, op. at., p. 262.
202 Ibid.
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Indeed, amongst certain sections o f  Spanish society, there appears to be a degree o f
tolerance and indifference to not only urban corruption but also the other kinds o f  criminal
behaviour discussed in this thesis. In relation to urban corruption, for example, according
to  analysis carried  o u t b y  Fundación A lternativas:
[...] politicians who are involved in, and indeed convicted of, cases o f  corruption 
appear to enjoy the same opportunity to be re-elected as those politicians 
uninvolved in corruption scandals.203
In the 2007 elections, 70.7 per cent o f  the 133 mayors suspected o f  corruption maintained
their position as mayor, and only 29.3 per cent lost their position204. The tolerance (and
even support for) improper behaviour is particularly noticeable in certain regions. Jimenez
claims that, in some part o f  the Costa del Sol, as well as in Murcia, the arrest o f  the mayors
charged with urban corruption has generated popular demonstrations o f  support for them
(and accusations have been made o f bias on the part o f  the judge in charge o f the case, the
prosecutor, or the police)205. l ie  claims that:
All this indicates that a substantial number o f  Spaniards share a pro-development 
stance, implying that the issues regarding environmental sustainability and the 
political corruption problems caused by the enormous urban development during 
these years do not arouse serious concern in many citizens.2“
Some o f  the interview sources also discussed a long-standing tolerance o f  corruption and 
the turning o f  a Tlind eye’ to criminal activities in die Costa del Sol207 (which was 
corroborated by the questionnaire sources *). Furthermore, it has also been argued that, in 
Marbella, and the rest o f  die Costa del Sol, die local population is becoming accustomed 
(and therefore indifferent) to the killings and kidnappings between ‘mafia gangs’, which 
have become ‘almost part o f  the landscape’2"9. Pérez argues diat the public only becomes 
aware of, and cares about, die problem when ‘organised criminals’ kill ‘innocent’ victims* 210.
203 Fundación Alternativas, Report on Democracy m  Spain2009: A E onm for,aNew.Spanish Prosperity- Towardsa 
New G lobal D ed, Madrid, Fundación Alternativas, 2009 (English version), P> 214, 
httIv//wwwfti*-™ahga<!.orfr/l*-fi.na:K-ion/dQcumfntQs/l»bros-e-u^^
^  JSÿ^/^OOS-, Madrid, Fundacióa
Alternativas, 2008.
205Jiménez, op. « r ,  p. 261.
206 Ik't/..
207 Interviews P2,J1 and J5.
208 For example, die respondents of questionnaires QG, QH, QI and QK indicated that there existed, in this 
region, a ‘permissive or tolerant’ attitude to corruption, and the respondents of questionnaires QH, QJ and 
QK indicated that there also existed a ‘permissive or tolérant* attitude to economic crimes (such as tax
evasion, fraud, counterfeiting, and so on).
209 See Femando J. Pérez, ‘Cuando las balas ya son paisaje', elpds.com , 28/09/08,I* i /- 1..1---- :____ J /A/VUtilA^
08/10/08] (my translation).
210IIid..
- 1 8 6 -
Several o f  the questionnaire respondents also attested to a feeling o f  indifference, on the
part o f  the local population in this area, towards organised crime generally .
In Galicia too, criminal activities are largely accepted and tolerated, and a Vail o f
silence [...] surrounds the narco/21 12. Undoubtedly, one reason for this silence is an element
o f  fear (which may also exist in the Costa del Sol213), which keeps some local people from
cooperating with the police and speaking out in protest against the traffickers and their
criminal activities214 215*. Perhaps, to some degree, this fear can be explained by the closeness
o f  the communities in Galicia or by, what one o f  the interview sources termed as, die
‘special’ characteristic o f  Galicia’s people. This source said.
The people o f  Galicia are special [...] everyone knows everyone. When someone 
sees a stranger, they tell everyone. When police from Madrid go to Galicia, 
everyone knows. People are suspicious.
Additionally, another o f  the interview sources said.
These are close communities [...] everyone knows everyone else, so they are under 
threat [...] everyone knows everyone’s wives and where their children go to school
This ‘special’ characteristic and the closeness o f  the communities may not only help to 
cultivate an element o f  fear in Galicia, but it may also provide a protective atmosphere for 
the region’s criminals in other ways too. Furthermore, fear may not be the only reason for 
the silence surrounding die traffickers. For example, the Anti-Drug Public Prosecutor o f  
Pontevedra, Marcelo de Azcárraga Urteaga, has complained about the hypocrisy’ 
surrounding die drug traffickers, saying that some people know V h o  is who in this 
business’ yet diey do not denounce the traffickers, but later ask why the police do not 
detain them217. Fear cannot explain this hypocrisy’ because, as the Prosecutor says, 
complaints can be made anonymously218. Instead, what may explain the tolerance o f  the 
local population are the indications drat smugglers and drug traffickers, at least until very
211 QuestionnairesQG,QH,QI,QJ andQ^* , *a -  * • 1 • ,  , ,
212 Tremlett, Ghosts o f  Span: Travels through a  country's hidden past, op. a t., p. 383. A similar point was also raised
during interviews P2,J4 and P14.
2,3 Interview P2. See also Irujo and Ordaz, op. dG P- f -  . ^  . .  . * .
2m Tremlett, ‘Ruthless heiß of cocaine trade tighten their gnp on a smuggle« paradise, op. at.. A similar
point was also raised during interview J l .  , . ^  ■ c  . , ,  , tr\ ■ e
215 interview M l On a similar point, Tremlett also discusses the character«he o í  retranca. Me states: One of
the great Galician characteristics is meant to be retranca, a devious refusal to let other, know what you are 
doing or thinking. Meeting a Galician on a staircase, other Spaniards hke to say, tt is tmposstble to know 
whether they are going up or down. Ask a Galician their opinion, they_ add and the answer will be . 
deliberately fudged. uD e p e n d e "That depends . . .”,the Galician will say. See Tremlert, Ghosts o f  Spain:
Travels through a  country's hidden past, op. at., p.378. ,
2.6 interview P2. This element of fear may also explain why local office« of the National Police and Gvil
Guard are so easily corrupted: their families are also under threat from the traffickers
217 See Lois "‘Más que repunte del narcotráfico hay exceso de confianza en algunas bandas , (interview with 
tíre Anti-Drug Public Prosecutor of Pontevedra, Marcelo de Azcárraga Urteaga), op. dt., citing Marcelo de 
Azcárraga Urteaga, Anti-Drug Public Prosecutor of Pontevedra.
21* ílñd..
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recendy, have been regarded favourably, or even admired, by the local population219, 
because ‘they give out favors [sic] right and left’220 and they have helped to ‘pump new cash’ 
into the region221. A t the very least, society generally appears indifferent to, or permissive 
and accepting of, criminal behaviour: as one o f  the interview sources stressed very 
emphatically:
Selling contraband [in Galicia] is very open in bars and restaurants etc. People are 
very used to it [...] it’s like a tradition inside o f  society.
This embedding o f  crime within the local economy clearly facilitates criminal activities in 
Galicia -  at the very least, ‘it reduces local hostility to people otherwise depicted as dangers 
to “society”’222. Indeed, a culture o f  tolerance and indifference, both here and elsewhere in 
Spain, generally allows illicit enterprise and corruption to flourish and proves advantageous 
to criminal groups.
Returning to the issues addressed at the beginning o f  this chapter, then, perhaps it 
could be argued that society's toleration o f  illicit enterprise in Spain contributes to the lack 
o f  political attention given to i t  I f citizens do not demand political action in this area, the 
political authorities may well turn their attentions to other (vote-gaining) issues.
Conversely, and in defence o f  the state, when the public has demanded action, this appears 
to have stimulated a state response. In Galicia, fo r example, certain sections o f  the 
population have reacted fiercely against the criminal activities undertaken in the region. An  
inevitable consequence o f  the extensive drug trafheking in Galicia is that drugs are cheap 
and plentiful there and drug addiction among young people in die region has soared in 
recent years224. As a result, the first public opposition to the drug traffickers came from
groups o f  mothers who had watched their children succumb to addictions and who thus
decided to make the traffickers’ lives as difficult as possible225. With the aim o f  breaking 
the silence that surrounds Galicia’s clans, these women mobilise themselves at drug-related 
court cases and fimerals, and numerous associations have sprung up in coastal areas226. 
Perhaps die most famous o f  these associations is the Fundacion Erguete-Integracion
c -  for examnle Carlos R e s a  N«tares, Transnational Organized Crime in Spain: Structural Factors ExSnfng its Penetration* in Emilio C Viano fed.), G kb d  O rgans^ C rim e m d lM o n d S m n ^ , Aldershot, AshgL polishing Ltd., 1999, p. 55 and Trcmlett, Ghosts o f Spain: T rm ls throng a m ntiy s hidden,past, op. a t., p.
220 Resa-Nestares, op. a t, p. 55. A similar point was also raised during mteraiews J6and P14. For example, during interview P14, it was stated that drug traffickers even finance school and football teams.^Trfmlett during interview P14.
5  Mkh^Tivi. ‘Omanized Crime and Terrorism’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds.),
. ^  TO7.
224 interview P2. See also Hooper, T he New S p a n ia rd s, 2nd edition, o p . at., p. 270.
^  Tremlett, c 7 h o te a fS p 2 : Tm *ls through a  country's hidden past, op. a t., p. 384. The assoc,ations of mothers against drugs were also discussed d u r in g  interview J6.226 See ibid, and Rcsa-Nestares, op. cit., p. 55.
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(Érguete-Integration Foundation), led by Carmen Avendaño Otero, which was formed in
the city o f  Vigo in 1999227. To a lesser extent, other sections o f  society have also voiced
their concerns about the criminal activities earned out in Galicia. For example, one o f  the
professionals interviewed for this research talked generally o f  the existence o f ‘social
movements’ against drugs in Galicia228, and the parish priest o f  Cambados (Pontevedra),
José Aldao, has specifically protested against cocaine trafficking229. Such activity has had
some important effects in Galicia (even i f  fear stops the local population participating folly
in these efforts230). Notably, as Resa-Nestares argues, such mobilisations have been:
[...] crucial to the increasing involvement o f  political and judicial authorities in the 
fight against drug trafficking as they become increasingly aware o f  the dimensions 
o f the problem, which until recently they had tolerated.23'
Moreover, as noted earlier in this chapter, the recent scandals relating to urban corruption 
in the Costa del Sol, and the public and media attention that these attracted, had the result 
o f  stimulating public policy and state action in that region, and the public concern over 
‘organised crime’-related violence in Madrid forced political attention onto the problems 
there.
Yet, the fact that the state has acted against corruption and illicit enterprise when
certain sections o f  the public have demanded it should not detract from the weaknesses
otherwise identified in the state’s response. Undoubtedly, in some sections o f  the
population, there is a degree o f  tolerance, passive acceptance, or even support fo r certain
kinds o f  irregular o r unlawful activity in Spain, but this cannot wholly (if at all) explain the
state’s lack o f  political will to address the kinds o f  criminal behaviour with which this thesis
is concerned. Indeed, maybe it is the state’s lack o f  attention to illicit enterprise, and its
failure to address the apparent inefficiencies in the legal and judicial spheres, that has
contributed to the Spanish public’s toleration and acceptance o f  certain criminal activities
in Spain. In this regard, Heywood makes an interesting observation in relation to
corruption scandals. He points out that:
[...] over time their impact and capacity to shock tends to diminish as the public 
becomes increasingly inured to public officials committing misdemeanours.232
Indeed, if  the legal and judicial spheres appear ineffective in responding to the
misdemeanours o f  public officials and the criminal activities o f  those engaged in illicit
227 Sec TtCmlett, G h o sts o fS p a in : T m ds th ro u g h  a  co u n try 's h id d e n p a st, o p . a t ., p. 384 and also the Foundation’s
website htlp://www.fimdyioneipu£fcQtgZ’
K9 ^ T re m k Ít, ‘Ruthless heirs o f cocaine trade tighten their grip on a smugglers’ pitratl.se*, o p . c it..
230 See ibid..
23t oti ¿it.. O- 5 5 . _
232 Paul M. I f c y w o o d , ‘Corruption in Contemporary Spain’, PS: Political Sciem and Politics, Vol. 40, No, 4,
2007, p. 697.
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enterprise, there is no wonder that the Spanish public has become desensitised to such
behaviour. Effectively, i f  the state appears to tolerate and give little priority to illicit
enterprise, it is not surprising that the Spanish public does the same. Moreover, although it
can be argued that the state institutions cannot respond entirely effectively if  they receive
little cooperation from local communities, the state could do more to counteract this, by
stimulating civil society, for example. In an interview, published in one o f the Costa del
Sol’s local newspapers, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, a judge from Spain’s National Court,
said in relation to corruption o f  the kind seen in Marbella:
Society must be conditioned against it, through education and training. A  more 
open culture is needed, in which people are not afraid to speak out against 
corruption and financial crime.233
The same could be said for the other kinds o f  criminal activity that flourish in Spain, and 
the state could play a more active role here too. Ultimately, it really should not be left to 
the mothers o f  Galicia, and others like them, to lead the fight against illicit enterprise in 
Spain.
233 See M . J .  Cruzado, ‘judge Grande-Mariaska: “It’s no t a bad thing for Marbella to be socially shWiii««.,!'** 
sn rin e n g lish .c o m ,06/10/08,1 ........................... .......................... - ■ ' *
madaska-thing-20081006121i,html [accessed 08/10/08].
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Chapter 6
Final Conclusions
This final, brief, chapter will now draw out the key findings o f  the thesis, identify 
the strengths and limitations o f  those findings (and, indeed, discuss the implications o f  the 
research as whole) and consider some possible avenues o f  further research.
Summary of the findings of this thesis: What has been shown?
In Spain, an array o f  criminal groups variously engages in a wide range o f illicit 
activities. Indeed, despite an increasing involvement o f  transnational groups, Spanish 
groups and criminals have continued to maintain a significant presence in the criminal 
activities that currently flourish there. These activities (drug trafficking, human 
trafficking/illegal immigration, organised prostitution, vehicle smuggling, fraud, 
counterfeiting, money laundering, and so on), as well as the groups that engage in them, are 
typically associated with the phenomenon o f  ‘organised crime’. However, although 
frequently used, what this term actually means is subject to some considerable controversy 
and contention. Definitional debates, and the existence o f a range o f both academic and 
law enforcement definitions, show that an understanding o f this concept is very much 
dependent on the purpose and perspective o f  the observer and that it is specific to time 
and place. In the case o f  Spain, the activities undertaken there, being either solely related 
to the supply o f  illegal goods and services and/or the provision o f  licit goods through illicit 
means (purely for profit-making purposes), need to be understood from an enterprise 
perspective and should more accurately be described as ‘illicit enterprise’. As the criminals 
engaged in these activities in Spain frequently use legitimate services and actors (lawyers, 
accountants, architects, business people, and so on) to facilitate their enterprises, this
sometimes blurs the legal and the illegal realms.
The purpose o f  the thesis, then, was to make sense o f  all this and to analyse why 
criminal activities o f  this nature, and the groups that engage in them, appear to thrive in 
Spain, As the underlying research question asked: what is it about Spain that facilitates 
illicit enterprise? In answering this question, the thesis has shown that; despite some initial 
scepticism as to their value, the common explanations that are so frequently used to 
account for these activities in Spain do help us to understand, to some extent, why the 
country retains a competitive advantage when it comes to illicit enterprise. Indeed, factors 
relating to Spain’s geographical location and characteristics, the nature o f  its economy (and, 
particularly, the predominance o f  certain sectors like tourism and construction), and the
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presence o f  immigrant communities, all interact to make Spain an ideal environment for 
those engaged in illicit enterprise. To some extent, these factors cannot be ignored -  b  
some cases, they do facilitate criminal activity b  Spab and these factors can be particularly 
salient in certain regions o f  the country. However, these factors cannot be applied 
universally to all o f  the regions o f  Spain that have been examined in depth in this thesis, 
not least because, b  these regions, the standard explanations vary in their importance and 
application. Indeed, each o f the case study regions has its own set o f  factors that make it 
vulnerable to illicit enterprise and some o f  the common explanations cannot even be 
validly applied in some areas -  for example, tourism and a significant presence o f  
foreigners cannot explain illicit enterprise in Galicia. Moreover, the factors that are so 
often used to explain illicit enterprise in Spain are not unique to the country and, 
essentially, they are simply too superficial to credibly explain Spain’s particular 
predisposition to illicit enterprise. I f we concentrate solely on these factors and ignore 
some rather more fundamental explanations, then, we are unable to fully appreciate why 
this particular form o f  crimbal activity flourishes as it does in Spain.
The thesis therefore hypothesised that other key explanations must be essential in 
understanding Spain’s particular susceptibility to illicit enterprise and a search for these was 
undertaken in the wider organised crime literature. Unfortunately, however, explanations 
fitting Spain’s exact and particular circumstances cannot be found b  this literature. 
Although convincing explanations, relating to various aspects o f state weakness, exist, and 
can be used to explain the growth o f ‘organised crime’ in a number o f  countries (such as 
Italy, Russia, Japan and Colombia, for example), these explanations cannot simply be 
applied to Spain. Essentially, this literature aims to explain different manifestations o f  
‘organised crime’ and the growth o f  criminal groups which, in their motivations and 
activities, are different to those which can be found in Spain. Nevertheless, the literature 
relating to various aspects o f  state weakness can prove useful in alerting us to the potential 
inadequacies o f  a state (and its institutions andsystems), which can facilitate the 
manifestations o f  criminal activity that some regard as ‘organised crime’. From this, it was 
hypothesised further that the key explanations for illicit enterprise m Spain may be found in 
the btrinsic weaknesses and vulnerabilities o f  b e  political, judicial, legal and law 
enforcement spheres there.
In support o f  the hypothesis, the thesis has shown that we can, indeed, find 
evidence o f  vulnerabilities in these spheres. The findings o f  this thesis show how, in Spain, 
important symbiotic relations exist between criminals engaged in illicit enterprise and some
politicians, law enforcement officers and judges, for example. Incidences o f  corruption
also reveal a poor quality o f  democracy, and examples o f  bureaucratic incapacity and a lack
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o f transparency and accountability in the spheres in which these officials work. 
Additionally, some other legal and judicial deficiencies, some apparent complexities 
surrounding law enforcement and policing structures, and a lack o f political and public 
attention given to the problem o f illicit enterprise contribute further to the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities inherent in these spheres. In Spain, criminals engaged in illicit enterprise are 
able to (and do) manipulate and exploit these vulnerabilities.
It is clear that the intrinsic weaknesses and vulnerabilities o f  the political, judicial, 
legal and law enforcement spheres in Spain that have been analysed in this thesis facilitate 
illicit enterprise in Spain. I f political attention to this kind o f  criminal activity is lacking and 
the police and the judiciary are vulnerable and weak (because they are understaffed, 
unmotivated, slow and poorly equipped, both physically and legally), their effectiveness in 
tackling illicit enterprise (and corruption) is limited. Moreover, corruption in the political, 
judicial and law enforcement spheres not only reveals further vulnerabilities (a lack o f  
transparency and accountability, and so on), but, in itself, also further undermines the 
effectiveness o f  institutions.
Strengths, limitations, and the implications of this research
A  consideration o f  the vulnerabilities discussed in this thesis is essential if  we are to 
fully explain and understand why illicit enterprise affects, exists and flourishes in Spain. 
Unlike some o f  the standard explanations that currently prevail, these vulnerabilities can 
explain illicit enterprise in every one o f  the case study regions examined in this thesis, as 
well as in Spain as a whole. The strength o f  this research, then, lies in providing important 
and original explanations which have, until now, not been addressed. As such, the research 
can build on and contribute to the existing academic literature on ‘organised crime' in 
Spain, which is currently very sparse, as well as add to the wider literature in this field o f  
study. Particularly, the research could prove insightful in understanding the potential 
facilitating factors o f  illicit enterprise in other nations (especially those with similar 
institutional (and other) characteristics to Spain). A  new and comprehensive understanding 
o f  why illicit enterprise occurs in Spain can also aid policy development. I f  those engaged 
in controlling and fighting illicit enterprise are to have any real success, and if  resources are 
to be allocated appropriately and efficiently (at both national and supranational level), there 
is a need to appreciate and recognise all o f its facilitating factors, no matter how  
unpalatable they may be. Although it may well be more convenient for the Spanish 
authorities to attribute the causes o f  illicit enterprise to factors outside o f  their control and 
blame ‘outsiders’ for its proliferation, it is clear that containing illicit enterprise in Spain is
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contingent on addressing the weaknesses and vulnerabilities inherent in Spain’s own 
political, judicial, legal and law enforcement spheres, many o f which the Spanish authorities 
could alleviate if  so wilful.
Nevertheless, the limitations o f  this research project should be acknowledged. For 
example, the methodological difficulties associated with research on a phenomenon as 
secretive and elusive as illicit enterprise are well documented, and some o f these problems 
have inevitably affected the amount, and possibly also the quality, o f the data used in the 
thesis. Indeed, for the reasons discussed earlier in this thesis, the number o f  questionnaires 
completed and interviews conducted during the course o f this research were relatively 
modest, and both these and the other data sources used in the research have their 
disadvantages (thus making triangulation o f  data particularly important). Furthermore, it is 
accepted that there may be a limit to the reach o f  this research. For example, it could be 
argued that the findings o f  this thesis can really only be applied to Spain. Indeed, as we 
have seen, manifestations o f ‘organised crime’ are particular to each and every state. This 
thesis, and also the literature discussed within it, has shown that the development o f  
‘organised crime’ and illicit enterprise is dependent on the specific environment in which it 
operates. In fact, this is the very reason why the literature relating to Italy, Russia, Japan, 
Colombia, and so on, could not just be taken and applied in this research. The findings o f  
this thesis, then, may not serve to particularly strengthen, or weaken, any existing 
theoretical generalisations and thus, in terms o f grand theory-building, the research may
have its limitations.
Future projects
In light o f  the findings o f  this research, it would be interesting to see how illicit 
enterprise in Spain develops over the next few years. Future projects monitoring any 
changes in the facilitating factors identified in this thesis and the impact (if any) that these 
may have on the nature and extent o f  illicit enterprise in Spain could allow us to extend or 
refine the results o f  this project. For example, in relation to the standard explanations, 
although the geographical location and characteristics o f  Spain will never change and it is 
perhaps unlikely that the importance o f  tourism in Spain will decline, it would seem that 
the construction sector is currently experiencing a downturn and, in future years, fewer 
immigrants may choose Spain as their home. Would this make a difference to the extent o f  
illicit enterprise in Spain, or would it continue to flourish as it does today? I f  illicit 
enterprise did continue to flourish under these circumstances and yet the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities o f  the political, judicial, legal and law enforcement spheres remained the
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same, then our findings could be strengthened further and the common explanations 
would prove to be even less valid. Alternatively, what if  the reverse happens; what if  the 
vulnerabilities identified in this thesis are addressed? Indeed, the thesis has acknowledged 
that, in recent years, the state has not been entirely ineffective in this area and that some o f  
the weaknesses we have identified are now beginning to receive some attention. In future 
years, when the impact o f  these changes has had time to take effect, will illicit enterprise in 
Spain decrease and become more manageable as a result? I f so, this would also provide 
further support for our hypothesis.
Spain will always possess a number o f  features that make it an ideal environment 
for illicit enterprise but, i f  the vulnerabilities discussed in this thesis are reduced, and if  the 
Spanish authorities are wilful enough, some o f  the factors that facilitate this kind o f  
criminal activity in Spain could diminish. We might just then begin to see a disruption o f  
illicit enterprise in the country or, at least, a displacement o f  it from its current location.
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AppendixA
Interviews and Questionnaires: Further Details
Dates and location of interviews
Interview Date Location
A l 10/11/05 Malaga, Spain
A2 20/09/06 Madrid, Spain
Cl 19/04/06 Leeds, UK
C2 01/05/06 Leeds, UK
Fl 06/07/06 Madrid, Spain
F2 06/07/06 Madrid, Spain
J1 09/03/06 Madrid, Spain
P 04/05/06 Madrid, Spain
J3 15/06/06 Madrid, Spain
J4 15/06/06 Madrid, Spain
J5 17/08/06 Madrid, Spain
J6 21/09/06 Madrid, Spain
P 18/10/06 Madrid, Spain
J8 14/12/06 Madrid, Spain
L1 21/09/06 Madrid, Spain
L2 28/11/06 Malaga, Spain
M l 05/04/06 Cataluna, Spain
M2 06/07/06 Madrid, Spain
PI 09/03/06 Madrid, Spain
P2 23/03/06 London, UK
P3 J 03/05/06 .•■Madrid, Spain.
P4 03/05/06 Madrid, Spain
P5 14/06/06 Madrid, Spain
P6 14/06/06 Madrid, Spain
P7 05/07/06 Madrid, Spain
P8 06/07/06 Madrid, Spain
P9 16/08/06 Madrid, Spain
P10 16/08/06 ~ Madrid, Spain
P u 28/11/06 Malaga, Spain
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P12 29/11/06 Málaga, Spain
P13 13/12/06 Madrid, Spain
P14 14/12/06 Madrid, Spain
P15 22/03/07 Galicia, Spain
P16 22/03/07 Galicia, Spain
P17 22/03/07 Galicia, Spain
P18 22/03/07 Galicia, Spain
Completion dates of questionnaires and regions to which they relate
Q u e s t io n n a ire Pate completed f i£ £ t im £ L H h id u t
relates
QA March 2006 Whole o f  Spain
QB March 2006 Whole o f  Spain
QC March 2006 Whole o f  Spain
QD March 2006 Madrid
QE April 2006 Galicia ~
QF May 2006 Galicia
QG May 2006 Costa del Sol
QII May 2006 Costa del Sol
QI May 2006 Costa del Sol
Q) May 2006 Costa del Sol
Q K May 2006 Gosta del Sol
QL May 2006 Galicia
QM March 2007 Galicia
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Appendix B
Outline Interview Schedule
Interview Schedule
1. H ow  do yo u  defin e  organised crim e? D o yo u  agree with/use the EU  
o r  UN defin ition  in yo u r organ isation , o r  w ou ld  yo u  d efin e  organ ised  
crim e in another w a y?
2 . C an y o u  tell m e about organ ised  crim e in this reg ion ? F or exam p le , 
w h at kinds o f  groups are ac tive  in this reg io n ? W h at kinds o f  
activ ities do these groups engage in ? D o yo u  think the undertaking  
o f  these activ ities is m ore com m on in this reg ion  (than in other parts 
o f  S p a in )?  H ow  w ou ld  yo u  rate/categorise/characterise the leve l and  
th reat o f  organised crim e in th is reg ion ? H as the p rob lem  got 
better/worse o v e r  the y e a rs?  W h y  do  you  th in k  th is is?
3 . W h y  do y o u  th ink there  is organ ised  crim e in th is reg io n ? W h at do  
yo u  th in k  fac ilita tes organ ised  crim e in th is reg ion ?
4 . In y o u r w o rk  (w hen investigating/fighting/prosecuting organ ised  
crim e etc), w h at challenges do  y o u  fa c e ?  W h ere  d o  yo u  encou nter  
prob lem s?
5. D o y o u  th in k  that organ ised  crim e is seen as a  serious/m ajor prob lem  
in S p a in ?  W hy/w hy not? A re  there  o th e r p rob lem s that are 
considered m ore im portant? I f  so , w h a t are  th e y?
6. A re  there  an y  o th er aspects/issues that yo u  w o u ld  like  to  m ention, 
w h ich  w o u ld  in form  m y stu d y?
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Appendix C
Original Questionnaire Template
Note that, in most instances, this template was amended very slightly depending on 
the case study region in which the respondent was based. In other words, although the 
substantive content o f the questionnaire remained the same in every instance, some o f the 
questions were altered in order to elicit specific information about the region in question 
(whether that be the Costa del Sol, Galicia or Madrid). In three instances (that is, in 
relation to questionnaires QA, QB and QC), this template version o f the questionnaire was 
completed because, in those cases, the respondents’ knowledge/understanding o f
‘organised crime’ was in relation to Spain as a whole.
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ueinuea fiaanieieraei
...............
La fcnaJeza i debilidad del suen
a financiero y de ins m
sufeoooes ñusnem
os m
 k
1
l|
2
(J
)4
¡S
|
rea«*t ftcitnan actm
dades de deim
ctteeea orgam
zada
'
E
xree una falta de transparencia / rendaron de coaitas por parte de tas bancos y las 
inatrtaeioBcs fxsaocaeras- ••
Existe una falta de o aphcacu» de k
 norm
ativa cantea el M
anqueo de capiteles en
benot?» e m
am
ocioncs financieras
1 1 1 2
; 3 j 4-j 5¡
í * 1 2 i 3 j 4 |_S j
Actúa/m
enee exzsfan m
es v m
ejores vínculos conto
rnáis cao otras naciones
' Ì i 2
:3
'
5
;
J 
____\
¿
jjo
ste* otras fiactore» «eoném
lcnn? (por favor anote)
W
B
tM
m
S
liää
__________
U
________
j
' 
'
;
f 
■ 
1
■
L
.......
......
J
r atenuó
se
bweoatlt
IT
- 2 4 1 -
1
a
s 
|
4 ■
4
Ten*»* *»eewd»
Db «cuanto
Hb efaf ataurt i «oto j
«i 
i
toewuedt
tocoBtnrao
Sitaacááa:
‘tfe ffiwnT.'i'SK'ig'rlfc''
1 .a situación jeopoüacadd coryw
ro de España aa ideal paraügvar a cabo actividades 
de delm
csencui organizada
| M
 2 t 3 i -* l 5
LaC
o*a dei So¡ N
iadod O
ptete nene ura situación geografica «teal para llevar a 
cabo actividades de dctm
oacnc« organizada
| i U
U
l^
t*
C
sfSC
teráóC
M
 geográficas:
En esta región, ex m
ea caeros características geograficas que fea to
n 1» actoaaonea
A> 1» 
(prw
 «ym
pirt «m
rfw
tt lcii¿m
etrm
decna&
r la»
m
ontañas. ios bosques eie.>
► , 
. 
......
l»
Ü
¡
3
l<
¡
S
En esta región. custeo m
 am
plió m
añero de ciudades aqttrtanSes» «pie fecükan las 
aeraciones de la delincuencia o
rtig
a
d
a
í í l 2 i 3 í 4 | 5
La e»«e«g«e. ai aúnM
aro y las careciera tica» da k» puestas aereas, terresaes y 
m
entim
os en esta fetno» facilitan las actividades de h
 drim
cuencui organizada
t I I 2 Í 3 S 4 i S
fe. ,. ,-.. 
. .> . 
.. 
.-i.. v 
r-.jHlk 
-
¿E
xinm
 otroa factores jpw
f« aflea»? (par favor ande)
‘t- -.J.:—
. 
r..
¿Q
uflkr» ciaw
fir riy
 ■
« «
 friid
M
 < tflw
 tartana tw
fiifitai y pd
m
m faw
w
cea a I» 
ériiiaim
m
 flfyM
idi?
n
P
or favor indique sus dato« personales (profesión, seco y puesto de trabajo! en «f espacio a cowauuamda 
{ftota: Esta M
araaeftó
a tteae p
rap
M
to
i paraaM
ale aaatttfcaa y aa gw
aréar* kn¿a la «
s
 estricta 
ennfidenciaB
éad).
¿c agradezco m
»cfc> a
i tiem
po y coiabonadóm
.
J&
mijer Sonda
- 2 4 2 -
Appendix D
English Translation of Questionnaire Template
OrgutM
d Crnac xn spin: 
Exploring its Fagflititiag and Ca«») Factors
L
 D
efinías 'orrsnited crim
e'
It w $mVt feeascftd
 to know
 bom
 you define mad ■■d
rn
tsn
rf A
t tem
i w
g
iiiK
d
 crim
e, H
tn
c
 
eem
id
er the three defautiees tilte
d
 beiew
s
The U
N
 C
onvent«** defines an ^
organized crane group' as « ggactorad group o
f three o
r m
o»» 
pereces that causes Sara certain period o
f tune and that w
orts sgoaem
eticatiy w
i&
 ttw
 ictenban o
f 
cam
m
rtttng one or so
re senous e
n
g
» o
r erases typ
ified
 ia accordance w
áb das C
ogvtaiuon, w
ith a 
view
 to
 obtajn, d
irectly o
r ui&
recxiy, sa econom
ic p
ro
fit o
r sam
e other m
aterial benefit
* 
The European U
nion (E
tA
 fEU
/12247/1¿34 g^
» T A*tnexV.
Ib 1993 the European C
eiH
Kaldeic^
opcd a litt o
f charartem
rics o
f argam
sed crane. According to the 
FU
, fo
r the defim
hen o
f organised enm
e to be feifilied
, at least six
 o
f these charaU
enshcs roust be 
present, »d
fb
e
r o
f th
e« m
utt be thoae num
bered 1,3, Sand 11: 
l. 
C
oB
abocetioaofm
ere A
tti tno
 people;
Z
 
aachw
ith A
err ow
n ippointed tasks;
3. 
fo
r a prolonged or indefinite period o
f tene;
4. 
using som
e form
 o
f dieeipfm
e and contra);
5. 
suspected o
f the oofrrnm
sion o
f serious crim
inal offences,
6. 
operaiiQ
g on an m
ierim
ioaalscaie;
7. 
using vioience o
r som
e oA
er m
esas suitable fo
r tetunidaùoix,
8. 
using com
m
ercial o
r businesslike structures;
9. 
engag'd h
i m
oney teunderfog,
10. eaerbng influence oa politica, the m
edia, public adm
inistzatioa, jud
icial auA
orities o
r the 
econom
y;
1Ì. m
otivated by the pursuit o
f p
ro
fit and/or pow
er.
im
proving the m
vestigaove action related to illeg
al drug trafficking and other serious il legal 
«c&
vitiqs (A
rtid
e
 Tuo».
'4. For the purposes m
entioned in A
e sacòon o
f A
»
 tra
te
, org
iased crim
e w
iU
 be corgideitd as 
the caociaoon o
f three o
r m
ore people m
 order to cany out, other perm
anently or repeatedly, 
behavio
ur* that constitute any o
f the foH
ow
m
g offences:
e) O
ffences relating Ip tbe kidaep
p
ii^
 o
f pecsoa referred to in A
rtid
e* 164 to
 166 o
f fee Pecal 
C
ode.
b) O
ffences relating to prostitution referred to
m
 A
rticles 187 to 189 o
f the Fonal C
ode.
c) O
ffences against property and tbe socioeconom
ic order referred to in
 A
rticles 237,243,244, 
248 and 30) o
f the Pena) Code.
d) O
ffences ag
ain« the rights o
r w
o
rkm
 referred to «A
rtic
le
s 312 and 313 o
f tbe Penal C
ode
e) 
O
tfences retefiag to tbe tnfS
d
ucg
 ofduesceoed speoes o
f flo
re sed fina» te&
rted «o «
 
Areteles 332 and 334 <rf tbe Penal C
ede.
0
 
O
ffeoce» rebm
ng to the tfee trafftckm
g o
f saetear «a
f ntdkuicrrve gaasnais referasd to ta 
A
n
id
e 345 o
f tbe Penal C
oda
g) O
zfeneea againat pobüc beefeh refa
ced to ia
 Ardeles 368 to 373 a£ &
e P
m
al C
ade
h> O
ffeacot ndatm
g to A
e cxM
otesfesoog o
f cuoencv retened o
 s
i A
m
de 3
8
6
« tbe Penal C
ade
i) 
O
f&
nceiid
atm
g
to
lhettaíB
d
m
g
 and depoetiioeoi arm
e. «B
n«uto*o
rcep
iaer*sflefiened
 
to ia A
rtides 36ó to 368 o
f tbe Penal C
ede.
j) 
O
ffeeca» rehem
g te tBum&
m
 retened to i
 A
n
d
a
 571 to 578 q
fthe Penal Cede.
k) Q
tüeacea against A
e ‘Fatraaotuo B
ataneo* (H
istorie Pacranagy) lefened to ia
 A
n
id
e Z
I e) 
trfQ
rg
m
icLaw
 12/1995,o
f 12 D
ecem
ber^o
fitp
m
ttqeqfoawtoabiind.'
D
e ye« agree w
üh tm
y e
f É
a
i A
fa
itim
?
Ves
N
o
If ye», w
hid
i e
f tbe defieitieee de yee aeree «ñ
h?
r 
- 
-- 
- 
- 
^
Ftemeódr
The ÜN deftnmcm9
The EU defeudon?
Tbe deñnuioa ^netmoced ia Ley Organica 3/1999
!f se, w
evid yon define orgaaáed c
rin
e
 i»
m
xy? C
ae yeateB
 m
e b
riefly fcew
yw
im
d
d
244-
X Qrpsuuscáorimei» the Cmtu áéiSúi"SUdrhLKiaUc'm
I w
eald particularly fice le lúa*« abort ertaaáied triar aa ifce C
osta dd S
o
l>
íad
rid
C
#
ltei* .M
are active «tfe**re£i*a? A
itdterK
S
pw
 oh grouts?
pisase tick a
ll that apply
F
o
rets «roups'’
M
ixed natw
nahty groups?
tb
id
ly«
if tw
iga pw
qw
 are active ia É
b
 n
yw
, w
iet are tfecy tract jic. w
tat a
 the raatry rf ecigM
of 
be* peep*)?
W
hatk
»di of attw
Ü
cide b
eo
rp
n
iid
 li¡m
ugraw
pa t* A
rt rtp
a
ia
p
y
 ■
? F
cr rt aoplt.de 
tte
jf «
w
 ir.
D
e *e yxwqpe arthe ia ibe Cosea det SeC
W
adnd G
alicia alee «agaiB
 ie:
vm
 —
——
—
 —
 —
- - -- 
■■■> —
. - 
—
--
-
—
 
—
▼»—
-»!
Picase tick a
il that rppfy
Theuseefneteoce?
The use o
f corruption?
Traasasuonaí activities?
C
ooperaooo w
rth other organised erm
* groáis?
Penettaooa o
f the li.njiti ir irr eccpotnv?
P
» ye* th
^
tfaato
^
 arderán» activa» ar? frtdrm
ir la:
11 '■
'iw
111 Oí OP<lJí#W^
Hl1 f*i' "IIW*1, ■V ^JK *! 
W---4
Pícese cci «11 d
ial apphr
The C
o
A
 dei Soi?
The Levante?
C
aedorne?
G
a
ikii?
M
adnd?
The C
aary islands?
T
ie
 B
alar®
 Islands?
O
ther puts o
f Speia?
Spain as «m
itote?
la w
faidi rf A
cer areas de ye* A
m
h that cr^iñii id cráae act« lúes are aart
- 2 4 5 -
3. FaàM
M
iiKi mm
d'ar canuti faeton
 . 
la
 A
i» p
art, T »
1 p
a
rtic
u
la
r!. tatare tied a
 n
phina
t w
fcy there n
 a
Sot^tadrìd.'G
aK
cìa. 
la
 fcetB o
f ,o
«r prêtaassestie ■
 thè C
osta del Set^
VtaéradÆ
ïaëeui.
e m
 tin
i reg
na
a the C
osta del
The 6
dœ
s tàat m
ost^
 iB
tem
t m
e a
rr
• 
Legai and procederai feto
re
• 
Factore re
la
is^ ©
poiicàig
 and law
 en&
fcanret
• 
Social feto
re
• 
P
olibcal faeton
• 
Eonoonàc faeton
• 
G
eographica
l feto
re
instruc&
oii«:
to tm
fbticw
ing sections, you w
*
 be given a
 tet of factatsundar tw
e
e
 headings. F
o
r each 
factor, please could you «S
c
a
ts
 the extent of yo
u
 agreem
enl o
r tfsagreernsr* as to «p
e
ttie
r 
the £a3
o
rco
tfd
 &
c^*6ale organised crim
e to tots region.
H
ow
ever, %
 yo
u to
r*
 that there are o
tte
r factors that have not been included here, please add 
these at tie
 end of the respective section.
P
lease tndteate yo
u
r opinion using the fbtow
ing scale:
1
2
3
4
5
S
tro
n
gly
A
gree
H
o
t S
u
re
 /
D
isagree
S
tro
n
gly
A
g
re
«
D
o
n’t K
no
w
D
isagree
Xpt 8«rt/ SontKwBW
Itrfadhsttdaytiyiriws
Safer ' 
! 
• ■
t 
1 
: 
r~
9*wm*am —
1 
tew
le
g
a
l m
o
e
n
 sod the km
: 
■ • ■ 
-
■* 
s. i 
5.*ka 
l •.'***....*
Thoreare problem
s «usto toe kg
afeio
n m
 referas is the fig
ht agsm
st organised ouue
li
2
i3
l4
5\
(eg. tie
 te^
al provtaoRs are w
eak, inadeaaate o
r m
effecav* etc.)
There are problem
s refem
g to jodicud aufom
saaons
!
f 2
Î 3
|4
5
The penalties fo
r offences o
f g
ig
 type «e
 inappropngag {eg. drey m
e leexfntnucak
»
‘
¡2
(4
5
etc.)
There are pretotem
s feto toe gatoenng o
f evident* (e.g. w
ith tire ose o
f m
febgsace, 
w
ireiappgi&
 m
icrophones, m
xharayvgr ageds as. )
T
V
*” 
P»nfei*wwe teafffr 
Pw
yairM
vvn {■*» g b
e
»«» tfe
 pofcc*Bod
the tea «uti»nt}es^
custD<n5 or the police and the b«iks oc.)
There are prebiaas s^a
to
a
tfe
m
irtv o
f evidence m
 toe oouns
iH
3
l.3
{
4
j^
 
ji I | z| 3 | «¡S
 j' 
iT
T
T
T
T
ïT
iT
s
T
The jn
d
tril p
reem
;
Ì
Ite
 fid
a
sti process a
 m
éjugent (&
a
étapes a toag tim
e lo
r eases to be resolved)
l
2 
1 
1
There is toe n»cà btgeaocoov w
itoas toe tutoaarv arid toe cotm
s 
I 
1
*
There a
 % jack o
f tnasoaren&¥ / accotintabttcty w
rtfeia the tuthcary
1
2 j 3
i 4
îj
There is toe «crassee o
f corrapbon t» toe j-utoaaj’y 
i
l
2 > 3 U
s
i
- 
.........
■)
Lead
 ite
rtittts
o
Q
a
:
There «e
 corrupt tavyecs that fe
d
ita
le
 toe activities o
f organised e
ra
*
tV
2
1
3 ! 4
5
There ewtst corrupt Isw
ven the! assist at organtsod enm
e ac&
vujei
■!«, 2|3U
5
O
ther legal / procedural fa
rfe
a
tia
g
 C
areen? tpiease usi)
|
*- ■ -a
C
a«ya* «dim
e am
** afee
t fem
e legal aad
yraced
araffeS
an and te
w
 they fe
tfa
rtta
fia
a
ie
e
d
 
e
ru
w
 is
 S
it rep
M
?
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C
$
5?
Jt
S
ü5
3 
M
ri 
p«
* 
a«
 
u
o
w
»i
- 2 4 7 -
ra&
kglF
acfgn
” 
ì 
r 
r 
5 
I 
s 
| 
«
fli
w
ufa A
m
m
 
I________
«
w
________
1 
n
g
iS
M
H
H
a
o
fftK
w
 
1_______
0
»
w
rw
_______
1 
«rene»
O
n
t
ff
r o
ttm
t M
rinadei:
r. 
...-
O
rganised crim
e does not hove im
potoace e«t the nauonai poiiucai agenda teg, «re 
other problem
s considered m
ow
 anpertem
? is the threat o
f organised crane takes 
serioiaiy?)
i H
 2 j 3 i 4 f 5 f
O
rganised o
im
e does not have im
portance <a tit®
 load pot m
eal agenda
‘1 i2 f3
1
5 i
There is a lack o
f p
o
litical w
tH to fig
ht organised crim
e
1 
2
i3
Ì 4 
5
There b
 a retuctzooe on the part o
f officials id do anything due appears to «votve the 
re-nnijosition o
f coctrol over society (e g do kscaetes o
f the dxaaratshtn rw
taat'^
( 1 1 Z 1 3
|4
 [ s
l
A
ttiM
u
n
g
a
m
fe
People do act have confidence in the stale astitar its HBm
ufcons
! 1 ! 2 ! 3 ! 4 i 5 f
 ^
j 
_ 
,
The petiocai frs
t»
The decentralised p
o
litical system
 fo
iviio
n
i m
 an inefficw
ai m
gm
er (e
g
 th
e
re
a
t 
lac
kcf com
m
taucaboiibdvveaa the central governm
ent acd the regicaal and local 
governm
ents etc )
t»
l2
Ì3
T
4
|
S
i
' T 
- - ^
R
a
o
a
rta
;
The local budge« to fig
flt cnm
e are inadequate
! 1 i 2 ! 3 ( 4 | 5 i
* MJ „ 
J.r 
U 
■ Jl,
D
eaaocnatic respow
iM
E
ty:
There «
 a lack o
f transparency / dem
ocratic accoaotabtiity m
 political and public 
offices
i M
 2 } 3 j 4 j 5 |
There s political oorm
poon m
 die region
ri'i ! 2 1 3 i'TSf 5}
O
d
e
r p
o
litic
al farihtatreg
 £actors?
E
co
n
o
w
k
 F
acto
r«
—
 
: 
T 
; 
J~ 
| 
i 
1 
. 
* 
if”" 
: 
»
»■
»A
—
 
t______
A
rm
 
I 
M
&
am
1S
a
n
\*
S
M
m
 
1 
. 
O
w
arw
 
.. 
j.. _tfctw
^fll—
t
fta
tn
re
a
f tod—
iry
: 
■ 
-.v.--" 
|
èf4sm
:
The ttm
nst industry m
 th
» region lam
inates oraansed crane *
 som
e vray or ano*ber 
i 
U
ri»
 a
e
tr^
fc
n
isa
iK
tia
a
a
B
d
ie
ria
itn
e
liR
 m
e re
g
n
i feifezusar^
n
aed
craw
) 
jr
4 
5
T
tfi
m
sorae w
ay o
r m
arine 
ia
s
®
?
iw
tg
g
a
w
lK
 
. 
1
The level o
f*«ai&
o
£
ihe focal population iageaerel a
 cpm
paratrveiy low
 
|
2
|
3
|
4
i5
!
There is a lack o
f em
ptovm
ent ocw
orttcm
hea tn the m
oon 
!
Ì
2
'5
S
t
B
anka am
i Sw
aanid ■
edtnfta«»: 
ji
Tl»c«reo
g
ril/w
r»knei»crf ¡heS
soncol lyaenand
 S
nansai insam
im
 m
 riseiqsB
O
 it 3 1 2 j 3 j 4 | 5 j
i«flitttesces»m
ed
 crim
e activittes 
[
There is a lack o
f accountafetUty / transparency in
 beaks and Snaneia.l Btstaottona 
i 
There a
 a foca of, o
r non-com
plunoe w
tthT aata-m
oocy launrim
og provia*ons m-
bade ard flnantnai m
scrotsons 
! u
i.
_L
4
i
2
(3
4«
sj5 j■
G
tobalraatifla and in
trm
a
tia
n
ii tender 
' 
i
__
There are now
 increased and better trading links w
tfa otoer m
uons 
1
1
= 
'
4
«5
j
r 
•-
 
-
•“H
f
O
d
e
r itom
m
tr fieedisaang factors? 
I
#
§Sil
C
a
»
y
w
tf»
^
ifc
i<
>
«
«
M
<
«
itfto
w
ia
é
h
>
ifftc
y
h
E
iiir>
lc
»
tiiw
*
c
ri«
iitb
c
G
eographical Factors
Scair_______________
H
etS
m
n
ibcn
iK
iV
K
C
OTi*C4
3
T n
rn
hie
*v«w(
The geopolitical Jocatkte o
f Spare «
a
 w
hote is ideal fo
r o
r^
ise
d
 crane ectivitjes 
j * 1 | 2 i 3 | 4 | 5 i
The C
*«a dei S
o
i^
kd
n
d
 G
ahcia has an ideal geographical location fo
r ofgK
bed 
crane gravities
t » ! 2 S 3 | 4 1 5 |
r-
-
-
-
11'" 
p- 
T—
r—
 ^
' *
G
eoenusSjcai ekaraeterteics: 
fe^
fovi; :• •
In
 bu
s regK
», diece arc ceram
 geographical features that Sag lim
a organised crane 
(eg. die ooast, tbe m
ountains, ike fo
nss etc.)
i i i 2 i 3 [ 4 | 5 |
in
 this region, diere m
e a oaxaber o
f im
poEtaat ckies, w
feidt isc
ilia
re
 organised crane
{1 { 2
f 3 ! 4 | S t
The etistence^
 som
ber a
id
 native o
f the srp
oris, ports etc in
 th
* regioa feciltfaxe 
otganised crim
e
i H
 2 1 3 | 4 f 5 |
O
d
e
r uingraoh» ilfie
B
m
iim
k
c
tiii?
\f *" < 
‘ ’ 
~ 
-
, 
-
C
w
^tidK
 
the refig
»?
13
A
re
 A
cre a»y other aip
o
rt»/ irn
tn
 A
etyo
w
 w
aarid S3« to
 «en
tic
e d
ttt m
W
 ieftw
m
 m
y M
ady?
Please indicate your personal details (profession, a
n
 and place o
f w
ed
) in the box bdow
 (N
B
: tfcia 
■
farm
atiga »
 fo
r analytical p
u
yo
w
 ardy and w
iB
 be kept sfcracBy eo»F«ient»f):
Ihcrnkpcm very match jbryovr am
rfance.
Jam
ijer Sm
tfs
u
